Palo Verde Is Going to Hell

They have no idea what is causing the drain valve leakage...what is broken in the valve. This safety philosophy is chilling, tightening down on a valve as hard as the manufacture allows, it slows the leak but doesn't not stop it. It is disgraceful maintaining and capacity factor above safety. 

Right, they are supposed to keep these valves in good condition throughout the cycle. They probably use this valve a lot. A some point you need to use maintenance judgement to replace the valve or components before it leaks. If it leaks midcycle, then you force them to shutdown and replace the valve. You incentivized them to repair their components before the plants return to power. This kind of incentives begs them to have multiple degraded safety known degraded safety components in the plant at one time. You don't want two or more broken components to show up in one accident or heard trip. It might confuse the operators.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53968
Facility: PALO VERDE Region: 4     State: AZ Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: GEORGE LESTER HQ OPS Officer: CATY NOLAN	Notification Date: 04/01/2019 Notification Time: 06:40 [ET] Event Date: 03/31/2019 Event Time: 20:06 [MST] Last Update Date: 05/15/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

1

N

Y

100

Power Operation

100

Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO ECCS LEAKAGE "At 2006 [MST], on 3/31/2019, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Shift Manager was informed that leakage was measured from the Train A Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at approximately 100 ml/minute through a High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) A drain valve. This value exceeds the assumed 3000 ml/hour ECCS leakage for a large break loss of coolant accident analysis. At 0230 [MST] on April 1, 2019, the valve was flushed and the leakage reduced to 10 ml/minute (600 ml/hour) and was no longer above the limit of the safety analysis. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)3)(ii)(B) and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to the control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). This event did not result in an abnormal release of radioactive material. "Notification received by Caty Nolan and emailed to HOO.HOC@NRC.GOV The NRC asked a followup question: Why was the criterion for Control of Radioactive Material selected? per the PVNGS Unit 1 Shift Manager, this criterion was selected due to the potential of exceeding offsite dose projections, post recirculation, following a Design Basis Accident." The resident inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE ON 05/15/19 AT 1417 EDT FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO BETHANY CECERE * * * "An engineering evaluation concluded that the as-found ECCS leakage would not have degraded the performance of the Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup system; therefore, it remained operable. "The evaluation also concluded that the as-found leakage was within the analysis margins for HPSI pump hydraulic performance and containment flood level following a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident; therefore, the ECCS also remained operable. "Based on the above information, the condition identified on March 31, 2019, was an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), but did not prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). "The NRC resident inspectors have been informed." Notified R4DO (Proulx).