Nation Wide Nuclear Industry Disgrace

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML14184B061

BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 and 2, and BYRON STATION, UNITS 1 and 2 - IMPOSITION OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT RE:  COMPLIANCE WITH LICENSING BASIS PLANT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (TAC NO. MF3206) 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
March 21, 2016
MEMORANDUM TO: Marissa G. Bailey, Acting Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
FROM:
SUBJECT: INPUT FOR EXELON BACKFIT REVIEW PANEL
In a memorandum to you dated January 12, 2016, William M. Dean tasked us to provide a recommendation on whether a backfit is necessary at Byron and Braidwood and whether the application of the compliance backfit was appropriate and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i). The Exelon Generation Company’s, LLC (EGC) appeal to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was dated December 8, 2015. The NRC backfit was imposed in a letter dated October 9, 2015, which stated that the Byron and Braidwood Stations were not in compliance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 15, GDC 21, GDC 29, 10 CFR 50.34(b), and the plant-specific design bases. The backlit documents two primary issues with the licensee’s analyses: (1) failure to evaluate a stuck open Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV), and (2) failure to properly qualify the Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV) for water relief.
After reviewing the assessment provided by Mr. Gendelman, Office of General Counsel, I concur that the staff implemented the backfit appropriately in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) and NRC Management Directive 8.4. However, my assessment is that the backfit was not implemented appropriately in accordance with NRR Office Instruction LIC-202, Revision 2. Specifically, I suggest that the use of a plant-specific backfit may not be the most appropriate method for addressing the generic nature of the technical issues associated with this event. NRR 01 LIC-202, Section 1 states, ‘a backfit is plant-specific when it involves the imposition of a position that is unique to a particular plant,” in the case of Byron and Braidwood, I believe the issues communicated in the backfit are not unique to these plants.
Following the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC ordered licensees to implement numerous changes to their facilities and operating procedures. Some of these changes were focused on improving the PORV and block valve reliability, supplying Class 1 E power to the PORV and block valve, and to have position indication in the control room. NUREG-1316, “Technical Findings and Regulatory Analysis Related to Generic Issue 70,” concluded that it was not cost effective to upgrade (backfit) existing non-safety-grade PORVs and block valves (and associated control systems) to full safety-grade qualification status when they have been determined to perform any of the safety-related functions discussed in the NUREG or any identified in the future.
CONTACT: Anthony I. Gody, DRS 404 997-4600
M. Bailey 2
In Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-29, Revision 1, the staff reiterated the NRC position that Condition II events are not allowed to progress to Condition Ill or IV events and indicated that PSVs and PORVs (and associated block valves) are not safety-related or qualified for water relief.
Arguably, if these components are relied upon to satisfy a Chapter 15 accident analysis, they are required to be both safety-related and qualified to accomplish the intended safety function (See 10 CER, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 1 and 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B). In 1993 and 1994, Westinghouse addressed a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL-93013 and NSAL-93-013 Supplement 1)to many pressurized water reactor licensees. In these NSALs, Westinghouse advised licensees that their pressurizer could fill much faster than anticipated during an increase in reactor coolant inventory event and recommended that they employ a strategy that used PORVs and associated block valves in their procedures.
I reviewed 10 UFSARs and developed a brief summary of the various strategies used by licensees in addressing the increased reactor coolant inventory event. The quick review identified a wide range of strategies that were accepted by the NRC. The review identified some interesting facts as follows: two licensees rely solely on the PSVs being capable of opening and reseating due to water temperature above 500 degrees F (no supporting analyses is referenced for this conclusion), four licensees rely on a PORV and its block valve in their strategy but do not appear to address whether PORV/block valve are safety-related and qualified to operate in water blowdown conditions, two licensees directly reference the same Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) test reports that Byron and Braidwood referenced as part of their mitigation strategy. Furthermore, licensees have implemented procedures to address high pressurizer level or inadvertent actuation of emergency core cooling (ECCS) events that employ the following strategy: assess the event, determining whether the ECCS actuation is appropriate, secure excess injection, re-establishing containment air and letdown, and control either pressurizer level with charging/letdown or reactor pressure with PORVs if solid. At least one licensee successfully avoided having to address the technical issues of the PSV and PORV passing water altogether with the statement that they can terminate a reactor coolant system overfill event before the pressurizer fills solid. One extreme example of this strategy approved by the NRC indicated that emergency core cooling system would be terminated as fast as 14 minutes. Most licensees rely on the PORV and block valve cycling (I think in automatic), preventing the reactor coolant system pressure rising above the PSV set point, while operators assess and terminate the overfill situation. One licensee documents that the PORV would cycle 88 times before injection could be stopped, it appears the PORV is in automatic during this operation.
In conclusion, the staff imposition of a plant-specific backfit to Byron and Braidwood was in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) and NRC Management Directive 8.4. However, my assessment is that the backfit was not implemented appropriately in accordance with NRR Office Instruction LIC-202, Revision 2. Specifically, I suggest that the use of a plant-specific backfit may not be the most appropriate method for addressing the generic nature of the technical issues associated with this event. NRR 01 LIC-202, Section 1 states, “a backfit is plant-specific when it involves the imposition of a position that is unique to a particular plant,” in the case of Byron and Braidwood, I believe the issues communicated in the backfit are not unique to a particular plant. My recommendation is that the staff consider implementing the NRC MD 6.4 process to revisit GSI-70, decide if the issues identified in the Byron and Braidwood backfit are indeed generic, and, if so, initiate actions to issue a generic backfit for this issue and begin an interaction with the nuclear industry using the NRC Principles of Good Regulation.
M. Bailey 3
The transparent use of risk insights in developing strategy and timeline for addressing this issue would be appropriate. NRC and industry should recognize the need to develop a predictable and reliable strategy to address increased reactor coolant inventory events that credits both operator and automatic actions with fully validated procedures; qualified systems, structures, and components; appropriate analyses; and consistent documentation.
cc: Adam S. Gendleman
Enclosure: Increase in reactor coolant system inventory event strategy summary

Entergy Nuke Plant Falling Like Dominos In the South: Waterford

Man, have there been a lot of Turbine trips recently. So Waterford and Grand Gulf have scrammed in recent days and River Bend after a really prolonged outage, seems to be stuck at 87%. 

Power Reactor	Event Number: 54068
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4     State: LA Unit: [3] [] [] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: MARIA ZAMBER HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	Notification Date: 05/16/2019 Notification Time: 18:07 [ET] Event Date: 05/16/2019 Event Time: 13:48 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/16/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DAVID PROULX (R4DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

3

A/R

Y

100

Power Operation

0

Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. "On May 16, 2019, at 1348 CDT, Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Steam Generator number 1 high level, which was the result of a Main Turbine trip and subsequent reactor power cutback which had occurred at 1345 CDT. The cause of the Main Turbine trip is currently under investigation. "Subsequent to the Reactor trip, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves number 1 and number 2 closed on high Steam Generator levels. Emergency Feedwater automatically actuated for Steam Generator number 2 at 1419 CDT and Steam Generator number 1 at 1425 CDT. Main Feedwater was restored to both Steam Generators by 1629 CDT. "The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and is in the process of transitioning to the normal operating shutdown procedure. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed through the main condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

Palo Verde Is Going to Hell

They have no idea what is causing the drain valve leakage...what is broken in the valve. This safety philosophy is chilling, tightening down on a valve as hard as the manufacture allows, it slows the leak but doesn't not stop it. It is disgraceful maintaining and capacity factor above safety. 

Right, they are supposed to keep these valves in good condition throughout the cycle. They probably use this valve a lot. A some point you need to use maintenance judgement to replace the valve or components before it leaks. If it leaks midcycle, then you force them to shutdown and replace the valve. You incentivized them to repair their components before the plants return to power. This kind of incentives begs them to have multiple degraded safety known degraded safety components in the plant at one time. You don't want two or more broken components to show up in one accident or heard trip. It might confuse the operators.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53968
Facility: PALO VERDE Region: 4     State: AZ Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: GEORGE LESTER HQ OPS Officer: CATY NOLAN	Notification Date: 04/01/2019 Notification Time: 06:40 [ET] Event Date: 03/31/2019 Event Time: 20:06 [MST] Last Update Date: 05/15/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

1

N

Y

100

Power Operation

100

Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO ECCS LEAKAGE "At 2006 [MST], on 3/31/2019, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Shift Manager was informed that leakage was measured from the Train A Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at approximately 100 ml/minute through a High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) A drain valve. This value exceeds the assumed 3000 ml/hour ECCS leakage for a large break loss of coolant accident analysis. At 0230 [MST] on April 1, 2019, the valve was flushed and the leakage reduced to 10 ml/minute (600 ml/hour) and was no longer above the limit of the safety analysis. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)3)(ii)(B) and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to the control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). This event did not result in an abnormal release of radioactive material. "Notification received by Caty Nolan and emailed to HOO.HOC@NRC.GOV The NRC asked a followup question: Why was the criterion for Control of Radioactive Material selected? per the PVNGS Unit 1 Shift Manager, this criterion was selected due to the potential of exceeding offsite dose projections, post recirculation, following a Design Basis Accident." The resident inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE ON 05/15/19 AT 1417 EDT FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO BETHANY CECERE * * * "An engineering evaluation concluded that the as-found ECCS leakage would not have degraded the performance of the Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup system; therefore, it remained operable. "The evaluation also concluded that the as-found leakage was within the analysis margins for HPSI pump hydraulic performance and containment flood level following a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident; therefore, the ECCS also remained operable. "Based on the above information, the condition identified on March 31, 2019, was an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), but did not prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). "The NRC resident inspectors have been informed." Notified R4DO (Proulx).

River Bend Finally Back After Prolonged Shutdown

Update May 17

Still at 87% power.

***Got up to 94% power yesterday, now at 87%? Least they didn't trip yet?

?

Junk Plant Grand Gulf too Frequent Scrams

This doesn't look like a easy trip.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 54062
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4     State: MS Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: GERRY ELLIS HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED	Notification Date: 05/12/2019 Notification Time: 15:28 [ET] Event Date: 05/12/2019 Event Time: 10:39 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/12/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

1

M/R

Y

75

Power Operation

0

Hot Shutdown

Event Text

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF SERVICE WATER "At 1039 CDT the reactor was manually [scrammed] due to a partial loss of plant service water. The loss of plant service water was caused by a loss of [balance of plant] BOP transformer 23. Reactor power was reduced in an attempt to restore pressure to plant service water. Reactor level is being maintained with condensate and feedwater. Reactor pressure is being maintained with bypass control valves. Standby Service Water A and B were manually initiated to supply cooling to Control Room A/C and [Engineered Safety Feature] ESF switchgear room coolers. The cause is under investigation. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical and also reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as any event or condition that results in actuation of RPS and Standby Service Water." The plant is currently in a normal electrical lineup. * * * UPDATE ON 5/12/19 AT 1846 EDT FROM GERRY ELLIS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * * "This is an update to the original notification. "The Drywell and Containment exceeded the technical specification (TS) temperature limits of 135 degrees F [TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.6.5.5] and 95 degrees F [TS LCO 3.6.1.5], respectively. "An 8-hour notification is being added for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)." Notified R4DO (Alexander).

NRC Industy Lying Politicans

The nuclear industry is attacking the federal regulators in so many ways and politicians like this are nothing but liars.

OPENING STATEMENT

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY20 BUDGET

ENERGY & WATER APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019 - 2:30PM

The Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development will please come to order.

Today’s hearing will review the administration’s fiscal year 2020 budget request for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This is the last of the Subcommittee's four budget hearings this year. In April, we heard from the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation about their funding requests. 

Senator Feinstein and I will each have an opening statement.

I will then recognize each Senator for up to five minutes for an opening statement, alternating between the majority and minority, in the order in which they arrived. 

We will then turn to Chairman Kristine Svinicki to present testimony on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

At the conclusion of Chairman Svinicki’s testimony, I will then recognize Senators for five minutes of questions each, alternating between the majority and minority in the order in which they arrived. 

We run a real risk of losing our best source of carbon-free power just at a time when most Americans are increasingly worried about climate change. Nuclear power must be part of our energy future if we want clean, cheap, and reliable energy that can create good jobs and keep America competitive in a global economy.

Today 98 nuclear reactors provide about 20 percent of electricity in the United States, and 60 percent of all carbon-free electricity in the United States.

But nuclear plants are closing because they cost too much to build and cannot compete with natural gas. 

Two reactors have announced they will retire later this year, and ten more have announced retirements by 2025.

Let’s do a little math here. If we closed those 12 reactors, that would mean a 17 percent decline in carbon-free nuclear power by 2025, which is 10 percent of carbon-free electricity.

The deal here is these are ancient and obsolete plants. They are increasingly being non completive and the future is bleak.

Today, solar power – despite impressive reductions in cost – provides 4 percent and wind provides 20 percent of carbon-free electricity despite billions of dollars in subsidies. 

Nuclear power is much more reliable than solar or wind power. It is available when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.

The bottom line is, we can’t replace nuclear power with just wind and solar. We would have to use natural gas to replace nuclear power, which would increase emissions in our country.

Unfortunately, we do not need to speculate about what happens when a major industrialized country eliminates nuclear power. We have seen what happened in Japan

Well the Japan nuclear industry melt down down three nuclear plants...that is the reason for the high cost of electricity. They had about fifty nuclear plants. Only some 6 nuclear plants are fit to safe and operarting today.

and Germany for different reasons. Major industrialized economies similar to ours lost their emission-free, low-cost, reliable electricity. Prices went up, pollution went up, and manufacturing became less competitive in the global marketplace. And that is where we are headed in the next 10 years if we do not do something. Stakes are high.

In Japan, the cost of generating electricity increased 56 percent after the Fukushima accident in 2011 when Japan went from obtaining 30 percent of its power from nuclear to less than 2 percent.

Before 2011, Germany obtained one quarter of its electricity from nuclear. Now that number is down to 12 percent.  Now Germany has among the highest household electricity rates in the European Union after replacing nuclear power with wind and solar as part of an expensive cap-and-trade policy.

Germany also had to build new coal plants to meet demand, which increased emissions.

In late March, I proposed that the United States should launch a New Manhattan Project for Clean Energy, a five-year project with Ten Grand Challenges that will use American research and technology to put our country and the world firmly on a path toward cleaner, cheaper energy.

These Grand Challenges call for breakthroughs in advanced nuclear reactors, natural gas, carbon capture, better batteries, greener buildings, electric vehicles, cheaper solar, and fusion.

I put advanced reactors first on the list for a reason. To make sure nuclear power has a future in this country, we need to develop advanced reactors that have the potential to be smaller, cost less, produce less waste, and be safer than today’s reactors.

We need to stop talking about advanced reactors and actually build something. Within the next five years, we need to build one or more advanced reactors to demonstrate the capabilities they may bring.

As we review the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s fiscal year 2020 budget request we need to make sure the Commission has the staff and resources it needs to respond to the changing industry.

First, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today, and also Senator Feinstein, with whom I have the pleasure to work again this year to draft the Energy and Water Appropriations bill. 

NRC Commissioner Burns Resigns Early?

The Russians Have Come Back

Back six months ago, I was getting a lot of traffic from the Russians going back for many years. I wonder what where they are up? I am more popular in Russia than I am in the USA :)

Hinsdale, NH

Two years ago, a Brazilian gang arrived in Massachusetts: Here are some of the robberies, kidnappings authorities say the gang committed

Defective Power Operated Relief Valve At The Vogle Build

Here comes the role out of all the defective new equipment.

Defective power operated relief valve

By letter dated August 10, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18222A599), revised October 11, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18284A447), and supplemented February 15, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19046A172), the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) amend Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Combined License (COL) Numbers NPF-91 and NPF-92, respectively.  License Amendment Request (LAR) 18-021 seeks departures from the generic AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD) Tier 1 in the VEGP COL plant-specific DCD (PS-DCD) with corresponding changes to the associated COL Appendix C, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to relocate the power operated relief valve (PORV) branch lines upstream of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) in the main steam (MS) lines.  In addition to the relocation of the PORV branch lines, the LAR seeks to change the PORV block valves from gate valves to globe valves in the UFSAR.  Specifically, this amendment results in changes to COL Appendix C (plant-specific Tier 1) Figure 2.2.1-1 and Figure 2.2.4-1 (Sheets 1 and 2), and UFSAR Figure 10.3.2-1 (Sheets 1 and 2), UFSAR Figure 3E-1 (Sheets 1 and 2), UFSAR Table 3.9-16, UFSAR Table 6.2.3-1, and UFSAR Table 10.3.3-1.  These changes are sought by SNC to reduce the noise contribution to the main control room (MCR) and improve human factors when the PORVs are in operation.
 

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
 SNC summarized the proposed changes to plant-specific Tier 1 (and COL Appendix C) and the UFSAR related to relocating the PORV branch lines upstream of the MSSV branch connections, and changing the PORV block valves from gate valves to globe valves, as follows:

• COL Appendix C (plant-specific Tier 1) Figure 2.2.1-1 and Figure 2.2.4-1 (Sheets 1 and 2) are revised to move the PORV branch line upstream of the MSSVs. • UFSAR Table 3.9-16, Table 10.3.3-1, Figure 10.3.2-1 (Sheets 1 and 2), and Figure 3E-1 (Sheets 1 and 2) are revised to change the MS line PORV block valves (SGS-PL-V027A/B) from gate valves to globe valves, to relocate the branch lines to the PORV and PORV block valve to upstream of the MSSVs, to resize the line from 6 to 12 inches, and to remove the reducer from downstream of the PORV block valve. • UFSAR Table 6.2.3-1 is revised to change the pipe length from each containment penetration to valves SGS-PL-V027A and SGS-PL-V027B to 26 feet. • Technical Specifications (TS) Bases B 3.7.102 is revised to remove the size of the branch line in which the PORV is installed.
 The staff considered the following regulatory requirements in reviewing the LAR that included the proposed changes:

                                               
 1 While SNC describes the requested exemption as being from Section III.B of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, the entirety of the exemption pertains to proposed departures from Tier 1 information in the PS-DCD.  In the remainder of this evaluation, the NRC will refer to the exemption as an exemption from Tier 1 information to match the language of Section VIII.A.4 of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, which specifically governs the granting of exemptions from Tier 1 information. 2 The staff notes that changes to TS Bases are not required to be reviewed and approved by the staff but are mentioned here for completeness.
-3-
Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4, to 10 CFR Part 52 states that exemptions from Tier 1 information are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and 10 CFR 52.98(f).  It also states that the Commission will deny such a request if it finds that the design change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design.
 Appendix D, Section VIII.B.5.a, allows an applicant or licensee who references this appendix to depart from Tier 2 information, without prior NRC approval, unless the proposed departure involves a change to or departure from Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the TS, or requires a license amendment under paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c of the section.
 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and standards,” incorporates by reference the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPV Code), and ASME Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, Division 1, OM Code:  Section IST (ASME OM Code), including specific editions, addenda, and codes cases, for the design, inservice inspection, and inservice testing of nuclear power plant components.  As guidance, the NRC endorses ASME Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.” 
 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) allows the licensee who references a design certification rule to request NRC approval for an exemption from one or more elements of the certification information.  The Commission may only grant such a request if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.7, which, in turn, points to the requirements listed in 10 CFR 50.12 for specific exemptions.  In addition to the factors listed in 10 CFR 52.7, the Commission shall consider whether the special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption.  Therefore, any exemption from the Tier 1 information certified by Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, 52.7, and 52.63(b)(1). 
 10 CFR 52.98(f) requires NRC approval for any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a COL.  These activities involve a change to COL Appendix C inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) information, with corresponding changes to the associated PS-DCD Tier 1 information.  Therefore, NRC approval is required prior to making the plant specific proposed changes in this LAR.
 The specific NRC technical requirements applicable to LAR 18-021 are the general design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50.  These technical requirements include the following GDC:
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, “Quality standards and records,” requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed.  A quality assurance program shall be established and implemented to provide adequate assurance that these SSCs will satisfactorily perform their safety functions.  Appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, and testing of SSCs important to safety shall be maintained by or under the control of the nuclear power unit licensee throughout the life of the unit.  
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,” requires that SSCs important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects
-4-
of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, “Environmental and dynamic effects design bases,” requires that nuclear power plant SSCs important to safety be designed to accommodate the effects of, and be compatible with, environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents.  These SSCs shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.  However, dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures in nuclear power units may be excluded from the design basis when analyses reviewed and approved by the Commission demonstrate that the probability of fluid system piping rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping.
 3.0  TECHNICAL EVALUATION
 VEGP Units 3 and 4 COL, Appendix C, Subsection 2.2.4, contains ITAAC for the steam generator system (SGS).  COL Appendix C, Figure 2.2.4-1 shows the SGS piping from the steam generators (SGs) through the auxiliary building and depicts the PORV as located downstream of the MSSVs.  During plant operations, the PORVs are automatically controlled by steam line pressure, and modulate open and exhaust to the atmosphere whenever the steam line pressure exceeds an established setpoint.  When needed for plant cooldown, the PORVs are automatically controlled by steam line pressure with remote manual adjustment of the pressure setpoint from the control room or remote shutdown workstation.  To cool down the plant, the reactor operator manually adjusts the pressure setpoint downward in discrete steps or takes manual control of the valve position.  Each PORV is installed in a branch line off the safety-related portion of the MS line upstream of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV).  The PORV block valves perform the safety-related functions of containment isolation, SG isolation, and SG relief isolation.  The PORV block valves also provide the capability to isolate a leaking or stuck-open PORV.  The PORV block valves are AP1000 Safety Class B, and close automatically on a Low-2 steam line pressure signal generated in the Protection and Safety Monitoring System.  
 To reduce noise due to acoustic resonance, SNC proposes in LAR 18-021 to increase the size of the PORV block valves from 6 inches to 12 inches in diameter.  SNC also proposes to increase the branch line in which each PORV block valve is installed from 6 inches to 12 inches.  These changes will reduce the flow velocity in the PORV branch lines.  In addition, SNC proposes to change the PORV block valve type from a gate valve to a globe valve to mitigate the potential for a Helmholtz or standing wave source developing in the valve body or seat.  The globe valve will be qualified for the same environmental, pressure, and temperature conditions as the current valve type.  Due to layout constraints, SNC proposes to move the location of the branch line for PORV block valves upstream of the MSSV branch connections.
 3.1 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE REQUESTED CHANGES
 The staff conducted a regulatory audit from November 5, 2018, to January 31, 2019, to review applicable documents provided by SNC in its electronic reading room (eRR) in support of the proposed changes described in LAR 18-021.  As part of that audit, the staff conducted telephone conferences with SNC to clarify information in specific documents.  The staff’

Brattleboro Reformer Newsroom

Inside the Shrinking Newsroom of the Paper that Shapes the primaries  

The great media disruption comes for the Des Moines Register.

By TIM ALBERTA

April 26, 2019 Continue to article content

Tim Alberta is chief political correspondent at Politico Magazine.

Tony Leys is a newspaperman. He has covered murders. He has worked the copy desk. He has knocked on doors and taken verbal battering. Most reporters evolve to become editors, but Leys, bored behind a desk 20 years ago, did the opposite. After spending much of his career assigning stories—as city editor, state editor, politics editor—he returned to writing them. His beat became health care, and he owned it, reporting with soul-wringing realism on the flaws of the American medical apparatus. He has won numerous awards, including two years ago for reporting on the impact of Medicaid privatization, as told through the eyes of poor, suffering patients, and last year for authoring a stellar package of Sunday print edition stories about mental health.

There will be no such series this year. Not because Leys has lost his job, but because he’s being reassigned—sort of. He’ll continue to cover health-related stories. But for the next 10 months, his priority will be covering presidential politics. Leys is used to this. It happens every four years. Because this is Iowa. Because this is the Des Moines Register.

Since the dawn of the modern nominating process, no single event has done more to winnow the field of aspiring presidents than the Iowa caucuses—and no single publication has done more to capture its characters, narratives and rhythms than the Register. But the scythe of technological change and economic pressure that is killing the news industry, and especially local journalism, is coming for Iowa’s paper of record, too. There are fewer and fewer political gatekeepers like the Register these days: influential publications staffed by reporters who live among the voters they cover, understanding their lifestyles and livelihoods in ways that can’t be mimicked by their peers parachuting in from Washington or New York or Los Angeles.

It’s almost impossible to imagine the first-in-the-nation nominating contest without Iowa’s biggest newspaper. Its editorial endorsements are national news. Its front-page stories, on subjects ranging from politics to agriculture policy, demand attention from every campaign. And its celebrated statewide survey—“The Iowa Poll,” a Register tradition since 1943—is met with nearly as much anticipation and external media hype in the political world as the caucus results themselves. “When I land at DSM,” says Jonathan Martin, national political reporter for the New York Times, “the first thing I do is pick up the Register.”

When Leys was first asked to “pinch-hit” during the 2004 cycle—filling in for political reporters, when asked, to write about Democratic candidates—he was thrilled. Any journalist who comes to Iowa pines to cover the caucuses, and Leys, who had been with the Register since 1988, was finally getting his shot. He felt fortunate whenever called upon, unsure how often the opportunity would present itself. The next time around, however, in 2008, Leys was pulled into political coverage more frequently. Then, in 2012, he became something of a hybrid, devoting nearly as much time to reporting on elections as he did health care. By the 2016 cycle, Leys was a full-time political correspondent, finding time to cover his regular beat when the presidential churn paused or when a major health-related story demanded it.

When Tony Leys, above, was first asked to help with caucus coverage, he was only called on to pinch-hit occasionally. Today, he is one of several reporters at the Des Moines Register who covers a regular non-election beat and moonlights as a political correspondent. | KC McGinnis for Politico Magazine

Today, with the 2020 Democratic caucuses already in full swing—20 declared candidates marauding across the state, and several more soon to join them—Leys can only chuckle at the quaintness of those old days. Fourteen reporters at the Register are currently assigned to Democratic candidates, responsible for tracking their every move and covering their every stop in the state, but only three of them are practiced political journalists. The paper’s business reporter is covering Bernie Sanders; its agriculture reporter is responsible for keeping tabs on not-yet-declared Montana Governor Steve Bullock; its metro reporter is assigned to the long-shot Maryland Congressman John Delaney, who has all but lived in Iowa for the past two years...