Wednesday, May 07, 2014

Back to the Chairman Jackson years...House blackmailing the NRC into safety cuts.

On linkedin:

Utilities Professional
Top Contributor
                        
About May 4 I wrote it down...the conversation occurred about three weeks ago.
"It is interesting, in my recent discussions with a NRC branch chief he began discussing the old history of the industry. He talked about Millstone, I reminded him I got fired from the industry for raising safety issued just before Millstone. Well, we came to a agreement and exchanged money. It was deregulation coming and the influence of the big power user that frightened everyone. This guy sums it up pretty good:http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2014/04/how-we-got-here-with-our-electric-system.html

The Chief brought up the 31% budget cut threat to NRC during the Clinton years and Chairman Jackson. Those mad dog House republicans! I reminded him about Illinois ComEd and their debacle with prolonged fleet wide nuclear plants problems that ricocheted into issues with their transmission and distribution system. Right, we are talking about pressures on chairman Jackson- a weakening Clinton in the opening stages of the nuclear renaissance. This is how we drastically overhauled the ROP and jumped into the deep end of the pool with risk respective. This is why plants have big accidents and we discovered sitting hidden under the plant a mountain of non conformance with licensing and regulation going back for years and decades. I was shocked a branch chief would be talking these issues with me…after all, we were supposed to be focused on Palisades. Usually its me that draws outside the lines…he has to genteelly pull me back to my senses. He was pulling a mike mulligan thing with discussing decades of NRC history.

I am convinced he was warning me sections of the NRC thinks we are heading back to 30% or more budget cut blackmail and chasing off another women NRC chairman. In other words, the Industry would take revenge over any liberalization of safety like they did in the 1990s. Will Obama cave like Clinton?

If that isn’t an example of regulatory capture, I don’t know what else is…"
   


 US House subcommittee blasts NRC's proposed $1.06 billion budget
Washington (Platts)--7May2014/640 pm EDT/2240 GMT

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed $1.06 billion budget for fiscal 2015 was under attack at a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee hearing Wednesday as lawmakers questioned how agency expenses could increase by $434 million in 10 years, while roughly 600 fewer licensing actions were slated for review.

"The NRC budget for fiscal year 2015 [which begins October 1] shows an increase in resources and staffing despite a shrinking fleet of reactors," Representative Fred Upton, a Michigan Republican and Energy and Commerce Committee chairman, said at the panel's Energy and Power Subcommittee hearing.

Standing in for subcommittee chairman Ed Whitfield, a Kentucky Republican who was not at the hearing, was Representative John Shimkus, an Illinois Republican, who repeatedly criticized the agency's proposed budget for next fiscal year.

Ten years ago the NRC's budget was $626 million, the agency had 3,040 staff and planned to review 1,500 licensing actions, Shimkus said in his opening statement. Shimkus, who chairs the committee's Environment and the Economy Subcommittee, noted that NRC's proposed $1.06 billion budget for fiscal 2015 would involve 3,881 staff members and the review of 900 licensing actions.

The agency's request is $3.6 million more than its enacted 2014 budget.

By law NRC must recover 90% of its costs from licensees. The US now has 100 licensed, operating power reactors, down from 104 in 2013. And Entergy announced last year that Vermont Yankee would shut at the end of this year because it was no longer economical due to competition from low-cost, natural gas-fired generating plants.

Meanwhile, five power reactors are under construction in the US, NRC Chairwoman Allison Macfarlane noted.

"As the size of our nuclear industry shrinks, the NRC cannot pretend that it needs more regulators to oversee fewer plants," Shimkus said. "This is another pattern that is not sustainable."

Reactors have shut in the US but that does not mean there are fewer licensees, Macfarlane told the subcommittee. The agency also is busy with other activities, she said, noting that it is working with the nuclear industry and reactor vendors and manufacturers to ensure they will understand the guidance NRC is developing for small modular reactors. Also big on the agency's agenda, and which will continue to be, are post-Fukushima items, requiring licensees to take certain actions to ensure their reactor's safety.

Shimkus, who has been a vocal supporter of the US Department of Energy repository project at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, also criticized NRC's response to a court mandate requiring the agency to restart its review of the Yucca Mountain repository license application.

NRC, under then-Chairman Gregory Jaczko, began an "orderly shutdown" of its Yucca Mountain licensing activities in 2010, the same year that DOE dismantled the Yucca Mountain project without having a replacement program in place. In 2011 NRC terminated all work associated with the congressionally mandated Yucca Mountain project.

Shimkus questioned whether NRC would seek funds to complete its review of the Yucca Mountain license application and how much completing that proceeding would cost. Macfarlane did not voice support for NRC filing a supplemental budget request to complete the licensing review and noted that agency staff is assessing how much the Yucca licensing proceeding would cost.

In response to questions from Shimkus, Commissioners Kristine Svinicki and William Ostendorff said they would support filing a supplemental budget request for the Yucca Mountain licensing review. Commissioner William Magwood noted that the commission has asked staff to perform an analysis to determine how much money would be needed.

Shimkus pressed Magwood again, asking the commissioner that if he knew how much money was needed, would he make a budget supplemental request.

"I would consider it," Magwood replied.

Shimkus did not ask Commissioner George Apostolakis that question. Apostolakis earlier recused himself from all Yucca Mountain decisions because of repository-related work he did before joining the commission in April 2010.

NRC is now using Nuclear Waste Fund carryover allocations from previous fiscal years to complete staff's multi-volume safety evaluation report, which assesses the ability of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to meet regulatory requirements. In its March monthly status report to the committee, the agency said it had roughly $11.3 million for that work and that staff had estimated about $8.3 million would be needed to complete the SER.

Staff expects to complete and release the safety evaluation report in January, Macfarlane said.

Senator Shaheen's Help With Seabrook's Deteriorated Service Water Piping

Note: More turbulence-flow in a accident with core cooling DG operation?

Amazing coincidence going on here...I talk to the Seabrook’s senior inspector this morning at 9am and the inspection report comes out at 3 pm.

I am going to tell you what the real Seabrook was/is. It was reported the bp line was leaking drops of water last August. Seabrook watched it for weeks doing nothing before the little hole blew out and then the leak rate challenged plant licensing according to the inspectors. Seabrook’s first instincts were to wrap it in rubber and tie it off. I believe the inspectors said this was insufficient. The inspector had to call his boss and he had to step in. Then Seabook welded a metal patch all around the hole.
 
It doesn't sound like Seabrook is adiquately self directed.
 
I think above exactly expresses the real hearts the Seabrook’s staff...I am disappointed the inspection report didn’t carry this.   
May 6, 2014
Seabrook, NH 03874
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000443/2014002

Annual Sample: Increasing Frequency of Leaks in Service Water Piping in the Vicinity of

Installation/Fabrication Welds

a. Inspection Scope

During the period January 27 to January 31, 2014, inspectors reviewed a root cause evaluation (RCE AR 16379222) completed by NextEra staff for a service water pipe leak that occurred in August 2013. This problem was described in a licensee event report submitted to the NRC dated December 23, 2013. The inspectors determined the effectiveness of actions by NextEra staff to identify, characterize, correct and prevent reoccurrence of SW system leaks.

The inspectors assessed problem identification threshold, apparent cause analysis, extent of condition reviews, and timeliness of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed documents listed in the Attachment to this report and interviewed NextEra engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the planned, scheduled, and completed corrective actions to resolve the identified deficiency.

The inspectors reviewed non-destructive test procedures, procedure qualifications including test personnel qualifications to determine compliance with the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers codes and standards. Also, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, work orders, procurement documents, drawings and photographs to determine if the nonconforming condition was appropriately identified, documented, characterized and entered into NextEra’s corrective action process. The inspectors reviewed root cause evaluation AR 16379222 and interviewed members of the evaluation team. The inspectors interviewed the qualified non-destructive test examiner to evaluate the ultrasonic test method used. Test results were reviewed with the test examiner to assess the remaining wall thickness for continued operation without encroaching on minimum wall requirements.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. The root cause evaluation and corrective actions were reasonable, appropriate and timely.

NextEra’s root cause evaluation addressed a history of SW degradation (corrosion/ erosion) resulting in wall thinning and pressure boundary penetration and leakage. The areas where wall thinning and leakage occurred was determined to be associated with the loss of protective coating and/or liner failure at fabrication/installation welds which typically results in turbulent fluid flow. This turbulent flow was particularly aggressive in the attack of base metals and protective coatings at these weld locations and configuration changes. The inspectors assessed the root cause determination, results of the extent of condition investigation of other locations within the SW system and other fluid (circulating water) systems with similar piping materials, operating parameters and configurations.

The inspectors noted that examination using ultrasonic testing was performed at selected locations with known change in flow patterns and velocity changes. The results of this testing identified areas exhibiting variable wear rates. An evaluation of these test results was made to determine pipe structural and pressure retaining integrity.

The inspectors visually examined several portions of previous SW pipe and fittings that had been removed from the SW system in prior outages due to identified leaks. The removed samples provided confirmatory evidence of corrosive/erosive attack from turbulent flow at root locations of field welds, configuration changes and pipe to fitting intersections. These locations revealed characteristic “pin hole” leaks at weld locations and a general “wastage” of pipe and fitting interior diameters. These locations were evaluated for compliance with minimum wall thickness requirements. Those locations which were identified as active “leaks” at weld locations or, where areas exhibiting loss of wall thickness and were encroaching on minimum wall requirements, were dispositioned for repair/replacement in the CAP.

The inspectors determined that this issue received appropriate management attention as indicated by the corrective action that was taken to perform a temporary leak repair by the installation of a weldolet encapsulating the leak location. At the next outage, (OR16) the weldolet will be removed and replaced with a more suitable “flush patch”. The patch will be coated internally with a corrosion/erosion resistant material. The inspectors discussed the licensee plans to systematically remove and replace the SW piping with a base metal that is significantly more resistant to erosion/corrosion attack. The inspectors examined numerous lengths of pipe and fittings which were staged.
The sin, this is the second leak in this length of pipe...it should have never happened if they were a competent nuclear plant operator. Worst, they would have measured the hole accurately within the first hours of the leak...then installed that weldolet.  

May 7
Had a wonderful discussion with senior resident Cataldo today. At one point I will trying to end the conversion...but he didn't want to stop talking. So we talked for another half an hour or so. We talked about the service water system...my side is the service water piping has had too many problems and should be replaced. Basically he said according to regs we can't force them to change out the piping. Going to have to wait until the inspection findings next cycle. Basically I said you guys don't have a big enough hammer to create fear...to get them to change their behavior. There is a repetitive nature to these problems.
I just wanted to let the NRC know somebody outside is very concerned about the reliability of Seabrooks service water piping...I am convinced the agency heard me out.
And they know I feel it is a problem at many plants. I like Mr Cataldo...that is not to say we see everything the same. (1.5 hour discussion)
Republished from Feb 28.

I like an acknowledgement like this.
CHAIRMAN Resource
This is to acknowledge receipt of your communication to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thank you for your input. Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
To Me
Today at 10:46 AM
This is to acknowledge receipt of your communication to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thank you for your input.
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
This is what I wrote.
Dear Chairman Macfarlane,
I find the below appalling. I reported it to the OIG electronically and to the NRC safety hotline.
Thanks,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
16033368320
"The Adams title on an official NRC document is meant to be disrespectful to our political system and to a US Senator! I consider it agency wrongdoing. The word“ plumbing” is meant to be professionally disrespectful and is meant to be a belly laughing insider joke to everyone who reads the title on ADAMs.
I am the guy who wrote up the complaint and submitted it to Senator Shaheen, who forwarded it for investigation to the NRC. Did I ever once say on my complaint it was a plumbing problem? It is Seabrook's service water system and it supports very important nuclear safety equipment.
I have explained it all on my blog: ‘The Popperville Town Hall’:
http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com.




Allegation Department?

I am a transparency freak!"



Back at you babe, I sent a electronic message to the OIG and a copy to the Chairman.
So today March 1, 2013 I called the NRC Allegations hotline. I wanted to begin documenting my concern.  I explained my problem, told them the agency was being disrespectful to a NH Senator, and gave them the two ML accession numbers with the offending NRC document titles. Told them it is all explained on my blog "The Popperville Town Hall".  These guys didn’t seem to be interested in it. They were only interested if it was a nuclear safety problem.

You know, what is a nuclear safety problem? It is a huge nuclear safety problem if a independent agency was contemptible and disrespectful its legislators and congressional overseers. Then you would have a runaway independent agency uncontrollable to the higher political arms of our government!
The safety hotline did say I should report this to the OIG if I suspect NRC official wrongdoing...
The NRC frames it as a plumbing problem on their notification ticket dated 11/20/2013.  Where in the hell did the word "plumbing" come from? This NRC official can't spell deteriorating?
Seabrook's Crap Cooling Water system...
You know, professionally or with incompetence, was the agency trying to manufacture humiliation with Shaheen and me?  Everyone in the industry who reads the NRC response and seeing the "plumbing" wording are going to think we are incompetent with the nuclear language. Is the agency trying to humiliate Senator Shaheen...you can’t control us? Believe me, this wasn't a careless NRC mistake...there was an intention of humiliation. A lot of NRC officials had to approve this response. A great insider laugh over a grossly incompetent Senator Shaheen...these officials all got a good belly laugh over this?

Did I ever once mention the word plumbing in my complaint?  
A lowly Shaheen aid might have first generated the word plumbing...but agency didn't protect the Senator from embarrassment. The agency intentionally amplified the word-speak mistake with the intent of demeaning a US Senator over "Constituent "services"! Seeing how it was my "Allegation"...if the Allegation department would have called me up I would have straightened out the agency with the word plumbing. 
The title should  have spoke like "re: Seabrook-Service Water System". The exact title words on Adams:
(ML14037A126)Senator Jeanne Shaheen E-Mail re: Seabrook-Piping/Plumbing (Response)
So are you saying if it was the discharge of a plant toilet or the service water inlet of an emergency diesel generator, it would be both titled “Seabrook-piping/plumbing”? It is just crazy bureaucracy. Something is wrong with this rule! A professional would tend to open up the link more if it included “service water system”.
God damn it, am I talking about Pilgrim or Seabrook? Honestly, plumbing... I admit, “deteriorating” is a terrible word to spell. You see where this is heading, I erred with blaming the wrong parent corporation and they blamed the wrong plant and state.
“Subject: Senator Jeanne Shaheen E-mail, re: Constituent concerning issues with deteorating plumbing around the plant at Seabrook,"
Honestly, on ML14007A715, the ticketed (Constituents Correspondence) document...what the hell is wrong with the NRC? They can't even keep the Senators and state's names straight in their heads...what plant is in what state. Jesus? This is on the title page...the NRC thinks I am talking about the Pilgrim plant and Massachusetts. Does the EDO and the chairman think this...this has gone through their offices...do they know which plant is in which state? There are answering Senator Shaheen and they name it in the document the"Pilgrim Plant". These are the document experts with big degrees! "Signature of the EDO"...is he stupid? And all the officials who read this document? Come on! I'll bet you it comes from a unpaid intern.
Subject: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
We are not talking about a plumbing system. The Seabrook's service water sytem supports a host of extremely important nuclear safety system...that direly supports the community's protection. It collective is the most important nuclear safety system in the plant.
These are the games teenagers play. Is the agency is purposely playing stupid with the intent of hurting Senator Shaheen in the nuclear power arena! This is a small example with how out of control the NRC has become with government oversight.
More than anything else, the agency is a word, language and a communication expert!
“Senator Jeanne Shaheen, E-mail re, Constituent concerning issue with deteorating plumbing around the Plant at Seabrook.”
That is a special agency process says the notification ticket.
File notification says it is a "Allegation.
Here below is the NRC's responce.
February 14, 2014
The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Shaheen:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to a January 7, 2014, email from Sarah Holmes of your staff forwarding an email from your constituent, Michael Mulligan. Mr. Mulligan provided a detailed account of his concerns associated with the service water piping system at the Seabrook Station nuclear power plant. The NRC is well aware of Mr. Mulligan’s concerns and has discussed them with him in the past. Please be assured that the Seabrook Station service water system currently meets NRC regulatory requirements and is capable of performing its safety function.
Because the service water system cools important plant equipment that is continuously operating, much of the system is always in service. Therefore, the licensee regularly monitors the condition of the system via flow tests, as well as periodic examinations of portions of the interior of the piping and measurements of its wall thickness. The NRC has conducted several of its own inspections of the condition of this system over the years, and has taken enforcement action when the system was not in compliance with our requirements.
Due to the design of a majority of the piping system (carbon steel lined with cement for corrosion protection), NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra or the licensee) has experienced degradation of the lining of the piping and subsequent corrosion of the pipe wall in some areas, principally downstream of pumps and valves where the water flow is turbulent. Where lining erosion was experienced, NextEra removed the cement lining and installed alternate materials. In select areas, the licensee has experienced some problems with these alternate materials that have resulted in pieces of the lining breaking..
(Well, they botched the initial readings on the nature of the “conical” pipe wall flaw and the NRC inspector calls the staff incompetent over this event's reportability. You notice the NRC doesn't mention that the outside hole is much smaller than the inside hole...that the deterioration occurred  unknown very quickly and Seabrook never anticipated the defect worsening until the weep leak and worst the later the larger leak. I guess being stupid is not agaisnt the NRC's rules!
Basically, if they followed the rule they would have been required to shutdown with hours...instead of a weeks of leaks to get special permission to stay up at power. The staff of this plant should have made the service water system durable enough to never be challenged by pipe corrosion. 
These guys have a long history of service water leaks and they habitually make non conservative calls over the reliability of the system and the degradation's reportability. Anticipating problems is consider a sin in NextEra! 
The excessive flow in the system and destructive turbulence around some components is a serious initial design defect. These problems are going to reappear over and over again unless the design of the system  is changed.
No doubt the agency has had inspection activities of recent at Seabrook. These activities are not sufficient to get a major behavior change and attitude out of NextEra. Recently the plant’s Union President spoke publicly about  the dire culture changes occurring through the parent corporation's financial problems and budgets.
I think Seabrook’s troubling behavior is intensifying and shows absolutely no signs of abating.
 Lets just say, I am always entertained by the agency's touristy happy-land spin on events at the nuclear plants.
I am telling you guys, there is a huge difference between meeting the minimums intent of the rules and doing the “right thing”. It sits way above financial or “being in group” considerations!)  
...free and/or corrosion of the underlying carbon steel piping. The NRC inspected these issues under the agency’s Reactor Oversight Process, dispositioned the individual performance issues in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, as applicable, and documented these inspections in NRC Inspection Reports. In the long-term, NextEra is in the process of replacing critical sections of the piping with an unlined stainless steel alloy that is corrosion resistant, which will ensure the service water system continues to perform its safety function.
Regarding the particular incident in late August 2013, referenced by Mr. Mulligan, where a small (less than ½ inch diameter) through-wall hole developed in the service water system, NextEra made a temporary repair to the pipe using a technique that was reviewed and accepted by the NRC. Specifically, the licensee submitted a request to the NRC to be relieved of compliance with the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed code and provided the information to justify why this temporary repair method was technically acceptable as an alternative to the method prescribed by the applicable ASME code. The NRC concluded that the licensee’s relief request was acceptable and that the system with the temporary repair was capable of performing its safety function. This spring, NextEra will either make a permanent ASME code-compliant repair to this portion of the service water system or replace the affected section of piping. The NRC did have concerns with the technical adequacy of the evaluation performed by NextEra when the leak first developed regarding the ability of the system to perform its design functions (i.e., an operability determination), and took appropriate enforcement action. However, at no time was there an indication of falsification regarding this operability determination by the licensee.
The NRC will continue to monitor the condition of the service water system to ensure that proper maintenance, testing, and repairs are performed and that the system remains fully capable of performing its safety function. If you need any additional information, please contact me or the
Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Satorius
Executive Director
for Operations
Here is my response to Gov Shaheen:
Sarah, 
I really appreciate the Senator Shaheen passing my message onto the NRC. Really, thank you! It does a lot of good allowing the NRC, licensee and other nuclear plants' staff seeing a senator and us bantering this around a bit. I am certain Seabrook’s staff is really paying attention to the NRC response.

But there is another reality under this. I am just going to be blunt. There is a greater truth under this that the agency is just skimming over. This agency has absolutely no fear that the Senate or the House can enforce honesty and full truth telling with this agency.

What is amazing with the agency from the recent past is the amount of time these highly experienced and highly educated professional experts have spent on me...a member of the public. It would really cost big bucks if I was forced to pay for these professional expert time! We are talking about literary hours of phone time. But I never get to see the actual evidence to make my independent judgment with what it means. It is always their self-interested interpretation I am dealing with. There is a kind of technical or agency spin that always goes on.

I really appreciate the agency using my real name...they usually call me “it”. I love transparency!

But I got to tell you in the conditions on the NEISO market and the grid...we actually have a shortage of electricity in NE today. Somebody sneezes in Maine and the price of market electricity increases by a factor of 6. In the winter of 2013, the Pilgrim plant had bought new defective and leaking safety relief valves. They were reducing power and had two shutdowns over these poor quality nuclear safety components. Our grid was so fragile...not enough natural gas pipe line capacity...when Pilgrim powered down, it threw the NE grid into a crisis and we almost had widespread blackout in very cold weather.

During Aug 2013 with Seabrook’s leaking service water piping, it could have been the same if we were in a prolonged summer heat spell. I certain the uncertainty with Seabrook last Aug along with a fragile electric market, this kicked up the market price of electricity.

It is going to be a really expensive for us if these remaining nuclear plants aren’t performing proper maintenance ...they start tripping and powering up all the time. These guys nationwide have performed 100’s of millions of dollars of poor quality maintenance. The Pilgrim plant has become very unreliable in the last year...the NRC is on their case.

And there are growing implication that repeat powering up and down of these nuclear plants, that are driven by poor maintenance and upkeep, are damaging nuclear equipment and components...Palisades CRDMs and Pilgrims highly radioactive crud problems. Is Seabrook with the crappy service water piping heading that way?

Believe me, just meeting the minimum requirements of NRC nuclear safety rules in order to save a few pennies...is not near good enough to protect the interest of New Hampshire, our greater New England and our beautiful nation.  
The NRC usually would include my letter to Senator Shaheen. If the agency chose to not publish it...this is a typical action to protect the reputation of the NRC officials and plant inspectors. 
The only way you are going to get at some of the truth with what is going on at Seabrook...it to get the actual people to swear under oath and interview them. We think the plant is undergoing a lot more stress than what is admitted and the employees are being intimidated. Recently Seabrook was having a Union contract dispute with NextEra...the Union president explained to the news media the new pressures Seabrook was undergoing. Mainly the cheap prices of natural gas were financially pressuring NextEra and Seabrook.

Union President on Seabrook’s financial pressures:
Thanks,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
16033368320
...Just trying to put this in a context; let’s say you reduce the piping wall thickness to all the systems and components in the plant. We are thinking metaphorically. They got millions of components...certainly a million components in Seabrook. That will cause them to breakdown and trip all the time. It is very dangerous business reducing the reliability and durability globally in all the components...that is Pilgrim and Palisades.
And if a lot of substandard non-safety equipment continuously causes them trouble...it will dilute the site’s resources paying attention to the safety equipment.
We are talking about a tremendously complex machine with an enormous amount of components and a tremendously complex organization that is needed to support a nuclear plant...indeed a huge fleet of nuclear plants.
And if this is done right, it creates tremendous benefits to society and the utility!
These guys loose themselves in the complexity all the time...
It is hard for people to understand the scale of these things...
I am done for now. Again, thank you for your attention with Seabrook!

Mike
This below is a excerpt from my letter to Senator Shaheen.
Seabrook Nuclear Station's "Crap" Service Water Piping System
"Seabrook nuclear plant was brought on line in 1990 with cheap and non-corrosion resistant carbon steel service water piping. Within two years, piping integrity problems began showing up with pitting and local corrosion. And this problem has only gotten worst and it’s running out of control as I write. It is corrupting the staff of this organization.
In 2011 they replaced a 30 year old 8 foot section of 24 inch (huge) width pipe on the service water strainer by pass line. I think because of corrosion issues. It seemingly had a secret failure of some sort in 2011, as the NRC didn't disclose it in their most recent inspection report (2013001). They replaced it with new carbon steel piping that was lined with so called super epoxy material Belzona. It failed within three years during August of this year. This is called progress. How do we know if the Belzona isn't’ going to clog again the emergency diesel generator cooling water orifices?:"

Monday, May 05, 2014

Interesting Information to Me

5 utility companies that are now takeover targets

Opinion: The Exelon-Pepco deal may kick off a wave of M&A
Among this group, the worst-performing stock over the past five years, coincidentally, is Exelon, with a negative total return of 2%. And that’s including reinvested dividends. The company pays a quarterly dividend of 31 cents, for a yield of 3.46%.                               
Excluding Exelon, here are the five utility stocks with the worst five-year total returns, despite strong performance this year. They just might be on utilities’ takeover-target list.





Sorry, I got confused over the green-blue colors. The 300% decline occurred over natural gas...nuclear production cost remained steady over many years.

The slow motion Tsunami...

Production cost declined 300.3%  from 2008 to 2012 for nuclear plants...

If it was a matter of survival, would they cut another 300% from production cost.

Nuclear Matters

Production Costs

Friday, May 02, 2014

Loose Parts In the Steam Generator and Core at Wolf Creek (oops)

This was released today. As a by the way, the outage before the last Palisades found foreign material sitting on top of one of their SG on the secondary side. They plugged a few tubes the the material was siting on, and then left it sitting on top of the SG because it was too big to take out.
Palisades?
What is the difference between foreign object wear and loose parts?
ENO Response
2. During the 2012 refueling outage steam generator inspections, the three tubes
listed in table 6 for steam generator (SG) E-50A as "LP Preventive Stabilization"
were plugged because loose parts could not be retrieved. Even though wear due to
these loose parts was not present, the three tubes were plugged as a preventive
measure should future wear occur.
To further clarify the 2012 refueling outage inspection results, the following
inspection report changes were made:
Two changes were made to Table 2, "Active Damage Mechanisms." The first is that
the location "Historical foreign object (FO) wear" was changed to "Loose Part (LP)
wear." Second, since historical FO wear, now labeled LP wear, is an active damage
mechanism in both E-50A and E-50B, E-50A was added to the LP wear location.
To better categorize the bases for SG tubes plugged in 1 R22, Table 5, "Tube
Plugging Summary by Damage Mechanism," was revised to change the row "Wear
- Loose Part" for SG E-50A from "3" to "0." A row was added to the Tube Plugging
Summary column labeled "Preventive - Loose Part (LP)" with a "3" in the SG E-50A
column.
Wolf Creek Special Report ...got pictures
 
Note: a rounded nut...there is a lot of damage for three days operation.

August 27, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO: Docket File
FROM: Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate IV /RA/
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the licensee) conducted a refueling outage at Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) that began on Friday, March 22, 2002. On May 10, 2002, in coming out of the outage, there were indications of an unusual noise followed by an alarm in the plant loose parts monitoring system for Steam Generator D. The plant was shut down on May 13, 2002, and the steam generator was entered to find the loose parts.

Enclosed are three e-mails dated May 17 and 20, and June 20, 2002, from the licensee. The May 17, 2002, e-mail provided (1) a copy of a special report issued by the licensee to the WCGS employees describing the loose parts found in the steam generator, and (2) pictures of the two parts found in the steam generator. The special report and the pictures can be found in ADAMS Accession No. ML022270414.

The May 20, 2002, e-mail provides answers to the six questions sent by me by e-mail to the licensee. The responses to the questions prevented the need for the staff to have a telephone call with the licensee to discuss the loose parts founds in the Steam Generator "D." The licensee’s answers follow the phrase "Answer)" in the e-mail. The Westinghouse letters referenced in the [...]’s in the licensee’s answers were not requested or reviewed by the staff.

The June 20, 2002, e-mail provides the licensee’s agreement to have the information provided in the previous two e-mails docketed. This memorandum dockets the information received from the licensee on the loose parts found in Steam Generator "D." No further action was needed to be taken by the staff.

Docket No. 50-482
Enclosures: 1. E-mail dated May 17, 2002
2. E-mail dated May 20, 2002
3. E-mail dated June 20, 2002

From: Kenneth Karwoski [mailto:KJK1@nrc.gov]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2002 1:04 PM
To: Jack Donohew
Cc: Louise Lund
Subject: Wolf Creek Loose Part

Jack,

This is to remind you of our conversation.

 I would like to have a discussion with Wolf Creek to discuss their loose part with the intent that a summary of the call would be made publicly available.

Specifically, I would like information related to the following:

What provided the initial indication of the part (e.g., loose part monitor alarm)? When was the initial indication?

 Answer) The initial indication of the presence of loose part(s) was an "unusual noise" heard on Channels 11 and 12 on the plant Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS), relating to steam generator D. This "unusual noise", followed closely by the LPMS alarm, occurred on 5/10/2002 at 0115 hours during a return to power after a reactor trip.

When was the plant shut down?

 Answer) The plant shutdown commenced at 1710 hours on 5/13/2002 directly subsequent to a Westinghouse presentation of the results of their just concluded evaluation of the LPMS tapes transmitted to them.

 Were the parts on the primary or secondary side or both?

 Answer) Two loose parts were retrieved from the primary side of steam generator D, consistent with the Westinghouse conclusions from their evaluation of the LPMS tapes.

 What was the extent of the damage?

 Answer) The known guide tube support pin damage is based upon the retrieval of the support pin nut and locking device (disc) from steam generator D. Although one possible failure mode is that the guide tube support pin shank did not fracture but that the nut, locking disc, and dowel pin came loose leaving an intact support pin in place in the guide tube, the evaluation for continuing operation assumed, more conservatively, that the assumed unrecovered loose parts included: 1) The guide tube support pin shank, 2) the guide tube support pin dowel pin, and 3) Fragments from the guide tube support pin nut.

There were no indications within the S/G of serious damage to the tubes, tubesheet, welds, or the divider plate caused by the loose parts.

Generalized peening to various degrees of the entire bowl region/bottom face of the tubesheet and divider plate was observed. All tube plugs were found in the proper tube hole location. The skirts of the tube plugs were peened to various degrees. Most of the entire inner surface of the channel head bowl was peened to various degrees. There was no indication of a foreign object present in any of the tubes. There appeared to be indications of scratching and displaced metal on the ID’s of various tubes. Whether this was caused by the objects found in the channel head, or from tooling associated with tubing NDE and other channel head maintenance operations was not determinable. It must be noted that the objects removed were larger than the tubing ID. The level of damage was considered not as severe as that of a comparison plant.

What was the acceptance criteria? What is the basis for the acceptance criteria?

Answer) The acceptance criteria for continuing operation with guide tube support pin damage and the assumed unrecovered loose parts, including the associated bases, through the end of the planned operating cycle, is documented in the Westinghouse evaluation [Westinghouse Letter LTR-MSI-02-62, Wolf Creek - Guide Tube Support Pin Loose Part JCO – Reactor Internals Evaluation]. This evaluation considered the safety concerns regarding the structural integrity of guide tubes with potentially fractured support pin shanks during operation and the potential effects on the nuclear fuel, the control rod drive mechanisms and drive line, and the applied impact and wedging loads upon the reactor pressure vessel and internals during operation from the assumed missing pieces.

The acceptance criteria and basis for the steam generator damage was documented in a bounding evaluation performed by Westinghouse [Westinhouse Letter LTR-SGDA-02-156]. The inspection and evaluation used industry experience from plants with damaged channel head components caused by loose parts. For the analysis, it was assumed that all of the tube welds were damaged and may be unable to perform their intended structural and leak prevention function. Resistance to tube pullout and resistance to primary-to-secondary side leakage was evaluated. Visual inspection of the mechanical plugs was adequate to establish confidence that the plugs will perform their intended plugging function through the end of the planned operating cycle. For the cladding, it was assumed that loose part impacts resulted in the cladding being breached in at least one location on the tube sheet and one location on the curved portion of the channel head and that the low-alloy steel is exposed to the primary liquid during the entire cycle.

What was the source of the part (if known)?

Answer) The two parts retrieved have been identified as the support pin nut and locking device (disc) from a guide tube support pin.

I have a phone call with Diablo at 12:30 p.m. on Monday. I will be leaving at 1:45 on Monday. I can support a call up to about 1:00 on Tuesday and I will be traveling the rest of the week.

Thanks,

Ken

415-2752

Thursday, May 01, 2014

Beavers paralyzes Route 63 in Hinsdale NH


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This is my coolest picture!




There is the beaver culprit. What caused it, 200 feet of elevation between the beaver pond and the culvert across route 63.  It is only 1/3 of a mile away. You only appreciate the incline by walking it down.

What do you say, between $500,00 to $1,000,000 damage on both incidents. The beaver ponds are on state property....what a waste of state monies.



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At least two lakeside beaver condos....







This below is the last time it happened..about two mile south of this one.  
Flooding paralyzes western region of N.H.


 
 
Monday, October 10, 2005

KEENE — After more than a day and a half of drenching rain, rivers and streams overflowed throughout New Hampshire on Sunday, flooding homes, washing out roads, threatening bridges and prompting evacuations.

"This is classic river flooding," said Jim Van Dongen, spokesman for the state Emergency Management office. "It's been raining since Friday night and there is nowhere for the water to go."

One Hinsdale resident, 19-year-old Sean Weeks, was awakened by firefighters about 3:30 a.m. and told to evacuate from his apartment house — just next to the stone bridge.

"I looked out my window and all I could see - straight down - was water, right up against the building," Weeks said. "I saw all this New Orleans stuff happening and I was thinking, `This can't happen to me,' then bada-bing, bada-boom, it just happened."

Weeks came out just in time to see a house across the street collapse into the raging water. No one was in the house at the time.

By late afternoon, police allowed him to return home to grab an armful of belongings: clothes, a construction tool belt, a backpack and a rifle.
This washout wasn't cause by the heavy rains...another beaver dam let go