The NRC's Happy Juice On Fort Calhoun

(A works in progress!)

The NRC certain knows how to play the media. Happy tunes in the beginning of the inspection report for the new media shallow idiot, while the very troubling violations later in the report. In other words, they know the reporters don't have the skills to properly interpret the report.

You just have to wonder how the NRC are catering  their activities to board candidate andlawyer Jeff Lux?

You just wonder how the Problem Identification and Resolution, the  corrective action program and the recent well known training program are interrelated. Right, the NRC expresses the CAP and training program in a isolated light. They never speak to us how the CAP and training are interrelated.

 Right, the NRC speaks as if Fort Calhoun is meeting 9 out of 10 commitments identified in CAL. We are safe, safe, safe! It is like saying the all these systems in you car are working great; the motor, transmission, headlights, tires, battery and brake lights are working properly, but your actual brakes are wheezing on their deathbed. Fort Calhoun is meeting the magority of their CAL commitments (whatever that means). Running a nuclear power plants with a broken CAP is very dangerous and it just might the greatest show stopper. The NRC is front loading you brain, the media with the happy juice... but the experienced guys knows this is a very troubling report and the plant shouldn't be running.

Fort Calhoun is effectively without their brakes???

Again, why is Cooper and Fort Calhoun having training problems together...why does it take outsiders to kick Fort Calhoun in the ass? This INPO deal is a rather secretive process where the NRC allows a plant to operate in a degraded condition hoping INPO will turn their hearts. The NRC hopes Fort Calhoun will come to their senses before they have to notify the public. They are basically forsaking public notification and operating outside the reactor oversight process process in cahoots with a wholly nuclear industry funded program.

I wonder if the NRC seen any problems with the Fort Calhoun's training programs upon their shutdown inspections? The only thing that has changed since then is Exelon is managing the plant. The problem with these kinds of relationships, is now the board is even more isolated than before. It just might be the reason why they did this, board political protection. Hey, you can't blame us Exelon never told about the problem...

Again, the NRC protects plant management with not expessly stating why the CAP isn't being followed, where the public might comdemn them all the more.

I either hit a tree because a deer jumped out in the road right in front of me or I was severely intoxicated, I just didn't care about paying attention to the road. Which is it?  

"A number of the deficiencies that were identified by the inspectors involved inadequate evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions that were entered into the CAP."

September 18, 2014
EA-14-151

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION – NRC CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER FOLLOW UP INSPECTION AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000285/2014009 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Based on the inspection results, the team concluded that FCS maintained a CAP in which
individuals generally identified issues at an appropriately low threshold. Of concern, the team
identified a number of deficiencies involving OPPD’s ability to effectively and consistently
evaluate and resolve problems as discussed in more detail below, and in the enclosed
inspection report.

A number of the deficiencies that were identified by the inspectors involved inadequate
evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions that were entered into the CAP. Several
examples involved the failure to make an immediate determination of operability because your
staff failed to recognize that a degraded or non-conforming condition existed. Additional
examples involved operability evaluations that lacked adequate technical justification as to why
the affected system, structure, or component would perform its specified safety function as
described in licensing and design basis documentation. The team concluded weakness exists
in this area and that OPPD’s corrective actions, to date, have not been effective in ensuring that
problems are consistently evaluated in a thorough and effective manner, with the appropriate
technical rigor that supports the operability conclusion.

These findings and observations are similar to previous NRC inspection results identified during
the last NRC PI&R team inspection completed in June 2013, documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000285/2013008. Many of the issues, identified both prior to and following restart,
reflect a poor understanding and use of design basis information. We do note that you are
taking action to address this challenge by a long-term licensee commitment to conduct a design
basis reconstitution through 2018. Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC
understands OPPD is conducting evaluations to determine the cause of the performance
problems affecting effective implementation of the corrective action program. The NRC is
interested in understanding the status of these evaluations and corrective actions during an
upcoming public meeting in Omaha, Nebraska on September 25, 2014. Additionally, the NRC
will be conducting future inspections focused on these areas of concern.


The NRC determined that, with the exception of the PI&R key area and the Operability
Determination element of the Program key area, OPPD is adequately implementing the CAL
items. The NRC determined that five key CAL areas were adequately completed and are
considered closed. These five key areas are:

• Organizational Effectiveness, Safety Culture, and Safety Conscious Work Environment
• Site Operational Focus
• Procedures
• Nuclear Oversight
• Transition to the Exelon Nuclear Management Model and Integration into the Exelon
Nuclear Fleet

Finally, there were also a number of deficiencies identified by the inspectors that involved
inadequate resolution of problems. Of particular concern, the inspectors reviewed OPPD’s
actions to resolve 36 previously issued NRC non-cited violations, documented in various
inspection reports in 2013, and identified five examples where OPPD failed to adequately
address the issues. Several examples were noted where no actions were either planned or
implemented to resolve the findings. The inspectors noted that a self-assessment, performed
by both OPPD and Exelon individuals prior to the team inspection, also identified this concern,
however, incomplete CAP implementation resulted in deficiencies that were not entered into the
process, and, subsequently, the particular non-cited violations were not adequately addressed.
As a result, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements
occurred and four violations associated with findings of very low safety significance (Green)
occurred. The NRC evaluated these violations in accordance Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC
Enforcement Policy, which appears on the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/
regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The enclosed report documents 14 additional findings of very low safety significance (Green).
All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements; one of these violations was
determined to be Severity Level IV under the traditional enforcement process. Two additional
Severity Level IV violations with no associated finding are also documented in the enclosed
report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Four licensee-identified violations are being documented in the enclosed report that were
determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC is treating these violations as noncited
violations consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station on probation; 'Why didn’t the public know?' OPPD board candidate asks

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station on probation; 'Why didn’t the public know?' OPPD board candidate asks

Posted: Thursday, September 18, 2014 2:00 am

By Cody Winchester / World-Herald staff writerThe Omaha World-Herald

Training and maintenance programs at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station have been on accreditation probation since March, a candidate for the Omaha Public Power District board revealed Wednesday.

The National Nuclear Accrediting Board imposed the six-month probation in late March, citing “broad gaps” in training at the nuclear plant, which restarted in December after being shut down for nearly three years.

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The accrediting board is an arm of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, a trade group that offers technical assistance and training to member utilities.

Candidate Jeff Lux, who is challenging 18-year incumbent Anne McGuire for the District 2 seat in South Omaha, called a press conference Wednesday outside OPPD’s headquarters to criticize the utility for not disclosing the problems.

“Why didn’t the public know about this?” Lux said.

The plant about 15 miles north of Omaha was taken offline in April 2011 for a scheduled refueling. But then flooding, a fire and the discovery of numerous safety violations led the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to place the plant under special oversight.

In 2012, the district hired an outside firm, Exelon, to run the plant. Fort Calhoun’s regular accreditation review came shortly after restart.

OPPD spokesman Jeff Hanson said the institute simply needed more time to review new processes as the plant transitions to new management.

The accrediting board will discuss lifting the probation when it convenes today in Atlanta. OPPD is optimistic about the outcome, Hanson said.

“All indications are that we will receive positive news,” he said.

If the board votes against re-accreditation, employees at the plant no longer could get any training, he said.

The probation was a “critical issue” at Fort Calhoun that prompted weekly conference calls with accrediting managers, who later visited the plant on inspection visits, according to internal OPPD newsletters provided by Lux.

“Without an accredited program, (Fort Calhoun) can’t properly train and qualify personnel to operate and maintain the station,” assistant plant manager Tim Uehling wrote in a July memo to employees.

Although employees and OPPD board members were kept in the loop, the probation never was made public, Lux said. He called it another example of the district’s record of keeping ratepayers in the dark.

Many issues identified by an internal review of the training problems, including weak management oversight, also were noted in a longer technical report that delved into why the plant was shut down in the first place, Lux said.

The district “shelved” that report, too, said Lux, a felony prosecutor in the Douglas County Attorney’s Office.

McGuire responded that Lux, whom she describes on her campaign website as a “bully” and a “manipulator,” is overstating his case.

She said the board was fully briefed on the probation, which has been discussed at committee meetings. Lux would know that “if he’d ever come to a meeting,” she said.

McGuire said Lux has declined offers by OPPD management for background briefings on issues facing the district.

“He’s not getting the right information,” she said. “He doesn’t want to get the right information.”

As the utility shifts to a new management model at Fort Calhoun, McGuire said, the recovery process won’t be perfect. But OPPD is making a lot more progress than Lux gives it credit for, she said.

“As problems come up, management deals with them,” McGuire said. “Bottom line.”s.