That is the rumors circulating around...they have employees in that room when the machine is started up and they might be crawling all over the machine.
They had people in that room when the steam pipe burst. It is a very small room and lots of steam!
I just want people to know whemn I was talking about my RCA 2.206 with NRC section chief and the senior project manager...we spent a lot of time talking about personal employee safety issue. i chewed them out. Their theme in safety is always taking about not melting fuel...i told them they were short changing the employees with not bringing up the issues and threats of direct employee safety. Say with the hydrogen issues with the AOG piping...I asked did you call OSHA for an assist with their safety employee experience telling them we got oxygen and hydrogen at these levels going through a pipe and its leaking in the ground, you got any advice for us.
Say for the feedwater leak...you never spoke of how the heroic actions of the bottom line employees dealing with such hot water and steam...never mind the amps and volts of the feed pump motor and cables, in excess of 2000 volts...that support our society.
OHSA and the NRC have a agreement that the NRC generally does the function of OSHA at the nuclear plants.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Sounds like Entergy's QC/QA?
....Why is Palisades, Cooper, River Bend and Grand Gulf having so many inspection findings...the only one behaving is Vermont Yankee.
...and Arkansas one.
The Entergy organization is on fire and their oil rig is burning in the Gulf.
...The new VY HPCI leak (update Feb 17), it looks substantial, NRC says its coming from the same HPCI steam drain line as the last leak...corrosion and erosion.
"The claims come in an amended version of the lawsuit, originally filed last year, that alleges BP inflated its stock price by hiding information and making false and misleading statements about its safety practices before the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. BP's stock value dropped roughly in half following the oil rig explosion and spill.
The amended complaint claims that a company reorganization that began in 2007, which resulted in numerous layoffs and cuts to safety budgets, "would materially affect the Company's ability to drill safely in the Gulf of Mexico."
The suit said Lacy, an experienced drilling engineer who had implemented a rigorous drilling safety program while at Chevron, had been recruited to join BP in 2007 to improve and standardize its drilling policies and protocols.
"Lacy's departure from the Gulf of Mexico drilling unit in December 2009 coincided with other additional and extensive reshuffling of personnel in the BP Gulf of Mexico drilling unit . such that by the time of the Deepwater Horizon incident, four out of five of BP's senior drilling officials for the Gulf of Mexico had only been in their posts for a few months," according to the lawsuit."
...and Arkansas one.
The Entergy organization is on fire and their oil rig is burning in the Gulf.
...The new VY HPCI leak (update Feb 17), it looks substantial, NRC says its coming from the same HPCI steam drain line as the last leak...corrosion and erosion.
"The claims come in an amended version of the lawsuit, originally filed last year, that alleges BP inflated its stock price by hiding information and making false and misleading statements about its safety practices before the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. BP's stock value dropped roughly in half following the oil rig explosion and spill.
The amended complaint claims that a company reorganization that began in 2007, which resulted in numerous layoffs and cuts to safety budgets, "would materially affect the Company's ability to drill safely in the Gulf of Mexico."
The suit said Lacy, an experienced drilling engineer who had implemented a rigorous drilling safety program while at Chevron, had been recruited to join BP in 2007 to improve and standardize its drilling policies and protocols.
"Lacy's departure from the Gulf of Mexico drilling unit in December 2009 coincided with other additional and extensive reshuffling of personnel in the BP Gulf of Mexico drilling unit . such that by the time of the Deepwater Horizon incident, four out of five of BP's senior drilling officials for the Gulf of Mexico had only been in their posts for a few months," according to the lawsuit."
Friday, February 11, 2011
The parable of the noisy main turbine generator bearing
I used this yesterday to the investigator.
So i am out on my rounds and I walk across the turbine deck...where I hear clearly a new noisy turbine bearing. It is a drastic change from a few hours ago.
Now I am in the control room...I have explained the problem to the shift supervisor. So he goes into this burdensome rendition of I have to absolute verification and evidence that the bearing is making noise. I have to have perfect evidence that the bearing is noisy and it is damaged before I do anything.
So he gets it in his head that I might have had a stoke...I might not be giving him accurate information. He might say I need to hear it for myself...but I can’t leave the control room right now. All my control room indication tell me there is no problem.
I kid the OIG investigator, I might have to go through a court preceding in order for the shift superviser to get off his lazy butt to check out the noisy bearing. The only way he is going to scram the plant is after we weigh the evidence of a presidential blue ribbon commission?
It is certainty/uncertainty gaming...I magnify or inhibit certainty/uncertainty in service to my needs or my groups or organizations needs.
Who do you serve?
The shift supervisor says, I am just going to have to have a aux operator with a SRO licence and a engineering PhD before I believe a word he says...to check out the noisy bearing and be forced to do something about it.
So i am out on my rounds and I walk across the turbine deck...where I hear clearly a new noisy turbine bearing. It is a drastic change from a few hours ago.
Now I am in the control room...I have explained the problem to the shift supervisor. So he goes into this burdensome rendition of I have to absolute verification and evidence that the bearing is making noise. I have to have perfect evidence that the bearing is noisy and it is damaged before I do anything.
So he gets it in his head that I might have had a stoke...I might not be giving him accurate information. He might say I need to hear it for myself...but I can’t leave the control room right now. All my control room indication tell me there is no problem.
I kid the OIG investigator, I might have to go through a court preceding in order for the shift superviser to get off his lazy butt to check out the noisy bearing. The only way he is going to scram the plant is after we weigh the evidence of a presidential blue ribbon commission?
It is certainty/uncertainty gaming...I magnify or inhibit certainty/uncertainty in service to my needs or my groups or organizations needs.
Who do you serve?
The shift supervisor says, I am just going to have to have a aux operator with a SRO licence and a engineering PhD before I believe a word he says...to check out the noisy bearing and be forced to do something about it.
NRC Heads should roll: "This will be fun for you."
Update Feb 13
Why isn’t there a LER on this...and why wasn’t there a analysis of putting a automatic closing mechanism on it or if the door mechanism was broken?
My opinion is the plant is overwhelmed with incidences, events and breaking and degrading equipment, that there is insufficient manpower and people with adequate training and education, the NRc inspectors are overwhelmed, and there just isn't enough people to keep up with the analysis, paperwork, procedures and documentation.
Palisades: 05000255/2008002
On January 8, 2008 while conducting a tour, the inspectors noted door 71, the fire door between the C bus safety-related switchgear room and the 1-1 EDG room, open about two inches. The fire door is a three-hour door which separates Fire Area 4 from Fire Area 5. Although there is an auto-closure mechanism on the door, when the ventilation system cycles on, the door will not close without assistance. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee’s corrective action process as CR-PLP-2008-00075, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000255/2008002-01, "Failure to Ensure Fire Door Was Closed.”
Updated at 3:00PM
Can't you the NRC saying this faslification isn't safety related...
I believe I sent this to the OIG...but they never answer me or anyone else back? I hope these messages all get entered into the adams. The below issue is actually associated with my petition with the Palisades plant...the boron in the fuel pool!
Message74 The falsification is in LER-008-004-00. Entergy-Palisades declares cold bloodily they discovered the violation, while later they admitted it was a NRC raised violation. Why is the document still inaccurate to this day...we know the NRC has looked over this document as seen in the comments of the inspection reports. It should be noted in the recent root cause and corrective action NRC inspection report Entergy repeatedly admitted they haven’t clearly indicated accurately in their own paper work if it was a NRC identified findings. How deep does this self deception go...what is the extent of conditions?
They do a lot safety analysis and licensing amendments reduction in safety margin things with LERs. So they would do, as a example, a search of how many NRC identified problems they discovered in the whole industry or a particular licensee. If they don’t admit it was a NRC identified findings, then the search and how they use the product of the search is suspect. As a extreme, all problems are licensee identified and the NRC never found a problem that we didn’t know about.
I have reason to suspect a lot of the plants’ use this kind of format of not identifying if it is a NRC identified finding. The accuracy of all the LERs are suspect...meaning the integrity of the pool of LERs is poisoned.
The point is, I had long term issues with the OIG...
Nov 5, 2010...The falsification is in LER-2008-004-00...
So these are the potential female culprits Chairman Quay gave his refrain to have fun too.
Its gota be to Nancy of the communication branch...
PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS
MERRILEE BANIC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Generic Communications Branch
NANCY SALGADO, NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
ANDREA RUSSELL, NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Mr. Kim,
These are two inaccurate LERs I am talking about. No wonder the HB Robinson has had trouble with LER accuracy because the NRC doesn't enforce completeness and accuracy across the board, or creates enough fear in the industry that everyone reports the whole truth. I have a concern with falsification in a recent Grand Gulf inspection report. We know most of the LER factual information across the nation, if they write one, gets flipped into the propriety and secret corrective action program. I don't think the LER rules allow that. It is just a huge reversal from the lessen learned coming from TMI...you can only trust the actions from open public reports and declarations.
1) Course, the most humorous LER in the bunch is Fitzpatrick's LER: 2009-004-00 "Loss of Control Room Envelope Boundary". Like, how many times does it take for the NRC to make known a concern before the Fitzpatrick staff gets it? We have no idea if the multiple times issue was addressed. I think it is extremely pertinent that the NRC discovered it over and over again, this important information was missing in the LER that the NRC kept discovering of the problem. How come it wasn't positively declared it was discovered by the NRC, and we made a mistake in not finding it ourselves.
2) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1: 2009 - 003 - 00 Unanalyzed Condition That Significantly Degraded Plant Safety Existed Intermittently Due to an Unlatched Door Serving as a High Energy Line Break Barrier. What is interesting in this is all the issues that was uncovered and not discussed in the LER...I guess this is Entergy short form LER. No mention the NRC discovered it and that makes it inaccurate. We get no idea why the NRC dropped it eventually. Was it Entergy abuse or was it a abuse of the NRC to Entergy by hounding them..the inspections reports and LER doesn't it at all make clear what going on?
3) November 9, 2010 GRAND GULF - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2010004
"Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V for failure to perform required inspections of safetyrelated plant structures. Specifically, the inspectors found inspections that had been only partially performed and some areas that had not been documented as inspected. Subsequent walkdowns identified several deficiencies including concrete cracks and spalling, deficient coatings, rusted tanks and exposed rebar. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2010-06871."
Inspections, paperwork and following procedures were grossly inaccurate, and I believe this is a follow up to past issues. Do they have a Vermont Yankee growing up down south?
...As far as my last 2.206 petitions pre-hearing, the comment by chairman Quay of "This will be fun for you " is a affront to the public and the Petition process. It was deeply disrespectful to a petitioner. But I think that is a perfectly honest phrase explaining the people have absolutely no power to gather independent information and thus the ability to participate in the petition process. It has become a game to Chairman Quay, me and the NRC in dealing with a completely dysfunctional agency and public process. Chairman Quay should be prohibited from ever being involved in 2.206 process again. He really owns me and the people around Vermont Yankee nuclear plant a public apology.
Honesty, the indoctrinating of a newcomer to the board by the chairman with "This will be fun for you" phrase should be the impetus to overhaul the 2.206 process. How widespread is this feeling within the agency...their real feelings and not manufactured. I think this cracked open a window allowing us to see a facet of the agency never before seen...a hidden secret culture within the NRC.
I also request the "voice recording" of this whole proceeding be made public from your web site...including whatever was recorded before and after I came on the telephone line. I was in a state of shock once I heard that phrase...utterly in a shocked state. I bet you could detect my emotional state by listening to the recording. There is a sense you turn off the mic in all of your public recoded processes before and after testimony because of the fear of what you say to yourselves under the sheets.
One can only image what the NEI would do if they ever got connected to a NRC phone line concerning nuclear utilities issues, and overheard the staff saying "This will be fun for you." I will bet you nothing about this is fun now. You got to know lots of heads would roll if this complaint came from the NEI or a large nuclear utility.
Thanks,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Vermont Yankee
Thursday, February 3, 2011
CHAIRMAN QUAY: At this point I would like to turn it over to Mr. Mulligan.
MR. Mulligan: Hello. I've got to get this on the record. When you first pushed the button when I came on the phone, I heard a snippet of information and the snippet of information was, "Let's have a little fun." What was that about?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: That was me. I was welcoming a new Board member. She hasn't been here before and I said, "This will be fun for you." The reason I said that is it's a new experience. It's an experience which all of us need to have is interacting and learning how to interact with the public.
MR. MULLIGAN: Who is this?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: This is Ted Quay.
MR. MULLIGAN: Okay.
CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay?
MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you...
Why isn’t there a LER on this...and why wasn’t there a analysis of putting a automatic closing mechanism on it or if the door mechanism was broken?
My opinion is the plant is overwhelmed with incidences, events and breaking and degrading equipment, that there is insufficient manpower and people with adequate training and education, the NRc inspectors are overwhelmed, and there just isn't enough people to keep up with the analysis, paperwork, procedures and documentation.
Palisades: 05000255/2008002
On January 8, 2008 while conducting a tour, the inspectors noted door 71, the fire door between the C bus safety-related switchgear room and the 1-1 EDG room, open about two inches. The fire door is a three-hour door which separates Fire Area 4 from Fire Area 5. Although there is an auto-closure mechanism on the door, when the ventilation system cycles on, the door will not close without assistance. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee’s corrective action process as CR-PLP-2008-00075, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000255/2008002-01, "Failure to Ensure Fire Door Was Closed.”
Updated at 3:00PM
Can't you the NRC saying this faslification isn't safety related...
I believe I sent this to the OIG...but they never answer me or anyone else back? I hope these messages all get entered into the adams. The below issue is actually associated with my petition with the Palisades plant...the boron in the fuel pool!
Message74 The falsification is in LER-008-004-00. Entergy-Palisades declares cold bloodily they discovered the violation, while later they admitted it was a NRC raised violation. Why is the document still inaccurate to this day...we know the NRC has looked over this document as seen in the comments of the inspection reports. It should be noted in the recent root cause and corrective action NRC inspection report Entergy repeatedly admitted they haven’t clearly indicated accurately in their own paper work if it was a NRC identified findings. How deep does this self deception go...what is the extent of conditions?
They do a lot safety analysis and licensing amendments reduction in safety margin things with LERs. So they would do, as a example, a search of how many NRC identified problems they discovered in the whole industry or a particular licensee. If they don’t admit it was a NRC identified findings, then the search and how they use the product of the search is suspect. As a extreme, all problems are licensee identified and the NRC never found a problem that we didn’t know about.
I have reason to suspect a lot of the plants’ use this kind of format of not identifying if it is a NRC identified finding. The accuracy of all the LERs are suspect...meaning the integrity of the pool of LERs is poisoned.
The point is, I had long term issues with the OIG...
Nov 5, 2010...The falsification is in LER-2008-004-00...
So these are the potential female culprits Chairman Quay gave his refrain to have fun too.
Its gota be to Nancy of the communication branch...
PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS
MERRILEE BANIC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Generic Communications Branch
NANCY SALGADO, NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
ANDREA RUSSELL, NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Mr. Kim,
These are two inaccurate LERs I am talking about. No wonder the HB Robinson has had trouble with LER accuracy because the NRC doesn't enforce completeness and accuracy across the board, or creates enough fear in the industry that everyone reports the whole truth. I have a concern with falsification in a recent Grand Gulf inspection report. We know most of the LER factual information across the nation, if they write one, gets flipped into the propriety and secret corrective action program. I don't think the LER rules allow that. It is just a huge reversal from the lessen learned coming from TMI...you can only trust the actions from open public reports and declarations.
1) Course, the most humorous LER in the bunch is Fitzpatrick's LER: 2009-004-00 "Loss of Control Room Envelope Boundary". Like, how many times does it take for the NRC to make known a concern before the Fitzpatrick staff gets it? We have no idea if the multiple times issue was addressed. I think it is extremely pertinent that the NRC discovered it over and over again, this important information was missing in the LER that the NRC kept discovering of the problem. How come it wasn't positively declared it was discovered by the NRC, and we made a mistake in not finding it ourselves.
2) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1: 2009 - 003 - 00 Unanalyzed Condition That Significantly Degraded Plant Safety Existed Intermittently Due to an Unlatched Door Serving as a High Energy Line Break Barrier. What is interesting in this is all the issues that was uncovered and not discussed in the LER...I guess this is Entergy short form LER. No mention the NRC discovered it and that makes it inaccurate. We get no idea why the NRC dropped it eventually. Was it Entergy abuse or was it a abuse of the NRC to Entergy by hounding them..the inspections reports and LER doesn't it at all make clear what going on?
3) November 9, 2010 GRAND GULF - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2010004
"Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V for failure to perform required inspections of safetyrelated plant structures. Specifically, the inspectors found inspections that had been only partially performed and some areas that had not been documented as inspected. Subsequent walkdowns identified several deficiencies including concrete cracks and spalling, deficient coatings, rusted tanks and exposed rebar. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2010-06871."
Inspections, paperwork and following procedures were grossly inaccurate, and I believe this is a follow up to past issues. Do they have a Vermont Yankee growing up down south?
...As far as my last 2.206 petitions pre-hearing, the comment by chairman Quay of "This will be fun for you " is a affront to the public and the Petition process. It was deeply disrespectful to a petitioner. But I think that is a perfectly honest phrase explaining the people have absolutely no power to gather independent information and thus the ability to participate in the petition process. It has become a game to Chairman Quay, me and the NRC in dealing with a completely dysfunctional agency and public process. Chairman Quay should be prohibited from ever being involved in 2.206 process again. He really owns me and the people around Vermont Yankee nuclear plant a public apology.
Honesty, the indoctrinating of a newcomer to the board by the chairman with "This will be fun for you" phrase should be the impetus to overhaul the 2.206 process. How widespread is this feeling within the agency...their real feelings and not manufactured. I think this cracked open a window allowing us to see a facet of the agency never before seen...a hidden secret culture within the NRC.
I also request the "voice recording" of this whole proceeding be made public from your web site...including whatever was recorded before and after I came on the telephone line. I was in a state of shock once I heard that phrase...utterly in a shocked state. I bet you could detect my emotional state by listening to the recording. There is a sense you turn off the mic in all of your public recoded processes before and after testimony because of the fear of what you say to yourselves under the sheets.
One can only image what the NEI would do if they ever got connected to a NRC phone line concerning nuclear utilities issues, and overheard the staff saying "This will be fun for you." I will bet you nothing about this is fun now. You got to know lots of heads would roll if this complaint came from the NEI or a large nuclear utility.
Thanks,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Vermont Yankee
Thursday, February 3, 2011
CHAIRMAN QUAY: At this point I would like to turn it over to Mr. Mulligan.
MR. Mulligan: Hello. I've got to get this on the record. When you first pushed the button when I came on the phone, I heard a snippet of information and the snippet of information was, "Let's have a little fun." What was that about?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: That was me. I was welcoming a new Board member. She hasn't been here before and I said, "This will be fun for you." The reason I said that is it's a new experience. It's an experience which all of us need to have is interacting and learning how to interact with the public.
MR. MULLIGAN: Who is this?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: This is Ted Quay.
MR. MULLIGAN: Okay.
CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay?
MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you...
Wednesday, February 09, 2011
Part 26 fatigue rules
Do you know there are more restrictive driving hours for truck drivers than for employees of nuclear power plants... nuke employees can work way more DOT hours than truck drivers.
We are way into altruism abuse...where they are defending more the world is more safe by reducing the safety margins...
We are way into altruism abuse...where they are defending more the world is more safe by reducing the safety margins...
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Vermont Yankee
Thursday, February 3, 2011
CHAIRMAN QUAY: At this point I would like to turn it over to Mr. Mulligan.
MR. Mulligan: Hello. I've got to get this on the record. When you first pushed the button when I came on the phone, I heard a snippet of information and the snippet of information was, "Let's have a little fun." What was that about?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: That was me. I was welcoming a new Board member. She hasn't been here before and I said, "This will be fun for you." The reason I said that is it's a new experience. It's an experience which all of us need to have is interacting and learning how to interact with the public.
MR. MULLIGAN: Who is this?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: This is Ted Quay.
MR. MULLIGAN: Okay.
...
CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay?
MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you
Thursday, February 3, 2011
CHAIRMAN QUAY: At this point I would like to turn it over to Mr. Mulligan.
MR. Mulligan: Hello. I've got to get this on the record. When you first pushed the button when I came on the phone, I heard a snippet of information and the snippet of information was, "Let's have a little fun." What was that about?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: That was me. I was welcoming a new Board member. She hasn't been here before and I said, "This will be fun for you." The reason I said that is it's a new experience. It's an experience which all of us need to have is interacting and learning how to interact with the public.
MR. MULLIGAN: Who is this?
CHAIRMAN QUAY: This is Ted Quay.
MR. MULLIGAN: Okay.
...
CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay?
MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you
Tuesday, February 08, 2011
It is a only a incentive game...
It is a incentive game, if there could be a means of Entergy to make good profits on having good grade radioactive pipes in the grounds of VY, they'd have a perfect prestine engineered body of pipes out in the yard.
They only reason the industry is fixated on capacity factor and safety relativeness(the nothing ever matters brigade) ...cause that is the only way their stockholders know the utility can make money over nuclear power. We'd be a lot better off if A CEO could think, I took a hit off my capacity factor this year, but I made money off upgrading my plant and behaving in a way where I make the community happy.
As it sits now, the only reason why Entergy and Vermont Yankee maintains extremely high and dangerous capacity factor is because it is a survival strategy. Their survival is at stake and they will do what ever it takes to survive.
As it sits, there is no way they can make money by plowing money out in the yard, and I could make the case when they get caught with their pants down they never get punished by consuming capacity factor.
They only reason the industry is fixated on capacity factor and safety relativeness(the nothing ever matters brigade) ...cause that is the only way their stockholders know the utility can make money over nuclear power. We'd be a lot better off if A CEO could think, I took a hit off my capacity factor this year, but I made money off upgrading my plant and behaving in a way where I make the community happy.
As it sits now, the only reason why Entergy and Vermont Yankee maintains extremely high and dangerous capacity factor is because it is a survival strategy. Their survival is at stake and they will do what ever it takes to survive.
As it sits, there is no way they can make money by plowing money out in the yard, and I could make the case when they get caught with their pants down they never get punished by consuming capacity factor.
Saturday, February 05, 2011
A Brewing Scandal
Updated Fed 07/2011
I like to know why the NRC didn't establish the LLD (670 to 700 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) in this inspection report (05000271/2010006)...
I like to know all the testing results from GZ-3, from 2007 to Jan 7 2010 or so....and what was the time in the counter...could that expect to detect the LLD in the liquid scintillation detector.
The basic question, is this an accurate sentence: "ENVY noted that this was the first positive indication of tritium"?
Entergy RCA back in June 16, 2010: "On January 6, 2010 Vermont Yankee was notified by TBE-ESL that a November 2009 sample from GZ-3 had a measured tritium concentration of 705 pCi/L."
New state report Feb/07
Vermont Yankee’s lower limit of detection (LLD) for tritium is in the range of 670 to 700 picocuries per liter (pCi/L).
...705 picocuries per liter should have put Entergy on the leak warpath back in Nov 2009.
Did the NRC define for us LLD?
New VY well tests positive for tritium
Yankee technicians are using techniques to lower their lowest limit for detection for many well samples, allowing them to detect tritium at lower levels than previously."
Think of it as if you are a Entergy employee. Entergy is allowed to game these numbers to the NRC and state to their advantage when all of the region public is watching VY, these governmental official never question this practice of gaming, an employee knows this is uncontested power that Entergy got. What chance does he have with truth telling when the company has this much power. They tell all their buddy friends in the company, Entergy has almost untested power, you better not ever cross them.
Complaint: Jan 28, 2011
" There is a scandal brewing questioning if everyone including Vermont, Entergy and the NRC has been gaming LLD...lower-than-detectible level of tritium. In other words, the tritium radioactive detector or counter has the ability to detect tritium lower than their declared lower limit...LLD. They mostly declared they can only go down to 500, 1000 or even 2000 picocuries per liter as the lower limit...but I have been told by the Vermont state radiological officer they can go down quite a bet lower than 50 picocuries of plant produced tritium. This is extremely low levels...but it is positive indication of radioactive leakage. The question becomes, how extensively is the area contaminated and why the gaming lies by everyone."
It seems the LLD is around 600 to 700 picocuries per liter...they should tell how long the detector is counting. The LLD is dependant on how long it is counted.
I like to know why the NRC didn't establish the LLD (670 to 700 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) in this inspection report (05000271/2010006)...
I like to know all the testing results from GZ-3, from 2007 to Jan 7 2010 or so....and what was the time in the counter...could that expect to detect the LLD in the liquid scintillation detector.
The basic question, is this an accurate sentence: "ENVY noted that this was the first positive indication of tritium"?
Entergy RCA back in June 16, 2010: "On January 6, 2010 Vermont Yankee was notified by TBE-ESL that a November 2009 sample from GZ-3 had a measured tritium concentration of 705 pCi/L."
New state report Feb/07
Vermont Yankee’s lower limit of detection (LLD) for tritium is in the range of 670 to 700 picocuries per liter (pCi/L).
...705 picocuries per liter should have put Entergy on the leak warpath back in Nov 2009.
Did the NRC define for us LLD?
New VY well tests positive for tritium
Yankee technicians are using techniques to lower their lowest limit for detection for many well samples, allowing them to detect tritium at lower levels than previously."
Think of it as if you are a Entergy employee. Entergy is allowed to game these numbers to the NRC and state to their advantage when all of the region public is watching VY, these governmental official never question this practice of gaming, an employee knows this is uncontested power that Entergy got. What chance does he have with truth telling when the company has this much power. They tell all their buddy friends in the company, Entergy has almost untested power, you better not ever cross them.
Complaint: Jan 28, 2011
" There is a scandal brewing questioning if everyone including Vermont, Entergy and the NRC has been gaming LLD...lower-than-detectible level of tritium. In other words, the tritium radioactive detector or counter has the ability to detect tritium lower than their declared lower limit...LLD. They mostly declared they can only go down to 500, 1000 or even 2000 picocuries per liter as the lower limit...but I have been told by the Vermont state radiological officer they can go down quite a bet lower than 50 picocuries of plant produced tritium. This is extremely low levels...but it is positive indication of radioactive leakage. The question becomes, how extensively is the area contaminated and why the gaming lies by everyone."
It seems the LLD is around 600 to 700 picocuries per liter...they should tell how long the detector is counting. The LLD is dependant on how long it is counted.
New VY well tests positive for tritium
New VY well tests positive for tritium
By BOB AUDETTE / Reformer Staff
Everyone knows I put the bug in state radiological officer Irwin ear that the discharge piping from the AOG building to the stack was leaking before the test results came in...at least the first outsider to know...indeed I knew there was a leak in this AOG piping before the wells were even dug.
So like what is the potential radiation and tritium levels in this piping during normal operation?
Where does the plant ventilation from the reactor and turbine building snake through the property to the stack...there is high suspicion this is highly contaminated. Remember there is or was suspicion the turbine building ventilation fan floor drains could be the cause of this leak.
Remember it been reported the stack stump has extremely high contamination levels in it. So where did this come from, and why wasn't it cleaned up. You got to know the rain comes in through stack piping hole at the top of the structure, drains down to the to the sump at the bottom. Does it drag the tritium down with it?
How does the standby gas treatment system go out to the stack, does it tap into ventilation piping? It is a hypa filter and carbon filter....but how does the discharge get to the stack. It doesn't filter tritium.
How does the torus bypass piping get to the stack....is there a assurance it is operable? If is uses other piping system that are 40 years old.
...If I had some time to screw around, I'd be wondering the actual efficiency of tritium reduction in the AOG stream...like is the reduction of tritium the amount it was designed for right now.
You could take a inlet sample to the AOG building and then a outlet sample....how much does it reduce tritium?
By BOB AUDETTE / Reformer Staff
Everyone knows I put the bug in state radiological officer Irwin ear that the discharge piping from the AOG building to the stack was leaking before the test results came in...at least the first outsider to know...indeed I knew there was a leak in this AOG piping before the wells were even dug.
So like what is the potential radiation and tritium levels in this piping during normal operation?
Where does the plant ventilation from the reactor and turbine building snake through the property to the stack...there is high suspicion this is highly contaminated. Remember there is or was suspicion the turbine building ventilation fan floor drains could be the cause of this leak.
Remember it been reported the stack stump has extremely high contamination levels in it. So where did this come from, and why wasn't it cleaned up. You got to know the rain comes in through stack piping hole at the top of the structure, drains down to the to the sump at the bottom. Does it drag the tritium down with it?
How does the standby gas treatment system go out to the stack, does it tap into ventilation piping? It is a hypa filter and carbon filter....but how does the discharge get to the stack. It doesn't filter tritium.
How does the torus bypass piping get to the stack....is there a assurance it is operable? If is uses other piping system that are 40 years old.
...If I had some time to screw around, I'd be wondering the actual efficiency of tritium reduction in the AOG stream...like is the reduction of tritium the amount it was designed for right now.
You could take a inlet sample to the AOG building and then a outlet sample....how much does it reduce tritium?
Thursday, February 03, 2011
NRC "having fun" over Vermont Yankee 2.206
I requested a NRC OIG investigation concerning these events...both in writing and in a phone call. Nobody was in the NRC OIG home, so I left my telephone number and name, no courtesy call or note as of yet that the NRC OIG had received my complaint.
Why didn't I hear something like these "petitions are a sacred" responsibilities "instead of have fun"...
As a note, the NRC had no intention for this women NRC official to speak as this meeting, and she said nothing...so why the fun comment?
Public Participation
The point I make, is public participation fun for the NRC, they don't take it as a serious business.
NRC "having fun" over Vermont Yankee 2.206
So I am on the phone bridge this morning...Feb 3, 2011...I identify myself to the mechanical voice message system, then I am just kind of waiting around in silence on the phone waiting for them to push the button to join the conference. There are people on the voice bridge, and then there are NRC officials in one or more rooms on a speaker phone device.
All of a sudden I hear a click, I hear the snippet "and have a little fun", then I hear the talking of all the NRC officials, then the "welcome to this 2.206 petition...". All the background chatter of the officials stops...then we are off to the races with the 2.206 processes. From this point on everything is recorded in the NRC ops center and it is transcribed for addition into the public record.
They do the introduction, then they give me the microphone so to speak. I say I got to get this down on the record. I just heard a snippet of "and have a little fun" when I first came into the meeting, when I was connected to the phone bridge...what did you mean by this? It was a male voice talking to a female. I am thinking two NRC officials were talking about outside activities, but you never can tell what is behind it. I said to myself too, they just might be talking about have having a little fun with me in the meeting.
The chairman of the petition board pops up on the phone connections explaining, "I was introducing a new NRC official to the petition board and I was telling her to have a little fun as she participates and listens to your review board" concerning tritium and root cause analyze issues at Vermont Yankee.
Can you imagine a 2.206 petition meeting chairman indoctrinating a new NRC official into the petition process by saying have a little fun with it? Are they all laughing and making faces behind my back as I am stuttering, stammering and fumbling my way through my speech. Are they laughing and having a little fun over us all?
Why didn't I hear something like these "petitions are a sacred" responsibilities "instead of have fun"...
As a note, the NRC had no intention for this women NRC official to speak as this meeting, and she said nothing...so why the fun comment?
Public Participation
The point I make, is public participation fun for the NRC, they don't take it as a serious business.
NRC "having fun" over Vermont Yankee 2.206
So I am on the phone bridge this morning...Feb 3, 2011...I identify myself to the mechanical voice message system, then I am just kind of waiting around in silence on the phone waiting for them to push the button to join the conference. There are people on the voice bridge, and then there are NRC officials in one or more rooms on a speaker phone device.
All of a sudden I hear a click, I hear the snippet "and have a little fun", then I hear the talking of all the NRC officials, then the "welcome to this 2.206 petition...". All the background chatter of the officials stops...then we are off to the races with the 2.206 processes. From this point on everything is recorded in the NRC ops center and it is transcribed for addition into the public record.
They do the introduction, then they give me the microphone so to speak. I say I got to get this down on the record. I just heard a snippet of "and have a little fun" when I first came into the meeting, when I was connected to the phone bridge...what did you mean by this? It was a male voice talking to a female. I am thinking two NRC officials were talking about outside activities, but you never can tell what is behind it. I said to myself too, they just might be talking about have having a little fun with me in the meeting.
The chairman of the petition board pops up on the phone connections explaining, "I was introducing a new NRC official to the petition board and I was telling her to have a little fun as she participates and listens to your review board" concerning tritium and root cause analyze issues at Vermont Yankee.
Can you imagine a 2.206 petition meeting chairman indoctrinating a new NRC official into the petition process by saying have a little fun with it? Are they all laughing and making faces behind my back as I am stuttering, stammering and fumbling my way through my speech. Are they laughing and having a little fun over us all?
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
Shumlin calls for Vermont Yankee oversight committee
In his own words:
Gov. Peter Shumlin calls for Vermont Yankee Reliability Oversight Committee, citing tritium leaks
Governor calls for Vermont Yankee oversight committee
Terri Hallenbeck, Free Press Staff • Tuesday, February 1, 2011
MONTPELIER -- Gov. Peter Shumlin announced Tuesday morning that he will form a five-person Reliability Oversight Committee to offer him expert advice.
Shumlin, a vocal critic of the Vernon nuclear power plant who took office as governor last month, said the panel will help the state with oversight of the recent discovery of radioactive tritium in a different location from what was reported a year ago. The committee will also advise the state on planning for decommissioning of the plant...
Gov. Peter Shumlin calls for Vermont Yankee Reliability Oversight Committee, citing tritium leaks
Governor calls for Vermont Yankee oversight committee
Terri Hallenbeck, Free Press Staff • Tuesday, February 1, 2011
MONTPELIER -- Gov. Peter Shumlin announced Tuesday morning that he will form a five-person Reliability Oversight Committee to offer him expert advice.
Shumlin, a vocal critic of the Vernon nuclear power plant who took office as governor last month, said the panel will help the state with oversight of the recent discovery of radioactive tritium in a different location from what was reported a year ago. The committee will also advise the state on planning for decommissioning of the plant...
Monday, January 31, 2011
New NRC Blog
Welcome to the new NRC Blog. We are excited about using this new communications tool and hope it will increase our collaboration and interaction with the public. The blog is intended to serve as a vehicle for informing, explaining and clarifying the actions, roles and responsibilities of the NRC, raising awareness about our agency and its mission, and – most importantly – giving us an opportunity to hear from you.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
2.206 liquid scintillation counter emergency evacuation delay
I withdrew this 2.206!
I could inquire about the hydrogen production and release in a accident, then turning into water, but that be nit picking. I have no bases for a 2.206 and will not sunmit one.
Mike,
The liquid scintillation counter at Vermont Yankee is only used for tritium analysis. It is not used in any accident scenario.
NRC Public Affairs
Waiting as answer:
Mr Sheehan,
"He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response."
So it played no role in the radiological emergency response?
Was there training and practice with a loss of scintillation detector accident?
Mr Sheehan,
"All he had to say is the liquid scintillation counter plays no role in the radiological response?"
Are you saying the scintillation counter plays no role in radiological emergency response capability, or the lead up to the detection of a radiological emergency condition?
I didn't send in the 2.206...but I asked Neil Sheehan about it.
Jan 31 11:00 What does this mean?
...Mr. Mulligan,
A staffer in the Region I Division of Reactor Safety I has reviewed the issue and its potential impact on Vermont Yankee’s radiological emergency response capability. He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response. In fact, in-line beta-gamma monitors are used for real-time emergency response indications and dose-significant radionuclides are measured via gamma spectroscopy counters in the chemistry laboratory, based on sample measurements. There is sufficient redundancy in the in-line plant monitors and chemistry laboratory gamma monitors to evaluate radiological conditions affecting emergency response. Therefore, there is no safety concern associated with out-of-service liquid scintillation counting equipment with respect to emergency response capabilities.
I hope this addresses your concerns.
Neil Sheehan
Jan 30, 2011
R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject: 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 Request a emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because the radiological and evacuation emergency procedures and plans were secretly inoperable or impaired between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011.
Dear Mr. Borchardt,
“Rutland Herald Susan Smallheer Jan 29
Irwin said the failure of the test equipment was disturbing.
They told me about the liquid scintillation counter being down and that was the cause of the delay. Irwin said, I figured like most labs, they would get the instrument repaired relatively quickly but for some reason that did not the case.
Irwin said that he only found out about the equipment failure last Friday (Feb 21?) (disclosed at the end of the week Jan 28, 2011), when he asked why the test results form the first well were so late.”
Timeline with Vermont Yankee events: http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2011/01/vt-gov-shumlin-patsy-to-entergy.html
I request a immediate emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because of the unreliability of their radiological and emergency plans for a indeterminate amount time. The liquid scintillation counter was broken between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011. That makes the radiological procedures inoperative or severely degraded in this time frame. Not having a backup liquid scintillation counter would make the emergency evacuation plans unreliable. If a nuclear power plant doesn’t have the capability to make reliable their evacuation plans, then they shouldn’t be licensed to operate a nuclear plant.
1) I request a NRC OIG and congressional investigation with why the NRC didn’t immediately notify the community that the Vermont Yankee radiological procedures and evacuation plans were not functional during these dates.
2) Request a investigation, in making sure that all radiological capabilities at the nuclear plants are reliable and durable with sufficient back ups in order to be able to carry out their emergency plans. Request all USA plants have sufficient back up liquid scintillation counter capabilities.
3) Request a information notice to given to all plants about this.
4) Request a disclosure of all delays with getting any radiological measurements that effected any normal or emergency requirement of a procedure.
Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 03451
1-603-336-8320
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
(I know they get a rough measure of liquid radioactivity from other detectors...the downfall in this is I am not exactly clear what the scintillation detector plays in the radiological plans. It seems preposterous the agency would let them get away with ineffective emergency evacuation plans.
You know, if it ain't defined as safety related and in a requirement of a procedure, they let the world fall off a cliff.)
I could inquire about the hydrogen production and release in a accident, then turning into water, but that be nit picking. I have no bases for a 2.206 and will not sunmit one.
Mike,
The liquid scintillation counter at Vermont Yankee is only used for tritium analysis. It is not used in any accident scenario.
NRC Public Affairs
Waiting as answer:
Mr Sheehan,
"He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response."
So it played no role in the radiological emergency response?
Was there training and practice with a loss of scintillation detector accident?
Mr Sheehan,
"All he had to say is the liquid scintillation counter plays no role in the radiological response?"
Are you saying the scintillation counter plays no role in radiological emergency response capability, or the lead up to the detection of a radiological emergency condition?
I didn't send in the 2.206...but I asked Neil Sheehan about it.
Jan 31 11:00 What does this mean?
...Mr. Mulligan,
A staffer in the Region I Division of Reactor Safety I has reviewed the issue and its potential impact on Vermont Yankee’s radiological emergency response capability. He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response. In fact, in-line beta-gamma monitors are used for real-time emergency response indications and dose-significant radionuclides are measured via gamma spectroscopy counters in the chemistry laboratory, based on sample measurements. There is sufficient redundancy in the in-line plant monitors and chemistry laboratory gamma monitors to evaluate radiological conditions affecting emergency response. Therefore, there is no safety concern associated with out-of-service liquid scintillation counting equipment with respect to emergency response capabilities.
I hope this addresses your concerns.
Neil Sheehan
Jan 30, 2011
R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject: 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 Request a emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because the radiological and evacuation emergency procedures and plans were secretly inoperable or impaired between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011.
Dear Mr. Borchardt,
“Rutland Herald Susan Smallheer Jan 29
Irwin said the failure of the test equipment was disturbing.
They told me about the liquid scintillation counter being down and that was the cause of the delay. Irwin said, I figured like most labs, they would get the instrument repaired relatively quickly but for some reason that did not the case.
Irwin said that he only found out about the equipment failure last Friday (Feb 21?) (disclosed at the end of the week Jan 28, 2011), when he asked why the test results form the first well were so late.”
Timeline with Vermont Yankee events: http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2011/01/vt-gov-shumlin-patsy-to-entergy.html
I request a immediate emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because of the unreliability of their radiological and emergency plans for a indeterminate amount time. The liquid scintillation counter was broken between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011. That makes the radiological procedures inoperative or severely degraded in this time frame. Not having a backup liquid scintillation counter would make the emergency evacuation plans unreliable. If a nuclear power plant doesn’t have the capability to make reliable their evacuation plans, then they shouldn’t be licensed to operate a nuclear plant.
1) I request a NRC OIG and congressional investigation with why the NRC didn’t immediately notify the community that the Vermont Yankee radiological procedures and evacuation plans were not functional during these dates.
2) Request a investigation, in making sure that all radiological capabilities at the nuclear plants are reliable and durable with sufficient back ups in order to be able to carry out their emergency plans. Request all USA plants have sufficient back up liquid scintillation counter capabilities.
3) Request a information notice to given to all plants about this.
4) Request a disclosure of all delays with getting any radiological measurements that effected any normal or emergency requirement of a procedure.
Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 03451
1-603-336-8320
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
(I know they get a rough measure of liquid radioactivity from other detectors...the downfall in this is I am not exactly clear what the scintillation detector plays in the radiological plans. It seems preposterous the agency would let them get away with ineffective emergency evacuation plans.
You know, if it ain't defined as safety related and in a requirement of a procedure, they let the world fall off a cliff.)
Saturday, January 29, 2011
2.206 on VY plant stack...not safety related.
2.206 on plant stack...not safety related.
Requested immediate shutdown of Vermont Yankee because the plant stack is not safety related. This questions maintaining the safety quality of the stack and it associated equipment and piping...the protection of the public...thus assurance of safety and dose limits can't be maintained at my town of Hinsdale NH.
If the stack toppled over it would take two years or more before it was discovered.
Request all plants in the USA with similar stacks be shut down because there is no assurance of radiological safety and functionality of the plant stack.
Aren't you dying to get the NRC on the record saying the plant stack is not safety related...the stack is visual icon for the whole area...the NRC is saying through the AOG tritium issues you could chop off the stack at the base and the plant could still operate. It is not safety related...
I wonder what the tech spec requirements are if the stack toppled over...how long could they operate without the stack?
Requested immediate shutdown of Vermont Yankee because the plant stack is not safety related. This questions maintaining the safety quality of the stack and it associated equipment and piping...the protection of the public...thus assurance of safety and dose limits can't be maintained at my town of Hinsdale NH.
If the stack toppled over it would take two years or more before it was discovered.
Request all plants in the USA with similar stacks be shut down because there is no assurance of radiological safety and functionality of the plant stack.
Aren't you dying to get the NRC on the record saying the plant stack is not safety related...the stack is visual icon for the whole area...the NRC is saying through the AOG tritium issues you could chop off the stack at the base and the plant could still operate. It is not safety related...
I wonder what the tech spec requirements are if the stack toppled over...how long could they operate without the stack?
Friday, January 28, 2011
They were supposed to have the RCA inspectors talking who wrote the report in the meeting...they withdrew them at the last minute.
Rich, the station chief said really astonished, mike, what you are asking for is a national standard of RCA. I said, you bet we should be doing that..
They basically said we enforce the RCA procedures Entergy writes even if they don't make sense...we don't have our own.
They had absolutely no idea what the engineering characterization of the tunnel was...was it a radioactive barrier?
They both said, what happened greater than three year ago is irrelevant to what the NRC does. We only regulate in a three year window...nothing matters in excess of three years.
I am sorry, I always have had issues with people being intentionally evasive to me, I pressed them a little, I though I behave myself.
You want my opinion, they maintain their profile as small as possible, they are a nothing neutral gray...there object is to make as small a wave as they can.
Mike
Rich, the station chief said really astonished, mike, what you are asking for is a national standard of RCA. I said, you bet we should be doing that..
They basically said we enforce the RCA procedures Entergy writes even if they don't make sense...we don't have our own.
They had absolutely no idea what the engineering characterization of the tunnel was...was it a radioactive barrier?
They both said, what happened greater than three year ago is irrelevant to what the NRC does. We only regulate in a three year window...nothing matters in excess of three years.
I am sorry, I always have had issues with people being intentionally evasive to me, I pressed them a little, I though I behave myself.
You want my opinion, they maintain their profile as small as possible, they are a nothing neutral gray...there object is to make as small a wave as they can.
Mike
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Washington Snow Storm
I would be surprised if the NRC could keep their date with me for our teleconference with the DC snow.
....rescheduled for tomorrow at 1pm
4:00pm: Fascinating isn't it...The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986...
....rescheduled for tomorrow at 1pm
4:00pm: Fascinating isn't it...The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986...
Space disasters still have lessons to teach
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41279886/ns/technology_and_science-space/
The Apollo fire, on Jan. 27, 1967 , was made possible by a decision to believe that flammability in pressurized pure oxygen couldn’t be that bad, even if no tests had been run to check out that convenient assumption.
The loss of Challenger, on Jan. 28, 1986 , was made possible by the decision that even though flexible O-ring seals had never been verified to function properly at sub-freezing temperatures, it was convenient to assume they would still do so in the absence of tests proving otherwise.
The loss of Columbia, on Feb. 1, 2003, was made possible by the decision — set down in writing — that even though observers suspected that tank debris might have hit the panel-covered leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, those panels were "probably" just as tough as other tile-covered areas that were previously hit. As was the case for the earlier tragedies, this was a claim that had never been tested.
Appallingly, in hindsight, when tests were made, they showed hazards that should never have been "assumed away." Pure oxygen fires were horrifically violent. Flexible pressure seals at low temperatures did not seat properly in their slots when hit by rocket thrust. And a leading-edge panel hit by a flying piece of insulation didn’t just get scratched — it shattered.
The Apollo fire, on Jan. 27, 1967 , was made possible by a decision to believe that flammability in pressurized pure oxygen couldn’t be that bad, even if no tests had been run to check out that convenient assumption.
The loss of Challenger, on Jan. 28, 1986 , was made possible by the decision that even though flexible O-ring seals had never been verified to function properly at sub-freezing temperatures, it was convenient to assume they would still do so in the absence of tests proving otherwise.
The loss of Columbia, on Feb. 1, 2003, was made possible by the decision — set down in writing — that even though observers suspected that tank debris might have hit the panel-covered leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, those panels were "probably" just as tough as other tile-covered areas that were previously hit. As was the case for the earlier tragedies, this was a claim that had never been tested.
Appallingly, in hindsight, when tests were made, they showed hazards that should never have been "assumed away." Pure oxygen fires were horrifically violent. Flexible pressure seals at low temperatures did not seat properly in their slots when hit by rocket thrust. And a leading-edge panel hit by a flying piece of insulation didn’t just get scratched — it shattered.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
RCA
Jan 28....I sent the 2.206 and within two days VY admitted another leak.
...Buildings in plume being explosive hazard...was the DG threatened.
...Has the gaseous tritium been accounted for...about 3 curies.?
...How about a hydrogen detonation of the drain pit building or any nearby buildings where hydrogen and oxygen can seep into?
..Entergy's causal evaluation identified deficiencies involving not having satisfied early-1970s non-safety-related construction and housekeeping standards, and weaknesses in the station's erosion/corrosion program.
...The Entergy report identified "(t)he ineffective monitoring and inspection of the leakage control system of the AOG pipe tunnel, i.e., the tunnel floor drain and sump
pump" as the second root cause.
Entergy's RCA:
RC1: Latent Standards and Practices That Were Inadequate
Inadequate housekeeping standards and practices were applied during the construction of the AOG Pipe Tunnel in 1972. Inadequate design and installation standards and practices were applied during the installation of the 2”CNPE-172A line in 1978. These latent issues combined to compromise the leak tight design of the AOG Pipe Tunnel and allow for water containing radio nuclides to leak to the environment.
NRC:
Root Cause No.1: Latent Standards and Practices That Were Inadequate
The Entergy report stated: "Inadequate housekeeping standards and practices were applied during the construction of the AOG pipe tunnel in 1972. Inadequate design and installation standards and practices were applied during the installation of the two-inch drain line CNPE-172A in 1978. These latent issues combined to compromise the leak tight design of the AOG pipe tunnel and allowed for water containing radionuclides to leak to the environment."
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's first root cause was well-supported.
Corrective actions planned were appropriate to the circumstances and included:
1) clearing of obstructions and removal of debris to the extent possible in the AOG pipe tunnel, completed prior to AOG system startup; and, 2) redesign and implement the removal from service (by sealing) of the two-inch drain line CNPE-172A. This action was completed in June 2010. The inspector reviewed Engineering Change(EC) 22659 developed to seal drain line CNPE-172A.
It is interesting...Entergy didn't submit a voluntary LER on it...
...Buildings in plume being explosive hazard...was the DG threatened.
...Has the gaseous tritium been accounted for...about 3 curies.?
...How about a hydrogen detonation of the drain pit building or any nearby buildings where hydrogen and oxygen can seep into?
..Entergy's causal evaluation identified deficiencies involving not having satisfied early-1970s non-safety-related construction and housekeeping standards, and weaknesses in the station's erosion/corrosion program.
...The Entergy report identified "(t)he ineffective monitoring and inspection of the leakage control system of the AOG pipe tunnel, i.e., the tunnel floor drain and sump
pump" as the second root cause.
Entergy's RCA:
RC1: Latent Standards and Practices That Were Inadequate
Inadequate housekeeping standards and practices were applied during the construction of the AOG Pipe Tunnel in 1972. Inadequate design and installation standards and practices were applied during the installation of the 2”CNPE-172A line in 1978. These latent issues combined to compromise the leak tight design of the AOG Pipe Tunnel and allow for water containing radio nuclides to leak to the environment.
NRC:
Root Cause No.1: Latent Standards and Practices That Were Inadequate
The Entergy report stated: "Inadequate housekeeping standards and practices were applied during the construction of the AOG pipe tunnel in 1972. Inadequate design and installation standards and practices were applied during the installation of the two-inch drain line CNPE-172A in 1978. These latent issues combined to compromise the leak tight design of the AOG pipe tunnel and allowed for water containing radionuclides to leak to the environment."
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's first root cause was well-supported.
Corrective actions planned were appropriate to the circumstances and included:
1) clearing of obstructions and removal of debris to the extent possible in the AOG pipe tunnel, completed prior to AOG system startup; and, 2) redesign and implement the removal from service (by sealing) of the two-inch drain line CNPE-172A. This action was completed in June 2010. The inspector reviewed Engineering Change(EC) 22659 developed to seal drain line CNPE-172A.
It is interesting...Entergy didn't submit a voluntary LER on it...
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
12 noon today...Hmm, called Dr Irwin of the Vermont Department of Health, their Radiological officer.
He says they are waiting for VY water sample results from the rad waste well. He tells me they are going to be sampling on a daily bases...then Irwin is going to get them and post them on their internet site.
I get from Dr Irwin, I seen your latest 2.206, man you name is all over Vermont Yankee documents. I'd also seen you at a bunch of VY and NRC meetings. I wonder if he remembers me making a jerk out of myself in front of chairman Jazcko last summer in Bratt. We talk a litttle about my history...he seems to be really up on nuclear submarine history.
He says the process pipe from the AOG building to the stack goes right through the area of the rad waste well. The is a lot of rad pipes in that area. You got those sampling tanks near by and they can be hot.
My scenario for a new well, it takes a lot of withdrawing of water, so that you pull far off contamination into the well to be sampled. He thinks it is a brand new leak and he fears it is going to get a lot higher.
Dr Irwin thinks the first negative sample...no tritium...was a legitimate sample. Entergy has a company come in to gather and measure the water radiation, then splits the sample with Vermont...they are the ones who disclose the count level. Then Vermont counts their half on their own. He just doesn't see how that first sample could have been doctored.
Dr Irwin implied, they should have begun excavating...
He says they are waiting for VY water sample results from the rad waste well. He tells me they are going to be sampling on a daily bases...then Irwin is going to get them and post them on their internet site.
I get from Dr Irwin, I seen your latest 2.206, man you name is all over Vermont Yankee documents. I'd also seen you at a bunch of VY and NRC meetings. I wonder if he remembers me making a jerk out of myself in front of chairman Jazcko last summer in Bratt. We talk a litttle about my history...he seems to be really up on nuclear submarine history.
He says the process pipe from the AOG building to the stack goes right through the area of the rad waste well. The is a lot of rad pipes in that area. You got those sampling tanks near by and they can be hot.
My scenario for a new well, it takes a lot of withdrawing of water, so that you pull far off contamination into the well to be sampled. He thinks it is a brand new leak and he fears it is going to get a lot higher.
Dr Irwin thinks the first negative sample...no tritium...was a legitimate sample. Entergy has a company come in to gather and measure the water radiation, then splits the sample with Vermont...they are the ones who disclose the count level. Then Vermont counts their half on their own. He just doesn't see how that first sample could have been doctored.
Dr Irwin implied, they should have begun excavating...
NRC Decision on Immediate Action of Vermont Yankee
From: "Kim, James"
To: Michael Mulligan
Sent: Tue, January 25, 2011 8:58:14 AM
Subject: VY 2.206 Petition on Shut-Down Vermont Yankee - Decision on Immediate Action
Mr. Mulligan,
With regard to your petition dated January 18, 2011, the Petition review Board (PRB) met on Monday, January 24, 2011, to discuss only the request for immediate action of immediately shutdown Vermont Yankee. The PRB determined that there was no immediate safety concern to the plant or to the public health and safety. The system is non-safety-related and the tritium leak amounted to approximately less than 1 mrem exposure to the public. No drinking water sources were impacted. Therefore, the PRB denied the request to immediately shutdown Vermont Yankee.
Thanks,
James Kim
PRB Manager
Mr. Kim,
The is the problem in a nut shell, I have to have triplicate poor that the plant is unsafe against impossible barriers to the truth, but the NRC and Entergy can use subjective and in the complete absence of any real information that a nuclear plant is safe. There are different standards for insiders and out insiders. It seems the more access to real information that you have at your fingertips, the more subjective and specious your assertions can be. The flip side of it is, the more distant to real information is your privilege, the more triplicate proof and evidence your need to make a case.
Mostly, in the RCA, there is nothing but unproven specious assertions in the characterizations within the RCA.
Again, in a culture of falsifications and a intimidation system to enforce illegal behavior at the employee level, how do we know anything we see with Entergy is true?
I can tell you for a fact, if a plant has a off site radiation event or any core damage in the USA today with NRC language like this, the media and political frenzy would take out the NRC as a credible regulator. That would have serious blow back consequences for the whole nuclear industry and the American public.
Anyways, I really do appreciate the official response...
Added Jan 25, 2011 at 6:51pm
This is what the NRC said on my emergency shutdown of VY: "The system is non-safety-related and the tritium leak amounted to approximately less than 1 mrem exposure to the public."
They could cycle this question to their computer models that estimates dose in a few fractions of a second: "how many curries being pumped into the ground would to take without taking any actions to get a member of the public or employees to exceed the licensing dose limit in the ground below the rad waste building well."
Say there is no well down there, how many curries being pumped into the ground would it take to get a regulated dose to be first exceeded?
I'll bet it would take a mind boggling amount of curies pumped into the ground to get that dose exceeded...that is why the limit is ridiculous.
Jan 26, 2011
It would probably take 10 VY spent fuel pools worth of fuel to get all chopped up in a blender and injected into ground before a member of the public would exceed his NRC regulated dose.
To: Michael Mulligan
Sent: Tue, January 25, 2011 8:58:14 AM
Subject: VY 2.206 Petition on Shut-Down Vermont Yankee - Decision on Immediate Action
Mr. Mulligan,
With regard to your petition dated January 18, 2011, the Petition review Board (PRB) met on Monday, January 24, 2011, to discuss only the request for immediate action of immediately shutdown Vermont Yankee. The PRB determined that there was no immediate safety concern to the plant or to the public health and safety. The system is non-safety-related and the tritium leak amounted to approximately less than 1 mrem exposure to the public. No drinking water sources were impacted. Therefore, the PRB denied the request to immediately shutdown Vermont Yankee.
Thanks,
James Kim
PRB Manager
Mr. Kim,
The is the problem in a nut shell, I have to have triplicate poor that the plant is unsafe against impossible barriers to the truth, but the NRC and Entergy can use subjective and in the complete absence of any real information that a nuclear plant is safe. There are different standards for insiders and out insiders. It seems the more access to real information that you have at your fingertips, the more subjective and specious your assertions can be. The flip side of it is, the more distant to real information is your privilege, the more triplicate proof and evidence your need to make a case.
Mostly, in the RCA, there is nothing but unproven specious assertions in the characterizations within the RCA.
Again, in a culture of falsifications and a intimidation system to enforce illegal behavior at the employee level, how do we know anything we see with Entergy is true?
I can tell you for a fact, if a plant has a off site radiation event or any core damage in the USA today with NRC language like this, the media and political frenzy would take out the NRC as a credible regulator. That would have serious blow back consequences for the whole nuclear industry and the American public.
Anyways, I really do appreciate the official response...
Added Jan 25, 2011 at 6:51pm
This is what the NRC said on my emergency shutdown of VY: "The system is non-safety-related and the tritium leak amounted to approximately less than 1 mrem exposure to the public."
They could cycle this question to their computer models that estimates dose in a few fractions of a second: "how many curries being pumped into the ground would to take without taking any actions to get a member of the public or employees to exceed the licensing dose limit in the ground below the rad waste building well."
Say there is no well down there, how many curries being pumped into the ground would it take to get a regulated dose to be first exceeded?
I'll bet it would take a mind boggling amount of curies pumped into the ground to get that dose exceeded...that is why the limit is ridiculous.
Jan 26, 2011
It would probably take 10 VY spent fuel pools worth of fuel to get all chopped up in a blender and injected into ground before a member of the public would exceed his NRC regulated dose.
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