Unreviewed Safety Issue At Fitzpatrick?

April 30: Dummies using torus water to fill up the lines...but the senior resident and I think there is no big deal. The resident was a nice guy.

Unreviewed Safety Issue At Fitzpatrick

Imagine how dirty the water is? Why didn’t the clean CST water immediately flush out the dirty water?  It is not like the HPCI was circulating with dirty water for many minutes or hours clogging up the "enlarged" filter.

Can the dirty water clog up the containment stray?

How do they control torus sedimentation?

Why makes up the sedimentation?

How do you control the particle size?

You know the nature of sedimentation is rust and paint chips.

Is there some kind of microbe thing going on?

I called their Branch Chief and on site inspector office.

Any studies on how the sedimentation will interact with the cladding and fuel pins?

So what happens if HPCI was forced to use the torus instead of the preferred source?  

If that dirty water and you have to assume all the sedimentation gets mixed up completely in a accident...will we see any surprises when this dirty water get mixed up in a accident and gets injected into the core?

Where do they get the water to fill this guy? Some come from a demineralizer. Any carry over of the resins.

Any carry over from the originating source of water?

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE94-57: DEBRIS IN CONTAINMENT AND THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

LER: 2012-002-01, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Pressure Control Valve Failure

According to the LER it is not sedimentation...it is debris that is clogging the filter.

"This change was made because of several instances where the 23PCV-50 filter or snubber would become blocked by debris thereby preventing the pressure control valve from controlling. A two year preventative maintenance (PM) activity was also established to clean, inspect, and replace the filter and snubber."

Why does the NRC shift from snubber to filter?

"23PCV-50 filter or snubber would become blocked by debris"

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEARPOWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2014002

.1 (Closed) LERs 05000333/2012-002-00 and -01: High Pressure Coolant Injection

Pressure Control Valve Failure

On August 28, 2012, while operating the HPCI system for routine quarterly surveillance testing, operators identified that water was overflowing the ‘A’ reactor building equipment sump. Subsequent testing revealed that the source of this water had been the HPCI booster pump recirculation safety valve, 23SV-66, which was discharging 75 gallons per minute (gpm) to the equipment sump due to failure of the HPCI booster pump recirculation pressure control valve, 23PCV-50.

The HPCI system is normally aligned with pump suction from the CSTs. With 23PCV-50 failed, this would result in 75 gpm of CST water being rejected while HPCI was in operation, which would deplete the CST inventory more rapidly than would normally be expected to occur. FitzPatrick staff did not know if HPCI would be able to meet its mission time before automatically realigning to the suppression pool when the CST low level setpoint was reached. Operation of HPCI in this condition would be unacceptable because the rejection of 75 gpm of water from the suppression pool would exceed the 5 gpm limit for total leakage sources outside containment established by the UFSAR, and would be contrary to the requirement of TS 5.5.2 to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during an accident to levels as low as practicable. Therefore, HPCI was declared inoperable on August 30, 2012. Revision 0 of the subject LER was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), “Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident;” revision 1 was subsequently submitted to report a violation of TS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 3.5.1, “ECCS - Operating,” because filling the HPCI system with low quality water from the suppression pool following maintenance caused the HPCI booster pump recirculation pressure control valve, 23PCV-50, to fail, thereby making the HPCI system inoperable, and this condition existed for greater than the TS allowed outage time of 14 days. Although the HPCI system was inoperable, it still maintained its safety function to provide emergency core coolant flow in the event of an accident.

...Operating experience at FitzPatrick indicated that suppression pool water was not the preferable source for filling plant systems because it contains sediment from the suppression chamber (torus).

According to the LER it is not sedimentation...it is debris that is clogging the filter...