Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Commissioner Ostendorff A Goner

Go USA: NRC Commissioner Ostendorff is Going to Answer My Email

False Ostendorff Senate Confirmation Testimony in 2010

Commissioner Ostendorff a goner. We are already down one commissioner.
William Ostendorff will not seek another term in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after his term ends June 30, he announced Wednesday.
After six years in the five-member body that oversees the safety of the country’s nuclear power plants, Ostendorff has elected to return to the United States Naval Academy to teach, said Eliot Brenner, a spokesman for the agency.

Ostendorff, a Republican, has served at the NRC through numerous challenges to the agency, including its response to 2011’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan and a very public leadership scuffle at the agency later that year. 
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Phase II On The Mike Mulligan NRC Special Inspection Report at River Bend

works in progress. 
My first special inspection got four green findings and a white finding…

My second got three green findings plus another white findings.
Why do I feel like these findings were selectively chosen.
February 16, 2016

EA-15-140

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION– NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015010 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Olson:
On March 24, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed its initial assessment of the circumstances surrounding a loss of control building ventilation, which occurred on March 9, 2015, at the River Bend Station. Based upon the risk and deterministic criteria specified in NRC Management Directive 8.3, “NRC Incident Investigation Program,” the NRC initiated a special inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 93812, “Special

Inspection.” The basis for initiating the special inspection and the focus areas for review are detailed in the Special Inspection Charter (Attachment 2 of the enclosed inspection report). Based on this initial assessment, the NRC sent an inspection team to your site on March 30, 2015.

On January 20, 2016, the NRC completed its special inspection. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on January 20, 2016, with Mr. Dean Burnett, Acting Director, Regulatory and Performance Improvement, and other members of your staff. The team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The enclosed inspection report documents a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance that may require additional NRC inspections, regulatory actions, and oversight. As described in Section 2.6.a of the enclosed report, the team identified an apparent violation for a failure to adequately assess the increase in risk of operating the control building chilled water system chillers in various single-failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems.

***TBD. The NRC identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” paragraph (a)(4) with preliminary white significance.

Prior to March 30, 2015, before performing maintenance activities, the licensee failed to adequately assess the increase in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, the risk assessment performed by the licensee for plant maintenance failed to account for certain safety significant structures, systems, and components that were concurrently out of service. On multiple occasions, the licensee failed to adequately assess the risk of operating the control building chilled water system (HVK) chillers in various single failure vulnerable configurations. As a result of this deficiency, the station reduced the reliability and availability of systems contained in the main control room and failed to account for the significant, uncompensated impairment of the safety functions of the associated systems. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-00095. The licensee also completed engineering analyses to evaluate alternate cooling methods, including cross-connecting service water and the HVK chiller systems, in order to provide cooling to spaces housing electrical components.

***Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality related to Masterpact circuit breakers. Specifically, the licensee did not promptly identify and correct a Masterpact breaker failure mechanism, even though related industry operating experience was available. The licensee determined the failure mechanism caused nine breaker failures since 2007, and may have contributed to an additional six failures where the cause was not conclusively determined. In response to the NRC’s conclusions, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS- 2015-03951. Further, the licensee modified all vulnerable Masterpact circuit breakers to remove this failure mechanism.

***Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to accomplish an operability determination in accordance with procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 8. Specifically, the licensee referenced non-conservative data, contrary to steps 5.5 and 5.11 of procedure EN-OP-104, when assessing the reduced reliability of Masterpact circuit breakers as a degraded or nonconforming condition. The licensee restored compliance by completing a design modification to eliminate the failure mode and initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-03952.
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Notes on 2015 River Bend

Remember Entergy's Arkansas One and Pilgrim are the worst operating plants in the USA according to the NRC.

When does Entergy and the NRC become overwhelmed by Entergy's fleet of power plants. When does the declining financial conditions in the nuclear industry start to overwhelm and numb the NRC?

River Bend: Unprecedented Four Special Inspections Ongoing at Entergy Plants

The Mike Mulligan's Special Inspection At River Bend?
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NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection


***Like who ever in the industry ever got two special inspection at one plant every in a year...


Reposted from 7/23/15

Update Sept 11

They are going to say they are trying to protect my confidentiality...they know what is best for me.

Generally the NRC gets very few, if any, request like this.

I bet you very few outsider ever gets a double header special inspection to a trouble plant. 

I think the agency and industry fears openly disclosing the "allegation letter" will raise my stature. 

note: It is a poor choice of mine making this letter on 9/11...anything 9/11 has nothing to do with this.  
Michael Mulligan   
RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

 I wanted to get the message out (holy crap) that I was really impressed with the agency's response to my complaint. How many outsiders ever initiated two special inspection at a US nuclear plant ever?  
Mrs. Weaver,  
 
I want the agency to put this response on the River Bend docket. So far this is just between me and the NRC. They have had issues with that in the past. Their wording is; as to not inhibit the NRC's allegation process and to protect your confidentiality/ anonymity...we are going to override your request to add secret allegation material onto Adams documents in the nation's and your best interest.     
Mike Mulligan
PO Box 161
Hinsdale, NH 03451
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV
1600 E. LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

June 2, 2015

SUBJECT: CONCERN YOU RAISED TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) REGARDING THE RIVER BEND STATION
RE: RIV-2015-A-0004

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

The NRC has completed its follow up in response to the concern you brought to our attention on January 5, 2015, regarding the River Bend Station. Your concern was related to equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance following scrams. The enclosure to this letter restates your concern and describes the NRC's review and conclusions with regard to the concern.

Thank you for informing us of your concern. Allegations are an important source of information in support of the NRC's safety mission. We take our safety responsibility to the public seriously and will continue to do so within the bounds of our lawful authority. We believe that our actions have been responsive to your concerns.

You should note that final NRC documents may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redaction of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act should be made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Requests for Records. Information is accessible from the NRC's website at http://www. nrc. gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-reouest. html#how.

Should you have any additional questions, or if the NRC can be of further assistance, please contact Mr. Jesse M. Rollins, Senior Allegations Coordinator, at the Region IV toll-free number 1-800-952-9677, extension 1245, Monday - Friday between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Central time. Information in writing may be provided to the address listed in the letterhead.

Greg Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
RESPONSE TO CONCERN

ALLEGATION RIV-2015-A-0004

Concern

Equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station and are not being addressed and resolved.

Response to Concern

You made a valid observation with regard to a number of contributing factors involved in the most recent events at the River Bend Station. These factors are currently being reviewed by the NRC staff. For instance, the NRC's most recent End-of-Cycle assessment of the River Bend Station identified that the River Bend Station's safety-significant performance indicator for Unplanned Scrams with Complications, crossed the White threshold during the 4th Quarter 2014. This was due to two unplanned scrams that the River Bend Station experienced in the 4th Quarter of 2014. As a result, the NRC plans to conduct Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." The main focus of this inspection will be to review the contributing factors that led to the scrams, and the conditions that gave rise to the complications encountered.

In looking at your concern, the NRC found that the specifics of the following event, and the NRC's response, to be relevant:
On December 25, 2014, at 8:37 a.m., the River Bend Station scrammed from 85 percent power following a trip of the B reactor protection system motor generator set. At the time of the motor generator set trip, a Division 1 half scram existed due to an unrelated equipment issue with a relay for the No. 2 turbine control valve fast closure reactor protection system function. The combination of the B reactor protection system motor generator set trip and the Division 1 half scram, resulted in a scram of the reactor.

The following equipment issues occurred during the initial scram response:
  • An unexpected Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal was received which resulted in tripping all reactor feedwater pumps.
  • Following reset of the Level 8 (high) reactor water level signal, operations personnel were unable to start RFP C. They responded by starting reactor feedwater pump A at a vessel level of 25". The licensee subsequently determined that the circuit breaker (Magne Blast type) for reactor feedwater pump C did not close because an interlock lever for a microswitch that controls the breaker close permissive was not fully engaged in the cubicle.
  • Following the start of reactor feedwater pump A, the licensee attempted to open the startup feedwater regulating valve but was unsuccessful prior to the Level 3 (low) reactor water RIV-2015-A-0004 level trip setpoint at +9.7". The licensee then opened main feedwater regulating valve C to restore reactor vessel water level. The lowest level reached was +7.5". Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a faulty manual function control card. The card was replaced by the licensee and the feedwater regulating valve was used on the subsequent plant startup.

Following restoration of reactor vessel water level, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3. A plant startup was conducted on December 27, 2014, with reactor protection system bus B being supplied by its alternate power source. During power ascension following startup, reactor feedwater pump B did not start. The licensee re-racked its associated circuit breaker and successfully started reactor feedwater pump B.

The NRC evaluated this event through its Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," to determine the level of NRC response appropriate for this event. Based on the multiple failures of the feedwater system, the potential generic concern with the Magne Blast circuit breakers, and the issues related to reactor vessel level between the Level 3 (low) and Level 8 (high) setpoints following a reactor scram, the NRC determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was to conduct a special inspection. 
On January 26, 2015, the NRC began the special inspection. This inspection was concluded on May 21. Similar issues to those listed by you were identified during this inspection. The results of this inspection will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2015009. This inspection identified a number of observations, issues, and findings-with regard to the licensee's equipment, maintenance, and operations personnel performance. 
In addition to the above event, on March 9, 2015, the River Bend Station experienced another event, whereby the HVK chiller 1 C failed to start, followed by the subsequent loss of the control building ventilation system. This event and associated equipment failures revealed a much broader concern that has been ongoing with an identified master pact breaker deficiency related to the breaker's ability to open and close. This, along with the issues associated with the GE Magne Blast circuit breakers described above, calls into question the overall adequacy of the licensee's breaker maintenance program. These concerns resulted in a second special inspection, which began on March 30, 2015 and was completed on May 28. Again, similar concerns to those listed by you were identified during this inspection.

These reports will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you are unable to retrieve these documents from ADAMS, you can request a copy from the NRC resident staff at the River Bend Station. 
Therefore, your concern that equipment issues leading to scrams and operator performance problems following scrams continue at the River Bend Station is valid. As previously stated, the NRC is currently monitoring the licensee's actions to resolve these issues, and the results of our inspections will be made available to the public upon issuance of our inspection reports.
RIV-2015-A-0004 2







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River Bend: NRC's Allegation Employee Mrs. Weaver Intentionally Blew Me Off



Reposted from 9/14/2015
I asked this senior Allegations employee...How old is the River Bend simulator. He told that information is protected, I can't tell you it. 
It's so silly... 
I hate the NRC Allegation department. They are too secrecy oriented and this effectively makes them gods unto themselves. They get to interpret the outsider allegations and the rules and regulations without adequate public oversight. I don't think they are properly overseen by senior management ever. Does the Allegation department meet the greater needs of the people who have unaddressed concerns and allegations or do they protect the NRC and licensees?
 
My choices with River Bend were to make a NRC allegation or directly talking to the residents. Outsiders have little influence with either these guys. I hate the arrogant Allegation department, with that in mind, I called the NRC River Bend resident. I hoped I could get the residents nervous with insider information, the inspectors would have a lot more credibility with Allegations. I was hoping from before the telephone call I could flip this into a special inspection. I had no chance talking to the allegation department flipped my concerns into a special inspection. 
 
I would consider the allegation department as having a infinite set of rules and regulation. All these rules and regulations get to be interpreted in a secretive agency process...effectively they get to deposition a allegation on a group and individual whim. Most allegations are flushed down the toilet by NRC design.  
 
So I am trying to get a little street cred over this and notify the industry that outsiders are watching.
 
1) From: Mike Mulligan
To R4ALLEGATION Resource
Sep 11 at 1:08 PM
Mrs. Weaver,
 
http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/07/nrc-proof-i-instigated-2014-christmas.html
“NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection”
 
I thought I made a request to the NRC to place my River Bend allegation closeout letter on the River Bend docket. I recently searched for it and couldn’t find it. Why do I feel the NRC understood my request, but decided to silently blow me off without an explanation? I thought the NRC would be fair and decent enough to at least give me an  written explanation why you won’t put my NRC allegation closeout letter on the docket. I just think there is an unseen agenda with the NRC, why this is not on Adams. It could also be a harmless oversight and I am paranoid?
What is the harm, it is already on the internet? I am a transparency freak and I think the world runs better with everything placed on the table where everyone can see it.  

Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
1-603-336-8320 

2) From: Mike Mulligan
To  R4ALLEGATION Resource
Sep 11 at 2:28 PM
Mrs. Weaver,

Here is my request sent to R4ALLEGATION REOURCE.

Mike
 
From: Mike Mulligan 
To R4ALLEGATION Resource
Jul 23
Mrs. Weaver,

Holy Crap. I am so surprised with this letter.

I request the NRC closure letter be placed on the River Bend Docket.

Could I discuss this with you say sometime next week or at your convenience?    
 
Thank You,

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

These is no doubt Mrs. Weaver read and understood my request to put the NRC closeout letter on the docket. She chose to not answer this and make believe she didn't see it. I am in a special category ... the special inspection was initiated on my request. She could have respected me, answered my question, she could have explained why it is not possible. She knew this would be controversial...so she just buried it. 
My problem now, is worrying this is what the allegation department does across the board. The Allegation departmental gets into a controversial problem...the agency finds a way to bury it or make believe they didn't even see the concern.  

The senior allegation inspector gave me a call today telling me putting my closeout letter on the docket was against NRC policy. They should have done that on my first request..


This wasn't a open discussion hashing out the problem, it was god has spoken and there is no way to contest it. I am the god, just accept it. 

 He said the the agency feels placing it on the docket would chill other employees from reporting problems to the NRC. Does the agency have any open analysis how this might occur or evidence it is a threat? Why didn't the agency withhold the result of my allegation as this might chill all the rest of the nuclear employees. 

This is what I mean by they are the gods. You can't create a open discussion if the chilling was valid. The NRC is great with mitigation...could they do something to mitigate the possible chilling effect? They could put a notification on top of close out letter...we put closeout letters on the docket strictly on the choice of the confidential concern maker. We would never release anything about alleger unless he positively requested it. I might make the case in a recent Millstone OI investigation and violation on 10 CFR 50.59 issues, a senior NRC official disclose to me it came from a Millstone alleger...came from the allegation program.
I asked the senior allegation department employee if he could memorize this conversation and put it on the docket. Could you give me a response to my request in writing? They ARE worried about seeing their written response on my blog. This guy knows their River Bend written closeout is up on my blog.  
I asked him could I talk to your boss about this problem. Could he call me...he said that won't be possible.
 
He reminded me there is the OIG. I consider the OIG as corrupt and most allegations vanishes in their black hole never to be seen again. So does the main line NRC troops tell the public you can make a complaint to the OIG knowing the complaint will vanish in the OIG cesspool. That is the little trick of the NRC, public concerns about the agency never goes up the management line for disposition and deeper discussions. They use the OIG to just disappear concerns about the agency. Certainly the licensees don't have this problem. 
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Requesting Another 'Mike Mulligan Special At River Bend", and then one on the ineffective NRC

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The Death Spiral Of Junk Plant Prairie Island

So they are discussing shutting downing PI in 2018. Now a official death cloud is hovering over everyone head. This plant has been
Xcel Remains Positive Despite Decrease in 2015 Earnings 
February 1, 2016

By Michael Brooks 
Xcel Energy last week reported net income of $984.5 million in 2015, a 3.6% decrease from $1.02 billion in 2014, as lagging sales and “negative” weather led to a decrease in revenue. The company brought in about $11 billion in 2015, compared to $11.7 billion in 2014.
extremely troublesome...busy. They are not self directed, the NRC has to hold their hands. They been teetering on the edge for many years. Sounds like they are so poor they have to kick out of the house the eldest child in order to save the youngest. 
Xcel Energy Waiting for Regulators to Approve Study of Nuclear Plant's Future 
Posted on Feb 16, 2016 
by Minnesota News Network 
(Red Wing, MN)  --  Xcel Energy is waiting on approval from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to move forward with an 18-month study on the future of Prairie Island nuclear plant in Red Wing. The study will examine the economics of possibly shutting down the facility before its
-----------------------------------------------

"Xcel also responded to concerns by state regulators about the ballooning cost of preserving its two nuclear power plants in Minnesota. The utility defended the projected investment of $1.2 billion or more over 15 years as cost-effective but said it is open to discussing early retirement of the Prairie Island nuclear plant in Red Wing, Minn."
----------------------------------------------- 
operating license expires in 2034. Though Xcel Energy believes the plant is a cost-effective part of its goal to
So you justify a two plant dog facility based on inconsequential CO2 emissions? CO2 emissions is making electricity much more expensive and is weakening the grid. Just get in the media eyes with problems. 

 I say again, the plant's capacity and edging towards more NRC attention, they are a extremely fragile condition. I don't trust their estimates. I'l add another billion dollars if the NRC gets on your case.    
reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the company is analyzing options for early decommissioning because of higher capital expenses over the next 20 years than originally expected. However, company officials say those are offset by lower-than-predicted operating and maintenance costs. A decision could be reached by 2018.
Xcel open tostudying options for nuclear plant’s future 
The filing, a supplement to Xcel Energy’s 2016-2030 Upper Midwest Resource Plan, states the company anticipates a $175 million increase in expenditures in the next five years over what was predicted in 2012, as well as increases of $600 million to $900 million from 2021 through 2034.
The driving costs are attributed to new requirements
The Fukushima response in not that expensive. It just the go-to excuse when they can't run this plant professionally.  
following the 2011 Diiachi nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan, and a general increase in regulations by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
However, the increases are largely offset by lower-than-predicted operating and maintenance costs for the plant,
These guys are crazy. They have been squeezing operating and maintenence budgets for years, It looks like you shifting operating and maintenance cost into the Fukushima response. It looks like they have been putting putting off maintenence work for years...there is a back log of work.   
Xcel Energy noted. The company expects to spend $1 billion less in fixed costs at Prairie Island through 2034.
And the fracking miracle is breathing down their throats. Lets not even talk about Monticello's botched upgrade. 
Xcel Remains Positive Despite Decrease in 2015 Earnings 
“I am pleased with our 2015 results,” CEO Ben Fowke said. “We delivered earnings within our guidance range despite negative weather and certain regulatory challenges.”
The $2.09 EPS excluded a $79 million charge ($0.15/share) from cost overruns on the upgrade of its Monticello nuclear plant. 
The decrease in revenue was partially offset by reduced natural gas costs and operations and maintenance expenses, as Xcel improved efficiency at its nuclear plants. 
These guys are under the Mike Mulligan watch. Monticello and PI are under my watch. 

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Moody: Negative outlook For NE Power Generators

Moody’s raises concerns in wake of power auction
Changes outlook to negative for region’s electricity generatorsBy Bruce Mohl  Feb 16, 2016 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE on Tuesday issued a negative outlook for the region’s power generators in the wake of a very successful auction held last week to secure electricity supplies for New England in 2019-2020.
Each year, the operator of the regional power grid holds a so-called forward capacity auction to secure electricity supplies three years out. The auction sets the price generators receive for having their plants ready to produce power when needed. (Power generators pay a steep fine of $2,000 per megawatt hour if they are not able to deliver power when needed.) In addition to the capacity payments, generators also get paid a wholesale price for the energy they actually deliver. 
Last week’s forward capacity auction easily secured enough electricity to meet the region’s power needs at a price that was $1 billion, or 25 percent less, than the clearing price of the previous year’s auction. 
Moody’s said in an analysis that the plentiful supplies and the low price “confirm our expectations that the downturn in the merchant sector is likely to persist,” resulting in a negative outlook for the industry.Moody’s said companies such as Dynegy Inc., Exelon Corp., NRG Energy, Dominion Resources, and NextEra Energy will see their cash flows pinched. Moody’s said debt issued by such power generators as Entergy Rhode Island State Energy LP, Essential Power LLC, and FirstLight Hydro Generating Co. will be negatively affected.
The downturn in forward capacity prices was driven by 1,459 megawatts of new generation, 371 megawatts of demand-side resources (promises by large energy users to reduce usage when called upon by the power grid operator), 27 megawatt s of new wind power, and 44 megawatts of new large-scale solar. Moody’s also noted that the region’s power grid operator, ISO-New England, had estimated that rooftop solar installations were reducing overall demand in the region by 390 megawatts, the equivalent of 57 percent of the output of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, which is slated for retirement...
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Tuesday, February 16, 2016

The New York Power Authority and Robert Moses


http://www.nypa.gov/about/history1.htm

Remember when we had the confidence to make private enterprise and government work for us? Remember when we made our big ideas come to life?  
Ultimately what led to the demised of the NYPA was the secrecy placed over the organization to protect the politicians and their cronies.
It's too bad Albany is still wrapped up in state government corruption.
I am surprised the NYPA is still around. 
This is the great story of how we once did Infrastructure.    

New York Power Authority and Robert Moses

"...The 2,400,000-kw Niagara Power Project was the largest hydropower complex in the Western World when it began operating in January 1961, less than three years after construction began. President John F. Kennedy, who joined three former presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman and Herbert Hoover in sending congratulations, called the Niagara project "an outstanding engineering achievement" and an "example to the world of North American efficiency and determination."
The Second Generation 
Low-cost power from the two giant hydroelectric projects flowed to upstate consumers and to factories providing thousands of jobs. But with most of New York's hydroelectric potential already developed, attention shifted to new sources of energy to meet increasing needs. In this climate, the Power Authority's "second generation" of power projects emerged.
In 1967, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller organized a blue-ribbon panel to study the state's power needs and the most economical ways of meeting them. The committee recommended, among other things, that the Power Authority be permitted to build nuclear and pumped storage hydroelectric plants. A bipartisan bill providing such authorization passed both houses of the Legislature in early 1968. Rockefeller, in signing the measure, said it created "a unique partnership between government and private industry in meeting the future power needs of the state."
In 1969, construction began on the Blenheim-Gilboa Pumped Storage Power Project (1,040,000 kw), in the Catskill Mountains, and the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (820,000 kw), named after the Power Authority's chairman at the time and located on the shores of Lake Ontario, near Oswego. The Blenheim-Gilboa project began operation in 1973; the FitzPatrick plant generated its first electricity two years later.
Meanwhile, still other new assignments were transforming the Power Authority into a truly statewide utility.
In 1972, Governor Rockefeller and the Legislature responded to an emerging energy shortfall by giving NYPA the go-ahead to build generating plants to power downstate subways and commuter trains. Then came the 1973 Mideast oil embargo and a four-fold increase in oil prices. To help Con Edison, the New York metropolitan area's primary utility, weather the resulting financial crisis, Governor Malcolm Wilson and the Legislature in 1974 directed the Power Authority to buy, complete and operate two power plants the private utility was building. The arrangement called for the Power Authority to sell most of the plants' output to government agencies in New York City and Westchester County.
One of the plants, the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant (970,000 kw), on the Hudson River in northern Westchester, began operation in 1976. The other facility, located in Queens, was the oil-fired Astoria 6, which began operation in 1977. It was later converted to also burn natural gas and renamed the Charles Poletti Power Project (825,000 kw) for the only person to serve both as governor of New York and a Power Authority trustee..."
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