The NRC Doesn’t Have The Statutory Horsepower to Control the Behavior of Palisades.

Do you speak Mulliganese?
 
If I read just one more time my "stuff like that" phrase I am going to hang myself:)


Official Transcript of Proceedings
 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 

Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Palisades Nuclear Plant

 

Date: Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Excerpts

 

·         MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you. Deterrents. You know, we look at deterrents as far as the NRC's activities associated with a nuclear power plant, and we see that the NRC doesn't have any, very little deterrents on the bad behaviors of other plants.

·         As far as all of the issues with Palisades over the years, a recent newspaper wrote up an interesting set of articles about Palisades and all the troubles they had. And what you see over this thing is there is, one thing, the NRC doesn't have any horsepower to, you know, put fear in the eyes of these guys. And that's, basically, you know, if you go one-by-one with these regulations and stuff like that, you're going to consume all the NRC's resources stuff like that.

·         And so there's the deterrence part of the NRC's activities. You know, the utilities are going to exhaust the agency with all the nickel and dime stuff if there's not a deterrence part of this deal, if they don't fear the NRC and that type of thing.

·         We also know that -- I believe that, generally, in the last five years, as shown by the articles in the newspaper, that with all of our troubles, Palisades had better capacity factor than they had in the early years and stuff. And this is all, essentially, because of risk perspectives and reductions of regulations and all that sort of stuff. And so in spite of all their troubles and that type of thing, Palisades has been allowed to continue on in the way they've always done.

·         Palisades did a relatively good job on the control rod drive mechanisms of recent, but they had a horrible history of CRDM problems and that type of stuff. Palisades has had numerous issues of falsifying documents, intimidating employees, lying to inspectors over the recent years and that type of stuff. And, you know, like the recent issue with the security guards, they had a similar incident four or five years ago, basically the same thing: lying and falsifying documents to the NRC. And I know the NRC basically says after two or three years, we’ll just make believe that it never happened, you know, the history never really is caught up knitted together. And you don't have enough influence and power to keep a plant like Palisades straight.

·         What's happened here is really ugly. What's happened with the impellers is ugly. It's unprofessional. It makes our nation a laughing stock to all the other nations that are desperately trying to, you know, maintain their fleet safely and stuff like that.

·         And I've heard from numerous professional people in the industry basically saying they cannot believe that we allowed the Palisades plants to operate for so many years with these reactor coolant pumps and all these different kind of warnings we've had over the years and stuff and all these indications. And we're only getting, the outsiders are only getting the bits and pieces of what really went on with these impellers and stuff. You know, a lot of nations think of this as irresponsible and not worthy of a great nation when you get down to these impellers and stuff.

·         And then you've got Salem, like I talked about, the recent issues with a horrendous, all their bolts being loose and stuff like that, prior, you know, prior warnings and that type of stuff that were ignored, and the NRC really hasn't stepped in there and done what the public wants. They don't want to have a Salem. You know, a crack starts somewhere in a reactor coolant pump. They want that crack fixed. They don't want to have to deal with these problems for years and years and deal with the broken bolts and fallen down components and the pumps and stuff. That's ugly. The amount of cracked and broken impellers, it's ugly. It's unprofessional. It's an essence of an indicator,

·         you know. If they can't keep these impellers, you know, if they don't have to spend so much resource on these broken components, impellers, the tank that recently leaked, the control rod drive mechanisms, and stuff like that. You know, they're just consuming plant resources, and we fear that other safety problems aren't being dealt with adequately.

·         A lot of these kind of components breaking and stuff like that, that has a tendency to make the employees disillusioned and they know that it's wrong and stuff like that. And they know that the NRC doesn't back them. They know that, you know, we have to make they'll be up in the control room and they'll have the indications of a big blade being thrown off the pump, and everybody will sit back and not give what the public really wants the Agency to force Palisades to do, to shut down, pay a price, deterrence, deterrence, and make them pay a price so that, you know, when they're in their little rooms and they're making these decisions about, you know, well, we've got some part of the impeller cracked, we can either fix it right, put in new parts so we don't have to deal with this in the past, or the NRC is going to, down the road, if, you know, bigger parts start falling off the pump or it gets strewn about the plant, they're going to make us pay a horrendous price.

·         Most of the people, you know, what is safety related and all that sort of stuff, you know. We think when you talk about Palisades is safe that means that you are pretty sure that they won't have a, you know, a type of severe core damage and off-site relief where you'll have a fatality. That's what you're saying when you say a plant is safe, and that's just not an appropriate standard. We don't think that's an appropriate -- we think this ugliness is a pretty good indicator of the future and that it shouldn't be tolerated. It should be nice and clean, and the operation of the plant should be nice and clean, and they're not all caught up with these degradations and broken components and all that sort of stuff. It's a clean plant. The staff is not excessively busy or the control room employees don't have all these complicated procedures in place of, you know, a well-engineered plant. And, you know, everybody is diligently paying attention to the plant, not paying attention, not worrying about the degradations.

·        We worry about Palisades, but there's a risk if a lot of plants have degradation mechanisms that the NRC doesn't have under control and, you know, necessarily what you can prove isn't the most unsafe. It's a lot of the stuff that's behind the barrier that's degraded, that's degrading in an unknown fashion, and that's a threat to the nation and to a plant.

·         So that's kind of what we're worried about with -- rules don't carry a lot of information and stuff. You know, staying within the rules doesn't have a lot of information. Usually, human intelligence and a brain can process a lot of information and that type of thing, and so that's what I worry about is a lot of these rules and stuff is designed to make us become more stupider than we really are.

 

·         I think, like I said, we worry about what's going on if regulations will tolerate this kind of ugly behavior at Palisades, certain events in the industry that are pretty concerning that are out there that kind of questions whether it's a lot more uglier than what's being portrayed by the NRC.

·         You know, it almost gets to the point of, you know, the NRC says, you know, well, cheating isn't safety related, you know. We can't -- it doesn't, it's un-safety related. It can be repaired, or it's not a big deal, or it's not modeled appropriately in all your risk perspectives and stuff like that.

·         Another issue we have is really you don't have any proof, there's no engineering proof that those reactor coolant pumps are safe. You don't have any, I don't see any model of, you know, actual building a plant, building, more or less, a prototype type of deal where you're beating the hell out of the pumps and you're getting those kind of blade failures and everybody, you know, you're experimenting a lot on a system like the Palisades pumps and its relationship to its primary coolant system and stuff like that. You don't have really any actual, I don't see any actual engineering that those pumps are safe. Studies, actual studies. It's all kind of, more or less, you know, the fallback of the NRC, it's our opinion that it's safe and stuff like that. That's the privilege of the NRC. They get to say that, basically, the professional people, they get to say, you know, a guy like me needs triplicate proof that Palisades is unsafe, even when it's all there. You guys get to say, "It's my opinion that it's safe," and you don't have any evidence to back it up.

·         So the evidence I'm talking about is, would be some engineering document showing that, you know, we've gone through all of the, you know, not necessarily intellectual kind of thing that the NRC likes to do, but we really set up a system and we've repeated the degradation mechanisms on Palisades with their PCP pumps and stuff like that, and we actually seen the results of the broken impellers and stuff like that. We have a full engineering understanding of the mechanisms of what potentially could go wrong in the future with those pumps. I don't think a lot of you guys really understand how difficult that is being in the control room and, you know -- you guys all mostly get to see a lot of this stuff in hindsight. Those guys in the control room get to see those events when equipment fails and they have no idea why it failed and why it's behaving that way. Then they get stuck with procedures that don't work. It's a terrifying situation and unnerving situation in the control room.

·         And we think, you know, with this Palisades deal being ugly and stuff, your inability to enforce integrity and truth-telling -- Palisades is not afraid to lie when they need to or be deceptive to the NRC. That's the history of Palisades and stuff like that, and we think actually that happens a lot throughout the industry.

·         And then the general stated the nuclear industry as a whole and incentives nowadays for a lot of these utilities with their economic troubles to cut back and stuff. You know, our fear is if we seen all that was going on there, we could foresee, and the NRC could behave in a different way. But there's tremendous barriers. A lot of rules are set up, you know, like in this thing here. I can't see all the documents and stuff like that.

·         And if we had all of the knowledge in front of us of what was going on, outsiders could intervene, just like if everybody seen what was going on in Fukushima and the anti-nukes could have that kind of ammunition, maybe that wouldn't have happened. Maybe we could have captured a couple of minds and consciences and not have such an ugly situation facing us in the future.

The Meltdown of Trust and Intergrity At Palisades nuclear Plant

Billie was once my lawyer and I didn’t like the outcome of my case.

Anyways, Billie was always naïve and out of the loop. The question is; lying and being deceptive is not safety related according to risk perspectives.

Calling a plant or employee a liar is basically a too big to fail philosophy. Calling them outright a liar would lead to enormous consequences: a shutdown or black listing of an employee for life. It intentionally takes way too much quality of evidence to make a call the employee has falsified an issue...thus integrity is never put into play. The the NRC positively incentivizes deception and lying in the so called interest of our nation. The NRC has turned upside down what is in our national interest...making the egency's interest above our national interest.  

It takes unobtainable triplicate proof that intentional lying went on, basically the liar has to admit he lied. Basically, if the agency went on a campaign of totally rooting out nuclear industry dishonesty, it would break the back of the nuclear industry, and threaten 20% of our electricity is the way they think. I say being being open and honest would lead to more profits and lower electric cost. They say the route to more profits and self-interest is through deception and lying.  The nuclear industry is too big and vital to tell the truth…the whole truth. It is too big and vital to our nation to fail. So we have institutionalized lying and deception in the NRC and in our political system.

It is now a natural and expected way to run the nuclear industry…

And basically the Confirmatory Action Letter and order is now but a tool for deception and lying, to keep a plant from not being accountable to the public. Does anyone in the industry ever really think they need to meet a CAL order or is it nothing but a bureaucratic and poltical façade?

Personally, I wouldn’t trust any third party nuclear industry safety consultant. It is all the arm of a deceptive and unaccountable nuclear industry. Any or all of the report can remain secret from the NRC and public and Entergy has dictatorial control of the investigation . For me to trust the safety consultant report, it would have to be independently funded off Entergy’s control. It would need be mandatory truth telling. I can’t see but the government funding this and the investigation be in  the total control of the independent and trustworthy organization.

 

Or they can just the shut the fuck down!

I am amazed Billie would want a commercial or corporate product? God, she must be so old now?

What we are really dealing here is systemic and widespread institutionalized lying and deception by the NRC and the corporate nuclear industry. It is, so called in the name of altruism or in the interest of our nation. It is really self-interest dressed up as "what is best for my family", altruism or what is in the greatest interest of our nation.

 

It is upside-down altrusim and family love!   

Law Office

CLIFFORI & GARDE

August 11, 2014 (revised)

 

Mark Satorius

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-000 l

Re: I0 CFR 2.206 Request for Enforcement Action Entergy Nuclear Operations (Palisades)

Dear Mr. Sntorius:

The safety culture within the Security Department at the Palisades nuclear power plant has reached the point that sig:1ificant regulatory intervention is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure that reasonable assurance exists that the public is protected from security related threats and incidents.

On behalf of my clients, and -(former Security Shift Supervisors at Palisades who were terminated by Entergy), and pursuant to l 0 CFR 2.206, this letter requests that the Agency take escalated enforcement action requiring Entergy (the Licensee) either I) to outsourcc its Security Department to a qualified security contractor, as existed in the past; or, 2) to appoint an independent third-party monitor to develop, implement, and/or monitor, actions to improve the work environment and safety culture within the Palisades Security Department.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The NRC's Happy Juice On Fort Calhoun

(A works in progress!)

The NRC certain knows how to play the media. Happy tunes in the beginning of the inspection report for the new media shallow idiot, while the very troubling violations later in the report. In other words, they know the reporters don't have the skills to properly interpret the report.

You just have to wonder how the NRC are catering  their activities to board candidate andlawyer Jeff Lux?

You just wonder how the Problem Identification and Resolution, the  corrective action program and the recent well known training program are interrelated. Right, the NRC expresses the CAP and training program in a isolated light. They never speak to us how the CAP and training are interrelated.

 Right, the NRC speaks as if Fort Calhoun is meeting 9 out of 10 commitments identified in CAL. We are safe, safe, safe! It is like saying the all these systems in you car are working great; the motor, transmission, headlights, tires, battery and brake lights are working properly, but your actual brakes are wheezing on their deathbed. Fort Calhoun is meeting the magority of their CAL commitments (whatever that means). Running a nuclear power plants with a broken CAP is very dangerous and it just might the greatest show stopper. The NRC is front loading you brain, the media with the happy juice... but the experienced guys knows this is a very troubling report and the plant shouldn't be running.

Fort Calhoun is effectively without their brakes???

Again, why is Cooper and Fort Calhoun having training problems together...why does it take outsiders to kick Fort Calhoun in the ass? This INPO deal is a rather secretive process where the NRC allows a plant to operate in a degraded condition hoping INPO will turn their hearts. The NRC hopes Fort Calhoun will come to their senses before they have to notify the public. They are basically forsaking public notification and operating outside the reactor oversight process process in cahoots with a wholly nuclear industry funded program.

I wonder if the NRC seen any problems with the Fort Calhoun's training programs upon their shutdown inspections? The only thing that has changed since then is Exelon is managing the plant. The problem with these kinds of relationships, is now the board is even more isolated than before. It just might be the reason why they did this, board political protection. Hey, you can't blame us Exelon never told about the problem...

Again, the NRC protects plant management with not expessly stating why the CAP isn't being followed, where the public might comdemn them all the more.

I either hit a tree because a deer jumped out in the road right in front of me or I was severely intoxicated, I just didn't care about paying attention to the road. Which is it?  

"A number of the deficiencies that were identified by the inspectors involved inadequate evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions that were entered into the CAP."

September 18, 2014
EA-14-151

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION – NRC CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER FOLLOW UP INSPECTION AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000285/2014009 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Based on the inspection results, the team concluded that FCS maintained a CAP in which
individuals generally identified issues at an appropriately low threshold. Of concern, the team
identified a number of deficiencies involving OPPD’s ability to effectively and consistently
evaluate and resolve problems as discussed in more detail below, and in the enclosed
inspection report.

A number of the deficiencies that were identified by the inspectors involved inadequate
evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions that were entered into the CAP. Several
examples involved the failure to make an immediate determination of operability because your
staff failed to recognize that a degraded or non-conforming condition existed. Additional
examples involved operability evaluations that lacked adequate technical justification as to why
the affected system, structure, or component would perform its specified safety function as
described in licensing and design basis documentation. The team concluded weakness exists
in this area and that OPPD’s corrective actions, to date, have not been effective in ensuring that
problems are consistently evaluated in a thorough and effective manner, with the appropriate
technical rigor that supports the operability conclusion.

These findings and observations are similar to previous NRC inspection results identified during
the last NRC PI&R team inspection completed in June 2013, documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000285/2013008. Many of the issues, identified both prior to and following restart,
reflect a poor understanding and use of design basis information. We do note that you are
taking action to address this challenge by a long-term licensee commitment to conduct a design
basis reconstitution through 2018. Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC
understands OPPD is conducting evaluations to determine the cause of the performance
problems affecting effective implementation of the corrective action program. The NRC is
interested in understanding the status of these evaluations and corrective actions during an
upcoming public meeting in Omaha, Nebraska on September 25, 2014. Additionally, the NRC
will be conducting future inspections focused on these areas of concern.


The NRC determined that, with the exception of the PI&R key area and the Operability
Determination element of the Program key area, OPPD is adequately implementing the CAL
items. The NRC determined that five key CAL areas were adequately completed and are
considered closed. These five key areas are:

• Organizational Effectiveness, Safety Culture, and Safety Conscious Work Environment
• Site Operational Focus
• Procedures
• Nuclear Oversight
• Transition to the Exelon Nuclear Management Model and Integration into the Exelon
Nuclear Fleet

Finally, there were also a number of deficiencies identified by the inspectors that involved
inadequate resolution of problems. Of particular concern, the inspectors reviewed OPPD’s
actions to resolve 36 previously issued NRC non-cited violations, documented in various
inspection reports in 2013, and identified five examples where OPPD failed to adequately
address the issues. Several examples were noted where no actions were either planned or
implemented to resolve the findings. The inspectors noted that a self-assessment, performed
by both OPPD and Exelon individuals prior to the team inspection, also identified this concern,
however, incomplete CAP implementation resulted in deficiencies that were not entered into the
process, and, subsequently, the particular non-cited violations were not adequately addressed.
As a result, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements
occurred and four violations associated with findings of very low safety significance (Green)
occurred. The NRC evaluated these violations in accordance Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC
Enforcement Policy, which appears on the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/
regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The enclosed report documents 14 additional findings of very low safety significance (Green).
All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements; one of these violations was
determined to be Severity Level IV under the traditional enforcement process. Two additional
Severity Level IV violations with no associated finding are also documented in the enclosed
report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Four licensee-identified violations are being documented in the enclosed report that were
determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC is treating these violations as noncited
violations consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station on probation; 'Why didn’t the public know?' OPPD board candidate asks

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station on probation; 'Why didn’t the public know?' OPPD board candidate asks

Posted: Thursday, September 18, 2014 2:00 am

By Cody Winchester / World-Herald staff writerThe Omaha World-Herald

Training and maintenance programs at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station have been on accreditation probation since March, a candidate for the Omaha Public Power District board revealed Wednesday.

The National Nuclear Accrediting Board imposed the six-month probation in late March, citing “broad gaps” in training at the nuclear plant, which restarted in December after being shut down for nearly three years.

Thank you for reading and relying on Omaha.com for your news and information. You have now viewed your 30 day allowance of 10 free articles.

The accrediting board is an arm of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, a trade group that offers technical assistance and training to member utilities.

Candidate Jeff Lux, who is challenging 18-year incumbent Anne McGuire for the District 2 seat in South Omaha, called a press conference Wednesday outside OPPD’s headquarters to criticize the utility for not disclosing the problems.

“Why didn’t the public know about this?” Lux said.

The plant about 15 miles north of Omaha was taken offline in April 2011 for a scheduled refueling. But then flooding, a fire and the discovery of numerous safety violations led the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to place the plant under special oversight.

In 2012, the district hired an outside firm, Exelon, to run the plant. Fort Calhoun’s regular accreditation review came shortly after restart.

OPPD spokesman Jeff Hanson said the institute simply needed more time to review new processes as the plant transitions to new management.

The accrediting board will discuss lifting the probation when it convenes today in Atlanta. OPPD is optimistic about the outcome, Hanson said.

“All indications are that we will receive positive news,” he said.

If the board votes against re-accreditation, employees at the plant no longer could get any training, he said.

The probation was a “critical issue” at Fort Calhoun that prompted weekly conference calls with accrediting managers, who later visited the plant on inspection visits, according to internal OPPD newsletters provided by Lux.

“Without an accredited program, (Fort Calhoun) can’t properly train and qualify personnel to operate and maintain the station,” assistant plant manager Tim Uehling wrote in a July memo to employees.

Although employees and OPPD board members were kept in the loop, the probation never was made public, Lux said. He called it another example of the district’s record of keeping ratepayers in the dark.

Many issues identified by an internal review of the training problems, including weak management oversight, also were noted in a longer technical report that delved into why the plant was shut down in the first place, Lux said.

The district “shelved” that report, too, said Lux, a felony prosecutor in the Douglas County Attorney’s Office.

McGuire responded that Lux, whom she describes on her campaign website as a “bully” and a “manipulator,” is overstating his case.

She said the board was fully briefed on the probation, which has been discussed at committee meetings. Lux would know that “if he’d ever come to a meeting,” she said.

McGuire said Lux has declined offers by OPPD management for background briefings on issues facing the district.

“He’s not getting the right information,” she said. “He doesn’t want to get the right information.”

As the utility shifts to a new management model at Fort Calhoun, McGuire said, the recovery process won’t be perfect. But OPPD is making a lot more progress than Lux gives it credit for, she said.

“As problems come up, management deals with them,” McGuire said. “Bottom line.”s.

Millstone's Three Special Inspections On A Safety Pump

September 15, 2014

CONTACT: Diane Screnci 610-337-5330

Neil Sheehan 610-337-5331

NRC Launches Special Inspection at Millstone 3 Nuclear Power Plant

In Response to Continuing Problems with Pump

Problems affecting a pump that is part of a reactor safety system will be the focus of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inspection at the Millstone Unit 3 nuclear power plant. The Waterford, Conn., plant is operated by Dominion Nuclear.

The Special Inspection team will have three members and will begin its work today (Sept. 15). The component of interest is the plant’s turbine-driven auxiliary, or back-up, feedwater pump. That pump is one of several that can be used to help cool down the reactor after a shutdown by pumping water into the secondary side of the plant’s steam generators. The steam generators are essentially large heat exchangers that convert heat generated by the reactor into steam, which in turn is used to spin the turbine and produce electricity.

The basis for this Special Inspection is the failure of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to pass quarterly surveillance tests on July 15 and Sept. 10. During both tests, the pump started and then unexpectedly stopped. It then restarted without operator intervention and reached rated speed approximately 15 minutes later. The pump has since undergone repairs and been restored to service.

"A key objective of this inspection will be to learn more about this latest malfunctioning of this safety-related component," NRC Region I Administrator Bill Dean said. "The repetitive problems affecting the pump continue to give the NRC concern."

Areas to be reviewed during the Special Inspection will include the adequacy and completeness of testing on the pump and causal evaluations of the problems. The results of the Special Inspection will be discussed in a report expected to be issued within 45 days after the completion of the review.

The NRC conducted a Special Inspection earlier this year into what appear to be unrelated issues with the same pump. That inspection report was issued Aug. 28.

The NRC's Management Stiff Arm

Basically, it is the issues most of the outsiders have...it is hard to get the higher ups to explain their justifications down on the paperwork. They just stiff arm us.  

But you have to respect the Hell out of the NRC and Mr. Peck for allowing this to become a public disscussion.

These cultural traits are expressed perfectly by Dr Peck.

"As an insider, I’ve found that the industry culture sometimes operates with the assumption that NRC Rules and license requirements impose excessive margins and burdens. In the 1980s, I worked as a reactor engineer (in-core physics) for the Tennessee Valley Authority. The plant culture often viewed NRC design basis requirements as far exceeding those need to preserve safety. “We have systems that back-up systems, that back-up systems, that … ” This industry culture justified encroachment on the facility design basis."

"As I’ve worked thought these issues, I’ve heard agency personnel express over and over again that Diablo Canyon has “plenty of seismic margin.” “Just look at the HE.” These statements imply that no real safety issue exists with the new seismic information. I maintain that Diablo Canyon seismic safety is very complex. It took the DPO Panel almost year just to conclude that the new ground motions were within the bounds of the existing SSE safety analysis. And I’m still not 100 percent convinced that they got it right. While the NRC license review processes may seem cumbersome and stakeholder input can be frustrating at times, use of the established regulatory framework provides us the basis for our presumption of nuclear safety. History has repeatedly taught us that we sometimes get ourselves in trouble when we try working around these processes."

Mr. Peck doesn't address at the bottom of this all is the issue of budget pressures and financial priorities...insufficient resources.

This isn’t about safety…it about money and profits!

Diablo’s Former Inspector Explains

Summary of the Diablo Canyon Differing Professional Opinion

Friday, September 19, 2014

By Michael Peck

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s internal processes allow employees to raise issues and make recommendations that differ from the prevailing agency view. Michael Peck, a resident NRC inspector at Diablo Canyon nuclear plant, had a “differing professional opinion” (DPO) after new seismic information was developed. His DPO asserted that PG&E operated the reactors outside the bounds of the facility design basis as defined by its license to operate. Any operation outside of the design basis challenges plant safety due to an erosion of regulatory margins. No immediate or significant safety issues were noted, but Peck points out that operations outside the design basis have contributed to nuclear accidents in the past.

Beginning in 2012, I used the NRC non-concurrence and differing professional opinion (DPO) processes to raise nuclear safety issues affecting the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Facility. These internal processes allow employees to raise issues and make recommendations that differ from the prevailing agency view. These safety issues were related to how the NRC addressed design control, equipment evaluation, and Operating License fidelity after Pacific Gas and Electrical (PG&E) Company developed new seismic information affecting the Diablo Canyon site. The agency carefully considered my recommendations and dispositioned these concerns in September 2014. The NRC subsequently made my views and the agency’s conclusions publicly available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS Accession Number ML1425A743).

Diablo Canyon seismology is both highly complex and controversial. However, my DPO was not about seismology. My DPO addressed routine and generally well-understood inspection practices related to agency enforcement of existing design basis requirements at a power reactor facility. These requirements are equally applicable regardless if the issues involved seismic qualification, spent fuel, accident analysis, or any other aspect of the facility design basis. The DPO did not identify any “immediate or significant safety issues.” However, the DPO asserted that PG&E continues to operate the Diablo Canyon reactors outside of the bounds of the facility design basis as defined by the NRC Operating License. Any operation outside of the design basis challenges plant safety due to erosion of regulatory margins.

For example, in 2004 a seismologist identified that the Fukushima sea wall was too low. This was a condition outside of the facility design basis that required protection against the maximum creditable flood and demanded corrective action. But this was not an “immediate or significant safety issue” because the probability of a large tsunami was thought to be small. But as we saw in 2011, the low sea wall height did impact the capability of facility operators to mitigate a flood.

The license application (Final Safety Analysis Report or FSAR) for a nuclear power plant must include safety analyses demonstrating that regulatory design basis are satisfied. The design basis includes requirements that equipment important to safety remain functional following the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The NRC defines the SSE as largest credible earthquake that can affect the site.

The Diablo Canyon license application, as amended and approved by the NRC, stated that this design basis SSE was satisfied by the Double Design Earthquake (DDE) safety analysis. NRC Rules required PG&E to maintain the plant capable of meeting this design basis requirement, as specified in the license application (as amended), during reactor operation. The Diablo Canyon license application also discussed a second earthquake analysis, called the Hosgri Evaluation (HE).

Nuclear seismic qualification is not just about how much the ground will shake following an earthquake. Equally important are the methods used to analyze how seismic energy propagates through plant structures; the engineering assumptions and inputs used in the safety analysis; and the application of load combinations and acceptance limits. The larger HE earthquake (0.75 g peak ground acceleration) predicted less mechanical stress on plant equipment, including reactor components, than the smaller SSE/DDE (0.4 g). While this may sound counterintuitive, this result reflected the different analytical methods and assumptions used in the two analyses. The PG&E license application (as approved) explicitly stated that SSE design basis requirement was satisfied by the DDE. The application discussed the HE as a response to NRC questions raised during the original licensing process. The application also specifically stated that the HE did not meet NRC requirements for the SSE. In other words, the facility Operating License established the DDE/SSE as the maximum ground motion for the site, implementing NRC design basis Rules for protection against earthquakes. The HE demonstrated that PG&E could safety shutdown the plant (assuming no accident or fire) if a 7.5 magnitude earthquake occurred on the Hosgri fault. The reasons for excluding the larger HE ground motions from the SSE safety analysis are complex and reflect negotiated agreements made between the NRC and PG&E prior to original plant licensing.

In early 2011, PG&E placed a reevaluation of the local seismology on the NRC docket. This report concluded that three earthquake faults were capable of producing greater ground motion than SSE/DDE but less than the HE. NRC regulations required PG&E to evaluate this new information against the existing facility design basis and update any deficient FSAR safety analysis. PG&E could have updated the SSE safety analysis with the new ground motions. However, this approach would have required an amendment to the Operating License because the resulting stress would have exceeded established safety limits for equipment important to safety, including the reactor pressure boundary. The NRC typically doesn’t approve safety analysis changes that conclude safety limits have been exceeded.

As an alternative, PG&E chose to change the SSE safety analysis methodology from the DDE to the HE. At the time, this seemed to be a reasonable approach since the new ground motions were bound by the HE spectrum. PG&E was required to obtain NRC approval before incorporating this change. NRC Rules require an amendment to the Operating License if less conservative analytical methods are used to demonstrate that a design basis requirement is satisfied. In October 2011, PG&E submitted License Amendment Request 11-05 requesting NRC approval for this change. NRC Rules allowed continued reactor operation while the agency reviews the amendment request provided that PG&E demonstrates a “reasonable assurance” that equipment important to safety remains “operable.” In other words, PG&E would have to show by evaluation that accident mitigation equipment would still work and reactor piping would hold together (meet acceptance limits of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) given the higher seismic inputs.

As a resident inspector, my job was to compare the Diablo Canyon facility and PG&E activities against the facility Operating License, NRC regulations, and industry guidance. When inspections identify gaps in the implementation of these requirements, then I was expected to draft violations consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. I was specifically tasked with reviewing between 19 and 25 PG&E operability evaluations each year.

In the summer of 2011, PG&E concluded that all safety equipment was “operable” given the higher ground motions. This evaluation relied on the HE as an alternate methodology. NRC operability policy allows use of “alternate analytical methods” provided certain conditions are met. For example, the alternate method cannot produce a result that “over-predicts” equipment performance when compared to the design bases method.

My inspection concluded that the PG&E evaluation failed to meet NRC operability standards. For a given ground motion, the HE method will always produce a less conservative result when compared to the SSE/DDE method. Gaining margin over the SSE/DDE was the sole reason PG&E used the HE as an alternate method. I also knew that very little margin to the Code limits existed from my experience with the replacement reactor head and steam generator inspections. Almost any increase in seismic loading would result in exceeding the Code acceptance limits, roughly 2/3 of the critical buckling strength for the material.

I included an inadequate operability evaluation violation with my 2011 third and fourth quarter Intergraded Inspection Reports. In both cases, NRC Region IV management removed the violation prior to issuing the report. The proposed violation addressed the decrease in nuclear safety because PG&E had encroached on design basis margins and safety limits.

NRC violations associated with inadequate operability evaluations are common. Typically, these violations address technical deficiencies in the analytical or regulatory approach used by the licensee. Corrective actions usually involve adding technical rigor or additional justification to the evaluation. However, for the seismic operability case, it was unlikely that PG&E would have been successful. The magnitude of the new ground motions combined with the lack of available margin in the existing SSE safety analysis would have made it all but impossible to conclude that plant equipment was operable. If this equipment was determined to be inoperable, then the Operating License required PG&E to immediately shut down both reactors.

A License mandated shutdown is not all that unusual. The NRC has and routinely uses statutory authority to grant regulatory dispensation in these types of cases. PG&E could have used the HE to support a safety argument justifying continued operation pending NRC approval of the license amendment. This path would have required the NRC to formally waive Diablo Canyon seismic design basis requirements and approve relief from the Code. This path would have also reversed the previously well-publicized agency position that PG&E had been operating within the bounds of the facility design basis.

To ensure NRC management fully understood the underlying technical and regulatory aspects of the proposed violation, I non-concurred on my own inspection report. To my surprise, the agency response stated that insufficient information was available to complete an operability evaluation. To the best of my knowledge, this position was completely unprecedented and contrary to written NRC policy. In my 30-plus years’ performing and inspecting operability evaluations, I had never once come across this view. The failure to clearly demonstrate operability has always resulted in a declaration of “inoperability,” requiring immediate application of the Technical Specification remedial actions. The agency’s response went on to state that NRC approval of the PG&E license amendment request was needed before operability could be fully assessed.

Apparently, I had misapplied NRC operability criteria during the inspection. However, the nonconcurrence response did not provide sufficient information for me to understand why or how I had missed the mark. The NRC response also appeared to establish new agency policy and precedent.

In 2012, NRC technical reviewers concluded that HE methodology was not suitable for the Diablo Canyon SSE design basis. In October 2012, PG&E withdrew the license amendment request at the NRC’s request. The NRC Diablo Canyon Project Manager subsequently requested PG&E to directly add the results of the Shoreline fault analysis to the facility FSAR, appearing to work around the failed license amendment process.

This action limited stakeholder input by bypassing statutory requirements for notice and hearing opportunity associated with a facility design basis change. NRC rejection of the license amendment also appeared to have voided the agency’s stated bases for the non-concurrence decision on operability.

I submitted the DPO in July 2013. My goal was to include sufficient technical detail and regulatory analysis to support a third-party review of the issues. I addressed the unresolved operability issue from 2011 and added the lack of appropriate corrective actions to restore the FSAR safety analysis to the facility design basis and regulatory requirements.

During the DPO deliberations, I did my best to reach a consensus on the technical and regulatory issues with the Panel. I offered to withdraw the DPO if the Panel could provide a technical resolution consistent with both agency Rules and the facility License. I also requested that the Panel obtain a legal opinion from the NRC Office of General Council since the DPO involved application of specific legal requirements established by the facility Operating License. My understanding was that the Panel did not accept either recommendation.

In May 2014, the Panel concluded that PG&E had satisfied all regulatory requirements. Apparently, I had misapplied the Diablo Canyon License requirements. The Panel’s conclusion was built on the assumption that the HE was a facility SSE. Because the HE was an SSE, then neither a license amendment nor an operability evaluation was required. To the best of my knowledge, this was the first time the agency had concluded that the HE was the Diablo Canyon SSE. Unfortunately, the Panel Report offered no explanation or the basis for this assumption. I found this partially frustrating since I went to great lengths in the DPO to provide a detailed description of the facility seismic licensing basis. I thought that if I had gotten it wrong, then the Panel should be able to point out were I made my error.

The assumption that the HE was a facility SSE appeared to be in direct conflict with the facility license application (FSAR). I followed up with the Panel Chairman to better understand the basis for their assumption and my error. He directed me to an FASR Section. Interestingly, this section was included in the September 2013 revision following the NRC Project Manager’s direction to add the Shoreline fault to the FSAR. NRC Rules state that FSAR changes that potentially affect how the facility design basis are met, are required to be screened to determine if a license amendment is required. These changes were flagged by PG&E as exempt from this screening requirement based on “correspondence from the NRC.” From my view, the Panel appeared to use circular logic as basis for their underlying assumption and then used this assumption to support their conclusion.

In June 2014, I submitted an appeal to the DPO decision. My appeal stated that the DPO conclusion appeared to be built on a misunderstanding of the Diablo Canyon license requirements and agency Rules. Also, the Panel appeared not to have fully addressed the statutory requirements associated with adding the new seismic information to the FSAR (10 CFR 50.59) and meeting ASME Code for the facility SSE (10 CFR 50.55a). Specifically, the Panel appeared not have compared the new seismic inputs against the FSAR safety analysis as explicitly required by agency Rules.

I included the actual original (license application, as approved) and current FSAR pages describing the seismic design and licensing basis in the Appeal. I included these pages to avoid any misunderstanding of the facility License requirements. I included the specific language of applicable agency Rules and approved guidance to avoid unsupported assumptions. I also added specific examples detailing past NRC enforcement action taken on similar issues at other facilities and formal agency guidance addressing expected actions following discovery of conditions outside of the seismic design basis.

In response to my Appeal, the agency again told me my conclusions were incorrect. Apparently, my regulatory analysis had inappropriately excluded the HE from the facility licensing basis. Again the agency response did not include sufficient detail to help me understand where I had made my error or which part of the license application I misinterpreted.

I have exhausted the NRC processes for raising nuclear safety concerns. At every turn, the agency reinforced that its original conclusions and actions had been correct. From my perspective, I applied the same NRC inspection standards and agency Rules to the Diablo Canyon seismic issues that I’ve used to disposition many other design bases issues during my twenty years as an inspector. Since the DPO was reviewed by the highest levels of agency management, I was left with the impression that the NRC may have applied a different standard to Diablo Canyon.

I’ve also encountered this culture as an inspector. For example, the NRC issued eight violations over five years associated with facility changes PG&E made without first obtaining the required NRC approval in the form of an amendment to the Operating License.

By studying major nuclear accidents, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, l found that these events were largely preventable. Encroachment of operating standards and the design basis contributed to each event. In some cases decision makers didn’t fully appreciate the complexity or consequence of the safety barriers they encroached upon. For example, an engineer directed reactor power be maneuvered outside of design basis limits at Chernobyl to support testing. The engineer didn’t realize that his actions had placed the reactor in an unstable region, leading to an uncontrolled power excursion. The results of his actions are now part of the nuclear legacy.

As I’ve worked thought these issues, I’ve heard agency personnel express over and over again that Diablo Canyon has “plenty of seismic margin.” “Just look at the HE.” These statements imply that no real safety issue exists with the new seismic information. I maintain that Diablo Canyon seismic safety is very complex. It took the DPO Panel almost year just to conclude that the new ground motions were within the bounds of the existing SSE safety analysis. And I’m still not 100 percent convinced that they got it right. While the NRC license review processes may seem cumbersome and stakeholder input can be frustrating at times, use of the established regulatory framework provides us the basis for our presumption of nuclear safety. History has repeatedly taught us that we sometimes get ourselves in trouble when we try working around these processes.

Michael Peck, PhD, is the former NRC senior resident inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant.