Sequoyah Fried Two Worker...

This indicates something is deeply wrong with management. Prolonged death by electrocution is a horrible way.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53270
Facility: SEQUOYAH Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: CAL ATCHLEY HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 03/19/2018 Notification Time: 02:27 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2018 Event Time: 00:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) CHRIS MILLER (NRR) JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

TWO CONTRACTORS INJURED BY ARC FLASH "On 3/16/2018 at approximately 1630 EST, an industrial safety accident occurred at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that involved an Arc Flash injury of two contract employees. While performing work near a non safety related 6.9kV electrical bus, an arc occurred injuring the two employees. Both personnel were transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment. Neither were contaminated. "The cause of the arc flash is not understood at this time, an accident investigation has been initiated by TVA. The SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No safety related systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown were affected. Both Unit 1 and 2 remain at 100 [percent] power. "TVA has received and responded to media inquiries concerning this event. As a result, this event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Is An Terrorist Attack in Progress

Two suspicious incidents just outside the plant in six hours. Or are terrorist planning a attack. It sounds like the community around the plant are nervous...  

March 5 police report

8:05 a.m.: Suspicious activity was reported on Bradstreete Crossing.

2:06 p.m.: Suspicious activity was reported at Pilgrim Nuclear/Entergy on Rocky Hill Road.

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Could Cape Cod Be Evacuated After The Current Blizzard

Update

NRC resident seem extremely rushed for time when I called. Said the NRC is trying to deal with the loop. It seems strange this busyness so many days after the LOOP and reconnected to the grid. She said the LOOP went pretty well. She said it was the switchyard that caused it and it was Entergy's gear.  

Pilgrim has had massive historic problems with the grid around their Plant. Its trips them many times and isolates them from outside power. Though shutdown this blizzard, they had very serious grid problems this blizzard.

Watching Pilgrim over the years, you can clearly see both Entergy and the grid owners haven't kept up with maintenance. These insufficient funding of maintenance and updating equipment issues have massively impacted Pilgrim's reliability and safety.  

Excerpts from the most Current Blizzard:   

“It’s been a pretty crazy couple of weeks for everyone down here on the Cape and across the Commonwealth,” he said.

Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs Matthew Beaton said the region has been dealing with an, “an unprecedented volume of outages in recent weeks.”

Several of the state representatives said in addition to the problem with the power failures, many Cape Codders lost cell service, specifically AT&T customers.

Hunt, who represents portions of the Upper Cape and Plymouth, said we can’t accept the excuse that being an ocean-side community leads to more outages.,

“You have to build your utility to withstand the conditions wherever your utility is,” Hunt said. 

“It does make me wonder if there’s probably a larger conversation we should be having about trees,” Baker said.

“The biggest question I have that needs to be answered is what is the state of the utility and electric supply out there with old telephone poles, old transformers and other things that have not been updated,” Cyr told the Herald. “When you have a stress like this — when it’s older equipment — it’s not as resilient.”

Cyr said in addition to keeping an eye on Eversource Energy’s power restoration efforts, he wants to know what is being done now to make sure the electric system stands up better to the next storm, especially with the expectation that the weather could grow worse as the climate changes. 

“Why do we have this failure?” he asked. “I think that’s what we are going to be working at. We have to have an electric supply system that can stand up in the environment we have out there.”

Eversource spokesman Mike Durand said the company has a comprehensive tree-trimming program and equipment upgrade plan.

“The reason for the devastation that we have seen in this storm and previous storms is the severe weather” that brought a foot of snow and hurricane-force winds to the Cape, Durand said.

Junk Plant Grand Gulf: BIG NEWS!!!

Grand Gulf has been up to 100% power for two weeks :)

Vogtle 3&4: Statement Of NRC on Registered Professional Engineers

Crutchley, Julie	Mar 13 (1 day ago)
to me, Sara, Sarenee, Sean, Stella, Dori

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has completed its review of the concerns you raised relating to Westinghouse and Vogtle Units 3 and 4.  Our letter describing our review and conclusions is attached.  Please acknowledge your receipt of this message and its attachment via return email or phone call.  We would like to keep a copy of your receipt for our records.

Thank you for bringing these matters to our attention.  If you have any questions or comments on the attached letter, please contact a member of the NRC Headquarters Allegations Team via our group email, HQ_Allegations@nrc.gov, or contact us individually:

·         Ms. Dori Willis, Senior Office Allegation Coordinator (Dori.Willis@nrc.gov), 301-287-9423

·         Mr. Sean Meighan, Office Allegation Coordinator (Sean.Meighan@nrc.gov), 301-287-9094

·         Ms. Sarenee Hawkins, Office Allegation Coordinator (Sarenee.Hawkins@nrc.gov) , 301-287-9292

·         Ms. Sara Bernal-Taylor, Allegation Specialist (Sara.Bernal-Taylor@nrc.gov), 301-287-9296

·         Ms. Stella Opara, Allegation Specialist (Stella.Opara@nrc.gov), 301-287-9286

Regards,

Julie Crutchley

I wonder if this is a wave off in the FBI and others are investigating this? 

STATEMENT OF CONCERN ALLEGATION NO. NRO-2017-A-0015

CONCERN
 You received a call from an engineer who works at Vogtle.  This engineer claimed that he has “the same problem as what is going on at V.C. Summer,” which is that non-licensed engineers are signing off on safety-related diagrams/paperwork that should be signed off by licensed engineers.

NRC Response:
 In order to evaluate the concern, the NRC staff (1) evaluated the pertinent regulations; (2) reviewed the associated Post and Courier news article, the letter from the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPEs), and the Westinghouse Electric Company LLC’s (WEC’s) legal opinion on the use of Registered Professional Engineers (RPEs); (3) reviewed specific drawings that the reporter of the news article believed required a RPE’s approval; (4) compiled a list of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements specifying RPE review of design reports and design specifications; (5) reviewed Regional and Vendor inspection reports associated with design reports and design specifications; (6) interviewed a sample of inspectors on the practice of ensuring whether a design report or design specification has been approved by a RPE; (7) reviewed excerpts from the State of South Carolina’s requirements regarding a utility’s use of RPEs; and (8) reviewed NRC guidance in inspection procedures (IPs) to determine if review of RPE documentation approval and personnel qualification are adequately addressed.

Regarding regulatory requirements, Criterion II, “Quality Assurance Program,” of Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” states in part, “The program shall provide for indoctrination and training of personnel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained.”  This regulation would apply to engineers involved in the development of the AP1000 nuclear power plant safety-related design activities.  The NRC’s inspectors routinely assess the training and qualification of engineers.  

 The staff also reviewed the ASME Code to determine when a RPE’s approval is required to be verified by the NRC.  The AP1000 Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 5.2.1.1, requires compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and standards.”  In 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1)(i), all ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III additions and addenda are incorporated by reference.  10 CFR 50.55a(b)(1) places certain conditions on Section III of the Code, but none of these regulatory conditions are associated with RPEs. 

 As an example, NRC staff would be required under 10 CFR 50.55a to verify a RPE’s approval on an ASME Code Form N5 associated with components manufactured to Code requirements.  This form is required to be signed by a RPE and is reviewed by the NRC as part of its inspection of the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) related to that Code component. 

 Regional and Vendor inspectors only look for RPE approval when required to do so by applicable ASME Code requirements, but normally do not document it in an inspection report unless an associated issue is identified.  The associated Regional and Vendor related inspection procedures do not specifically require the NRC inspector to identify whether a design report or design

Is the NRC telling me we got no problem with RPEs because we don't inspect none qualified RPEs.

specification has been approved by a RPE.2  However, the NRC staff did identify one integrated inspection report (ADAMS Accession No. ML17226A0343) which documented in the Inspection Scope that the inspectors reviewed the qualification records for the RPEs that developed the squib valve and piping design specifications.  There was no further discussion as no qualification records issues were identified.  

With regards to the Post and Courier article, the NRC noted that information used to support the author’s position in the article did not state that WEC was using unlicensed or unqualified engineers.  The documents referenced by the reporter focused on the fact that WEC was not requiring a RPE’s approval of certain documents.  However, based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that not all documents need a RPE’s approval.  The specific drawings relied upon for the news article are examples of documents not requiring a RPE’s approval to meet NRC’s requirements.

In addition, when NRC inspections are performed, it is routine to review the qualifications of individuals performing the work.  Also, NRC inspectors often interview personnel in detail on specific work being performed.  These interviews ensure personnel are knowledgeable in their tasks.  There was no indication from the NRC inspection reports that unqualified individuals from WEC or its contractors were involved in the performance of work related to the AP1000 design.

Based on the NRC staff’s review, the NRC staff concluded that (1) there was no evidence of inspection report findings for unqualified personnel preparing design documents, and (2) design reports and design specifications that were required by NRC regulations to have RPE approval did so.  However, because the State of Georgia also has requirements related to professional licensure, you may wish to contact the Georgia Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors directly regarding your concern (http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/licensing/plb/22). 

As stated in our cover memo, we feel that our actions in this matter have been responsive to your concern and plan no further action.   Thank you for contacting the NRC. 

                                                 1 The ITAAC identified in the combined license are those inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria necessary and sufficient, when successfully completed by the licensee, to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the combined license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s rules and regulations. 2 The NRC staff is currently evaluating the value of adding a specific step in NRC inspection procedure(s) that ensures a RPE has appropriately approved the document (if required by the applicable ASME Code) when inspectors are reviewing design reports and design specification documents. 3 Public documents can be found on the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Management System (ADAMS) at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

More Fleet Wide Ethics Training for Entergy: History Shows It Don't Work

Entergy has had hundreds of falsification and other ethical problems over recent years ending in Confirmatory Orders demanding fleet wide ethical training.  Fleet wide ethical training and scapegoating the little guys has been proven not to work. We need a investigation on is ethics training effective.

NRC Issues Confirmatory Order to Entergy  

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Order to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., and Entergy Operations, Inc., documenting actions they have agreed to take to implement programs designed to prevent willful misconduct at their fleet of seven operating nuclear power plants. 

As a result of investigations at the Grand Gulf nuclear power plant in Port Gibson, Miss., Entergy identified that (1) an examination proctor deliberately compromised examinations by providing inappropriate assistance to trainees; (2) workers did not perform required rounds to check equipment and plant conditions; and (3) workers deliberately provided inaccurate documentation indicating they had done so. Three apparent violations of NRC requirements are described in a Nov. 20, 2017, inspection report.  

Entergy requested the Alternative Dispute Resolution process with the NRC to discuss corrective actions. The process uses a neutral mediator with no decision-making authority to assist the NRC and its licensees in coming to an agreement.  Following a meeting on Feb. 6 with Entergy officials, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order documenting actions the company agreed to take. In addition to Grand Gulf, the Entergy fleet includes Arkansas Nuclear One in Russellville, Ark., Indian Point 2 and 3 in Buchanan, N.Y., Palisades in Covert, Mich., Pilgrim in Plymouth, Mass., River Bend in St. Francisville, La., and Waterford in Killona, La.
 

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Leaking Feedwater Heaters And Another Total Loss Of Offsite Power

That 23 line is interesting. It is piss ass small line and extremely unreliable. But it plays a disproportional role in any violation levels if it stays operational. Of course, if the plant was operational, they would have had another hard trip.

The industry and NRC basically believes a plant at shutdown is more risky than at power. So they might be required to shutdown, the utilities will justify staying at power on it more risky to be shutdown.   

Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HETTWER HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 03/13/2018 Notification Time: 15:54 [ET] Event Date: 03/13/2018 Event Time: 10:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/13/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): MARC FERDAS (R1DO) JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

OFF-SITE POWER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO WINTER STORM "On March 13, 2018 at 1000 hours [EDT], with the reactor in Cold Shutdown condition, both 345kV incoming power lines and 23 kV Shutdown Transformer became unavailable during the Northeast winter storm. Per procedures, the emergency on-site emergency power supplies (Emergency Diesel Generators) were running and providing power to essential systems. In addition, the back-up Diesel Air Compressor was in service and one Reactor Protection System bus was on the back-up power supply prior to the loss. "With both 345kV incoming power lines and 23 kV Shutdown Transformer unavailable, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station procedures direct a report be made to the NRC per the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.72(b)(3)(v), any event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. No actual loss of safety function has occurred since the on-site emergency power supplies are maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition and removing residual heat. "The loss of incoming power is under investigation. "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."