FitzPatrick: What The Death Rattles Of A Dying Nuke Plant Looks Like

Doesn't Pilgrim with their Safety Relief Valves and Fitzpatrick with their Leaking main condenser look similar? 

Then they recently did the expensive main condenser retube job. What a waste of money?

This severely challenges Entergy's credibility on managing their Enterprise under changing times. Didn't Exelon's CEO Row admit he never seen the natural gas fracking miracle coming? How do these electric utilities CEOs make many tens of million dollars a year being so stupid?

Maybe Entergy can turn Fitzpatrick's new titanium main condenser tubes into radiation titanium gonad (testicles)protection shields for Palisades. (insider joke). The new titanium tubes are just a year old?  

(2014)"During the outage, workers will replace 184 fuel assemblies in the reactor and perform various maintenance activities, tests and inspections on plant equipment. Other major work includes a complete retube of the plant’s main condenser. The plant’s existing condenser tubes constructed of admiralty brass will be replaced with titanium tubes designed to be resistant to silt and other abrasive sediments found in Lake Ontario. 

The new condenser tube material was selected for its long-life expectancy and resistance to environmental erosion and corrosion conditions. The life span for the retubed condenser is projected to exceed the station’s extended period of operation. In 2008 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved FitzPatrick’s renewed operating license allowing the station to operate an additional 20 years beyond the original license, to 2034. 

“Significant capital investments are scheduled during this refueling outage that will contribute to FitzPatrick’s continued safe and reliable operations,” said Larry Coyle, site vice president and top Entergy official at FitzPatrick. “The FitzPatrick team has worked hard since our last refueling outage and the employees take pride in our commitment to safety first and foremost at all times.”

I got to give Entergy credit with the Pilgrim plant. They didn't purchase expensive top of the line SRVs. The replaced their dangerous and defective 3 stage SRVs with cheap obsolete, dangerous and defective 2 stage SRVs they had in the plant in 2009. I got to give Entergy credit, they are not going to waste money like they did at Fitzpatrick?   

FitzPatrick nuclear plant put off repairs, now plagued by water leaks

SCRIBA, N.Y. - An aging cooling system at the FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County is springing leaks so often that plant operators had to reduce power 11 times during the first three months of 2014 so that workers could plug the leaks.

FitzPatrick's condenser, which circulates Lake Ontario water for cooling, leaks far more any other U.S. plant, in part because FitzPatrick operators failed to repair the aging equipment, according to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

View full sizeThe rate of unplanned power reductions at FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County has fallen off the chart established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to monitor that indicator of plant performance. The number of unplanned power changes per 7,000 hours of operation is one measure of plant stability.NRC 

Now the leaks cause FitzPatrick to reduce power so often that the NRC keeps the plant under heightened oversight.

Nuclear regulators say the leaky condenser does not pose a major safety issue, and the leaks are expected to be resolved by a major repair during a refueling outage later this year.

But in a report issued Monday the NRC also criticized plant owner Entergy Corp. for not doing a better job of anticipating problems with the condenser tubes and getting them fixed before now.

The condenser at FitzPatrick was last replaced in 1995, and the metal tubes within the condenser have an expected lifespan of 15 years, NRC officials said.

"Entergy had earlier opportunities to recognize the degradation of the main condenser tubes and to act to address that,'' said Neil Sheehan, of the NRC, in an email. "There were condition reports internal to the plant in 2007 and 2009 that indicated the condenser was nearing its end of life.''

At this point, frequent plugging of the leaks is a "reasonable" tactic until the condenser can be overhauled during a refueling outage this fall, NRC officials said.

If a nuclear plant reduces power unexpectedly more than six times in 7,000 hours of operation, the NRC puts the plant under heightened oversight. FitzPatrick has been in that category since January 2013, and its unplanned power change rate recently plummeted to 18.4 per 7,000 hours.

On 15 other performance indicators measured by the NRC, FitzPatrick has good ratings.

An independent nuclear safety watchdog, David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the leaks pose no immediate threat absent other equipment failures, but they represent an "amazingly steep declining safety trend.''

Entergy officials continue to make safety their first concern, said Mark Sullivan, speaking for the company.

"The safety and security of FitzPatrick remains our top priority,'' Sullivan wrote in an email. "We applaud the team for the outstanding job they do every day in striving for excellence. We are proud of the way the Fitz team faces challenges and produces outstanding results.''

The condenser is a large metal box positioned beneath the nuclear plant's generating turbine. Steam that drives the turbine then passes through the condenser, where it is cooled and returned to a liquid state by water from Lake Ontario, which circulates in thousands of small metal tubes.

Silt and other abrasive sediments from the lake wear away at the inside of the tubes and can eventually cause leaks, said Sullivan, of Entergy. The most recent leak was May 4.

To find a leak and fix it, operators must reduce the plant's power output, typically by 50 percent. That cuts what the plant can earn from power sales.

Last year, Entergy officials openly expressed concern about the financial health of FitzPatrick, saying New York state's wholesale energy market did not allow the plant to earn enough revenue. Some Wall Street analysts said FitzPatrick was among a handful of plants at risk of closing for financial reasons. The company's fortunes have improved since then.

Thanks to high winter electric prices, Entergy Wholesale Commodities, the subsidiary that owns FitzPatrick and five other nukes, earned $444 million before taxes during the first quarter of 2014, compared with $194 million the year before.

Nuclear critics started drawing attention to FitzPatrick's condenser problem last year.
Lochbaum, a former nuclear plant engineer who now works for the Union of Concerned Scientists, filed a petition in July 2013 asking the NRC to order Entergy to make the repairs this year. Otherwise, he argued, the company might delay the repair. The NRC has yet to rule on that request.

At the time Lochbaum filed his petition, FitzPatrick had experienced 16 condenser tube leaks in a little more than two years, compared with just 12 during that time at all other U.S. nuclear plants.

"Troubling is the recent trend that strongly suggests the bad situation at FitzPatrick is getting worse,'' Lochbaum wrote in the 2013 petition. "FitzPatrick reported three condenser tube events in 2011, nine in 2012, and four during the first three months of 2013."

Contacted by email Friday, Lochbaum said the 11 events during the first quarter of 2014 represented an "amazingly steep'' decline in safety performance.

"Babe Ruth's home run record was beaten,'' Lochbaum wrote. "Lou Gehrig's continuous game record was beaten. Dan Marino's touchdown pass in a season record was beaten. Entergy's condenser tube leak event record will never be broken, even if some company wanted to try."

The condenser is the normal "heat sink'' for energy produced by the reactor core. If the condenser is unavailable, steam produced by the reactor core flows through pipes down into a large water well called the torus and gets cooled there, Lochbaum said. Other emergency systems cool the water inside the torus to allow it to continue to function as an energy sponge.

An unreliable condenser only becomes a safety issue if the backup systems fail also, Lochbaum said. That's what happened at the Fukushima meltdown in Japan. But allowing the condenser to deteriorate creates a "pre-existing impairment,'' Lochbaum said.

"If the luck runs out and the pre-existing impairment factors into a nuclear accident, it'll be hard for Entergy and the NRC to claim they took all reasonable measures to avoid it,'' he wrote

Entergy: Fitzpatrick Shutting Down Years Before Pilgrim (end of 2016)

Entergy to close FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County

SCRIBA, N.Y. – Entergy Corp. plans to shut down its money-losing FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Oswego County after the reactor runs out of fuel next year.

Entergy officials called a meeting of employees today to announce that the company will not install more enriched uranium fuel rods next September, which would be required to continue operating the facility beyond the end of 2016.

Barring some unexpected intervention by state officials, the 850-megawatt facility will shut down in late 2016 and begin laying off its 615 employees.  

Oswego County officials have been dreading the loss of FitzPatrick's $74 million annual payroll and its $17.3 million in yearly property tax payments. All told, FitzPatrick's operation is thought to support $500 million or more in local economic activity.

We recognize the consequences of the shutdown for our employees and the surrounding community and pledge to do our best to support both during this transition.'' said Leo Denault, CEO of Entergy, in a prepared statement. "As a company, we
are committed to ensuring the well-being of our employees, and appreciate their continued dedication to making safe, clean, secure and reliable operations a top priority,"

New York energy officials will review the impact of FitzPatrick's loss on the regional power grid. If they decide the shutdown should be delayed, they could order utility ratepayers to subsidize the plant temporarily, but only until replacement power sources are found.

Members of Gov. Andrew Cuomo's administration have been in private discussions with Entergy for months, apparently seeking a compromise that would keep FitzPatrick open. Many observers suspect the talks centered around Entergy's profitable Indian Point nuclear plant in Westchester County. Cuomo has fought Entergy's application for a 20-year extension of Indian Point's operating license.

Entergy has previously announced the closings of two New England nuclear plants that lose money, and FitzPatrick fits the same mold.

Pilgrim Diesel Generator; Example of "Are minds drifting at Pilgrim"?

This is my example of the NRC is managing the decline of Pilgrim. This should have been a lot bigger violation.

Personally I think this comes from all the hard starts these DGs have undergone in recent years in "Loss of Offsite Power" accidents. They are wearing them out. I predicted next LOOP, both DGs started up needing to supply the plant, one would fail on premature wear.  

***Any little corrupt trick to get onto the other side of the surveillance-"Entergy staff determined that the X-107B EDG had been and remained operable because the volume of fluid that had been discharged would not have produced a hydraulic lock on cylinder 9L and therefore would not have prevented the engine from starting. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F at 2:30 AM.

General incompetence-"In discussions with the inspectors, Entergy staff stated that the condition did not render the EDG inoperable, but that they were entering voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation and troubleshooting only."

***Bet you for months they have been adding water to the expansion tank. Have they been getting low level alarms when operating. They log filling the expansion tank...this is first thing the inspectors should have done is get the long term trend on filling the expansion and fill tanks.   

***From identification of the issue through correction of the problem by replacement of the 9L cylinder head, Pilgrim staff maintained that the condition had not caused the X-107B EDG to be inoperable.

***"Entergy staff stated that their EDGs were capable of operating with one cylinder removed from service; however, were unable to provide the inspectors with any design documents or engineering calculations showing that the EDGs would be capable of supplying design basis loads under such conditions."

***"Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states that, for an immediate operability determination, “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.”


I still think Entergy massaged this into a non cited violation from a required shutdown...

August 11, 2015

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED 

INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2015002

Pg 17

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 – 6 samples)

Description. On March 18, 2015, at 2:15 AM, operators entered TS 3.5.F, “Minimum Low Pressure Cooling and Diesel Generator Availability,” to perform pre-startup checks of the X-107B EDG in accordance with procedure 8.9.1, “Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance,” Revision 129. TS 3.5.F provides a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) that can be extended to 14 days provided that all low pressure core and containment cooling systems, and the SBO diesel generator are determined to be operable. When the engine was rolled over with air to verify that no fluid was present in any of the cylinders, engine coolant was instead observed to spray out of the open cylinder test cock on cylinder 9L. Entergy staff estimated that approximately six ounces of fluid was discharged. This issue was entered into the CAP as CR-2015-02109. Entergy staff determined that the X-107B EDG had been and remained operable because the volume of fluid that had been discharged would not have produced a hydraulic lock on cylinder 9L and therefore would not have prevented the engine from starting. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F at 2:30 AM. 

On March 18, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Entergy staff determined that an inspection of cylinder 9L should be performed, and entered TS 3.5.F. Initial troubleshooting was inconclusive as to where the leak was coming from, leading Entergy staff to exit TS 3.5.F and prepare additional troubleshooting plans. At 4:00 PM, Entergy staff entered TS 3.5.F to continue troubleshooting and perform additional inspections of the cylinder head. The scope of this activity subsequently expanded to include replacement of the associated cylinder head. In discussions with the inspectors, Entergy staff stated that the condition did not render the EDG inoperable, but that they were entering voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation and troubleshooting only. Entergy staff performed surveillance procedure 8.9.16.1, “Manually Start and Load Blackout Diesel via the Shutdown Transformer,” Revision 48, at 5:40 PM, to extend the TS 3.5.F allowed outage time to 14 days. Testing of the replaced head showed the source of the leakage to have been from the area of the cylinder exhaust valves. Entergy’s immediate corrective actions included replacement of the X-107B EDG 9L cylinder head and sending out the damaged cylinder head for analysis by a vendor. The completion of the analysis by the vendor is being tracked by CR-2015-2109. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F following successful post maintenance testing at 6:11 AM on March 21, 2015. From identification of the issue through correction of the problem by replacement of the 9L cylinder head, Pilgrim staff maintained that the condition had not caused the X-107B EDG to be inoperable. Entergy staff stated that their EDGs were capable of operating with one cylinder removed from service; however, were unable to provide the inspectors with any design documents or engineering calculations showing that the EDGs would be capable of supplying design basis loads under such conditions.

The inspectors reviewed CR-2015-02109 and the associated apparent cause evaluation (ACE). While the inspectors agreed that the as-found condition would not have prevented the X-107B EDG from starting, they did not conclude that the EDG remained operable. Although the source of the engine coolant leak was unknown at the time of discovery, it could reasonably have been due to a crack in the cylinder head. Such a leak would have the possibility of worsening during engine operation. Although hydraulic locking of the cylinder would not be a realistic concern during engine operation, increased engine coolant leakage into the cylinder would result in water intrusion into the crankcase and lubricating oil sump, which would eventually cause the engine to fail to operable after engine coolant had been identified in cylinder 9L.

Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states that, for an immediate operability determination, “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.” In this case, at the time of discovery, although the cause of the leak had not been established, it could reasonably have been due to a crack in the cylinder head. For the reasons discussed above, it could be concluded that this condition would not support a determination that the X-107B EDG remained operable. Additionally, an operability determination example presented in Attachment 9.1, “Operability Classification Guide,” of this procedure indicates that an EDG that cannot run for the duration assumed in the current licensing basis should be considered inoperable. SDBD-61, “Design Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG),” states, “The ‘mission time’ for the design basis Loss-of-Coolant- Accident (LOCA) is 30 days for the long term containment cooling analysis, as described in TDBD100 “Design Basis Document for Design Basis Accidents, Transients and

Special Events (DBATS).” Therefore, the inspectors further concluded that Pilgrim staff also should reasonably have concluded that the X-107B EDG should have been declared inoperable after engine coolant had been identified in cylinder 9L.

TS 3.5.F, “Minimum Low Pressure Cooling and Diesel Generator Availability,” provides a 72 hour allowed outage time for one EDG, provided the remaining EDG is demonstrated to be operable per TS SR 4.5.F.1. TS SR 4.5.F.1 requires that, within 24 hours, a determination be made that the operable EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or that the monthly TS-required surveillance test be performed for the operable EDG, and that, within 1 hour and every 8 hours thereafter, correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability for each offsite circuit be verified. If these requirements cannot be met, TS 3.5.F further requires that the reactor be placed in cold shutdown within 24 hours. Since Entergy staff did not declare the X-107B EDG inoperable as a result of the engine coolant leakage issue, but instead entered what Entergy staff considered to be voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation, only the portion of TS SR 4.5.F.1 for offsite breaker verification was performed. Therefore, the inspectors additionally concluded that Entergy staff’s failure to perform the required determination that the operable EDG was not inoperable due to common cause failure constituted a violation of TS 3.5.F.

The TS-required monthly surveillance test was satisfactorily completed on the X-107A EDG on April 2, 2015, approximately two weeks after the X-107B EDG 9L cylinder head coolant leakage event. While this did not eliminate the TS violation discussed above, it did demonstrate that, from a risk perspective, the X-107A EDG had been capable of performing its design safety function during that period.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that Entergy’s inadequate operability determination of the X-107B EDG after engine coolant was found in one of the cylinders, and resultant failure to determine that the X-107A EDG was not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or to perform the complete TS-specified EDG monthly surveillance test, within 24 hours in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1, was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy’s ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Entergy staff inadequately determined that the X-107B EDG was operable, which resulted in the operability of the X-107A EDG not being verified, either through determination that it was not inoperable due to a common cause failure or performing TS SR 4.5.F.1 in its entirety. 

In accordance with IMC 0609.04, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,” the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Conservative Bias, because Entergy staff did not use decision making practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that are simply allowed. Specifically, Entergy staff’s operability determination for the X-107B EDG was based on the conclusion that the as found condition would not have caused the engine to be inoperable because it would not have created a hydraulic lock; they did not consider that the condition would likely worsen during EDG operation, nor did their operability determination consider EDG mission time [H.14]. 

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” states, in part, that “activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings… and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.” Procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states, in part, that “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.” Also, during any period when one EDG is inoperable, TS 3.5.F allows continued reactor operation during the succeeding 72 hours, provided that the remaining EDG is demonstrated to be operable in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1. TS SR 4.5.F.1 requires that, within 24 hours, a determination be made that the operable EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or that the monthly surveillance test be performed on the operable EDG in accordance with TS SR 4.9.A.1.a, and that, within 1 hour and once every 8 hours thereafter, correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability for each offsite circuit be verified. If this requirement cannot be met, then the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

Contrary to the above, on March 18, 2015, Entergy staff performed an inadequate operability determination of the X-107B EDG following indications of engine coolant leakage in cylinder 9L, the X-107A EDG was not demonstrated to be operable in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1, in that a determination that the X-107A EDG was not inoperable due to a common cause failure was not made, nor was the monthly surveillance test performed on the X-107A EDG in accordance with TS SR 4.9.A.1.a. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy staff entered this issue into their CAP as CR-2015-2109, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000293/2015002-02, Inadequate Operability Determination for the X-107B EDG Results in TS Violation)

Pilgrim: I Am Startled In A Good Way With The Honesty Today

Well, the NRC is going to report it all in a inspection report anyways.

"Plant Struggles To Maintain Its Aging Plant"

Pilgrim plant workers aim for a safe shutdown

By David Abel Globe Staff  October 31, 2015

PLYMOUTH — Behind the barbed-wire fences and heavily armed guards protecting the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Steve Verrochi and his department heads huddled around a long table to review the daily report of potential safety concerns at one of the nation’s most troubled nuclear plants. 

A component of the security system had been declared “unreliable” and an “unexpected alarm” had gone off in the plant’s control room. Some fans at the huge plant had failed, and a radiation monitor required repairs after being struck by lightning. There were leaky seals, malfunctioning gauges, corroding pipes, and a computer that ceased providing real-time data about reactor power.

***And the maintenance workers were falling behind on their repairs. 

“We need to get back on track,” Verrochi, the plant’s general manager, told his staff at that recent morning meeting, as a Globe reporter looked on. “The last couple of weeks we’ve been off the mark.”  

This month, Entergy Corp. announced that it will shutter the money-losing plant no later than June 2019. Plant officials, as well as federal regulators, insist that Pilgrim remains safe, even as company officials say the plant is losing about $40 million a year, and that they expect to pay tens of millions of dollars to comply with new federal inspections. But antinuclear activists argue that the plant is unsafe and fear that Entergy will now scrimp on safety to save cash.

 

Maintenance at the 43-year-old plant has received increased scrutiny since the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission downgraded Pilgrim’s safety ranking in September, designating the plant as having one of the nation’s three least-safe reactors.

The meeting in a white-walled conference room of the operations building reflected the risks of continuing to run a 43-year-old plant, which will start the decades-long task of decommissioning after it closes.

‘There’s a lot of obsolete stuff out there. We do a lot of repairs.’ 

John Ohrenberger, who oversees maintenance staff at plant 

During the visit, the plant’s attention to safety and security concerns was evident nearly everywhere throughout the sprawling facility along Cape Cod Bay. 

Guards in black fatigues, who carry assault rifles and handguns, patrol the property and keep a close watch from scores of cameras and bulletproof towers. They regularly train for terrorist attacks and store weapons in gun lockers and armored vehicles, while local and federal law enforcement officials patrol the waters beyond the rocky sea wall off the coast. 

Visitors must pass through a gantlet of security before nearing sensitive areas, including massive concrete barriers to protect against truck bombs, steel turnstile doors that require handprints to open, and X-ray machines that examine the contents of bags and others that check for explosive residue.  

Inside, posters exhort employees to mind their ALARA, the ubiquitous acronym reminding them to reduce their radiation exposure to “as low as reasonably achievable.” 

Others remind them that “every millirem counts” and “we are all responsible for radiation protection.”

Craig F. Walker/Globe Staff 

A spent fuel pool contains thousands of fuel assemblies.

The average US resident is exposed to about 620 millirem of radiation a year, according to the regulatory commission; Pilgrim allows its employees near radiation until they absorb 1,200 millirem. If there’s a major emergency, plant officials allow them to be exposed to as much as 20,000 millirem. 

 

High doses of radiation can cause cancer, but the regulatory commission says on its website that “there are no data to establish a firm link between cancer and doses below about 10,000 millirem.” 

Employees who work in the containment area at Pilgrim are required to wear devices that track their radiation

John Ohrenberger, who oversees 95 employees who do maintenance at the plant, said he used to get about 1,200 millirem of radiation a year as a nuclear mechanic. He wasn’t concerned about the routine radiation exposure, even as his staff’s workload has risen to address the plant’s aging systems. 

***“There’s a lot of obsolete stuff out there,” he said. “We do a lot of repairs.” 

Those jobs include working inside the drywell that houses the reactor, where hundreds of highly radioactive fuel rods generate steam that turns the plant’s turbines to create electricity. 

Plant officials use equipment to suck nitrogen out of the air before the workers open the steel hatch to enter the steamy drywell, which is where Tom Wonsey found himself last January when one of four critical safety valves failed. 

***The nuclear mechanic was part of a team that spent about 30 hours wearing special anticontamination suits, using wrenches to replace the bulky valve, which weighs more than 1,000 pounds and helps cool the reactor when it powers down. That failure, following previous safety valve problems, led the regulatory commission to downgrade the plant’s safety rating. 

Yet the prolonged proximity to the reactor didn’t faze Wonsey, who estimates he has been exposed to about 1,000 millirem of radiation this year. “I’ve never seen anything to be concerned about the plant’s safety,” he said between jobs at the plant.

Craig F. Walker/Globe Staff 

David Noyes of Entergy walked past dry cask storage units last week during a tour of the Pilgrim nuclear plant.

Plant officials showed the redundant systems they would use to prevent a calamity, including water pumps and diesel generators stored in multiple locations, well above sea level. They would be used in the event the plant lost power to cool the reactor, as occurred in Japan after a tsunami in 2011 ravaged the Fukushima nuclear plant. 

While Entergy has invested millions of dollars in safety upgrades to comply with new federal regulations triggered by Fukushima, some longtime employees acknowledge they can only prepare for what they can foresee. 

“When Fukushima happened, it took everyone aback,” said Paul Smith, a staff engineer who has worked at Pilgrim

***

since 1968. “It taught us we don’t know everything. It also taught us modesty.” 

In the coming years, as the plant enters the decommissioning process, its employees will still have dangerous work to do. They’ll have to transfer 3,162 highly radioactive fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to massive casks, a delicate, expensive task that will leave them indefinitely on a large concrete pad beside the reactor building. 

Helping ensure that the plant complies with federal safety regulations is Erin Carfang, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s senior resident inspector at Pilgrim. 

She said she goes wherever she wants at the plant and has issued multiple violations to Pilgrim, including the one earlier this year that led the regulatory commission to downgrade its safety rating. 

***If the plant becomes unsafe, Carfang said, she wouldn’t hesitate to recommend it be closed before 2019. She has young children and lives near the plant, she added.
“We believe there is an adequate safety margin for the plant to continue operating,” she said in her office. “We have a vested interest in keeping it safe.” 

So why didn't the NRC listen to me in my 2013 petition on the SRVs? I had everything in my 2013 petition the NRC later discovered in their 2015 SRV inspection report and violation finding.  

At the recent morning meeting, the 27-page report the group reviewed showed that the plant’s staff had already been exposed to nearly 97 percent of the radiation that Pilgrim officials had set as a goal for the year. 

Verrochi also heard reports from maintenance, engineering, security, and other departments about concerns both big and small. 

***Verrochi worried that “mental distractions” could lead to “severe consequences.” 

“It’s all about being deliberate,” he reminded the staff. “If you find yourself in a situation where your mind drifts, it’s time to readjust.” 

Verrochi discussed how to “finish strong in 2019” and gently reprimanded the staff for being three minutes late to the meeting, which prompted the department heads to flash a thumbs-down sign in unison. 

Then he praised the staff for their alertness and “excellent job” responding to a leak in the control room, prompting a thumbs-up from the staff. 

“Be deliberate and act with integrity,” he told them before adjourning the meeting.

Fifteen Years of Data on Hope Creek's 2 Stage SRVs

Ok, put together these recent events. Put the puzzle together. What picture do you see. The dual recirc pump trip. The out of alignment srv and it piping. The come-along who broke the SRV before operation. The dinged SRV piping...many pipe...with a pipe wrench gouge weakening it. The prolong operation with the leaking SRV on strong indications. The whole deal with the SRV set point inaccuracy. Leaking SRV and using safety equipment (torus cooling) to accommodate poor maintenance. Hope Creek has painted a picture with these events…what commonalities do you see in it all. What picture do you see in the puzzle?   

I called two Hope Creek telephone numbers this morning explaining the SRV problem...gave them a opportunity to talk to me. Nothing yet

Right, in 2000 Hope Creek said all is fixed with the SRVs. I see a trends from 2000 to today of a drastic increase in the magnitude of inaccuracies going higher than required tech spec limits and a drastic increase in testing valve failures per operating period. The reliability the Hope Creeks SRVs has drastically declined in 15 years. Over and over again Hope Creek has opined after each poor operational period, we now are positive we got a handle on the SRV maintenance and reliability issues. But each operational period only gets worst. In 2000 Hope Creek had a SRV failure of 14%. In the most recent period in their NRC reporting it is at a 71% failure rate. The current failure rate is 5 times worst than 2000.

Hmm, Hope Creek had their first power up rate in 2001. It was 1.4%? Had another uprate in 2008 @ 15%. Is the SRV inaccuracy deal uprate related? 

Just saying, a 16.4% increase in power and no comparable increase in safety relief valve capacity?

How is the insulation situation around the SRVs with all this movement and power increase?   

There is clear and convincing evidence a majority of the SRVs aren't reliable enough to stay within tech specs limits for the operating period and the majority of the operational time Hope Creek really is prohibited from being at power according to plant licencing. I bet you at the 6 month operational period, if the plant was required to be shutdown and test their SRVs for lift pressure accuracy...five SRVs would be inop. According to tech specs, Hope Creek is required to have thirteen of fourteen fully functional.   

It is beyond shocking Hope Creek and NRC hasn't made a operability determination and why there was so many failures this past operating period. It is mind boggling! Why did we have 10 failures out of fourteenth...why have the rates changed so drastically in recent years. Isn't anyone inquisitive?

Why do I feel like the corrective actions on the distance past failures have led to a rash of new failures? 

Fifteen years of SRV LERs: 

Licensee Event Report 2015-004-01

10 of 14 failed tech specs testing 

Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00

5 failed 

Licensee Event Report 2013-005-00

SRV P solenoid failed to operate-they didn’t know at what point in the cycle. Manufacturer defect. Why didn’t testing pick this up before installation and during cycle?

  

(If this is a LER, how come the cold spring H SRV isn’t a LER?)

The SRV-P SOV (S/N 481) was a new valve purchased from Target Rock for installation in refueling outage H1R17.

A new SRV…it this why the Target Rock new SRV replacement deal fell through? What crap quality new valves.

Licensee Event Report 2012-004-01

6 failed

Outside tech specs by a huge margin  

Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01

6 failed

5 failed by corrosion bonding.

1 failed through a spring failure.

Taking about the change from plus or minus 1% t0 3%.

Outside Tech Specs by a huge margin.

Licensee Event Report 2009-002-001

6 failed with another with a question

Outside tech specs by a huge margin.

Was  the H SRV this period, was the bellows assemble noticeably distorted. What cause this distortion in 2009...

“For the sixth SRV, the bellows assembly was noticeably distorted.”

15% Power Uprate

LER 354/2006-003-00

3 failed tech specs accuracy.

All failed by 3.2%. It is highly implausible they all at the exact rate. It is an indicator of fraud.

LER 354/2004-009-00

“PSEG determined that the setpoint value for several safety relief valves” :)

5 failed set point accuracy

3 failed oxidation bonding

Unknown reason for the other two. The LER update on the two unknown failures are missing? 

LER 354/2003-003-00

8 failed tech spec setpoint testing

6 on setpoint testing

2 by leaking. A leaking SRV has a high probability of failing to operate on demand and the valve just opening on its own. A leaking SRV has a high probability of failing on setpoint inaccuracy. 

Implies these valves were leaking from the beginning: The offsite test procedure was revised to require the performance of an additional seat leakage test at 10 psig higher than the seat leakage certification test. This additional test provides added assurance of the valve's ability to be leak tight. The certification seat leakage test pressure is currently performed at the maximum operating pressure of 1010 psig.

LER 354/2001-007-00

3 failed tech spec testing

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2000-003-00

2 failed tech spec testing;

If only the next 15 years Hope Creek had two failures per refueling outage. Look at with the future record I provided.  In the next fifteen years, the magnitude of  inaccuracies have drastically worsened and the number of valves failures per operating period have drastically increased. Remember the most recent period had ten of fourteen SRVs being inop.

•  Prior to Cycle 9, pilot discs for thirteen of the fourteen SRVs were modified with platinum ion implantation to address problems with setpoint drift caused by corrosion bonding of the pilot disc to the pilot seat.

I think the below is basically a public con job and coning the public about fixing the SRVs is just going to continue in the future. Hope Creek and the NRC are just addicted to being deceptive. 

“On May 4, 2000, the results of the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) setpoint testing were received. The testing revealed that, following Cycle 9, 2 of the 14 SRVs experienced setpoint drift outside of the Technical Specification limit of +/ 3%. One of the failures was of a valve with a pilot disc that was modified with platinum ion implantation. The drift for this valve appears to have been caused by friction on the sliding surfaces resulting from poorly controlled maintenance performed by the valve vendor. These practices have been addressed via a NUPIC audit. Corrective actions have been proposed and their effectiveness is being monitored. The cause of the drift for the other valve is corrosion bonding of the pilot disc to the pilot seat. The SRVs were inspected, refurbished and satisfactorily re-tested at a test facility. SRV drift in two-stage Target Rock valves is being addressed generically by the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group. Platinum ion implantation has now been implemented on all 14 SRVs. The ion implantation process has resulted in a marked reduction of setpoint drift and will continue to be the primary solution for pilot disc to seat corrosion bonding.”

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES 

LER 95-004, LER 95-036, LER 354/97-024, and LER 354/99-003, reported events where SRV setpoint drift exceeded the Technical Specification allowable limits during previous operating cycles. The corrective actions taken to address setpoint drift have not been fully implemented; therefore, they were not entirely effective at eliminating this phenomena. However, the ion implantation process has reduced the magnitude of the setpoint drift and is expected to further reduce it after the corrective actions are fully implemented. As described in the following Corrective Actions section, PSE&G continues to work with the BWROG to resolve this issue.

2011 Edition: Hope Creeks SRV Tech Specs

The 10 violation average 6.5%. Bet you the average of the 14 reliefs is higher than 3.0%?

update 10/30

Why isn't LER 2015-004-01 a violation? Why did the NRC intentionally walk pass this violation last Sept 2014.

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected.

I don't have any conclusive proof at all the SRV weren't replaced with clean spares last sept 2014. Maybe they all only been in the plant for seven months.

2015-004-01

test results for the ten SRVs not meeting the TS requirements are as follows:

Valve ID As Found TS Lift Setting Acceptable Band % Difference

(psig) (psig) (psig)               Actual

F013C 1216 1130 1096.1 -1163.9     7.61%

F013F 1240 1108 1074.8 -1141.2     11.90%

F013G 1208 1120 1086.4 - 1153.6    7.86%

F013H 1148 1108 1074.8-1141.2      3.60% (in about 7 months)

F013J 1161 1120 1086.4 -1153.6     3.66%

F013K 1161 1108 107 4.8 -1141.2    4.80%

F013 L 1165 1120 1086.4 -1153.6    4.00%

F013 M 1207 1108 1074.8 -1141.2    8.90%

F013P 1221 1120 1086.4 -1153.6     9.00%

F013R 1169 1120 1086.4 -1153.6     4.38

Obviously these guys are in trouble. Going to have to look at the safety evaluation with why they need 13 of 14 SRVs. The NRC implies it is a reactor over power level and vessel pressure thing. 

This is what I mean by stove piping or siloing. Nobody considered a SRV pressure lift setpoint over limit could be discovered when the plant is operational. Nobody ever figured somebody would discover evidence of a inop could occur early in a operating cycle. Then the outside contender would discover a 72% failure rate in last cycle and Hope Creek has been whining about wanting to replace the poor reliability 2 stage SRV. There is very credible proof Hope Creek in recent years spent the majority of its operational time in a condition when they shouldn't have been allowed to operate. This is a perfect SRV storm and the industry will be studying or training on these events for many years.     

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES
SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.1 The safety valve function of at least 13 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE*# with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:**

4 safety-relief valves @ 1108 psig ±3%

5 safety-relief valves @ 1120 psig ±3%

5 safety-relief valves 0 1130 psig ±3%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the safety valve function of two or more of the above listed fourteen safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 110F, close the stuck open safety relief valve(s); if unable to close the stuck open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool average water
temperature is 110F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

c. With one or more of the above required safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitors to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

*SRVs which perform as ADS function must also satisfy the OPERABILITY requirements of Specification 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating.

**The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

#SRVs which perform a low-low set function must also satisfy the OPERABILITY requirements of Specification 3.4.2.2, Safety/Relief Valves Low-Low Set Function.
HOPE

TABLE 1.2
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
MODE SWITCH
POSITION
AVERAGE REACTOR
CONDITION COOLANT TEMPERATURE

1. POWER OPERATION

2. STARTUP

3. HOT SHUTDOWN

4. COLD SHUTDOWN

5. REFUELING

The Value Of Backing The Highest Cost Electricity.

See, the powerful Canadian cabal Entergy warn us about. They control both political parties...

Long term overpriced contracts are not in the public interest. 

Remember the natural gas fracking miracle...it is going to drive down electric prices for the next two decades. 

All the teabagger electricity interest always favors the highest price electricity that sets the price for the rest of energy sources. Baker and Dean's political interest always backs the highest energy source price. It is a policy that backs the collusion of all the electric energy sources. And high electricity prices always favors the profits of the electric utilities. Now you know the magic why all the politicians favors the highest cost electricity.     

Former Vt. Gov. Howard Dean backs Gov. Charlie Baker's hydropower bill 

By Shira Schoenberg | sschoenberg@repub.com masslive.com
on October 28, 2015 at 1:36 PM

BOSTON - Former Vermont governor Howard Dean met with Massachusetts Gov. Charlie Baker for an hour at his Statehouse office on Wednesday, as Dean threw his weight behind Baker's proposal to increase the use of hydropower in Massachusetts. 

The event was a unique bipartisan moment, with Dean, the former 2004 Democratic presidential candidate and chairman of the Democratic National Committee, supporting a proposal by Baker, a Republican governor.

"Isn't it nice to do something bipartisan in an election year?" Dean quipped. 

Baker's bill would require utilities to solicit long-term contracts for hydroelectric power. So rather than buying electricity daily, the utility could sign a contract with a supplier for several months. The legislation would authorize utilities in Massachusetts to work with utilities in Connecticut and Rhode Island to buy power together. The goal would be to allow Massachusetts utilities to get better rates on hydroelectric power by buying in bulk. 

Baker's legislation, which is being considered by the Democratic-controlled Legislature, has taken on increased urgency with the news that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station plans to close by 2019, which will require the state to come up with a way to replace the lost power.

Vermont faced a similar situation with the 2014 closure of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant. Dean, who was governor from 1991 to 2003, and the governors before and after him, have all signed contracts to import Canadian hydropower. Vermont also has its own…. hydroelectric generation facilities. According to a Vermont-based renewable energy group, in 2013, 20 percent of Vermont's electricity generation was produced from hydroelectric power…