Fort Calhoun: Complete Breakdown in NRC Oversight Again

So here is the LER on this. With all these bum corrective actions and new ones, in 2014 and 2015 they discovered the floor coating twice cracking and a brand new leak in 2015. They are quailified running a nuclear.

Tell you how much value is a non cited violation, the NCV makes their knees tremble. 

How come no new LER on the new 2015 leak???

Licensee Event Report 2013-015-01: 

Unqualified Coating used as a Water Tight Barrier in Rooms 81 and 82 

On September 23, 2013, it was identified that the floor structure in Rooms 81 and 82 may not maintain its integrity during a high energy line break environment allowing water to migrate into the rooms below that houses the diesel generators and safety related switchgear. This was reported on September 23, 2013, under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition (Event Notification 49378). Fort Calhoun Station was shutdown in MODE 5 when the condition was identified and entered into the station's corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-18103. 

Inspection report 

***September 23, 2013, CR-FCS-2013-18103: During periodic coating inspections, the licensee identified yet again that the coating in Room 82 had degraded during a routine walkdown. The licensee performed another Apparent Cause Analysis and determined that the 2009 RCA was inadequate.
***October 18, 2014, CR-FCS-2014-12894: A building operator identified several cracks and chips in the Room 82 floor coating. Work Order 552343 was generated to recoat the floor, but was never completed. 

***January 21, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-0874 and CR-FCS-2015-0883: During a routine walkdown of Room 82, a design engineer identified additional cracks in the Room 82 floor coating. In addition, the engineer identified a piping penetration seal in the Room 82 floor that was degraded. Work Request (WR) 220667 and WR 220668 were generated to repair the penetration, and WR 220618 was generated to recoat the floor. 

***October 14, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-11976: Maintenance personnel identified a water intrusion into Room 63. Water had been dripping around the primary starting air compressor. The leak was identified to be from an auxiliary steam system leak in Room 82.

These guys thinks just throwing in the paperwork in the system mysteriously fixes the problem without using money and organization. If you pray to the gods to fix a problem god always come through. The inspector went to the agency's best go-to excuse...the agency is only a sampling regulator and we see only a limit view of the problems in the plant. So the NRC documents Fort Calhoun's eight or nine failed attempts to fix this safety related roof or ceiling leak in this inspection report. It first was a non sited violation in 2006 when the leak was first documented. Then eight fail attempts or more to fix it over almost  over a decade threatening the operation of a emergency Diesel Generator, it is still a non sited violation 2016. The NRC's violation or risk determination system is broken down. The repeated nature as this, the NRC's risk determination system doesn't capture the threat...appropriate feedback to change corporate behavior...with having such a chaotic organization running the plant.     

You know what this reminds me of; the fire water piping leak in Indian Point unit 1 over many years leading to a huge flooding event. They stuck the very small piping leaking problem into their paperwork or computer problem documentation system repeatedly. The small leak kept getting lost in their monsterous bureaucratic system and their godzilla priority system until the huge pipe completely burst. I believe the pinhole leak was spinning in the bureaucracy uncorrected for a decade. Hierarchical bureaucracies are supposed to be highly efficient and effective at identifying and fixing problems. They are not designed to highly efficient at burying and hiding problems.     

I talked to the new Fort Calhoun inspector yesterday about this problem. Its the "black swan" event proving either the site is severely backsliding or the correction coming out of the NRC 's mandatory plant shutdown in 2011 wasn't deep enough.

 I asked why hasn't  the NRC warned Fort Calhoun once say in 2006 or 2009, then if they came upon it again, then violating them and severely jack up the violation level. The new inspector told me they severely punished Fort Calhoun by shutting down the plant. You get it, the agency is siloed by congress to be severely reactionary. Only hammer the plant once it's in the news with a big event. I told him I expect the NRC to prevent a 2011 Fort Calhoun. I pay you to prevent events like this. 

I asked the inspector, is cracking concrete walls and floors acceptable in plant licensing and USFAR. He laughed saying, I am not a licensing expert. I don't know. Not, I'll get back to you mike.

He scoffingly told me, normal buildings are filled with concrete cracks. I've seen concrete building with a lot more cracks. So is telling me his opinion...not a engineering fact. Where is his evidence and codes where it is acceptable with a foundation to have a lot of cracks? These guys advocate for the industry not needing any facts to back him up when they talk off the cuff. I seen a lot of building concrete foundations without a single crack in them. A good quality concrete foundation or building never has a crack in the crack on the concrete.        

Generally NRC officials talking to outsiders like me, they get quickly into defending the industry interest. They rarely stay in the government regulatory neutral role.

By the way, the inspector was very talkative to me yesterday and he respected me. He knew my name before I said it, he reminded me I had talked to him more than once before.   

April 30, 2009 

Subject: FORT CALHOUN STATION NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000285/2009002

Findings

Introduction. A Green self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” was identified for the licensee’s failure to take prompt corrective measures after identifying that water could penetrate cracks in the turbine building concrete floor and adversely impact the operability of an emergency diesel generator and safety related switchgear. Cracks in the floor of turbine building mechanical equipment room were identified in February 2006, when water was observed

I think it is a huge threat when any water is leaking from the ceiling or through a wall...its alway should be a rather large violation because this piece of equipment is so valuable. Almost a decade to fix this? These guys should be responsible for completely fixing it right on the first leak...taking more than one bite out the apple, it indicates serious organization dysfunction.

***Maybe in the 2009 or the Feb 9, 2011 leaks, the NRC should have severely hammered the hell out of Fort Calhoun over these leaks. This should have cued the NRC into looking more closely into the site organizational problems. They would have found a lot of serious problems. Then rock the organization with a severe violation level into having a change of heart....fundamental reform. Then the summer of 2011 events won't have happened. 

____________________________________________________________

You get it, often looking underneath a perceives insignificant problem leads to discovering huge organization problems under the iceberge.

The IAEA inspection team urged the Nuclear Regulation Authority to enhance inspection competence and the government to amend its nuclear safety law to make on-site safety checks more effective and flexible.

Mission leader Philippe Jamet, a French regulatory commissioner, said Japan's inflexible inspection rules do not allow inspectors to move freely at nuclear facilities or respond quickly when there is a problem.

This inspection process is severely flawed in USA nuclear plants. This is similar to the recent IAEA report finding on the Japanese nuclear regulatory authority. NRC regulations severely restricts an inspector from getting into the business of the plant like Fort Calhoun. This is how political campaign contributions influences federal regulations. I proposed an additional area of inspections:1) Inspection report areas defined by NRC regulation. 

2) An NRC inspector or official reported observation of events at the plant. These professional observations in inspection reports would be unconstrained from the typical NRC regulations and would be protected areas from intimidation to the inspector and other NRC officials. These are my observation of important or emerging issues at the plant(either in house use or for the industry in general as a mean of drawing attention)needing attention. These inspector or official "observations" would be totally disconnected from any violation or penalty to a licencee. Just a general comment or warning and a inspector's ability to speak totally free without repercussion or restrains.

_________________________________________________________

leaking into the Diesel Generator 1 room (Room 63). The licensee took no immediate corrective actions to evaluate or repair the cracks. In February 2009, water was again observed leaking into Room 63, resulting in unexpected tripping of breakers associated with the Diesel Generator 1, secondary compressor motor starter.

Description. On February 11, 2009, maintenance workers were removing tags for maintenance on Diesel Generator 1, and determined that three breakers associated with the secondary air compressor had tripped. Investigation revealed that arcing on the power leads had occurred due to the introduction of water into the breakers from the ceiling of the Diesel Generator 1 room (Room 63). The source of the water was standing water on the floor of the turbine building mechanical equipment room (Room 82), which is located directly above Room 63 (as well as the Diesel Generator 2 room, and the east and west Switchgear rooms). After the water was removed from the floor of Room 82, several cracks were evident in the floor, which provided a path of water from Room 82 to Room 63.

I suspect the cracks are moving as the building and concrete is heated up or cooled off. I'll bet you the concrete foundation at Vogtle or other new construction nuclear plant doesn't have one crack in it. 

The inspectors’ review of corrective action documents determined that a condition report was created (CR 200600399) which documented an event that occurred on February 1, 2006. That event also involved water flowing through the ceiling of Room 63 near the area of the starting air compressors. The condition report was classified as a Condition Level 6, which was the lowest condition report classification. The condition report was closed to a work request since “equipment is not an SSC [structures systems and components].” The resulting work order applied caulking to certain areas of the floor in

***Careless repair of a concrete crack in caulking without understanding the fundamental mechanism causing the crack.Painting it is so unprofessional... 

Room 82, but did not address all of the floor cracks or the

Need a extent of condition or cause on all concrete cracks at Fort Calhoun plant...

Did any building settle as result of the flooding at Fort Calhoun? 

potential impact on safety-related equipment. The licensee’s failure to recognize that cracks in the floor of Room 82 could impact the operability of the diesel generators resulted in an improper classification of the condition report, limiting the review and depth of subsequent corrective actions. The corrective actions that followed were inadequate to ensure a watertight surface between Room 82 and all the rooms located below it.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that the failure to take prompt corrective actions to address a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because the failure to perform adequate corrective actions on the turbine building floor, if left uncorrected, could become a more serious safety concern. Specifically, water could seep through the floor and render the emergency diesel generator and/or safety related switchgear inoperable. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 4 “Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,” this finding was of very low safety significance because it: 1) was confirmed to result in a loss of functionality of the secondary compressor motor starter; 2) did not represent a loss of safety function; 3) did not result in a loss of a technical specification required train for more than its allowed outage time; 4) did not result in a loss of risk significant equipment for more than 24 hours; and 5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the performance deficiency was aged and not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, in February, 2006, the licensee failed to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality (cracks in the turbine building mechanical equipment room floor). The cracks were a condition adverse to quality because they permitted water to leak on to safety related equipment, which could challenge safety related equipment operability. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-0687.

Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-0687, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000285/2009002-01, Failure to Implement Adequate Corrective Action for Floor Cracks.

January 21, 2016 

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000285/2015009

Findings

.a Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition of a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generator Room Water

Intrusions

Introduction. The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” for the licensee’s failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, since February 2009, the licensee failed to prevent repetitive water intrusions from the Auxiliary Building HVAC room (Room 82) into the number one Emergency Diesel Generator room (Room 63).

Description. On February 11, 2009, the licensee had documented a significant condition adverse to quality due to water intrusion from the Auxiliary Building HVAC room (Room 82) into the number one emergency diesel generator room (Room 63), located below. The water intrusion had caused water to leak onto the secondary air compressor motor starter in Room 63 and tripped the associated breakers. This electrical transient then caused the number one emergency diesel generator, which was running for surveillance purposes, to trip. The licensee initiated Condition Report CR-FCS-2009-0687 and subsequently determined that an unanalyzed condition had existed by which an auxiliary steam leak in Room 82 could potentially result in water entering both diesel generator rooms through the floor of Room 82. This condition had existed at least since February 1, 2006, when CR-FCS-2006-0399 was written to document water dripping from the same crack in the ceiling of Room 63 above the secondary air compressor. This event was documented as a Green NCV in NRC

Inspection Report 0500285/2009002 (ML091200069).

Why wasn't this a LER?

The licensee performed a root cause analysis (RCA) following the event in 2009. The analysis determined that the root cause was a failure to document, in the licensee’s USAR, the implicit assumption that the floor in Room 82 shall not leak. As a result, a program was not established to assure the integrity of the flooring. Licensee corrective actions included the following:

• •Coating the Room 82 floor.  

• •Revising the USAR to document the implicit assumption that floors of rooms analyzed for medium and high energy line breaks are leak tight.  

• •Revising the periodic structural inspection of the Auxiliary Building to ensure all ceiling cracks, for rooms that are susceptible to internal flooding, are documented and evaluated.

Following implementation of the above corrective actions, recurrent leaks into Room 63and identified examples of inadequate Room 82 floor coating were identified by the licensee and documented in the licensee’s corrective action program, these included:

• •January 9, 2011, CR-FCS-2011-0156: The licensee identified water leaking into Room 63 at approximately 3 drops per minute. The licensee performed an evaluation and determined that this leak was from a previously identified ceiling crack, and that the drip would not impact the operability of any equipment in this location.

Flooding and switchgear breaker two year shutdown. You would think by Fort Calhoun getting punished with the two year shutdown and all their mandatory corrective actions...the new conscience of the plant....they could fix it right the first time. Why didn't the intense NRC inspection during the recovery catch the water leaking into a diesel generator room.  

• •October 6, 2012, CR-FCS-2012-14958: The licensee identified water dripping into Room 63 while placing Room 82 auxiliary steam in service. On October 12, 2012, the licensee generated Work Order 461213 and made repairs to the Room 82 floor coating where chips and cracks were identified. The licensee then performed an

But why in the above?

• Apparent Cause Analysis, and determined that the floor coating previously installed was not adequate for Room 82. The licensee generated Engineering Change (EC) 62082 to modify the floor coating to a more suitable material. This EC was implemented on October 22, 2013.

• •September 23, 2013, CR-FCS-2013-18103: During periodic coating inspections, the licensee identified yet again that the coating in Room 82 had degraded during a routine walkdown. The licensee performed another Apparent Cause Analysis and determined that the 2009 RCA was inadequate.

• •October 18, 2014, CR-FCS-2014-12894: A building operator identified several cracks and chips in the Room 82 floor coating. Work Order 552343 was generated to recoat the floor, but was never completed.

• •January 21, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-0874 and CR-FCS-2015-0883: During a routine walkdown of Room 82, a design engineer identified additional cracks in the Room 82 floor coating. In addition, the engineer identified a piping penetration seal in the Room 82 floor that was degraded. Work Request (WR) 220667 and WR 220668 were generated to repair the penetration, and WR 220618 was generated to recoat the floor.

• October 14, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-11976: Maintenance personnel identified a water intrusion into Room 63. Water had been dripping around the primary starting air compressor. The leak was identified to be from an auxiliary steam system leak in Room 82.

Following the water intrusion event on October 14, 2015, the licensee recoated the floor per an existing WO 552343 and cancelled the work requests associated with the degraded floor penetration (WR 220667 and WR 220668), since work planners had assumed that all repairs had been made. 

Really an act of a employee falsifying internal documents and impairing the NRC oversight?

The inspectors performed a walkdown of Room 82 following repairs to the flooring on November 18, 2015, and noted that the degraded pipe seal had not been fixed, and that water intrusion via this piping penetration was still a vulnerability to the rooms below. The inspectors informed the licensee, and at this time, CR-FCS-2015-13151 was generated to repair the degraded fire seal.

Analysis. The team determined that the licensee’s failure to implement adequate corrective actions to prevent repetitive water intrusions into Room 63 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, water intrusion events from Room 82 into Room 63 could challenge the reliability of the emergency diesel generator when relied upon during a loss of offsite power. Using Inspection Manual Chapter

A broken Significance Determination Process...

0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” Exhibit 2, “Mitigating Systems Screening Question,” dated June 19, 2012, inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program. The finding has a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect within the resolution area because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.3].

Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” requires, in part, for significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the above, between February 2009 and November 2015, measures established by the licensee to correct a significant condition adverse to quality did not assure that corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, corrective actions taken to address water intrusion from Room 82 into safety related emergency diesel generator Room 63, a significant condition adverse to quality first identified on February 11, 2009, were not effective to prevent recurrent water leaks. Immediate corrective actions to correct this condition included evaluating the Room 82 flooring for operability and recoating it. This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR-FCS-2015-11976 and CR-FCS-2015-13151. NCV 05000248/2015009-01, “Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition of a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generator Room Water Intrusions.”

Millstone-Dominion Still Has Junk Engineering Organizations

The greatest sin here was Millstone was situationally unaware of the responses in their switchyard and grid system. They didn’t know how or gain an accurate picture of these interacting systems. They were hyper focused on dumping of the SLOD safety protection system instead of understanding the interaction and function of these giant systems.

What really what caused this is a broken and unenforced 50:59 NRC process. Its turned into a voluntary system. Basically the game goes across all utilities, the NRC says all rules associated with the 50:59 are optional depending on the needs of CEO bonuses. You can ignore the rules at your own peril...our inspectors would never question you on these intentional NRC rule and plant licencing violation . If you guess right and nothing happens to the site associated with a design change to the facility...you are free and clear. If you create a nasty public relation(say, a dual plant trip) event, then we will retroactively harmlessly violate you for not requesting a 50:59.   

If Millstone would have submitted a 50:59 or the NRC would have enforced a 50:59 in 2001 when this boondoggle began leading to a preventable dual plant LOOP,  these NRC Jan 2016 questions would have been asked and answered before the project even began in 2001.  

The idea at this point, Millstone engineering is still highly dysfunctional, in that the NRC had to prod the utility to understand the grid response in with a dual plant trip.

It is totally disgraceful and unprofessional on the nuclear safety and Dominion’s grid responsibility, the agency had to prod them with these questions.

Jan 13, 2015 

SLOD

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF SEVERE LINE OUTAGE DETECTION FROM THE OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-336 & 50-423 (TAC NOS. MF6430 AND MF6431)

By letter dated June 30, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML15183A022), Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (the licensee) requested a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 (MPS2 and MPS3).

The proposed amendments would revise the MPS2 and MPS3 Final Safety Analysis Reports(FSARs) to: 1) delete the information pertaining to the severe line outage detection (SLOD) special protection system, 2) update the description of the tower structures associated with the four offsite transmission lines feeding Millstone Power Station (MPS), and 3) describe how the current offsite power source configuration and design satisfies the requirements of General

Design Criteria (GDC) 17, "Electric Power Systems" and GDC-5, "Sharing of Structures…

This below link is my blog write up of the dual plant trip...the NRC answers my question fromn this post in their 2016 questions to Dominion.   

Millstone: Response to Special Inspection

What the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Says About the Nuclear Industry's Death Spiral

Originally Published on 12/8/2015:

I wonder where the 30% come from? This indicates a national financial crisis in the nuclear industry never seen before.Everyone is winging it.   

You notice here on the NEI website, they don't say the NRC is involved in this, while the platts article says they are involved? 

• I will just say across the board the maintenance and quality of maintenance at these plants are dissonant and chaotic. Too much rework as the primary symptom. You'd cut 50% of your overhead if all maintenance was highly centralized throughout the industry. One large company doing all the maintenance.

• I'd also cut the NRC's budget by half. That way it will be a lot easier on profits if it becomes basically voluntary to follow all rules and plant licensing.

The NRC is undergoing a massive multiyear downsizing initiative (budget cutting)and now the industry at all the plants are even thinking of a bigger percentage initiative. Two giants organizations undergoing a simultaneous reorganization in this amazedly complex endeavor...not a chance this is going to go smoothly...    

• Same thing if one company ran all the the nuclear plants. You'd have to have a contract making sure the prior parent company paid their fair share and keep up with decommissioning.  

The NEI's spin:  

Nuclear Industry Initiative Aims to Bolster Plant Safety, Economic Viability and Value 

WASHINGTON, D.C.—America’s nuclear energy facilities are launching a multiyear initiative to safely generate the electricity that the nation uses more efficiently and economically. The initiative was announced today by the Nuclear Energy Institute, which is coordinating the multifaceted effort in tandem with member electric utilities, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and the Electric Power Research Institute.

The initiative comes with nuclear energy facilities operating at sustained high levels of safety—as documented by an array of performance metrics—but earning less revenue during an unprecedented era of low natural gas prices and subsidies for other electricity sources.

As part of the initiative, the industry will analyze cost drivers common to all nuclear power plants and recommend programs and processes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. The goal is to provide companies with innovative solutions that enable a significant reduction in operating expenses at the nation’s reactors by 2018.

“We want to encourage bold ideas, not just tweak current processes,” said Maria Korsnick, NEI’s chief operating officer. “We are operating in markets with a glut of natural gas at historically low prices, concurrent with low growth in electricity demand nationally. We are seeking to redesign fundamental plant processes to significantly improve operational efficiencies and effectiveness, and in the process make nuclear energy facilities more economically viable.”

Nuclear energy facilities operating in 30 states provide electricity to one of every five U.S. homes and businesses. They provide 63 percent of the electricity that comes from zero-carbon sources.

Despite excellent operating performance, reactors in Vermont and Wisconsin have been retired prematurely in the past two years for economic reasons. Two more reactors in Massachusetts and New York will be shuttered prematurely over the next two years, largely due to financial losses.

More broadly, total electric generating costs at U.S. nuclear plants have increased 28 percent—to an industry average $36.27 per megawatt-hour—over the past 12 years.

“A ‘business as usual’ approach will not successfully address the challenges of rising costs and inadequate revenue for our reactors,” Korsnick said. “Part of this effort will be aimed at gaining full recognition in electricity pricing for the value of nuclear energy in electricity markets and as a uniquely reliable source for meeting environmental requirements, such as the Clean Power Plan.

“This is an initiative to reduce our operating costs, without question, but advancing safety and reliability are foundational aspects of this plan.”

The initiative’s name is “Delivering the Nuclear Promise: Advancing Safety, Reliability and Economic Performance.”

Teams of industry experts are examining areas such as engineering, work management and corrective actions programs to identify more efficient and effective means to accomplish their work. Chief nuclear officers from across the industry are aligned in their commitment to implement the strategic plan and its goals, with governance by utility chief executive officers. The teams will be assisted by working groups from the industry, in coordination with the Electric Power Research Institute, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and NEI.

“The U.S. nuclear industry excels in providing reliable electricity with world-class safety performance. This plan will ensure that safe and reliable operations continue to be the first and most important focus of all electric companies with nuclear energy technology,” Korsnick said. 

The Brooks Brother Suits Wants Budget's Slashed 30% at Nuclear Plants

Republished from 12/8/2015

Update 12/9

Another example of terrible waste:  "Indian Point's other reactor, Unit 3, is now running at 100 percent, but has been shut down for two scheduled and four unscheduled outages in 2015."

As one insider says:

"Over paid execs who are just sending gold bars to their headquarters" 

 

In other words, the NEI and electric utilities finally see themselves in a severe death spiral. It is time to begin hacking and slashing budgets in order to survive. If these guys were really fiducial professional, they would already be funding these plants without any extra financial waste or slack. It would already be going back to the stockholders.   

Did the nuclear utilities order the NEI to pressure plants to cut cost 30% across the board?

Not a worry a bit about this ultra-high capacity factor degrading safety. How are they going assure us no safety will be cut.

I got the first big cut, wind down the NEI. This is only basically a no work or easy work nuclear industry welfare.  

I am glad they are finally seeing the magnitude of their financial problems.

The NRC should send out a mandatory anonymous questionnaires to every technical employee and management in the industry. Ask them if they now are adequately resourced? Will you be able to safely operate with budget cuts of upwards to 30%?

List the 3 top weak links with severe budgets cuts?

I got another great ideal, anyone making over $150,000 a year should begin with a 30% reduction in salary and the higher paid Brooks Brother suits should take a much bigger percentage hit as a symbol of the crisis.

 

You just got to know the rank and file guys who really run the plant, the Brooks Brother suits are going to be focusing their wrath at cutting the wages and benefits at the bottom half.

When A Strike is a Possibility at a Plant

You notice how Entergy took care of their Union and strike problem at FitzPatrick...they are just going to shut them down.     

US nuclear power fleet aims to cut costs by 30%: industry official 

Washington (Platts)--8 Dec 2015 517 pm EST/2217 GMT

• You mean the electric utilities have demanded this goal.

The US nuclear power industry has launched a wide-ranging initiative with the goal of cutting its electricity production costs by 30% by 2018, an industry official said Tuesday. 

Maria Korsnick, chief operating officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute, said during a media briefing at the National Press Club in Washington that despite record-high capacity factors achieved by US nuclear power plants in recent years, the average production cost of the electricity they generate rose significantly from 2002 to 2014. 

• “despite record-high capacity factors” for last 12 years.  

• "total electric generating costs at US nuclear plants have increased 28% in twelve years” despite record capacity factor. 

NEI said in a statement Tuesday announcing the initiative that "total electric generating costs at US nuclear plants have increased 28% -- to an industry average $36.27/MWh -- over the past 12 years," including fuel, capital and operation and maintenance costs. 

Since 2013, Entergy's Vermont Yankee and Dominion's Kewaunee in Wisconsin have been permanently shut "for economic reasons," and Entergy has announced it will shut its Pilgrim in Massachusetts and FitzPatrick in New York in the next two years "largely due to financial losses," NEI said. 

"We are operating in markets with a glut of natural gas at historically low prices, concurrent with low electricity demand nationally," Korsnick said in the statement. "We are seeking to redesign fundamental plant processes to significantly improve operational efficiencies and effectiveness, and in the process make nuclear energy facilities more economically viable." 

NEI said in a fact sheet provided at the briefing that "[a]n analysis at one US nuclear plant site found that supervisors spent over half their time on administrative duties and only 14% of their time supervising employees. In addition, little time was being spent on process improvement efforts or problem-solving activities." 

Other factors contributing to increased productions costs, Korsnick said during the briefing, include significant increases in regulation of nuclear plants and electricity markets that do not adequately recognize and compensate the benefits of nuclear power, such as its reliability in extreme weather, she said during the briefing. 

Industry working groups have identified initial potential savings in several areas, including improvements in corrective action programs, work management, engineering, security and regulatory efficiency, she said. 

Korsnick said the groups' recommendations are being reviewed by a steering committee of chief nuclear officers from companies that operate power reactors. 

Preliminary estimates indicate that the potential savings identified by the working groups could result in "30% cost savings across the industry," amounting to "hundreds of millions of dollars" annually, Korsnick said. Korsnick emphasized that the initiative is being closely coordinated with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and "safety reviews are built into the process" of selecting and implementing the savings proposals. 

• So what about running this across independent safety advocates and representative community. You do well with people who are skilled at communication and highly skeptical.

In fact, by encouraging operators to take a fresh and critical look at practices and procedures at nuclear plants, the initiative is expected to enhance safety, she said. 

•  Most if not all the big events in the industry and certainly watching a plant or their management spectacular failing…all of it revolves around emerging financial priorities and budgets cuts. These guys are spectacularly stupid at budget cutting.

Korsnick said in response to a question that the initiative is considering various proposals to modify regional electricity markets to better value the benefits of nuclear power, including low-carbon portfolio standards that would provide additional compensation to carbon-free generators using funds from a surcharge on electricity sold in the state adopting the standard. Exelon, operator of the country's largest nuclear fleet, has proposed such a standard be adopted in Illinois, saying that would benefit its economically struggling nuclear plants and help assure reliable electricity supply. 

Such market reform proposals, however, are far more complex than plant-specific efficiency improvements, and so would take longer to consider and implement, Korsnick said. 

• So it is a voluntary program plant by plant? What if going through this program they find more money needs to be spent. 

Proposals approved by the steering committee will be either offered for adoption by individual nuclear plants at their discretion or, in the case of actions that must be undertaken by the industry as a whole to be effective, submitted for a vote of NEI's Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee, a standing group of chief nuclear officers, Korsnick said. Initiatives approved by that committee are binding for the entire industry.

Fitz Scram: 'The Three Little Pigs'

The Three Little Pigs 

"Little pig, little Pig, let me come in." 

"No, no, not by the hair on my chinny chin chin." 

"Then I'll huff, and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in."

So three things took out Fitz. These plants have have millions of components in it and the bureacrocy of the plant is just as complex. This is what happens with insufficient maintenance and budgets...the plant runs away from them. This is a small scale cascade event at the plant. 
 
These guys are heading for the gallows in a year. They ain't plowing money into this invaluable plant.

Anyone watching the new X Files?

What is wrong with this picture? They were at 100% when Frazil ice didn't take them out. Then went down to 60%. It sounds like it's operator error dressed up as an act of god with frazil ice.

Somebody is lying through their teeth. This is not illegal at all.      

1) Frasil

2) So called Planned maintenence

3) And a broken switch 

Platts: FitzPatrick spokeswoman Tammy Holden said in an email Monday: "The lowering intake level indication was a result of frazil ice," which she explained "is a slushy ice condition that occurs in Lake Ontario under meteorological conditions involving water temperature, air temperature, and wind speed and direction." She said, "Frazil ice can create a blockage at the [water] intake structure." 

Sheehan on Monday said, "There was one complication during shutdown: A power transfer glitch knocked the circulating-water pumps out of service, but other systems were used for the cooldown." 

Operators early Friday had reduced the unit's output to 60% of capacity from 100% early in order to conduct unrelated "planned maintenance," Holden said that day in an email.

Calvert Cliffs Junk-Waiting For A Shocking Cascade Accident to Occure

It pretty pathetic when two separate problems takes out a plant. What else is spinning in the background broke but unseen.

Setting up for the deep cascade accident that will shake the nation...

Now what was that special inspection switchyard cable issue. It was Oconee? Junk switchyards at a increasing number of nuclear plants.  

Exelon's Calvert Cliffs-1 nuclear unit shut due to tech glitch in storm's wake

Washington (Platts)--25 Jan 2016 515 pm EST/2215 GMT 

Operators at Exelon's 890-MW Calvert Cliffs-1 units in Lusby, Maryland, shut the unit early Monday morning due to a technical issue, following a downpower to about 10% of capacity from 100% on Sunday when a main transformer cable was found to be disconnected, a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman said Monday.

Lacey Dean, a Calvert Cliffs spokeswoman, said in an email late Sunday: "Icy conditions and 60 mph winds [from the weekend blizzard] caused a high voltage line in Calvert Cliffs' switchyard to disconnect." Dean added operators "reduced power on Unit 1 and took the generator offline to allow BGE crews to repair the line safely and effectively."

The 880-MW unit 2 continues to operate at 100% of capacity, she said.

Neil Sheehan, an NRC Region I spokesman, said in an email Monday that operators shut the unit early that day "after elevated sodium levels were identified in the condenser. Plant personnel will be checking for condenser tube leakage."...

A Weekend Worth of Junk Nuclear Plants' Tripping.

Yep Calvert Cliffs was related to the storm. So Pilgrim about a year ago had switchyard problems and now Calvert Cliffs uncovered salt water leakage into the condensate through a broken switchyard cable occurring during storm Jonas.

God now is uncovering and disclosing problems at the plant not the NRC or the plant's bureaucracy.   

I see none of these related to storm Jonas. This is a severe scram rate on the national picture. It would be pretty bad if this 3 day rate stays this high. Only Fitz is winter related. This is all bad maintenance... 

Several nuclear plants see unplanned outages over winter weekend

January 25, 2016

By Wayne Barber
Chief Analyst, GenerationHub

Several nuclear power plant units experienced unplanned outages during the winter weekend, according to data filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Jan. 25. 

NRC records indicate that four commercial reactors went offline during the winter weekend when much of the eastern half of the nation was experiencing the so-called “Winter Storm Jonas.” At least one of the nuclear operators has acknowledged that their outage was weather-related. 

Overall, 92 of the nation’s 100 commercial power reactors were listed as generating power early Jan. 25 by the NRC. Some were already offline for scheduled maintenance. 

The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar 2 unit has not actually commenced operation yet but is counted among the 100 active domestic units because it has been licensed. 

Nuclear operators typically don’t divulge how long they expect an outage to last, citing competitive reasons. Here’s a rundown of the weekend’s unplanned outages:

• The Calvert Cliffs 1 unit in Maryland, operated by Exelon was manually tripped from 10 percent power due to elevated condenser sodium levels. All systems responded per design, according to an event report filed with NRC. The event happened shortly after 3 a.m. on Monday, Jan. 25. Unit 2 was not affected and remains at full power, according to the report.  

• The Dominion Millstone 3 facility in Connecticut was at 100 percent power shortly before 2 a.m. on Jan. 25 when a problem with the ‘B’ reactor coolant pump “caused a reactor trip on low coolant flow,” according to the NRC report. The issue is under investigation and the dayshift will be troubleshooting the problem, the report said. A company spokesperson described the automatic shutdown as “safe and uncomplicated.” 

• The Entergy FitzPatrick 1 facility in Upstate New York underwent a manual scram from 89 percent power late Jan. 23 “due to a lowering intake level,” according to the report to NRC. There was no release of radioactivity and no threat to workers or the public, an Entergy spokesperson told GenerationHub. “The lowering intake level indication was a result of frazil ice. Frazil ice is a slushy ice condition that occurs in Lake Ontario under a specific set of environmental and meteorological conditions involving water temperature, air temperature, and wind speed and direction. Frazil ice can create a blockage at the intake structure,” the spokesperson said. 

• The FirstEnergy Perry plant in Ohio experienced a reactor shutdown "due to unidentified leakage in the drywell,” according to the NRC report. Perry plant personnel are performing maintenance on a weld on a plant piping system after shutting down early Sunday, Jan. 24, said a company spokesperson. “There are no adverse impacts to workers at the plant or to the public as a result of this work,” she said.

Connecting the Dots on ANO and Recent Nuclear industry Issues

My theme is there was documented and known issues these plants were entering a abyss by the NRC...but the NRC was prevented to act by Congress. Prevented from seeing the big Picture. I really don't think the rank and file NRC inspector has the requisite education and experience to even be a NRC inspector.   

This all looks like jumping flees to me...Palisades, Vermont Yankee, ANO, Pilgrim and now River Bend and Waterford. 

So basically the function of the NRC is to stay away from a serious off site radiation event(meltdown)...their job is not to keep the industry palatable to the public and orderly. Risk perspectives does that for them. I think the demarcation of a serious accident like TMI and Fukushima is is blurry as hell to the agency and at the plant. More, the danger line is almost unquantifiable, as least through the component worth and isolated risk calculation of components and systems. Basically risk perspectives is worthless.It is grossly oversold as a protect scheme for our nation...

Why doesn't risk perspectives focus the agency to look at the right areas in the below plant events...anticipate these events. Why didn't the NRC informed by risk perspective, step in and knock heads before these events emerged from the bureaucracy of organizations. Really, the events below are seen months and years before the events occur. They are organization centric events, not components, systems and electronics centric events.

Really congress is regulating the plant inspectors and the NRC...limiting their interaction and field of view with the goings on in the plants. We strictly follow the rules, but are we really allowed to see everything and is the plants required to show everything. It more a child's peekaboo going on in the USA between a plant and the NRC.

Jan 2015 Pilgrim

March 2013 ANO

March 2012 San Onofre

June 2011 Fort Calhoun

As example, if the NRC can't anticipate and head off...being situationally aware... in the four plant events above, how do you expect them to head off a meltsown or other significant industry events.

Post findings on these plants for the events, they discovered years of known problems not openly confronted by the NRC. It is as if we got two regulatory policies, one declared and the other not seen by outsider until a big event makes transparent the agency negligence over many years. The truth is, congress never punishes the NRC for allowing a plant to operate outside regulation. The NRC is mostly on the day to day events in these plant a god unto themselves. The big problem is agency knows they are not constrained by higher levels of government. The giant electric utilities are just a too powerful political force unconstrained  political campaign contribution. Really not bounded by the ideals of our perfect constitution. The NRC acts like a totalitarian force for big business, unafraid of getting thrown out of office by the voters. Ultimately they are a power unto themselves and nobody is required to tell the complete truth.       

Why aren't we asking ourselves and NRC, is our NRC just as inflexible as the Japanese's Nuclear Regulatory Authority. Have we regulated the inspectors more than the plants? Is the NRC and the public only getting a very limited field of view...has Congress set up the system for that by campaign contribution. 

January 22, 2016 5:30 pm JST 

IAEA urges Japan to enhance technical competence for nuclear restarts 

TOKYO (Kyodo) -- The International Atomic Energy Agency said Friday that Japan should "strengthen its technical competence," after a team of experts of the U.N. nuclear watchdog concluded a 12-day mission the same day to assess the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety in Japan. 

The country's Nuclear Regulation Authority "needs to further strengthen its technical competence in light of upcoming restarts of nuclear facilities" idled after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the team said in its initial report. The final mission report will be released in about three months.

The latest Integrated Regulatory Review Service followed the first review in Japan in June 2007, marking the first assessment since the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami caused the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The NRA was established in 2012 to oversee stricter regulations. 

The team of 19 nuclear experts also found Japanese authorities need to amend relevant legislation to allow the NRA to conduct more effective inspections. 

"What we found is the system that is regulating or defining the framework for inspection is very complex and very rigid," Philippe Jamet, the head of the mission team, said at a joint press conference held by the team and the NRA.
"It doesn't give enough freedom for the inspectors to react immediately," Jamet said. 

Shunichi Tanaka, the chairman of the NRA, said the Japanese regulatory body will work more closely with power companies to improve its inspection operations. 

"We have to talk to operators more thoroughly to improve the inspection method," Tanaka said. 

The mission team also said the NRA should work to attract more experienced staff and strengthen staff skills through education, training and international cooperation...

 Briefing Notes for 95003 Inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One

2:00 pm EST/1:00 pm CST

January 20, 2015

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff Participants:

• Neil O’Keefe, Branch Chief and 95003 Inspection Team Leader
• John Dixon, Assistant Team Leader
• Brian Tindell, Senior Resident Inspector

Purpose 

To provide a current status of performance regulatory oversight and performance improvement efforts to improve safety performance at the Arkansas Nuclear One nuclear power plant.

Background 

The NRC increased regulatory oversight of Entergy’s Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) plant in the third quarter of 2014. ANO was placed into Column 4, “Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone,” of the NRC’s Action Matrix as a result of having two Yellow findings affecting each of the two plants. The NRC’s color coding indicates that Yellow findings have substantial safety significance. These findings were identified as a result of the events surrounding the industrial accident that occurred at the plant on March 31, 2013, which resulted in one fatality and eight injured personnel. One Yellow finding involved performance deficiencies identified from the event associated with dropping a heavy component and causing significant damage to plant equipment. The other Yellow finding involved performance deficiencies associated with inadequate flood protection of safety equipment that was exposed as a result of plant damage from the heavy component drop.

Event Description 

On March 31, 2013, during a planned Unit 1 outage, the licensee was lifting the Unit 1 main generator stator out of the turbine building when an inadequately designed temporary lifting rig failed, causing the 525 ton stator to fall approximately 30 feet into the train bay. The train bay is shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The impact caused substantial damage to the Unit 1 side of the turbine building and power distribution systems, and parts of the lift rig impacted the Unit 2 side of the turbine building.

Yellow Finding Associated with the Heavy Component Drop

The temporary lifting rig collapsed because there were incorrect assumptions and errors in the design such that it could not safely complete the intended lift. A test to verify the capability of the lift rig was not performed due to further errors in communication and decision making. These failures were the result of inadequate oversight of the primary contractor and a subcontractor hired to perform the operation. As a result, there was a complete loss of offsite power to Unit 1 for six days, and Unit 2 partially lost offsite power. This increased risk to the plant because alternate means of providing electrical power to key safety-related systems was not available using installed plant equipment in the event the diesels failed. The NRC determined that this constituted a violation of substantial safety significance.

Yellow Finding for Degraded Flood Protection Features

Following the flooding that occurred during the heavy component drop event, the licensee conducted a comprehensive inspection and identified over 100 deficient flood protection features, including unsealed electrical cable conduits, and degraded hatches and floor plug seals in the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings. NRC inspections subsequently identified additional problems, necessitating further reviews. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) require that the auxiliary building and safety-related pump rooms be watertight.

The NRC concluded that the licensee had failed to design, construct, and maintain the flood protection features in both units in accordance with the approved design requirements. The finding included multiple violation examples and was determined to have substantial safety significance. The primary contributor to the safety significance was due to the potential safety impact of the theoretical maximum rainfall event, which could lead to core damage due to equipment damage from the degraded flood protection features.

NRC Actions

• The safe operation of the units is the NRC’s primary concern. We have three inspectors onsite that are continuously assessing day to day operation, and we are documenting our assessment that continued plant operation is acceptable in quarterly inspection reports.

• ANO is currently receiving one of the highest levels of NRC oversight designed to ensure that the plant continues to operate safely and performance does not further decline. If safety performance declines further, the NRC will promptly identify and address the decline with regulatory actions up to and including shutting the units down.

• Both the NRC and the licensee are in the process of evaluating the nature and extent of performance issues. We have reviewed the results of each of their evaluations and interim actions to avoid further performance decline.

• The NRC will begin a comprehensive inspection on January 25, 2016. The inspection will involve a team of about 25 inspectors who will spend about 3,600 hours on the effort. This inspection will be an independent evaluation of the extent of the performance problems at Arkansas Nuclear One. We will also assess the licensee’s evaluation of their problems and their proposed corrective actions to ensure they lead to timely and sustained performance improvements.

• We expect to issue an inspection report with the findings and assessments of the team in the spring of 2016. We have tentatively scheduled a public exit meeting for April 6, 201

• April 6, 2016, and will also present the results of the NRC’s annual assessment. Victor McCree, the NRC’s Executive Director for Operations, is expected to attend this meeting.

• The NRC will issue a Confirmatory Action Letter that documents commitments made by the licensee to implement the key corrective actions needed to improve safety performance. The NRC will then conduct inspections to verify the completion and effectiveness of those corrective actions as the actions are completed.

• Based on past experience with plants with similar performance problems, we expect it will take ANO 2 to 3 years to complete the actions needed to demonstrate a sustained improvement in safety performance. The NRC will not reduce the level of oversight until ANO has completed those key actions designated in the Confirmatory Action Letter and the NRC inspections confirm that those actions were effective.

ANO Actions

• ANO has been effective in running the units safely and not allowing the recovery efforts to detract from safe plant operation.

• ANO has completed an extensive series of evaluations to identify the causes for declining safety performance, and has developed, prioritized, and scheduled corrective action to address those causes. These evaluations were performed with the help of nuclear industry experts from outside the company to assist in recognizing areas where ANO and Entergy have not been following industry practices.

• ANO has recognized that their top issue affecting performance involves ensuring that the necessary resources are provided to accomplish station programs and processes in a safe and effective manner (for example, vendor/contractor oversight, increasing backlogs, and equipment maintenance). They have added more than 100 workers and have brought in consultants to assist with its performance improvement and recovery effort.

• The NRC will issue a Confirmatory Action Letter that documents commitments made by the licensee to implement the key corrective actions needed to improve safety performance. The NRC will then conduct inspections to verify the completion and effectiveness of those corrective actions as the actions are completed.

Who Wants River Bend’s Junk Capacity Factor?

Update 1/27

Is River Bend ever going to startup again? This is the big problem as far as the industry's financial problems.

What the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Says About the Nuclear Industry's Death Spiral

 

Update 1/24

Still shutdown today? Have they made money in the last two years? 

***This shutdown must have caused a lot of damage? Eleven days and counting?  

Special Inspection in 2015 Didn't Fix a Thing at Crap Plant River Bend

Event Date: 01/09/2016

 

Junk Pilgrim Prepared For Storm, Operators Say

It would take at least 4 to 6 hours to bring about a orderly shutdown and cool down.

It would be so cool for the plant to trip today and LOOP? Would this be the last shutdown in the life Pilgrim plant. :)

None of this is based on real engineering, engineering assurance it could survive Blizzard. Although I believe Entergy is worried about if Gov Baker begins to turn on them. It is all a grand NRC experiment.  

 

Who cares if Entergy is going to permanently shutdown within a year. or so.

..."the Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman said Friday that procedures for addressing storms have been tightened since last year."

It is interesting the grid prices spiked up this early morning. Is it a result of normal winter condition approaching the coast or has the grid anticipated losing Pilgrim:)

 

Maybe Entergy wants the NRC to shutdown the plant...blame them for permanently shutdown the plant.   

NUCLEAR SAFETY

Pilgrim prepared for storm, operators say

The protocol has been tightened in the year since a blizzard-induced shutdown at the plant, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman says.

By Christine Legere

Posted Jan. 22, 2016 at 5:45 PM
Updated at 9:17 AM

PLYMOUTH — Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station say they are ready for whatever the fast-traveling snowstorm heading up the East Coast this weekend, with accompanying 60 mph winds, brings their way.

“We are monitoring the storm closely and have begun preparations under our coastal storm protocol,” Entergy Corp., the plant’s owner-operator, said Friday in a statement provided by spokesman Patrick O’Brien.

One provision in the newly beefed-up storm plan calls for a pre-emptive shutdown based on the severity of the storm. “It has to do with wind speeds and the rate of snowfall,” Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, wrote in an email Friday.

Entergy is holding off on that decision for now. “The currently projected storm path and weather conditions do not meet the criteria for a pre-emptive shutdown of the station,” the company statement said. “We will continue to monitor the storm closely and have appropriate staff and other resources available should conditions change.”

The Pilgrim plant's 220-foot primary meteorological tower is still out of service, awaiting a part expected to be installed in February, according to Sheehan. The smaller backup tower will provide plant operators with vital information on wind velocity and direction.

That second tower had been inoperable for several years and was just recently replaced. The plant must rely on the National Weather Service in Taunton whenever a single tower goes down and lacks backup.

Representatives of the Plymouth Fire Department were at the nuclear plant earlier this week to review storm preparations, according to the town’s emergency management director, Aaron Wallace.

It has been just about a year since a blizzard tore through the Northeast, knocking out power at Pilgrim. Problems began with electrical arcing in the switchyard, where power is brought to the plant and sent from the plant to the grid. Such switchyard problems date back as long as 30 years.

Operators shut down the reactor during that January storm, but problems persisted, with the failure of a diesel-driven air compressor, a leaking safety valve used to depressurize the reactor, failure of a manually operated safety relief valve and failure of the high-pressure coolant injection system, which then leaked an inch of water onto the floor.

Sump pumps could not clear it, since all nonvital functions at the plant had been shut down.

The series of malfunctions during that storm prompted a week of federal inspections and contributed to the downgrade of the Pilgrim plant by NRC officials in September to among the three worst performers in the country.

Entergy announced in October its plan to permanently shut down the Pilgrim reactor sometime before June 2019.

Although some plant watchdogs warn there is no longer any impetus for Entergy to stay on top of plant maintenance, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman said Friday that procedures for addressing storms have been tightened since last year.

“We have a resident inspector at Pilgrim who is continuing to closely track storm preparations,” Sheehan wrote. “For instance, site walkdowns were conducted yesterday to check for any loose debris that could be tossed by strong winds and impact the switchyard or plant infrastructure.

“Also, a change put in place since last winter’s storms is the installation of heat lamps in the switchyard to prevent the kinds of electrical arcing events that have occurred in the past,” Sheehan continued. “We will be paying attention to the heat lamps’ effectiveness should they be needed during this storm.”

David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the switchyard is always vulnerable to winds and icing. “The backup generators are the real safety net,” he said. “If they work, they effectively cool the reactor. Because of the problems in the past, (Pilgrim operators) may be more prepared and have a longer list of backups.”

Storm Jonas 2016: Is Junk Plant Pilgrim Shutting Down?

Update The day after 1/24

The definitive answer from the NRC tonight. Lots of nuke plants had lots of trouble with weather this storm.
 

…”there have been no significant impacts at the facility”: depends on what their definition of “no significant impacts at the plant” means. I'd like them to describe all storm related impacts at the plant.    

  NRC: Update: As the Blizzard Moves Out of the Mid-Atlantic
Just North of Pilgrim.

The Weather Service recorded a wind gust of 70 miles per hour at the municipal airport in Marshfield.

So far it looks like Pilgrim stayed up at power. Course Plymouth got only grazed by storm Jonas. But...

Update, 6 p.m.
PLYMOUTH MA — Eversource crews on Saturday night restored power to all but about 100 customers after a snowstorm knocked out power to over 1,000. 

Winter Storm Jonas brought blizzard conditions that knocked out power for more than 1,000 in Plymouth Saturday afternoon. 

Boston Globe:

"Boston can expect the snowflakes to start falling between noon and 2 p.m. Temperatures will hit a high of about 30 degrees and a low of about 20 at night, said Frank Nocera, a National Weather Service meteorologist.

Nocera said the highest snow totals from the storm would be in the southeastern part of the state, where 8 to 12 inches of snow can be expected. The storm will also feature high winds that may bring down power lines and the possibility of coastal flooding, forecasters said."

Remember Pilgrim last year didn't trip after many hours of brutal blizzard conditions. It wasn't a really bad blizzard and much snow accumulation. The plant tripped right at the beginning of the blizzard.

Accuweather says Plymouth is going to get more than two hours of heavy snowfall this afternoon.

The red outlined area is the National Weather Service's "Winter Storm Warning".  Storm Jonas has intensified much more than anticipated in the models. South Shore Massachusett just a few hours ago wasn't supposed to get any snow at all.

Winter Storm Warning remains in effect until 7 AM EST Sunday.

• Locations: Kent and Bristol counties in Rhode Island and coastal Plymouth County. Cities and towns in the warning include Plymouth, West Greenwich, Warwick. Bristol.
• Hazard types: Heavy snow.
• Accumulations: snow accumulation of 4 to 8 inches.
• Timing: snow will develop around mid morning and become heavy at times in this afternoon and evening. Snowfall rates up to one inch per hour will be possible at times. Gusty winds up to 45 mph combined with the snow will result in blowing snow and poor visibilities at times. The snow will begin to taper off after midnight.
• Impacts: hazardous travel with heavy snow and poor visibilities. Heavy snow combined with strong winds may result in isolated power outages.
• Winds: northeast 25 to 35 mph with gusts up to 55 mph.
• Temperatures: in the upper 20s.
• Visibilities: one quarter mile or less at times.