Pilgrim Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

NRC and Pilgrim Cover-up: Public Notification And Evacuation plan broke during accident

And still not fixed!

Did I catch them in a unreported violation and a problem they failed to fix or confront?

So they had  potential for winds over 75 mph according to Wiki. I'll bet you the failed met towers happens often in winter weather? 

Wiki: "In addition to the significant snowfall totals, hurricane-force wind gusts were recorded, reaching 102 mph (164 km/h) in Nova Scotia, 89 mph (143 km/h) at Mount Desert Rock, Maine, and 84 mph (135 km/h) off the coast of Cuttyhunk, Massachusetts. Boston experienced a storm surge of 4.2 ft (1.3 m), its fourth-highest."

Cuttyhunk is off the coast of New Bedford Massachusetts. Pilgrim nuclear plant couldn't detect the wind speed for 18 hours in the below according to the Nemo LER 2013-003-00 report. Why did Pilgrim and Nstar have so much troubles, while Millstone with much more snow escaped with little problems? 

2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm."

The NRC has not a mention of this in their inspection report. Is this another cover-up with Pilgrim and the NRC...they couldn't perform their radiological emergency plan. And they didn't report it. The assumption is it is gummed up with ice and snow...but how do you know? Pilgrim is in hot water with Massachusetts and the local antis...is this a cover-up so as not to inflame these players.

Is there a wind speed and direction detectors that are qualified through all realms of blizzards and winter weather?

You catch it, it might not be blizzard...it might be related to a component that doesn't have power. The don't throw us the cause with what "stopped recording weather data until 1840 the next day. What do you think, the wording implies the recording stopped, but the real time indication could be seen in the control room?

New May 19: Wait, see this disconnected phase, the incompleteness of the sentence it implies Nemo snow or ice took the Met instrumentation out. The trip occurred at 2117. Did they lose the 120 safeguard bus like they did in LER 2008-006-00 and not disclose it.

During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. 

 Then later down in the report, we get the below. The 2340 B phase fault on the start-up transformer (SUT) took out the met tower.  The trip times and recovery times almost match?

At 2340 hours, a 'B' phase fault on the SUT bus work tripped the SUT bus lockout relay. Walkdowns of the switchyard were conducted by Maintenance and Engineering to assess the condition of the SUT bus. The relays that initiated the bus trip indicated the fault was within the SUT protection scheme, but external to the SUT. Breaker ACB-1 02 was closed at 1809 hours on February 9th.   

What are the history with anemometer failures in winter storms?

This is the entry into the emergency classification entry point: Unusual  Event. 

Sustained winds  (greater than 5 minutes) in excess of 75 mph indicated on wind speed recorder Panel MT1. 

What happens next storm when the lines don't trip and the meteorological instruments fail at 40 mph? So the plant has a inability to to cycle into their wind emergency classification procedures and there is no way that Pilgrim complete a evacuation. What wind speed are they required to be immediately shutdown? UE reports get to the NRC. How do you know where the radiation is heading and time frames?

It is absolutely astonishing the lackadaisical tack the NRC is taking towards public protection!

The "Preliminary Notification" should have been; we had a LOOP and our radiation evacuation plan (wind speed and direction) is severely degraded or non operational because our wind instrumentation failed in the blizzard. 

February 9, 2013

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-I-13-001

PILGRIM STATION: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM NEMO

On February 8,2013, at 9:17 p.m. EST, while operating at 80% power, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station automatically scrammed following the loss of all three sources of offsite power, apparently caused by Winter Storm Nemo. All plant systems performed as designed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is being used to control reactor vessel water level and the High Pressure Coolant Injection is controlling reactor pressure. The Unusual Event was declared at 10:00 p.m. EST based on the loss of offsite power lasting greater than 15 minutes. As of 5:00 a.m. EST on February 9, 2013, both emergency diesel generators continue to provide power to the safety-related electrical busses. Pilgrim has three sources of offsite power: the 355 and 342 lines (both 345KV lines), which feed the plant's startup transformer and have been given priority restoration status by the electrical transmission company; and a 25KV line, which connects to the station's shutdown transformer and could not be immediately restored. Once one of the offsite lines is restored and determined to be reliable, the operators will reconnect offsite power to the vital and non-vital 4160 Volt AC buses and exit the Unusual Event. PILGRIM STATION: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM NEMO

The operating staff is supposed to report to their emergency technical support center and the NRC...our meteorological station is dead. These federal and internal emergency technical support centers are supposed to be thinking three steps ahead of the accident. They are supposed to be thinking...OK, the plant lost the met instrumentation and they are going to need that in a eminent or actual release of radiation. So we (tech center) have to come up with a immediate plan to get the wind speed and direction data points outside the plant to the technical emergency support people running the evacuation. They have to be prepared way ahead of the eminent or real release even if the accident isn't on the observable horizon yet.    

NRC MONITORS PILGRIM STATION AFTER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I staff is monitoring the Pilgrim nuclear power plant after the site lost offsite power Friday evening. The plant is operated by Entergy Nuclear and is located in Plymouth, Mass.

Pilgrim automatically shut down after losing offsite power at 9:17 Friday night (2/8). The plant is stable and all plant safety systems responded as designed. The plant's diesel generators are currently supplying power to plant equipment. Plant operators declared an unusual event due to the loss of all off-site power. An Unusual Event is the lowest of four levels of the NRC’s emergency classification system.

There was no impact to plant workers or the public.

The below is the classification entry point...you could get there by an interpretation of the "other". They teach these guy to cue off only on hyper specific wording of the classification. Not close enough wording.

Nothing in there cues the staff about what to do with the loss of the met instrumentation...this seems to keyed to plant safety. The met instrumentation doesn't impact plant safety...just the potential of public safety.

Think about it as a example, say all the radiation instrumentation in the stack or maybe mysteriously Pilgrim discovered all their warning sirens didn't work. Nothing specifically would cue them into a classification entry and notifying the communities the emergency evacuation plan is unworkable. The staff can't see the radiation reading or give alarm by siren. There should be a rework on the emergency classification system!

Right, the met instrumentation is a communication device...but the operator's are trained too specifically that communications means telephone lines and notifications to the NRC. It doesn't mean wind speed or direction to the operators.

So you wouldn't see a notification for maybe three month if you get lucky in the NRC inspection report.

I think the emergency classification system is broke...it doesn't notify outsiders that the staff is blind... say, can't see the wind speed or direction to carry out the evacuating plan to the public.

8.1 Other8.1.1.4 8.1.1.3 8.1.1.2 8.1.1.1

UE: Any event in the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director could or has lead to a potential degradation of the level of safety at the plant.

Any event In the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director warrants the prompt notification of Commonwealth and local authorities and precautionary notification of Emergency Response Organization personnel.

SA: Any event in the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director could or has causes actual substantial degradation of the level of plant safety.

6.4: Loss of indications, alarm, or com capability

Loss of indications and/or alarms which cause a significant loss of assessment capabilities such as loss of indication or annunciation on safety related equipment to the extend requiring a shutdown by technical specification. 

Licensee Event Report 2013-003-00

Loss of Off-Site Power Events Due to Winter Storm Nemo

April 8, 2013

Event date: 2/17/2013

Report date: 4/8/2013

 

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On Friday February 8, 2013, at 2117 hours with the reactor initially at 85% core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) experienced a loss of off-site power (LOOP) resulting in a load reject and a reactor scram. All rods fully inserted and the Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and powered safety-related buses A5 and A6. All other safety systems functioned as required. The plant stabilized in Hot Shutdown. At the time of the event a significant winter storm (Nemo) was buffeting Southern New England. At 2200 hours PNPS in conjunction with the local grid operator determined off-site power sources were not reliable and efforts to restore off-site power were temporarily suspended. At 2200 hours, PNPS declared a Notification of Unusual Event. On February 10, at 1055 hours, one of two off-site power supplies was restored, all safety buses were powered from the startup transformer and the Unusual Event was exited. Later on February 10, at 1402 hours with the plant in Cold Shutdown, ice bridging on a startup transformer insulator caused its 345 KV supply breaker to open resulting in a second LOOP. Again the EDG's started and powered safety-related buses. All other safety systems functioned as required. Shutdown cooling was restored at 1426 hours.

On February 10, at 2020 hours, this occurrence was reported to the USNRC as documented in EN# 48739.

The severe winter storm which caused extensive generalized geographical damage to the electrical distribution network was root cause of the LOOP events.

These events posed no threat to public health and safety.

NARRATIVE

BACKGROUND:

Pilgrim Station is connected to the transmission lines through a 345KV ring bus located within the station's 345KV switchyard. The 345KV ring bus connects the output of the main transformer, the startup transformer (SUT), Line 355, and Line 342. There are four gas circuit breakers which comprise Pilgrim's 345KV ring bus: ACB-1 02, ACB-1 03, ACB-104 and ACB-105.

Line 355 is a two terminal line which connects Pilgrim to National Grid's Bridgewater Station and is connected to ACB-102 and ACB-1 05. Line 342 is a three terminal line, which connects Pilgrim to the Canal Power Plant's Switchyard in Sandwich, MA and to Auburn Street Station Switchyard in Whitman, MA. The Canal Switchyard is owned and operated by NSTAR and Auburn Street Station Switchyard is owned and operated by National Grid.

Pilgrim's ACB-103 and ACB-104 connect Line 342 to the plant's switchyard. The 345KV system is the Pilgrim Station output power connection and is the preferred off-site power source via the SUT.

The 345KV ring bus design locates the power transmission lines such that a failure of any one line will not result in the loss of the other line. Specifically, with both transmission lines in service, a failure of either 345KV line will not result in a main generator trip, a SUT trip, or a failure of the other 345KV line. Either of the two 345KV lines is capable of carrying full station output and supplying station loads via the SUT.

The 345KV protective relay system is designed and coordinated to isolate system disturbances and minimize the impact to the overall transmission system. The protective systems are comprised of a primary and secondary protection scheme and are divided into four zones of protection.

·         The main transformer (bounded by ACB-104 and ACB-105)

·         The SUT (bounded by ACB-102 and ACB-103)

·         Line 355 (bounded by ACB-102 and ACB-105 and Bridgewater Station)

·         Line 342 (bounded by ACB-103 and ACB-104 and Auburn Street Station Street and Canal Stations)

When ACB-104 and ACB-105 open, the main transformer is isolated from the 345KV transmission system thus resulting in a generator full load reject event.

In addition to the preferred 345KV off-site power lines, Pilgrim has a secondary off-site power source, a 23KV line from NSTAR's Manomet Substation that provides power to a shutdown transformer (SDT).

During normal station start-ups and shutdowns, the station's 4160V demands are supplied by the SUT. Once the station main generator is synchronized to the 345KV transmission system, the station unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) supplies all station 4160V demands, with the SUT maintained in standby, ready to provide 4160V power if necessary.

In anticipation of a major snow storm impacting Pilgrim Station (PNPS) on February 8, 2013, Operations entered Procedure 2.1.37 (Coastal Storm Preparations). Procedure 2.1.42 (Operation During Severe Weather) and ENEP- 302 (Severe Weather Response, currently, EN-FAP-EP-010) at 0800 hours on February 7, 2013. At 1021 hours on February 8th, Station Risk was elevated to YELLOW due to the winter storm warning (severe weather).

During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On Friday, February 8, 2013, at 2018 hours, the shutdown transformer (SDT) was declared inoperable due to repeated off-site 23KV Trouble/Trip Bypass alarms and reports from NSTAR regarding the power loss and restoration events on the Line via the Manomet Substation.

On February 8th, two line faults occurred on both 345KV transmission lines connected to the PNPS ring bus. At 2102 hours a major fault occurred on off-site Line 342 which remained de-energized for the remainder of the storm. At 2117 hours a fault on Line 355 occurred resulting in a full load reject of the PNPS generator, a subsequent reactor scram, and loss of the SUT. Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) automatically started and provided power to safety buses A5 and A6. Groups 1, 11, and VI isolations went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was placed in service to maintain reactor vessel water level. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was placed in service to control reactor pressure. All systems performed as designed to bring the reactor to Mode 3, including initiation of reactor water cleanup isolation, reactor building isolation system, and standby gas treatment system.

At 2200 hours, an Unusual Event was declared (EAL SU 1.1) for loss of off-site power to Emergency Busses.

At 2211 hours, off-site line 355 was restored and ACB-102 was closed manually to reenergize the SUT.

At 2340 hours, a 'B' phase fault on the SUT bus work tripped the SUT bus lockout relay. Walk downs of the switchyard were conducted by Maintenance and Engineering to assess the condition of the SUT bus. The relays that initiated the bus trip indicated the fault was within the SUT protection scheme, but external to the SUT. Breaker ACB-1 02 was closed at 1809 hours on February 9th.

At 0813 hours on February 9th, NSTAR reenergized Line 355 and the SUT was energized and non safety related buses Al, A2, A3, A4 were energized from the SUT commencing at 1815.

At 0400 on February 10, off-site power was restored to safety-related 4160V bus A5 through the SUT via a single 345KV line. At 0830 hours, off-site power was restored to safety-related 4160V bus via A6 through SUT.

The EDGs were secured and were on standby. Residual heat removal was in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel pool cooling was in service with fuel pool temperatures trending down.

Effective at 1055 hours on February 10, 2013, Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and transitioned to recovery.

At 1401 hours on February 10th, with all control rods fully inserted and the reactor in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a second loss of off-site power with a flashover fault on the B phase bus work of the SUT due to salt contaminated ice bridging on the phase insulator. This resulted in the tripping of the breaker ACB- 102 and loss of power to 4160V busses. Both EDGs auto-started as designed and provided power to the emergency buses. This loss of off-site power resulted in de-energization of both reactor protection system (RPS) channels resulting in a reactor scram signal and loss of Shutdown Cooling. At 1426 hours, Shutdown Cooling was returned to service. All other plant systems responded as designed. Station personnel established back-up power to A5 and A6 buses in accordance with plant procedures. On February 12, at 0405 hours off-site power was restored to the non safety buses via the Main/ Unit Aux Transformers. At 0601 hours on February 12th, offsite power was restored to safety bus A6 through the Main/Unit Aux Transformers. Off-site power was restored to all 4160V buses through the SUT as of 2147 hours on February 12. The plant returned to power operation on February 15, 2013.

CAUSE:

The coincident loss of transmission Lines 342 and 355 from faults external to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station switchyard due to the winter storm resulted in the loss of offsite power, full load rejection, and reactor scram. The subsequent flashovers in the switchyard were due to snow and ice buildup on insulators and electrical distribution components.

CONTRIBUTING CAUSES:

PNPS procedure 2.1.42, Operation During Severe Weather, provides limited guidance for Operations to determine which severe snow storms are most likely to challenge Pilgrim switchyard reliability.

Corrective actions to preclude recurrence taken in response to prior LER 2008-006-00 and LER 2008-007-00, Loss of SUT on line 355 flashover and ACB-1 05 flashover, and plant trip did not prevent recurrence.

Previously identified internal Operating Experience (OE) was not successfully utilized to direct the removal of snow and ice from insulators on the SUT prior to reenergizing.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following corrective actions were completed to address the LOOP and flashover events prior the restart of Pilgrim Station:

The component of the capacitor coupled voltage transformer (CCVT) that was damaged due to the flashover fault was repaired.

Pilgrim reviewed LOOP events with NSTAR to improve reliability of service to the SUT.

Additional corrective actions included in the corrective action program are as follows:

·         Procedural guidance containing a systematic process for removal and restoration of bus sections during and following blizzard conditions will be developed and implemented. This includes all 345KV and 23KV power lines.

·         Procedural guidance for de-icing insulating material susceptible to a flashover event in the switchyard following blizzard conditions will be developed and implemented.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

The Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) event is analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and assumes loss of both 345 KV and 23 KV (preferred and secondary) sources coincident with a design basis accident (DBA). The design imposes a 10 second delay in re-energizing the 4160V Emergency Buses required to mitigate the DBA. In cases where coincident loss of an EDG presents a bounding condition, the affected safety bus is not assumed to be picked up by the shutdown transformer (SDT). The bounding condition in which all off-site power and onsite AC (EDGs) sources would be lost is a Station Blackout (SBO) transient event (10 CFR 50.63). Pilgrim is designed to recover from the SBO event by having a separate SBO diesel generator capable of providing power to the required safety buses to shutdown the plant and maintain it in a safe condition. Thus, the LOOP events experienced by Pilgrim are within the analyzed conditions and plant systems responded as desiqned.

During and following the storm, operators were able to maintain safe shutdown conditions (reactivity control, reactor water inventory, decay heat removal, etc.). While loss of power to non-safety related spent fuel cooling was a key consideration, time-to-boil never became an overriding concern with respect to reenergizing buses and there was no freshly discharged spent fuel in the pool. The most recent freshly discharged fuel was almost 23 months old, and the time to boil was approximately seven days upon loss of fuel pool cooling. The spent fuel pool temperature was less than 105 degrees F.

The EDGs started and loaded as expected following each loss of SUT event. The amount of fuel onsite initially was sufficient to operate the EDGs for 7 days (under LOCA conditions) and the SBO DG was always available.

Based on the challenge to safety systems during and following the event, Conditional Core Damage Frequency (CCDF) of the event was estimated to be 1.8E-5.

Throughout these events there was no adverse impact on the public health and safety.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

The most recent LOOP events at Pilgrim Station reported as LER are as follows:

LER 2008-006-00, Automatic Scram Resulting from Switchyard Breaker Fault During Winter Storm, dated February 12, 2009.

LER 2008-007-00, Momentary Loss of all 345KV Off-Site Power to the Startup Transformer from Switchyard Breaker Fault, dated February 12, 2009.

ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES:

COMPONENTS CODES

Transformer (Startup AC) Bus XFMR

SYSTEMS

Switchyard System (Startup Transformer) FK

ESF Actuation (RPS, PCIS, RBIS) JE

Main Generator Output Power System EL

Medium Voltage Power System- Class 1 E (4KV) EB

REFERENCES:

Condition Report CR-PNP-2013-0798, Loss of Off-Site Power

NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)