Prairie Island Junk

306, 282

Why is xcel stock price off a huge almost 3% today?  I don't think its related to PI? 

Unit 2 also shut down in June for repairs after a turbine trip caused by low oil pressure.

Rework? 

What grand nuclear power plant overhaul did Excel bungle recently? 

Work wraps up on Prairie Island Unit 2

By Red Wing Newsroom on Dec 9, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.

News Red Wing,Minnesota 55066 http://www.republican-eagle.com/sites/all/themes/republicaneagle_theme/images/social_default_image.png

Red Wing Newsroom

Republican Eagle http://www.republican-eagle.com

Work wraps up on Prairie Island Unit 2

Red Wing Minnesota 2760 North Service Drive / P.O. Box 15 55066

The 29th refueling outage of Unit 2 at Prairie Island nuclear plant was completed Dec. 6, Xcel Energy announced Tuesday. More than 1,000 contractors and employees replaced about a third of the fuel in the reactor, as well as replaced its main electrical generator and step-up transformer — work only possible when the unit is offline. 

Knowing these guys another oil pipe cracked and oil began leaking on hot piping or oil soaked insulation. The crack wasn't big enough to trip the turbine...

LER 15-003-00

On June 7, 2015, Unit 2 Turbine Bearing Oil Pressure was normal at approximately 19 psig. At approximately 05:00, the Unit 2 Turbine Bearing Oil Pressure started to decrease. The Unit 2 Turbine Bearing Oil Pressure decreased at an increasing rate until at 07:35 oil pressure sharply decreased from approximately 17.7 psi to a level that required a turbine trip (trip setpoint is 6 psi). Unit 2 Turbine Bearing Oil Pressure quickly recovered from a low point as indicated on Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) of 4.3 psi at 07:36:19 to above 16 psi at 07:36:21. Turbine Bearing Oil Pressure was able to be maintained by the Turning Gear Oil Pump while the turbine was on turning gear at a nominal pressure of 21 psi. The Unit 2 Turbine was removed from the turning gear at 00:30 on June 8, 2015. The oil system was shut down a short time thereafter. Oil was drained from the Unit 2 Turbine Oil Reservoir on June 8, 2015 at 06:00. As a result of the investigation, the site identified a circumferential crack on a welded joint upstream of check valve 2T0-303 on June 8, 2015 at18:23. (Corrective Action Program (CAP) Action Request (AR) 1482236). The weld was repaired by Work Order 524416-06 on June 10, 2015. 

These guys have been continuously a problem plant for many years and decades. They are always in the reports.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51609
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND Region: 3 State: MN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: WAYNE SEXSON HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 12/17/2015 Notification Time: 14:33 [ET] Event Date: 12/17/2015 Event Time: 13:18 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/17/2015
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): NICK VALOS (R3DO) ALLEN HOWE (NRR) JEFFERY GRANT (IRD) BILL DEAN (NRR) DARRELL ROBERTS (R3 D)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE ALARM IN CONTAINMENT NOT VERIFIED WITHIN 15 MINUTES "Unusual Event HU2.1 declared at 1318 [CST]. A fire alarm was received in unit 2 containment at 1307 [CST]. Due to the location of the alarm, personnel were unable to verify the status within 15 minutes. At 1343 [CST], the fire alarm in containment cleared. This alarm came in shortly after a unit 2 reactor trip. The reactor trip was due to a turbine trip. Decay heat removal is via forced circulation with aux feed and steam dumps providing secondary cooling. Offsite power remains available." The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all control rods inserted. 25B feedwater heater relief valve lifted and has reseated. No offsite assistance was requested. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. State and local authorities were notified. * * * UPDATE ON 12/17/2015 AT 1734 EST FROM TOM HOLT TO DONG PARK * * * "The licensee terminated the NOUE [Notification of Unusual Event] at 1450 CST. The basis for the termination was determination that there was no smoke or fire in the Unit 2 containment observed during containment entry. "NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. State and local governments were notified. The health and safety of the public was not at risk." Notified the R3DO (Valos), NRR EO (Morris), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops enter, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

Safety Relief Valves SRVs melted In Fukushima

updated 12/18

Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Buna-N thread seals

I was coached the regs says the drywell environmental design temp is 340 degrees.

I think the original SRV manufacture had the actuator design seals high temp consideration right. It speaks to how unthoughtful we have become with the design of safety equipment and replacement parts. The first swipe in designs stated the replacement seal was required to be asbestos. Who even cares what temperatures the drywell got with the severely temperature resistant asbestos.

I have written a lot up on VY SRV actuator problems in the final years of the plant. Got a 2.206 on it. Just do a goggle search on popperville, Vermont Yankee, Safety Relief Valves and buna-n or some combination. 

***This reminds me of the Buno-n material they put in the Vermont Yankee's SRV actuators. Basically only qualified to 140 degrees when they needed 400 degrees in it. Mysteriously put in type II valves when it should have been type 1 valves. VY did this intentionally and the NRC allowed them to get away with it.

Collectively and systemically I feel the industry and the NRC has been undermining safety environmental qualification across the board for many years now.   

Safety Relief Valves melted In Fukushima. 

Delay in cooling Fukushima reactor possibly due to melted rubber, says Tepco

Kyodo

• Dec 17, 2015

The injection of water to cool one of the reactors that suffered meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear complex in 2011 was delayed because the rubber parts in valves used to reduce reactor pressure had possibly melted, the plant operator said Thursday. 

According to Tokyo Electric Power Co., the component that may have melted is part of a device used to open the so-called safety relief valve when steam building up inside the reactor pressure vessel needs to be released in an emergency. 

Tepco had been unable to explain why workers faced difficulty opening the safety relief valves of the No. 2 reactor, but the company now says “one of the reasons” may have been because the component melted and was not able to function properly. 

The temperature limit for the component was about 170 degrees Celsius, but Tepco found it was able to withstand that level of temperature for only several hours. 

The nuclear crisis began on March 11, 2011, when earthquake-triggered tidal waves hit the plant, flooding electrical equipment and leading to the loss of reactor cooling systems. 

The system that had kept cooling the No. 2 reactor ceased on March 14. Workers sought to inject water by using fire trucks, but could not do so because the pressure inside the reactor was too high. 

Tepco thus sought to open the eight safety relief valves by using battery power, but the operation did not go smoothly. After several attempts the valves were finally opened, enabling water to be poured inside the reactor. 

For a safety relief valve to open, it needs to be supplied with nitrogen gas through another valve, to which the rubber component in question is attached. But nitrogen gas might have leaked when the component melted, Tepco said.

More Indian Point Junk

Lots is nuclear plant issues with switchyard insulators. I was spot on with my guesses with what caused this.

Cuomo calls for investigation of Indian Point nuclear plant

Why doesn't Gov Cuomo order the plant to be shutdown. I doubt the governor actually has the power to do this. Its called ceremonial or the power of influence and position. You don't need rules for the use of these kind of power. I doubt Entergy would operate a plant contrary to the started wishes of the Governor.    

"The company said workers replaced several electrical insulators on a high-voltage transmission line this week prior to returning Unit 3 to service. Insulators protect transmission lines and related electrical equipment from the high-voltage associated with each line.

Next, engineers will examine the replaced insulators over the next few days to help determine the cause of the electrical disturbance, company officials said." 

My guesses.

"Their switchyard is a wreck."  

"Maybe the insulator..."

Reposted from 12/15

Hmm, getting this might be undetected damage from the transformer fire...

Maybe the insulator...

The first Indian Point trip this month. Hey, at least River Bend is still up to 100% power. Humm, vibrations with a main coolant pump. They lose a blade?  

Dec 6: Indian Point Unit 2 Scram

Their switchyard is a wreck.  

Entergy: Indian Point nuclear power plant shut down due to electrical issue

Officials say one of the Indian Point nuclear power plant's reactors in suburban New York has been shut down due to an electrical disturbance.

By The Associated Press
Posted Dec. 15, 2015 at 9:00 AM

BUCHANAN, N.Y.

By The Associated Press

Posted Dec. 15, 2015 at 9:00 AM

BUCHANAN, N.Y.
Officials say one of the Indian Point nuclear power plant's reactors in suburban New York has been shut down due to an electrical disturbance. 

Governor Andrew Cuomo said in a statement that “Because of the number of recent unplanned outages, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements will result in increased inspections and scrutiny of the plant. A thorough investigation of this shutdown is underway and we will make sure the safety of New Yorkers is not compromised.” 

Plant owner Entergy says the Indian Point 3 reactor was automatically shut down at about 7 p.m. Monday. The company says the disturbance on the non-nuclear side of the plant is related to a high voltage transmission line. There was no release of radioactivity and no threat to the public. 

The Indian Point 2 reactor was shut down for three days earlier this month due to a tripped circuit breaker. The two reactors together supply about one-quarter of the power used in New York City and Westchester County. 

The nuclear plant is located in Buchanan, about 30 miles north of midtown Manhattan.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51606
Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [ ] [3] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: BRETT ULRICH HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 12/14/2015 Notification Time: 19:49 [ET] Event Date: 12/14/2015 Event Time: 19:06 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN GENERATOR LOCKOUT "At 1906 [EST] on 12/14/2015, Indian Point Unit 3 received a Main Generator Lockout trip signal, and the reactor automatically tripped. Site personnel reported seeing arcing on a 345kV output transmission line tower. At the time of the trip, there was moderate rain and fog in the area. The site fire brigade leader investigated the reports of arcing and found no evidence of fire; fire brigade response was not required. "All automatic systems functioned as designed and all control rods inserted automatically. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started automatically due to expected low steam generator levels following a reactor trip from 100% power. Unit 3 is being maintained in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via steam dumps to the condenser. Offsite power remains available and in service from 138kV to the 480V safeguards buses. The cause of the Main Generator Lockout signal is being investigated. "Unit 2 was not impacted and continues to operate at 100% power. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." After the trip, operators observed high vibrations on the 33 reactor coolant pump which eventually returned to normal range. The licensee will be notifying the New York Public Service Commission and their local Independent System Operator. A press release will be issued by the Communications Department.

"Gov. Andrew Cuomo calls it another unexplained incident and has ordered the state Department of Public Service to investigate

“Because of the number of recent unplanned outages, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s requirements will result in increased inspections and scrutiny of the plant,” Cuomo said in a statement. “A thorough investigation of this shutdown is underway and we will make sure the safety of New Yorkers is not compromised.”"

Swedish-Westinghouse Nuclear Vessel Problem

Supposedly Something new? Swedish?

Additional vessel inspections delay Beznau 1 restart

Dec 2, 2015

During a scheduled outage that began in May, inspections were made of the Beznau 1's RPV using state-of-the-art ultrasonic equipment. Axpo said these measurements "registered findings at some points in the base material of the block 1 RPV indicating minimal irregularities in the fabrication process". It conducted further measurements and analyses "in order to assess these in compliance with current regulations" and submitted a report to Switzerland's Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI).

In July, Axpo announced that the restart of unit 1 had been postponed while the flaw indications were investigated further. At that time, the unit's restart was expected to be postponed until the end of October. However, in August ENSI called for additional investigations.

Axpo yesterday submitted a road map to ENSI for the further analysis and testing process on the unit's RPV.

Axpo said it is assessing additional measurements made with "a special testing method developed for a Belgian reactor" - a reference to work led by Belgian utility Electrabel to investigate a similar issue at Doel 3 and Tihange 2. Axpo noted that so far these results confirm the findings of earlier measurements. The company plans to submit a new, provisional test report later this month to the Swiss Association for Technical Inspections (SVTI/ASIT) and then to ENSI.

ENSI said it will now "review the plan for completeness and assess the extent to which the method chosen appears suitable for delivering reliable results on the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel". The regulator will subsequently issue a review report.

An extensive analysis and testing phase taking several months will be carried out by an international committee of experts nominated by ENSI. After reviewing Axpo's project plan, the committee will review the company's analyses and safety case.

ENSI deputy director Georg Schwarz said, "We will incorporate the experts' recommendations into our safety evaluation report. ENSI is solely responsible for the regulatory decision as to whether Beznau 1 is allowed to resume power operation."

Axpo said that, based on the current results, it "remains convinced that unit 1 will go back on grid after completion of the testing phase." However, it said that restart approval is not expected before the end of July 2016.

Meanwhile, Axpo said ultrasonic measurements on the RPV of Beznau 2 - which has been offline for a scheduled maintenance and upgrade outage since July - are "in an advanced stage". It noted the unvestigations so far have only resulted in "minute findings, which ... are normal based on their number and location".

Axpo said it will submit a test report on its unit 2 investigations to SVTI/ASIT "in the next few days".

It noted, "At present, nothing should stand in the way of the scheduled restart at the end of December 2015 following the completion of the unit 2 revision."

The two 365 MWe Westinghouse units at the Beznau plant are the oldest power reactors in Switzerland. Unit 1 began operating in 1969, while unit 2 entered operation in 1972. In addition to providing power, both units also produce district heating.

 

Cook Plant: Interesting Plant Trip???

Think of how widespread this kind of engineering incompetence is at this two unit site. This would be my example of mind boggling engineering stupidity ultimately driven by financial pressures. This is only going to get worst. I just don't think the NRC has the capability to fix this management.      

SUBJECT: D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRCINTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2015003; 05000316/2015003; AND07200072/2015001

November 12, 2015

Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was self-revealed on April 23, 2015 when the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped shortly after startup from a refueling outage due to two condenser steam dump valves failing open. Contrary to the requirements of Modification Procedure PMP–5040–MOD–007, the design of the new valves that were installed was not compatible with the steam dump system.

In 2013, the licensee decided to replace the existing steam dump valves with a new design due to an increasing number of valve failures and other issues. However, design work and planning to perform the modifications failed to meet timeliness milestones prior to the outage. Contrary to the modification procedure for these circumstances, the change was not considered ‘fast-track,’ therefore, additional risk assessments and management oversight were not provided. Additionally, prior to the start of the modification package, components were procured ‘at-risk’ given the shortened timeline available to get the modification ready. Guidance in the modification procedure required personnel to confirm that a design had progressed sufficiently before allowing ‘at-risk’ procurement. In this case, procurement occurred prior to the start of the modification package. Further, stakeholder meetings to assess the modification only occurred after parts had been procured (i.e., the design had already been selected). Attendance at the meetings was also noted to be poor. As a result of the issues in adhering to the modification process, key attributes regarding the operation of the steam dump system were not incorporated into the design of the new valves; namely, the fact that the steam dump lines can be subject to significant amounts of condensate under normal operations. The design of the new valves allowed some of this condensate to be trapped in the valve body, unlike the original design. The potential for this condition was not considered when selecting the design nor conveyed as a possibility to the valve manufacturer. When steam was admitted to the valves, a two-phase flow dynamic was established due to the trapped water. This, combined with a different plug design in the new valves, created a significant backpressure within the valves, causing them to fail open. This conclusion was determined by an outside engineering firm the licensee consulted as part of the root cause process, and was accepted by the licensee.

Just think how expensive this screw-up was. Issues

1)      You catch the enormous magnitude of the normalization of devience going on here. They are severely addicted to NOD.

2)      The DG maintenance crew was negligently incompetent.

Annual Followup of Selected Issues: Failure of 1AB Emergency Diesel Generator

Inspection Scope  

On May 21, 2015, the 1AB EDG suffered a failure of the #4 main bearing during a post-maintenance test run. As a result of the failure, the EDG automatically shutdown on high bearing temperature. At the time of the failure, Unit 1 was in day three of a 14 day TS action statement allowed for major EDG maintenance outages. Because repairs would exceed the allowed outage time, on June 1 the licensee shutdown Unit 1 in accordance with TSs. During the forced outage, the license repaired the EDG, which included replacement of the crankshaft and several bearings. Following repairs, the licensee tested the 1AB EDG.

These issues had an impact on the volume of air remaining in the system upon this particular EDG start. Regarding the other factors necessary for arcing to occur, during repairs it was identified that the #6 rear connecting rod bearing had been damaged during a maintenance period in 2008. The degradation helped complete a current path for the arcing to occur

Updated and Reposted from 4/28
April 28:

Yea, 25% this morning... 

April 27:

(Tiny nuke company)

(AEP CEO) This strategy of investing in the regulated companies, particularly Wires and Transmission, focus on continuous improvement initiatives, such as lean practices, the crescendo in savings over time. And a culture of continued disciplined execution of our employees around operational excellence continues to produce positive results.

The Cook Plant is still at 0% power today? Nothing in the news? Man, they got a great cloaking device on site.  

 "manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown"  

Honestly, you have a cooldown of a reactor still fully up a power by two failed steam dump valves slamming open. How many times have we seen this?

Outage began March  25? Must have just started up? Must have scammed on 20 to 30%. NRC says % last night and scammed at 5 am.  So it was relatively low power...transitioning onto the turb. Maybe not even at the point of adding heat. We are talking about a big cooldown.

Not even in the media?

They had a severe cooldown while at power, then they had to manually scam? I wonder what the max d/p was across the steam generator.

This guy is going to a special inspection...

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A SECONDARY PLANT TRANSIENT
"On April 23, 2015 DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown due to two (2) failed open steam dump valves. The cause of the failure is still under investigation. 

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) Tech Spec Required Shutdown, as a four (4) hour report; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report; and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report. 

"The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 continues to be supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator Power Operated Relief Valves due to steam dump valves being manually isolated. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.

"The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified." 

There is no indication of primary to secondary leakage and there is no impact on Unit 1.

SAN ONOFRE 

REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/01/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:33[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/30/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:58[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CONOSCENTI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/01/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 18 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE DUE TO TWO
ADDITIONAL |
| STEAM DUMP VALVES FULLY OPENING DURING STARTUP. |
| |
| System Affected |
| "Primary: Rx Trip, CEA, RCP's stayed on, PLCS" |
| "Secondary: SBCS Open, MSIV's, ADV, MFW, AFW" |
| |
| Actuations and Their Initiating Signals |
| "MSIS A & B @ 741 PSIA. Lowest Seen = MSIS setpoint" |
| |
| Causes |
| "Prelim: 4 SBCS All Fast Open . . . " |
| |
| Effect Of Event Plant |
| "Low S/G Pressure Rx Trip, Turbine Trip, MSIS isolated secondary. CVCS |
| remained in service. MSIS verified and rest, then AFW initiated. (Did not |
| want cooldown from steam-driven AFW Pp. Adequate S/G water level maintained |
| throughout. Approx. 50% NR)." |
| |
| Actions Taken or Planned |
| "EOI's: S023-12-1 (SPTA's), S023-12-2 (RTR), OI: S023-S-1.3.1 S0123-0-14 4 |
| Hour" |
| "E-PLAN Review P S/G" [decreased]) |
| |
| The licensee was going to bring the main turbine on line which was rolling |
| at 1800 rpm. Two steam dump bypass valves were open dumping steam to the | | main condenser to help maintain reactor power at 18%. Unexpectedly two| main condenser to help maintain reactor power at 18%. Unexpectedly two |
| additional steam dump bypass valves opened. When these two additional steam |
| dump bypass valves opened the first two open valves initial started to close |
| then they went full open. Steam generator pressure decreased to the low |
| steam generator pressure setpoint of 741 psia at which point an automatic |
| reactor trip plus a main steam isolation signal (MSIS) was generated, main |

These guys got a automatic scram and no mention of a out of control cool down?  

| steam isolation valves (MSIV's) closed. All rods fully inserted into the |
| core. Atmospheric steam dump valves were used to maintained proper reactor |
| coolant system temperature. The licensee said that they did not have any |
| leaking steam generator tubes. Proper steam generator water inventory was |
| verified at which time the MSIS signal was reset, then one Motor Driven |
| Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was manually initiated to maintain proper steam |
| generator water level. Main feedwater system isolated due to the MSIS |
| signal and the reactor trip. All emergency core cooling systems, emergency |
| diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is |
| stable. The licensee is investigating why the two additional steam dump |
| bypass valves opened. |
|

Hmm?  Cook must be in a media dead spot?

POINT BEACH: REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED FSAR ANALYZED 

On 10/12/12 at 0420 CDT the Unit 2 Steam Generator B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ADV) spuriously opened while in automatic control. This resulted in indicated reactor power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt. Prompt operator action was taken and reactor power was restored to within limits in approximately four minutes. The operators placed the Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller to manual and closed the ADV successfully. This event is being reported under the criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).

NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED

Timely Report on a 60,000 gal Condensate Leak at River Bend (not)

Degraded floor seals, does that mean flooding seals?  Did they discover degraded flood seals by another large and preventable flooding incident.  

Is this in a inspection report.

Hmm, occurred on Aug 1st...

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51599
Facility: RIVER BEND Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: JACK MCCOY HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 12/11/2015 Notification Time: 02:30 [ET] Event Date: 08/03/2015 Event Time: 15:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): BOB HAGAR (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR CONDENSATE SPILL IN TURBINE BUILDING "On August 1, 2015, during tagging activities to support planned maintenance on a condensate demineralizer, operators incorrectly positioned certain air-operated components which, combined with apparent leakage past a solenoid valve, resulted in a drain opening on a demineralizer that was in service. Flow through the drain line caused a turbine building sump to overflow to the floor of the 67 foot elevation of the Turbine Building. Immediate actions were taken to stop the leak. "The spill volume was approximately 60,000 gallons of condensate. The tritium activity of the water is estimated at 1.32E-2 microCi/ml. Gamma activity was from noble gases only in a concentration of approximately 2.30E-6 microCi/ml. The spill was confined to the Turbine Building. The affected area contains degraded floor seals which might allow the spill to reach groundwater. "The reason for this notification is that industry and governmental officials were notified of this event on August 3, 2015. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and informal notification was made to the NRC Region IV office, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and West Feliciana Parish government authorities. The Nuclear Energy Institute was informed as specified in their ground water protection initiative. "Plant cleanup activities arising from the spill are complete."

An Era In Nuclear Power History Nobody Ever Seen Before?

I have to disabuse you of the idea that our times are similar to any other era in nuclear power history.

I can make the case in all our nuclear industry accidents and tribulations, all of these events were initiated from financial, budget limitations or inappropriate priorities. The withdrawal of resources from a nuclear plant or just simply not having enough resources to keep up with the normal degradations mechanism of an operating nuclear reactor. The nuclear power industry is particularly bad at doing budget cuts professionally.

The unprecedented processes ongoing:

1)   Runaway electric price deflation-The miraculous nature gas and petroleum fracting technology. Basically we are finding bigger and more easily obtainable gas reservoirs than we ever imagined before. They are stacking up on top of each other. The majority of nuclear plant are no longer making enough money to stay viable and we are in a severe intensification of this phase.

• “The Brooks Brother Suits Wants Budget's Slashed 30% at Nuclear Plants”

2)   The nuclear Industry (NEI) is instituting the largest experiment in the history of the industry. They are massively and almost instantaneously cutting 30% from the budgets of all nuclear plants.

3)   The NRC is massively reforming themselves towards the ends reducing their agency budgets in the same timeframe

4)   Another unprecedented grand experiment: The aging fleet of nuclear power plants.

Get ready for a blizzard of mindboggling stupid mistakes occurring at nuclear plants for no explainable reason? Or it becoming excepted practice.        

A River Bend situation at Wolf Creek

I called in a NRC special inspection this winter (2015)to River Bend over bad reactor level control after a scram and apparent problems with their feed regulating valve control.

If the NRC did my style of thorough special inspection at Wolf Creek in early 2015 on emerging operator training and simulator fidelity deficiencies...Wolf Creek's violations this inspection cycle wouldn't have occurred.

I'd seen the scale of Wolf Creeks problems in Fed 2015 and wanted the NRC to hammer them. Wanted the agency to reset the facility to at least a average facility. The agency in Jan 2015 needed to make Wolf Creek knees tremble with fear.   

Feb 13, 20154: Why is Wolf Creek In Trouble II?

“You are seeing the worst of the NRC here. So the simulator was inaccurate and the safety knowledge of the licensed operators was really poor. They bifurcated the depth of the problem or diluted the magnitude the problems by separating these problems between two independent inspection reports. I am certain the NRC seen the inadequacies of the licensed operators training and the inadequacies of accurate simulator modeling at the same time. They strategized to separate the issues to minimize the violations for their buddies.

If they would have hit these guys with these two problems at the same time, jacked up the violation level...threw it into the special inspection...these guys would have gotten the message to clean up their act really hard. Everyone else would have seen this saying, we can't let this happen to us.

Better yet, failed training and shut them down for a month or so for retraining...this wouldn't be seen in the nuclear industry for a decade or more.”

River Bend blindly had:

massive leaking FRVs. 

They never set up their feed water system right post construction.

With large scale simulator problem modeling the feed system.  

Check out how closely related Wolf Creeks problems are to River Bend? 

December 8, 2015

EA-15-139 

SUBJECT:WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2015009

Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” because the licensee did not assure the procedures for reactor startup were appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, prior to May 3, 2015, the licensee failed to include adequate instructions for transferring feedwater flow from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main feedwater regulating valves in Procedure GEN 00 003, “Hot Standby to Minimum Load.” As a result, operations personnel did not properly control feedwater flow during a reactor startup, which led to a plant trip on May 3, 2015. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 96064 and 100583. The corrective action taken to restore compliance was to revise Procedure GEN 00-003 to update the process for transferring main feedwater control from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main feedwater regulating valves, including the monitoring of necessary parameters steam flow and feedwater flow.

Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1), “Plant referenced Simulators,” due to the licensee’s failure to maintain a plant-referenced simulator used for the administration of the operating test such that it would demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond. Specifically, until June 13, 2015, the licensee failed to maintain the simulator consistent with actual plant response when using the main feed regulating valves in manual control. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 96252. The corrective action taken to restore compliance was to change the simulator modeling of the main feedwater regulating valve controller to match the installed plant controllers. 

Pilgrim’s Security Violations Resemble All Other Problems Seen Throughout the Plant

Updated 12/14

Entergy : Opinion Turco: ‘We want a future, not a Fukushima’ NRC inaction on Pilgrim has failed region

12/11/2015 | 02:45pm US/Eastern

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Recent concerns raised alarm regarding safety at the Pilgrim nuclear reactor and the lack of serious federal oversight. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported five security safety violations, promulgated a new ruling to allow an increase of safety infractions before additional oversight and initiated a rule-making proposal on decommissioning, which would allow the funds to be used for spent fuel storage, end off-site emergency planning and reduce security and insurance costs. Federal regulators with benefits for the nuclear industry prevail. 

First, the NRC identifies five security safety violations concluding, "Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance.” Sound familiar? This conclusion is repeated in multiple NRC assessments regarding Entergy. Even after increased NRC oversight for the past two years, Entergy and the Pilgrim reactor continue to fail. The consequences for such poor operation are not a deterrent. When asked what timeline is given for Entergy to respond to the failing September report, NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan replied, “There is no required timeline for Entergy to notify us of its readiness for the review. The company is supposed to present its improvement plan before the Commission within six months.” Six months? This timeline reinforces sluggish action by the NRC. Being downgraded due to repetitive degraded assessments, the pattern is clear. The industry is not held accountable for public safety and neither is the NRC. 

The second concern is a ruling allowing an additional infraction before increasing oversight. If the expense to an operating reactor is cost prohibitive, the industry will pressure the NRC to change the rules. An exemption to the rule is generally the avenue corporations have chosen to avoid additional costs or loss of revenue. The NRC made it easier by allowing an additional safety infraction before increased oversight. 

Finally, the NRC proposal for rule making for decommissioning is a vehicle for the industry to meet minimal standards and continue to evade serious public health and safety concerns. The current regulations prohibit use of decommissioning funds for costs other than cleaning up the site and returning it to public use. Also, multiple studies confirm the serious dangers from the densely packed and tightly racked spent fuel. The NRC, however, has determined the current crowded configuration is safe. Their practice to exempt the industry from responsibility of all off-site emergency planning and deny the documented dangers from the spent fuel pool is both irresponsible and immoral. The new rules will codify that practice. 

In their book “Fukushima, The Story of a Nuclear Disaster,” Union of Concerned Scientists authors David Lochbaum, Edwin Lyman and Susan Stranahan warn us, “Absent significant upgrades in nuclear operation and regulation, it will only be a matter of time until the world watches another Fukushima unfold.” 

Pilgrim is assessed as one of the worst operating reactors in the country, with ongoing failing reports. The NRC has proven it is incapable of regulating. The mission to prop up the failing nuclear industry at the expense of public safety is a failure of government. If a day care center or restaurant had comparative federal safety violations, would the owners be given months to respond while they continued to rack up failing assessments? I doubt it. But here is a nuclear reactor where a catastrophic event would challenge the entire region, including Boston and Providence. 

What more evidence do we need to expose the NRC as set on weakening safety rules and oversight? This demands immediate public outcry. 

Assurances of public safety through the regulatory process are revealed as a fatal farce. U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) admonished the NRC commissioners for lack of attention to serious public safety issues in her home state. She said, “This is not hyperbole but life and death for my people.” The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not just failing the people in Massachusetts but the entire nation. 

We want a future, not a Fukushima. 

Tell that to NRC Chair Stephen Burns at chairman@nrc.gov
— Diane Turco is the executive director of Cape Downwinders
© Copyright 2015 The Barnstable Patriot. All Rights Reserved., source Newspapers

 ***You get it, these types of violations and problems are seen throughout the plant in other issues and is systemic. It not just relegated to security issues.***

It sounds like broad budget problems and disillusionment of the staff?

It is like a neighborhood speeder. The cops stops him all the time for speeding and just give him a warning. The driver is oblivious to the fear of the cops, so he keeps speeding without a care in the world. And the cops in the neighborhood see a pick up in speeding violation across the board. The disease seems to be catchy. It is just a matter of time before a kid gets hit.    

See we all make light of this because we don't the nature of the violation. 

Avoid Complacency, because Entergy failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes [H.12

I sounds like they got a demoralized security force basically because it isn't funded appropriately.

Resources, because Entergy failed to maintain adequate procedures to support nuclear safety [H.1], 

I think in our greater interest we should know the nature of the violations.  The community and politicians would have a better take on the professionalism of Pilgrim. They could provide feedback to the Pilgrim to quickly fix their security problems. 

Work Management, because Entergy failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority [H.5]. 

Basically it is a insignificant risk if terrorest knew the nature of these violations. How come security violation disclosures aren't risk based. Yes it is a tiny risk, but it is insignificant. How come the common good of security disclosures doesn't offset the possibility of giving information to terrorist risk. Why don't we look a holistic risk.

One cross-cutting aspect was assigned to a finding in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance [P.3].

Cause the public knowing the true security violations would degrade the credibility of the NRC and licencee. All this is, they are protecting inappropriately the credibility of the industry. 

Remember if you game Homeland security in the name of a private of corporate interests, we are undermining our faith in government. "Faith in government" is our most precious national security issue...it is our highest and greatest priority.     

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

December 1, 2015

Mr. John Dent, Jr.

Site Vice President

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

600 Rocky Hill Road

Plymouth, MA 02360-5508

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION – NRC SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2015404

Dear Mr. Dent:

On October 23, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented five findings of very low security significance (Green) in this report. These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest these violations or their significance, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Three cross-cutting aspects were assigned to the findings in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes [H.12], Resources, because Entergy failed to maintain adequate procedures to support nuclear safety [H.1], and Work Management, because Entergy failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority [H.5]. One cross-cutting aspect was assigned to a finding in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance [P.3]. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC resident inspector at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.