The Ongoing 2011 Accident at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant

 How stable is Fort Calhoun with this?

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILURE OF CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING

"At 1505 CDT the 'A' control room air conditioner (VA-46A) trouble alarm annunciated in the control room. The unit was confirmed to be not functioning properly and was declared inoperable at time 1515 [CDT]. The 'B' control room air conditioner (VA-46B) was previously declared inoperable due to maintenance. With both control room air conditioners inoperable the plant entered technical specification 2.0.1, a 6 hour shutdown action statement. Repairs to the 'B' had been previously planned and are in progress to allow the unit to be returned to service as soon as possible. Troubleshooting and subsequent repairs to the 'A' unit are in progress. At 1812 [CDT], the station commenced a shutdown to comply with the required action statement."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE FROM ORTIZ TO KLCO ON 4/15/14 AT 2237 EDT * * *

"At time 2050 [CDT], VA-46A was declared operable based on installation of an emergency temporary modification. TS 2.0.1 has been exited. Shutdown has been secured and FCS is stable at a nominal 33% power."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Reposted from 3/18/2014
 

March 20: Fort Calhoun was up to 38% this mourning...looks like the generator survived.

Being safe means you never ever ever ever depend on a safety device.

They were probably seconds away from destroying their stator and generator. Imagine if the automatic turbine trip didn’t work. You get it, the amps are so high and the time to damage is so short...they got to depend on an automatic trip.

  See, crap quality assurance and crap maintenance. This came out on the same date of the new scram.
 

These scrams and shutdowns are damaging the plant...

Sluice Gate Shutdown LER on Jan 9, 2014

"Engineering Analysis (EA) 12-018 upgraded the sluice gates to limited-critical quality element (LCQE). The CW-14 sluice gates had not been previously credited as safe shutdown equipment. Even though the CW-14 sluice gates became credited as safe shutdown equipment, FCS did not treat the sluice gates any different than before the reclassification. Consequently, the valves' motor operators (MOVs) were never entered into the MOV program, additional analyses and preventative maintenance (PM) items were not implemented.

CW-14C torque switch as found setting was different than the last time the switch was adjusted. In April, 2013, the torque switch for CW-14C was set to increment 2.5. The as found value after the event initiating this report was 3.75. Additionally, the torque switch was found preloaded in the open direction - meaning that it would take more torque applied to the valve before the valve would trip on torque in the shut direction. The torque switch was preloaded 2 increments bringing the total value of the torque setting to 5.75, placing the MOV in a condition where it would cause significant damage to the MOV had the stem not bent.

Additionally, the spring pack - the part of the MOV which translates motor torque to the torque limiter switch was unable to complete its function due to the amount of grease that had seeped into the spring plate section. The grease would not allow the spring pack to compress thereby not translating motor torque to the torque limiter switch. The combined effect as described above in addition to the extreme cold temperatures on the intake structure veranda was that the MOV would not have tripped on over-torque before failure of the MOV."

March 18

Junk! Another plant scram! They fixed the stuff relevant to NRC rules...but neglected components support reliable plant operation.

Facility: FORT CALHOUN Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: (1) CE NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 03/17/2014 Notification Time: 15:55 [ET] Event Date: 03/17/2014 Event Time: 12:02 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): GREG PICK (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP INITIATED BY LOSS OF STATOR COOLING WATER "Ft. Calhoun station automatically tripped due to a loss of turbine load. The turbine tripped due to loss of stator cooling water. Maintenance was in progress on the stator cooling system when inventory was lost and low pump discharge pressure caused an automatic turbine trip and reactor trip. All systems operated as expected. Ft. Calhoun station is shutdown and stable in mode 3 at this time." All control rods fully inserted into the core and decay heat is being removed using the normal condenser steam dump system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Originally published on Jan 13

Jan 15: They are up to 60% power today. Any bets on how many days before the next scram! Hope they make a week?

I first put this on my other blog by mistake. 

Three years and 200 million dollars...16 days of operation...and they already had two shutdowns.

Were the new sluice gates cheaply purchase at Walmart...

Would that be great, putting on this kind of debt for 10 years...then have to shutdown within a year.

Goes to show you, if the majority of the plant is obsolete and degraded gear...throwing 200 million is a waste of money! They just didn't go in big enough!

Good job bankrupt Exelon!

Notification Date: 01/09/2014
Notification Time: 06:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2014
Event Time: 05:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2014

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE RAW WATER PUMPS.

"At 0315 CST T.S. 2.0.1 was entered for all four Raw Water pumps being declared inoperable. The pumps were declared inoperable due to inability to close one of the sluice gates. There are six sluice gates and one is not functional.

"At 0518 the technical specification required shutdown commenced."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM AMY BURKHART TO NESTOR MAKRIS ON 01/09/14 AT 1915 EST * * *

"At 0900 CST 1/9/14 Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was manually tripped and entered Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown to less than 300 deg F was commenced at time 1030 CST 1/9/14. The RCS temperature was less than 300 deg F at time 1433 CST. A press release has been issued."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO [Hagar]

Notification Date: 01/12/2014
Notification Time: 06:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2014
Event Time: 03:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2014

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING CONTROL ROD POSITION DEVIATION  

"After achieving criticality a deviation between control rods was observed by plant personnel. When attempting to level the control rods, one rod could not insert to the level of the rest of the group. A manual reactor trip was initiated by the operating crew. All tripable control rods fully inserted into the core."

The trip was uncomplicated and the licensee is investigating the cause of the control rod position deviation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.