Thursday, June 06, 2019

Heroin Drug Den Hinsdale NH: Police Department In A Unsolvable Crisis

Update June 7

New- like mike said, he will have to cycle this through a few committees to figure out what is going on and fix it. This is a emergency, the town is in a extraordinary fragile state. The remaining cops know how untrustworthy the chief is and the selectman. We could have 1, 2 or 3 cops emediately resign. If I was a chief, I figure out what kind of bonus would it take to keep the rest of the cops working for the next year and make the cops sign a contract. Money is the only thing that is going to work now we dug the hole so deep. More sweet words with nothing to show for it, is just going to piss them all off more.    

Personally I think the Hinsdale select-people hate the police department...they are sabotaging public safety and their aim is to keep the police as weak as possible and in a total state of object chaos. This is a policy of the selectman's office maliciously and intentionally weakening the police department for a unseen agenda. 

Come on, why hasn't the selectman's office been keeping up to the conditions of the Hinsdale police department? It is the most important office the Selectman have. This has been going on for years. And the selectman just discovered it. What kind of show you got going on here!!!   

Update

There is no doubt I agitated to Darcy and to selective police officers about the funding problems surrounding the police department. I set this meeting in motion. I even advocated to Darcy the police department is in such bad shape they need to be put into state receivership or in direct supervision. When all is said and done, this problem fixed, we will discover this shortage in police funding comes from a agenda of the selectman. In hindsight, there never was a legitimate reason for this shortage of police funding.      

Rereading this, basically it is a revolt by the police force against police managnement and the selectman. 

***As far as the police chief, if he don't have the gravitas to get the selectmen to pay the police officers what they are worth and keeping the police force in tip top shape, then the police chief should have long ago resigned on conscience. There is something wrong with the police chief if he is not independent from the selectmen and act on in a way that = is in the best interest of the police force and the community they serve

And lets face it, what legitimate company would want to move to a small community with systemic and uncontrollable police department problems. An area with a weak and non functioning police department just draws the scumbags of the earth drug dealers and other corrupt entities to the poorly policed area. Then the businesses start to leave for greener pastures and new ones won't move in. It is a police department and town's revenues death spiral. How much town's revenues have we lost with this weak and dysfunctional police department so far? Much worst yet, how much town revenues are going to be lost in the future with a ever declining police force. We are just screaming for all the scumbags to move to Hinsdale. Then the housing property values decline, taxes increase, people move out...then we get into these repeating cycles of lost tax revenues declines, decreasing housing values and the reputation of the town in a continuous decline. 

Who is to say the great exodus of homeowners and renters out of town isn't about the lawlessness within the town? They don't want to deal with dangerous racism at the schools and the sense they are unsafe on our streets. Dead bodies all over the place. Who is to say this is about taxes, not safety and security in the street with a high performance police department.          

The police chief should be fired emediately for allowing his police department to get into this shape. You see the black hole we are in? Lets say he quits or gets fired, who is going to replace him? What kind of hot shot police official would want become our police chief in the horrible shape of the police department and selectman. You'd have to be insane to come to work as the police chief in this town. You got to know the pay sucks. Are we just stuck with this guy and his philosophy??? You are not going to get a replacement for months. The next guy or lady police chief then is going to have less police quality than a MacDonald's table washer. Just like the regular police offers. 

Ok, say you have a police officer taking shortcuts or is just plain lazy, not the proper alignment to be a good officer? Are you going to fire him on a hint of a improper police alignment like you should? The chief is going to weigh the consequences of having three or two officers on the force against the possibility of a loose cannon police officer on the force. Sometimes a warm body is better than none. It is the slippery slope. You are effectively giving too much power to the bottom of the barrel police officers. The officers are going to sense they are not being managed and watched as they should. Then they are going to takes chances and do stuff they normally won't do. It usually ends up as a runaway police department.               

So in recent times we had the killing and murdering of three people in Hinsdale and the potential high felony crimes in the grammar school.

We are right in the middle of a heroin apocalypse and the dealers are in control of our town.  

Think about this. This is a free market state, so they say. The Hinsdale police department just can't pay the going market rate for a police officer. And we got weak police departments all over the place. And you know for a fact, with this horrible pay, we are getting the bottom of the barrel quality with the police officers. Honestly, you get what you pay for. Basically in a humongous crisis like this, that have been for many years, you got to know training and police career development goes right out the door (It is just day to day survival, and this makes the officers just want to leave.) It is just too expensive.  

Do you get it, the Brattleboro rag and all of the locale newspapers have been throwing at us for many years now, that the general poor economic conditions of the community is causing the low pay for the police officers and the dysfunction of the police departments. All you are hearing about this is from the selectmen and the police department in the newspapers. These police and town officials for their own self interest have been saying for many years now, the problems are intractable and unsolvable through the newspapers. Basically there is no hope for your community, just like our newspapers. It is mono thinking by everyone. Nobody talks about a solution to this. It is just hopeless. 




Posted Wednesday, June 5, 2019 7:51 pm

By Bob Audette, Brattleboro Reformer


HINSDALE, N.H. — The town of Hinsdale has 10 slots designated for its police department, counting the chief of police. But at this moment, it only has four officers and its chief.

"Our department is currently in crisis mode," said Corp. Adam Belville, reading from a statement during the Monday evening meeting of the Hinsdale Board of Selectmen. "Often times there is only one officer working at a time who is responsible for responding to calls and handling investigations."

After reading from his statement, Belville went on to describe the situation as "a boiling point."

"I wouldn't be here if I didn't have the best interests of the town and department in mind," said Belville, who noted many small-town departments get rookie cops who stay on board for a year or two for experience before hopping to a bigger city with better pay.

All four officers on the town's payroll went to Monday night's meeting, but Chief Todd Faulkner stayed away.

"They didn't tell the board anything that I haven't told the board before," said Faulkner, and most of that is about how much pay he can offer new recruits to the department.

"Every year I have expressed to the town that pay is an issue," said Faulkner. "I am sympathetic about how the budget works and how much the people of Hinsdale are paying in taxes, but the hiring pool that's out there is not sustainable and my officers will do what's right for them and their families, regardless of how dedicated they might be to Hinsdale."

Starting pay in Hinsdale is about $19 an hour, or $39,520 a year, for applicants with no certification. With prior experience, the starting pay is a little less than $22 an hour, or about $45,760 a year.

"Do you feel one of the biggest factors in the retention of officers has to do with pay?" asked Selectmen Mike Carrier during the Monday night meeting. Carrier himself is a police officer with the Winchester Police Department and a former member of both the Hinsdale and Brattleboro police departments.

Belville said there are a lot of factors weighing against Hinsdale and other small-town police departments, but pay is one of the major factors.

"Larger departments ... are definitely dangling the pay in front of them," he said. In addition, he noted, officers can work at a larger department and have a smaller caseload because there are more officers on staff.

Sgt. Joshua Murray put it more bluntly.

"Would you go to the town that pays less to do more or go to the town that pays you more to do less?" asked Murray.

Up until about two years ago, said Faulkner, the town guaranteed all of its employees a 3 percent pay raise each year, dependent on a performance review, in addition to cost-of-living increases, amounting to about 5 percent a year.

The town went to performance-based pay raises for two years, he said, but this year has placed a freeze on all pay raises.

The Hinsdale police budget for fiscal year 2019, which ends June 30, is $1,390,493.

Both Belville and Faulkner acknowledged that all the departments in the region are fighting over the best applicants, but only the ones, like Keene, that offer a better starting pay, are winning.

The Keene Police Department is currently hiring, with a starting pay between $43,992 and $55,681, depending no experience.

Pay in nearby Winchester is similar to what is offered in Hinsdale, said Chief Mike Tollett, who has eight full-time slots, counting himself, all of which are filled. However, noted Tollett, one of his officers is leaving on Saturday. Pay starts at about $19 an hour for non-certified officers and $21 to $22 per hour depending on experience.

"Winchester is horrible with pay," said Tollett. And that's not just in his department. "No town employees get annual raises or cost of living increases."

In the past, said Tollett, the way to get a pay raise in the Winchester Police Department was to get promoted.
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"I try to look for folks who are going to fit in the department and who have a sense of loyalty," he said.

He also asks new hires to sign a contract, promising they will stay for three years, but even that doesn't guarantee an officer will stay the full three years.

"Other departments such as in Keene and Swanzey will buy out the contract," said Tollett. "Recently, Swanzey paid Winchester $16,000 to buy out a contract."

Chesterfield, which offers a slightly higher introductory pay rate, also has no openings, said Chief Duane Chickering.

"We have five full-time officers, including myself, and three part-time officers," he said.

Starting pay for non-certified officers in Chesterfield is $21.14 and $21.92 for certified officers. Chesterfield also has eight pay steps for its officers, meaning they can earn up to $27.22 an hour.

"Even though we are fully staffed, we are always looking," said Chickering, who noted during the last hiring process he received more than 50 applications, of which only three who passed all the tests.

Chesterfield doesn't require that its new hires sign a contract, but they must live in town, he said.

"If you live in the town, you have a vested interest," said Chickering, who noted two of his current officers are approaching their three-year mark, and their experience makes them a valuable asset to any department.

"Outside agencies are salivating over the amount of work we put into our officers," he said.

Belville noted that between March and May of this year, the Hinsdale Police Department received nearly 40 resumes.

"Only 10 applicants showed up ... to begin the hiring process," he said. "Of those applicants, the majority couldn't pass the physical fitness test. The ones who could, either couldn't pass the next step i the hiring process or backed out altogether."

"Recruitment is the same for us as for everybody else," said Tollett. "We get applications. We set up physical fitness tests. Some don't show up and some don't pass the test."

Faulkner said that the officers who have remained on staff in Hinsdale have done so because they are dedicated to the town and to its police department. But that dedication is no match for better pay somewhere else when someone's life situation changes.

"I had an officer leave because he wanted to start a family and buy a house," he said. "You can't do that on the pay we offer. Any one of my current officers could walk away today for the same reason."

"We have a great group of people now who work well together," said Belville during the Monday night meeting. "The downside is, we are getting absolutely swamped with calls."

According to numbers compiled by Jerod Tier, a Hinsdale resident, seven officers responded to or worked 6,842 incidents, or 977 incidents per officer.

If the same call volume holds steady in 2019, that's 1,710 incidents per each of the department's four officers, not counting the chief, who said he is currently working 20 cases he would normally assign to a detective.

"Everyone is tired," said Faulkner.

"All of the town departments are feeling the same issue," said board member Bernie Rideout.

Board Chairman Mike Darcy thanked Belville and the other officers for bringing the situation to their attention and promised they would "start working on it" as soon as possible.

Wednesday, June 05, 2019

Perminentaly Shutdown Fort Calhoun Is A Risk Of Flooding This Spring And Others.

It would be interesting if the permanently shutdown Fort Calhoun had a building flooding issue. I don't think there is anything to worry as far as the used fuel in the plant today or the cast. But the Cooper plant is about 75 miles downstream of the Fort Calhoun plant. A big flooding event has got their eyes on the Cooper plant. The Cooper plant has the highest meltdown risk this spring. But the flooding is so widespread, you can't rule out any other flooding risk. The Mississippi river got me concerned with their massive and historic flooding...

Fort Calhoun prepares for more flooding

Posted: 9:52 AM, May 31, 2019
Updated: 10:53 AM

By: Jake Wasikowski
"As you can see we're about level with what the river level is right now," Danielle Cram said, Project Manager at the Fort Calhoun Station. She says they have been reinforcing flood measures that have been out since March.
They have Hesco barriers around the switch yard, and thousands of sand bangs protecting transformers.
"We will test our barriers we are very confident we will be able to protect the plants," Cram said.
Crews are also building a scaffolding walk way to the nuclear station.
The plant was shut down in 2011 before the floods started, and stayed dry through a long flood emergency surrounded by water.
Since the station is in the process of deconstruction, one main priority is to make sure no hazardous materials end up in flood waters.
"So as we start to dismantle buildings and work towards the demolition process it's making sure that we have positive control of all of that demolition material so that we're not inadvertantly releasing something to the environment that we don't want to," Cram said.
Isabelle Thomas has lived a short distance away from the nuclear station, and says she's glad OPPD is putting the public's safety first.
"i think that's very important because of the fact of the contamination and getting rid of the nuclear waste in the proper way, that also was a concern to me," Thomas said.
OPPD anticipates having their flood protection system out at least until Mid-July as the river may continue to fluctuate throughout the season.

Monday, June 03, 2019

Entergy's Got a Busy Southern Fleet Of Regulated Plants

Entergy got rid of their merchant fleet of nuclear Plants, it didn't fix their nuclear plant problems.
Power Reactor Event Number: 54096
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALFONSO CROEZE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Notification Date: 06/01/2019
Notification Time: 03:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2019
Event Time: 23:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 30 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL

"At 2345 CDT at River Bend Station (RBS) Unit 1, a manual Reactor scram was inserted in anticipation of receiving an automatic Reactor Water Level 3 (9.7") scram due to the isolation of the 'B' Heater String with the 'A' Heater String already isolated. The 'B' heater string isolation caused loss of suction and subsequent trip of the running Feed Water Pumps 'A' and 'C'. All control rods fully inserted with no issues. Subsequently Reactor level was controlled by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. Feed Water Pump 'C' was restored 4 minutes after the initial trip and the RCIC system secured. Currently RBS-1 is stable and is being cooled down using Turbine Bypass Valves.

"No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit."

The plant is currently under a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

ANO Tripped...Lots Of Unreliablity In Their Fleet



Power Reactor Event Number: 54091
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4     State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STROBEL
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 05/26/2019
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2019
Event Time: 05:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP ON GROUND FAULT

"This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Plant Protection System (PPS) actuation. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, automatically tripped from 100 percent power at 0512 CDT. The reactor automatically tripped due to 2P-32B Reactor Coolant Pump tripping as a result of grounding.

"No additional equipment issues were noted. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) actuated and was utilized to maintain Steam Generator (SG) levels. The EFW actuation meets the 8-hour Non-Emergency Immediate Notification Criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). No Primary safety valves lifted. Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) did lift initially after the trip.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump valves to the main condenser. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient on Unit 2. The licensee notified the State of Arkansas."

Wednesday, May 22, 2019

Brunswick Nuclear Plant Operating While Drunk

Update

Welcome to you new NRC of deregulation, we should have had at least a special inspection. This is how they can game risk perspectives by pick and choosing what is put into the risk perspectives. And the NRC doesn't have to disclose why a special is not done... 

*They ought to get a red violation finding for allowing the reactor water instrument line to rupture uncontrollably. The leaking water into the drywell is not that important...it is the lost of the indication of the reactor water level along with the inaccurate activation and the missing activation with a host of critical systems designed to prevent a core meltdown. I get it, we got redundant systems. The example is, what if we had lost the other side's instrumentation coupling at the same time. What if a plant lost all reactor water indications. Even if we didn't have a meltdown, this accident would have dire problems for the industry. I bet this plant would have to do a emergency blowdown and fill up the drywell with water to get cooling water to the reactor. It would be a brutal accident that never had any testing on the emergency procedures. This would be in the news for a years.         

*My issues with this is that the reactor water level instrument line could have sheared off during a very complicated accident leading to meltdown. 

Here is your new world boys with unprecedented NRC deregulation. They don't have to publicly notify the community with serious accidents.  

***Here is the industry's crooked advocator trying to reduce the drunken driving charges with the plant operator.


Indications of a plant in serious troubles: 
PLANT STATUS
 Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and operated there until February 22, 2019, when power was reduced to 60 percent RTP to perform a control rod sequence exchange, feed pump maintenance, scram time testing, and turbine valve testing.  The unit was restored to 100 percent RTP on February 23, 2019, where it continued to operate until February 24, 2019, when power was reduced to 85 percent RTP for a control rod improvement.  The unit was restored to 100 percent RTP on February 25, until March 10, 2019, when power was reduced to 82 percent RTP as a result of a recirculation pump runback caused by a loss of the Unit 1 uninterruptible power supply (UPS) bus.  Power was restored to 100 percent on the same day following restoration of the UPS bus and the unit continued to operate at 100 percent RTP until March 28 2019, when the unit was taken offline for a reactor coolant system leak in the 'B' train reference leg.  The unit remained offline and in mode 4 for the remainder of the inspection period.
 Unit 2 began the inspection period at 60 percent RTP as a result of a trip of the ‘A’ reactor feed pump (RFP) on December 31, 2018.  Following repairs to the ‘A’ RFP, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP January 9, 2019.  Between January 9 and February 8, 2019, the unit operated between 95 percent and 100 percent RTP due to power to flow limitations.  Following several rod improvements during this period, the unit reached 100 percent on February 8 2019, and continued to operate there until February 25 when a power coast down was commenced.  On March 2, 2019, with the unit at 97 percent RTP, Unit 2 was shut down for a refueling outage and remained shut down until March 29, 2019, when the unit entered mode 2 and the reactor was taken critical.  On March 30 2019, with the turbine generator still disconnected from the grid and the reactor at approximately 20 percent RTP (mode 1), the reactor was manually tripped due high bearing vibrations (No. 9 bearing).  The operators subsequently placed the unit in mode 4 on March 31 2019, in order to effect repairs to the No. 9 main turbine bearing.

It is a white finding so far...  It is a leak performance that went to white. 
NEI 99-02 FAQ 19-02 Brunswick RCS Leakage 
 Page 1 of 10 Revised 20180520
Plant:   Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 Date of Event:   March 28, 2019 Submittal Date:   May 22, 2019 Licensee Contact:  Tony Zimmerman    Licensee Tel/email:  980-373-2520/Tony.Zimmerman@Duke-Energy.com NRC Contact:   Galen Smith, Brunswick NRC Senior Resident Inspector  Tel/email: (910) 832-2831, Galen.Smith@nrc.gov

Performance Indicator:  BI02 -  Reactor Coolant System Leakage 

Site-Specific FAQ (see Appendix D)? (X)Yes or (   ) No

FAQ requested to become effective (X) when approved or (other date) ____________


Question Section  
 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02 Guidance needing interpretation (include page and line citation): 
 NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Page 42, lines 3 – 6.  NEI 99-02 defines the purpose of the performance indicator for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage as:

3 This indicator monitors the integrity of the RCS pressure boundary, the second of the three 4 barriers to prevent the release of fission products. It measures RCS Identified Leakage as a 5 percentage of the technical specification allowable Identified Leakage to provide an indication of 6 RCS integrity. 
 Event or circumstances requiring guidance interpretation:  
 This FAQ is being submitted to request an exemption from the NEI 99-02 guidance to report elevated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage due to plant-specific circumstances or unique conditions.  Specifically, Brunswick Unit 1 is requesting an exemption related to the March 2019 RCS Leakage Performance Indicator (PI) data, which crossed the Green/White threshold due to the unique circumstances surrounding failure of a 1-inch instrument line coupling that occurred on March 28, 2019.  Brunswick does not have a Technical Specification limit on Identified Leakage and reports RCS Total Leakage for this PI, as discussed on NEI 99-02, page 42, lines 33 and 34.  The following describes the basis for this exemption request. 
 
 1. The RCS Leakage Performance Indicator is intended to monitor RCS leakage below the Technical Specification limit to ensure that licensees identify and trend leakage early and take timely corrective actions well before the technical specification limit is reached.  RCS pressure boundary material is ductile by design and typically exhibits a leak-beforebreak failure mechanism in which cracks begin small and leakage progresses over time.  The RCS Leakage Performance Indicator is intended to monitor licensee behaviors in taking prompt action to address RCS leakage before it reaches the limit in the Technical  
NEI 99-02 FAQ 19-02 Brunswick RCS Leakage

 Page 2 of 10 Revised 20180520
Specifications.

Contrary to this, the March 28, 2019, Brunswick event resulted from the immediate circumferential separation of a 1-inch coupling on the steam side sensing line for reactor vessel level indication, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.  Based on the material of construction and environmental conditions (i.e., temperature, hydrogen), the post-event metallurgical report determined the coupling showed no evidence of localized plastic deformation.  The coupling experienced hydrogen embrittlement and did not exhibit a leak-before-break failure mechanism.  There were no precursors to this event and the resulting leakage from the break exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) limit.  RCS leakage was stable and well below the TS limit before the event.  The steam leak could not be isolated from the reactor vessel.  Operations took prompt action to reduce power, commence a plant shutdown, and depressurized the reactor to stop the leak.  The leakage resulted in the declaration of an Unusual Event (UE).  Operations completed an uncomplicated reactor shutdown.  It was the last reading taken before entering Mode 4 (i.e., the Mode in which the SR is no longer applicable) that caused the PI to transition from Green to White.  RCS leakage was stable and was being appropriately managed before the event.  Based on these unique circumstances, Brunswick requests an exemption to exclude reporting the leakage from the event in the RCS Leakage PI.  This would result in the PI returning to Green for March 2019.  
    
 2. As a result of the event, the NRC initiated their event follow-up process (IMC 0309, “Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors”, and IP 71153, “Follow-Up on Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion”) to determine if it was appropriate to enter Management Directive 8.3, “Incident Investigation Program” to initiate a follow-up inspection (Special Inspection).  In performing the “plant response and event follow-up checklist” the NRC evaluates control room conduct, the circumstances of the leak, plant conditions, and the associated risk of the event.  NRC determined that a Special Inspection was not needed.  Since the RCS leakage was low prior to the event with no precursors, the supplemental inspection initiated for a White PI would be redundant, in part, to that which has already been inspected.  Based on the fact that Brunswick has already replaced all the susceptible couplings in both Units and given the unique characteristics of this failure, plant-specific circumstances should be considered to exempt recording the leakage from the event as part of the indicator and evaluate under other NRC processes.  
 Problem Statement:  The RCS leakage Performance Indicator (PI) monitors leakage that is below the Technical Specification (TS) limit to ensure licensee’s take prompt actions to monitor, diagnose, mitigate, and correct RCS leakage to prevent it from progressing into a more significant condition.  

At Brunswick Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, RCS leakage was stable, monitored and managed well below the TS Limit with the PI low in the Green performance band prior to this event.  On March 28, 2019, a 1-inch instrument line failed without any prior indications, resulting in exceeding the TS limit for RCS total leakage, as shown in Figure 3.  A deliberate, controlled shutdown of Unit 1 was undertaken that was commensurate with the risk associated with the  
NEI 99-02 FAQ 19-02 Brunswick RCS Leakage

 Page 3 of 10 Revised 20180520 
leakage.  The location of the leak prevented it from being isolated, requiring the depressurization of the RCS to stop the steam leak.  There were no precursors for the failure of this instrument line.  The last data point taken in Mode 3 was 13.93 gpm as shown in Figure 4.  This was the only data point in March 2019 that exceeded the 50% of the TS Total Leakage Green/White threshold of >12.5 gpm.

NRC Region II implemented their event follow-up procedure and did not raise any concerns with the performance of the Operations crew responding to the leak.  Duke Energy’s position is that the absence of any precursor to the leakage and the prompt action of the Operations crew in responding to the leak provides special circumstances not addressed in the PI guidance.  Duke Energy requests an exemption to exclude reporting leakage from the event in the RCS leakage PI calculation, which would return the indicator to Green for March 2019. While this FAQ is being resolved, the Brunswick Unit 1 first quarter 2019 RCS Leakage PI was reported as White on April 22, 2019, for the PI exceedance on March 28, 2019.  

Brunswick, Unit 2 was shut down for a refueling outage during this event. 
 Event Description:  
 At 1419 on March 28, 2019, while operating at 100% reactor power, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant Unit 1 N004B narrow range reactor water level instrument (1-C32-LI-R606B) failed high.  N004B is an instrument tap off the steam space of the reactor vessel.  Drywell pressure and drywell floor drain leakage increased.  Operators controlled drywell pressure and reduced reactor power per the immediate power reduction instructions.  An Unusual Event was declared at 1450 based on elevated drywell leakage and reported to the NRC via Event Notification 53961.  A controlled shutdown of Unit 1 was undertaken that was commensurate with the risk associated with the leakage. This timely action by the operators mitigated the leakage while preventing an unnecessary transient on the plant by performing a scram from a high power level.   Timeline of event:
  March 28, 2019 – Unit 1 operating at full power  1419 – N004B narrow range Reactor Pressure Vessel level instrument failed high  Drywell pressure and floor drain leakage increased  Entered TS 3.4.4 RCS Leakage for unidentified floor drain leakage  Operators reduced reactor power per the immediate power reduction instructions  1429 – Drywell pressure slowly lowering in response to operator action  1438 – Drywell Floor Drain sump alarm increased above setpoint, automatic actions in progress (sump pump started)  1440 – Drywell Floor Drain sump level lowered below reset point and alarm cleared  1450 – Declared Unusual Event due to elevated drywell leakage  Operators continued reducing power in accordance with procedures  1600 – RCS leakage data recorded at 8.3 gpm as shown on Fig. 4  1603 – Operators completed a manual reactor shutdown in accordance with procedures  Reactor Pressure Vessel level maintained in established level band 
NEI 99-02 FAQ 19-02 Brunswick RCS Leakage

 Page 4 of 10 Revised 201805 
 Scram recovery and cooldown – no significant problems  2000 - RCS leakage data recorded at 11.51 gpm as shown on Fig. 4  March 29, 2019 – Unit 1 shutdown  0000 - RCS leakage data recorded at 13.93 gpm as shown on Fig. 4  0238 – Entered Mode 4 
 Investigation inside containment determined that a 1-inch coupling on line 1-B21-774 located on the steam side of a reactor level condensing chamber experienced a 360° circumferential separation at the approximate center of the coupling as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below.  This opened a path for steam from the reactor to leak into the drywell.  Reactor water level was maintained in the established level band, below the level of the sensing line nozzle, throughout the event. The impact from the coupling failure has been analyzed by the Duke Probabilistic Risk Assessment staff and determined to be very low safety significance.

Approximately 1.5 days before the event, the Brunswick, Unit-1 measured an increase in drywell pumping and implementing procedure 0OI-02.3, Drywell Leakage Control.  Investigations determined that the cause of the higher measured leakage was a failed vacuum breaker which allowed water to flow back into the sump after it had been pumped out, causing it to be counted twice by the integrator for the RCS Leakage calculation.  The integrator was observed to be ‘clicking’ or counting leakage when the pump was not running.  This measured leakage was not related to the coupling failure and did not represent an increase in actual RCS leakage.  In addition, there was no indication of increased activity on any of the Radiation Monitors, which provides additional assurance that this was unrelated to the coupling failure.  The vacuum breaker was repaired during the outage and leakage rates returned to historical normal values.  
 Basis for Exemption from guidance:  
 Appendix E of NEI 99-02, Revision 7, allows an exemption to be submitted via the FAQ process for plant-specific circumstances such as unique conditions. Duke Energy is requesting this based on the unique conditions of this RCS leak in that it was not a leak-before-break and not indicative of chronic unresolved elevated RCS leakage.  The RCS Leakage Performance Indicator is intended to monitor how licensees manage RCS leakage below the TS limit to ensure that timely corrective actions are taken in advance of reaching the TS limit.  As stated in Appendix C of SECY 1999-007, Barrier Integrity Key Attributes and Means to Measure: Research has determined the RCS pressure boundary has a high probability of experiencing a leak prior to a rupture (i.e. "leak-before-break"). Therefore, the extent of such leaks offers an objective perspective on the probability of a more catastrophic failure.  

A foundational assumption of this Performance Indicator is that the RCS pressure boundary has a high probability of “leak-before-break” and that the PI is intended to monitor these precursor events.  Additionally, in NRC Staff White Paper titled, Objective of the RCS Leakage Performance Indicator, from the June 26, 2013, ROP Working Group Public Meeting (ML13203A258), the NRC Staff made the following statement on page 20 of 60 regarding an Observation from the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF): 
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As documented in LLTF recommendation 3.3.3(3), the intent of the current RCS Leakage PI is to call attention to those plants that have identified primary systems leaks but have not corrected them in a timely manner.

The PI is intended to monitor leak-before-break situations that are viewed as precursors of a more catastrophic failure.  In the Brunswick event, RCS Total leakage had been steady for the month of March as shown below in Figure 3.   There was no advanced indications of degradation or leakage from the coupling and no trend that worsened over time due to operator inaction. 

As shown in Figure 3, RCS Leakage trends were stable and low in the Green performance band for the month leading up to the coupling failure.  The coupling failure occurred without warning.  Drywell leakage and temperature in the vicinity of the coupling did not increase prior to the failure.  There was no opportunity for Operations staff to identify this condition in advance of failure.  As no precursors were present, no mitigating actions could have been taken in advance of the leak and the actions taken following the leak indicate prompt and conservative response on the part of the licensee.  In addition, the location of the leak prevented it from being isolated until the plant was depressurized, which added to the volume of the leakage calculated in the PI.  Despite timely operator actions to accomplish this, the volume of leakage calculated in the PI resulted in one calculation data point exceeding the threshold for White.  The degradation mechanism of the coupling will be evaluated under other NRC processes.  

The leakage measured during the event should not be counted in the RCS Leakage PI because the operators exhibited the behaviors consistent with the intent of the performance indicator.  Operations took prompt action to conduct a safe and stable shutdown, minimizing the transient to the plant, in the interest of safety.  Including this leakage in the performance indicator and taking the actions associated with a White PI could have the unintended consequence of providing an incentive to licensees to depressurize the plant in a less controlled manner without a commensurate benefit to public health and safety.

A Root Cause Evaluation was initiated following the March 28, 2019.  The coupling that failed was a 1” Cryofit (cryogenic) coupling.   Cryofit couplings are devices used to connect small bore piping (1-inch nominal pipe size and less) without welding.  They are fabricated from a shape memory alloy (SMA) material composed primarily of Nickel-Titanium-Iron (Tinel) which experiences a phase change at cryogenic (extremely low) temperatures.  To prepare for installation, the Cryofit coupling is cooled below the transformation temperature.  The ends of the coupling are then expanded and the coupling is stored in the cold, expanded state.  The pipe ends are inserted into the coupling while it is cold.  The phase change causes the coupling to shrink as its temperature rises from its installation temperature of less than -200° F to ambient temperature and above.  This results in an interference fit that does not require welding.  This unique effect is produced by a phase transformation, i.e., an instantaneous shear transformation between the alloy’s body-centered cubic austenite phase and its highly twinned martensite phase.  These couplings had been installed at Brunswick for approximately 30 years.

Examination of the failed coupling was conducted at the McGuire Island Metallurgical lab.  Microhardness testing, visual microscopy and scanning electron microscopy were used to characterize the failed material.  Using metallurgical analysis and investigation of the process  
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conditions at the coupling location, the Root Cause Evaluation team determined that the failure was due to hydrogen embrittlement of the Tinel material.  This resulted from many years of exposure to high temperature and high levels of hydrogen.  This conclusion is supported by the transgranular cleavage, high hardness values in the region exposed to the process fluid, and a hydrogen rich environment, which are all consistent with hydrogen embrittlement.

An evaluation was performed to address the couplings installed in both units.  All couplings exposed to reactor steam (i.e., potentially susceptible) were removed and replaced with welded fittings prior to startup of Units 1 and 2.   In addition, the installation procedure for the couplings was placed on hold pending revision, to prevent any further installation of Cryofit couplings.  

RCS Leakage Data Collection:

The BNP Technical Specifications defines the frequency of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.4.1, RCS Operational Leakage, in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP).   The Brunswick SFCP has an 8-hour frequency for this SR.   This is consistent with NUREG-1433, Revision 4, General Electric BWR/4 Standard Technical Specifications, which lists an RCS Operational Leakage Surveillance Requirement frequency of 8 hours, or in accordance with the SFCP.  As a normal practice, Brunswick performs this surveillance every 4 hours in Modes 1 through 3 as a conservative approach to ensure the completeness of the required surveillance.  It was the last data point collected before entering Mode 4 that caused the PI to transition from Green to White.