My Indian Point Nuclear Plant Problem: Huge Plant Design Flaw

Update 11/16: 

Hey, amazing timing.

Cuomo administration to NRC: Shut down Indian Point
 

By Casey Seiler, Capitol bureau chief

November 16, 2015 at 3:47 PM

Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s Director of State Operations Jim Malatras on Monday penned a letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission calling for it to deny Entergy a new license to operate the Indian Point nuclear plant.

 “To be blunt, Entergy’s aging management plan is woefully inadequate,” Malatras wrote, pointing to aging infrastructure and recent “unplanned shutdowns.” Cuomo has long opposed the relicensing of the plant, due to its age as well as the unique security risks associated with its proximity to New York City and its northern suburbs.

Gov. Andrew Cuomo speaks to reporters near the main entrance of the Indian Point nuclear power plant in Buchanan, N.Y. on Saturday, May 9, 2015, following a transformer fire. (Craig Ruttle, AP)

“Allowing Entergy to operate these facilities for another 20 years puts the lives of too many New Yorkers at risk and cannot be justified by Entergy’s present plan to address these defects,” Malatras writes.

The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will hold an evidentiary hearing this week on Entergy’s application.

Entergy is expected to make the case that Indian Point is both safe and a necessary component of New York’s power supply system.

First published on Nov 15. Republished 

Why does the NRC treat Point Beach diesel generator postulated flooding as the severing of the eight inch fire water fire water piping, while the NRC at Indian Point uses only the piping on the deluge valve small bore automatic drain valve piping. It is similar to the small bore piping with the service water relief. The magnitude of the differences is some 50 grm versus 4300 gpm. 

“Near Street New” The Department of State in New York is attempting to block the relicensing application for the Indian Point generating station 24 miles north of New York City on grounds that it is harmful to the fish habitat of the Hudson River and a threat to the city's population. 

About 17 million people live within a 50-mile radius of the plant. The state says that it would be impossible to evacuate the area in the event of an accident, which is a risk given the seismic fault lines near the plant. 

The state also says this threatens the New Croton Reservoir, a major source of drinking water for millions of people. In addition, the plant kills billions of fish larvae each year, drawing 2.5 million gallons each day for cooling. A major estuary region downstream is affected, the state claims.”

It just might come down to keeping a fire water main pressurized to fight a fire or shutting down the fire main in order to not drive the plant into a station blackout by flooding out the safety 480 volt switchgear room. 

On the far side of the switchgear room is another door. It opens to one of two diesel generators. I think IP 3 has two diesel generators. Surprisingly the next leak in the deluge room threatening the safety switchgear buses, the NRC is allowing Indian Point to open up diesel generator room door such that the flooding switchgear room water drains into the diesel generator sump. Seems it has a larger sump pump.

“The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel will hold a hearing next week to gather information on whether Indian Point is ready to handle safety-related challenges for the next 20 years. 

Entergy Corp., which owns and operates the Indian Point nuclear power plant in Buchanan, is seeking to extend licenses for its two reactors for 20 more years.
The panel's three administrative judges will ask questions to experts representing groups — including the state and Riverkeeper — who have raised safety concerns over license renewals because of Indian Point's aging facilities. 

A similar hearing was held at the same location in the fall of 2012, when the panel listened to concerns over both safety and environment. The upcoming hearing will focus on the remaining safety concerns, according to Diane Screnci, spokesman for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the panel's parent organization. 

"This is a very important part of the process," Screnci said of the hearing. "The license renewal process has the NRC staff look at whether there are safety issues, whether there are environmental issues that should preclude the issuance of licenses."”

Obviously Indian Point has large defective design problem. Check out how much this design vulnerability eats up precious and limited on shift human capital.    

RidsNrrPMIndianPoint.Resource@nrc.gov   

Nov 14 at 11:14 AM

 

Mr. Pickett,

In Indian Point unit 3, why didn’t the NRC assume the safety switchgear largest postulated internet flood was the preverbal Point Beach 8-inch fire water pipe leak?  Why is Indian Point’s largest postulated fire water delude valve automatic drain valve piping diameter or the largest diameter service water relief valve leak the smallest possible diameter pipe in the systems? The magnitude of these leak differences are tremendous (50 gpm versus 4100 gpm).

It sounds like fraud to me in Indian Point.

Hmm, doesn’t say if the PB 8” fire water pipe is seismic? 

 

Doesn't the probability of an accident in "one in a million years" at Indian Point sound like the pre Fukushima mentality all over Japan before their accident?  

Please place both my e-mails to you on the docket.

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2015003; 05000301/2015003

Description: During the inspectors’ review of Prompt Operability Determination (POD) 02044783, “Reduced Available Operator Response Time For DGB Flood,” Revision 1, they found that the licensee had previously identified an error in POD 02044783, Revision 0, which had failed to identify all affected SSCs for a postulated 8-inch fire water pipe leak. The DGB contains predominately Train B emergency power systems; however…

Specifically, when the licensee identified that internal flood sources in the diesel generator building (DGB) were larger than the drain capacity, they failed to identify all affected SSCs.

****To: RidsNrrPMIndianPoint.Resource@nrc.gov

Nov 13 at 11:20 AM

Mr. Pickett,

You and me got back a long way. Them god damn SRVs.  As does Mrs. Rich. The good old VY days.

I talked to Mrs. Rich yesterday about the large service water and fire water pipe being able to knock out the safety switchgear room spoken to in the transformer special inspection. It sounds like both safety bus divs are in the switchgear room. Sarah says the NRC considers a large pipe taking out both safety divs are too improbable to worry about. So this is a threat that can take out both safety buses, as spoken about with the water level getting too high in the switchgear room, it could drive the plant into a SBO.

Personally I think Indian Point and the NRC has been misinterpreting NRC regulations over this for decades. And it is not innocence either. 

The terms we are talking about is not a 50 gpm flood, but a 4100 gpm… 

I basically believe Indian Point is prohibited from having a piping system threatening both divisions of the safety bus. The accident is basically the largest diameter piping gpm, such as the fire water piping and the service water pipe in the vicinity.

Based on the probability of the large pipes breaks that have occurred in the industry with the fire water system and service water piping to date, the failure mechanisms,  the risk calculation of “1 in a million years” is utterly ridiculous.   

“Scenario B, resulted in a change in core damage frequency of low E-8 per reactor year (an increase in 1 in 100 million reactor years).”

The fire water and service water piping needs to be removed from the area or the switchgear room or needs to be water proofed such that a postulated internal or external flooding event never threatens both safety buses at the same time.  

We are all aware of the contentions in this facility. 

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

1-603-209-4206

End of Daylight Savings in Brattleboro: Pedestrian Slaughter On Their Roads

Updated 11/16

Honestly, is this the great New York Times newspaper? How can they be such idiots. We are losing minutes of daylight at the greatest rate of the year on a day to day bases. And then we got to the end of daylight saving.

 

If you count back 16 days, what significant event occurred around Nov 1 you idiot. How about the end of daylight savings.

 

In our studies in Brattleboro 2013, we discovered the greatest risk when most of the accidents happened was about from 6 pm to 9 pm. I blame it on our slow adaption to fewer daylight hours and not adequate reflective gear. We didn't have such rates in the morning, many of ours were the elderly. Maybe eye issues or drunk. So the amount of people walking on and near our roads and a high disabled and elderly population walking in that period between 6-9 pm.

Marchers Warn of Safety Crisis Amid Spate of Pedestrian Deaths in New York 

By TATIANA SCHLOSSBERGNOV. 15, 2015

But the staggering number of deaths from traffic collisions in the last 16 days remains.

First posted on Nov 7, 2015 Reposted

***Is this the beginning?

2013:Western Ave Pedestrian deaths

Was it last year on High street and Western ave where they had all those car pedestrian fatalities.

Pedestrian struck by car in Brattleboro Thursday

Posted: Saturday, November 7, 2015 8:00 am

Pedestrian struck by car in Brattleboro Thursday By Matt Nanci Sentinel Staff SentinelSource.com 

BRATTLEBORO — A pedestrian was taken to Brattleboro Memorial Hospital with non life-threatening injuries after being struck by a car Thursday, police said. 

The collision happened at the intersection of Canal and Elm streets, according to a news release from Brattleboro police. 

The driver of the car was found to be unimpaired and is still being investigated, police said. 

Additional information was unavailable from Brattleboro police Friday.

Stupider Than Rocks at Beaver Valley Nuclear Plant (FirstEnergy)

"I am trying to save a company"?

Musical Chairs FirstEnergy's "I am trying to save a company" CEO Chuck Jones is basically saying I think bankruptcy is right around the corner. 

The trajectory the company now is in we end in bankruptcy. 

How can this be good for their nukes?

Is the absolute stupidity with repetitive component failures really insufficient budgets. Is the lack of money making the nuclear plant staff look stupid beyond belief... 

Basically they talked themselves into it's safe to operate a large electric motor with the oil level barely visible in the sightglass. 

There has been repetitive and notable big events at this plant in recent years. These guys are struggling and have gotten behind the eight ball…

Just out how these electric utility CEOs are making millions of dollar in salaries just recklessly jumping into one speculative pipe dream after another. I always thought preparing for deregulation and the resultant budget cutting cause the Davis Besse near disaster. Davis Besse hole in the head came in early 2002. 

Deregulation. Consumer choice. Restructuring. No matter what you call it, the 4.8 million customers of Ohio’s largest electric utilities have been free to pick their power supplier since 2001.

The euphemism of re-regulation here is stranded assets. Going into deregulation they thought it would make the nukes worthless. So they allowed utilities to write off the value of the nuke plant...make the ratepayer pay for their mistakes. You get it, now because natural gas is so cheap, they want to re-regulate. Effectively stranded assets the coal and nuclear plants again. I mean, how many times can they stranded asset a nuclear plant.        

FirstEnergy wants Ohio to end deregulation, return to state-controlled rates

By John Funk, The Plain Dealer

The Plain Dealer
Posted on July 28, 2015 at 5:11 PM, updated July 29, 2015 at 2:27 PM

Sammis is FirstEnergy's last Ohio coal-fired plant and its closing could force the company to build more long-distance transmission lines -- paid for by customers -- to bring power here from Pennsylvania and other states. Associated Press fil

AKRON -- FirstEnergy Corp. wants Ohio to re-regulate the electric utility industry, hoping to end an era the company itself fought for just seven years ago, in which electricity rates were set by wholesale markets without interference from the state.

"I would do it in a heartbeat," said Chuck Jones, CEO since January, in an interview with The Plain Dealer's editorial board. "I think it makes sense. I am trying to save a company."

Jones said FirstEnergy's future is at risk if it cannot convince the state's Public Utilities Commission to force ratepayers to cover the full cost of electricity from two of its huge coal and nuclear plants, even if other sources of electricity, such as natural gas, would be cheaper for consumers.

At the time of the last big battle over deregulation, in 2008, the company seemed likely to prosper because its coal-fired plants were among the cheapest sources of electricity in the state.

Since then, the development of horizontally drilled and hydraulic fractured gas wells has helped push down the price of a thousand cubic feet of natural gas, from more than $10 in the spring of 2008 to about $2.80 today. FirstEnergy's stock price tumbled from a high of more than $82 on June 1, 2008, to $32.80 at the end of trading on Tuesday.

Jones said the company is not currently working with any lawmakers to write a re-regulation bill, but added that the first step toward returning to regulation is for the Public Utilities Commission to approve the company's pending rate case.

That case includes a 15-year power purchase agreement to have FirstEnergy's local distribution companies Ohio Edison, the Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison buy all of the power generated by the Davis-Besse nuclear plant and the coal-fired H.R. Sammis plant, at whatever it cost to generate.

Those generating costs are currently higher than the wholesale price of power on the grid, where gas-fired power plants are the low-cost producers. The company admits the deal would cost customers money in the first three years but argues that over the 15-year lifetime of the contracts, it would save about $2 billion because natural gas won't remain at today's rock bottom prices.

Critics of the plan, including the Ohio Consumers Counsel and the Northeast Ohio Public Utilities Council, or NOPEC, argue the deal would cost customers an extra $3 billion.

However long-term prices play out, the plan would ensure that the company would not lose money by operating the plants. In filings before the PUCO, the company's experts have argued that without the special power purchase contract the company may be forced to close them.

Sammis is the company's last Ohio coal-fired plant, said Jones, and its closing would force the company to build more long-distance transmission lines -- paid for by customers -- to bring power here from Pennsylvania and other states.

Jones said he has talked to Gov. John Kasich about the company's current situation. "We talked very frankly about the the kind of tenuous position FirstEnergy is in and he asked me four times what can they do to help.

I am trying to save a company.

"My answer four times was it's not your problem. It's my problem. The only thing I will ever ask you for is a fair chance to tell our story, a fair chance to have our case heard. And if we can't do it in a convincing manner, then shame on us.

"I am not asking the state for anything," he said.

But, apart from the rate-settting case, the company did ask for something from the state just a year ago.

It convinced legislators to remove the state mandate, in place since 2009, that forced power companies to help their customers use less power annually by buying energy efficiency technologies, and a parallel rule requiring power companies to sell an increasing percentage of "green power" annually.

Senate Bill 310, which Kasich signed into law in June 2014, froze those mandates for two years while lawmakers decided what to do next.

The chairman of the special committee studying the issue recently said it does not want to permanently freeze the mandates.

Jones said the energy efficiency programs FirstEnergy was forced to put in place were paid for by customers through higher rates, but benefited only those companies and consumers who could afford to buy new energy efficient products -- everything from new production line motors to new home appliances.

He said another way has to be developed to pay for energy efficiency programs, but did not offer any specific plan.

He said FirstEnergy is not opposed to renewable energy but believes that it must be "feathered in" slowly because wind and solar power production is not constant and therefore cannot be counted on.

And building solar arrays on buildings and homes is the least efficient way to add solar, he said.

"If you want solar energy the most efficient way to get solar energy is to have the utility build it for you," he said. "And build it in 200-300-400 megawatt solar farms."

A regulated power company could do that, Jones said, because it could add the costs to its rate base, just as the industry did for the first 85 years of its existence.

Check out how many times they revised the so called safe sight glass oil level until they felt it was at a adequate level to destroy the motor.  

It is actually pretty funny. I wonder how much this motor and outage cost them? Then they are whining to the politicians about they are not making enough money on the grid. 

LER 2015-001-00

The root cause evaluation determined that responses to technical questions were provided without the appropriate technical rigor or validation of assumptions regarding acceptable oil level for the pump motor. This resulted in an incorrect change in the oil level sight glass configuration and continued operation of the motor with the oil level below the vendor recommended minimum level until bearing failure. 

Replacement of the condensate pump motor. (Complete)

November 10, 2015: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2015003 AND 05000412/2015003 

Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 – 1 sample)(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000334/2015-001-00: Manual Reactor Trip and Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Due to Condensate Pump Motor Failure

On April 15, 2015, FENOC manually tripped Unit 1’s reactor

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 15, 2015, operators inserted a manual reactor trip after the ‘A’ condensate pump tripped on overcurrent. Operators returned the plant to 48 percent power with one condensate pump in operation on April 17 and remained at that power until the plant shutdown for 1R23 on April 24.

at 85 percent power following a condensate pump trip. Prior to the trip, the unit was performing an emergent power reduction after the identification of a degrading condition on the ‘A’ condensate pump motor. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the auxiliary feedwater system actuated as designed. The unit was stabilized in Mode 3 with main feedwater in service and auxiliary feedwater secured. 

Introduction. A Green self-revealing finding was identified for FENOC‘s failure to correct a low oil level in the Unit 1 ‘A’ condensate pump lower motor bearing in accordance with NOP-LP-2001, “Corrective Action Program.” Specifically, FENOC failed to execute the work order to add oil to the ‘A’ condensate pump motor and, instead, installed a placard on the oil level sight glass with improper oil level indications. This led to the motor bearing failure, which caused the pump to trip on overcurrent, and required the operators to insert a manual reactor trip.

Description. In November 2013, the Unit 1 ’A’ condensate motor was replaced due to moisture intrusion. During

Water destroyed it in 2013 and they replaced it with a leaking oil defective motor. The old normalization of deviance.  These guys are having shutdowns every time you turn around.

initial oil filling and motor operation, oil leaked around the motor shaft. After contacting the vendor, FENOC determined that the correct oil level was at the bottom of the oil sight glass. During the forced outage in January

Luckily they destroyed the main transformer (preventable and poor quality) in early 2014 in order to set up the destruction of the condensate pump in 2015 through intentionally starving the bearing of oil. It is notable the turbine driven aux main feed pump tripped on mysterious oscillations(LER 2014-002-00) when the main transformer got destroyed. And the TDAFW pump had been unreliable for years over improper symptom diagnosing and poor maintenance.

The idea I can link all these preventable things together is very dangerous. This is a cultural problem. Who owns these guys? Oh man, FirstEnergy stock has been dropping like a stone since 2012. 

***Who in a recent presidential debate accused Ohio governor John Kasich with getting bailed out over the miraculous Marcellus shale natural gas fracking economic development boom. Wasn’t it Donald Trump who posed the insult to the Ohio governor?  They got so much gas being produced in the Marcellus field the transmission pipes are overloaded with gas production…the oil wells can’t produce as much as they want. The Marcellus shale is the most productive oil/gas field in the world. Ohio sits right on top of the field.  You got to wonder if all this cheap natural gas is degrading nuclear safety across industry.

FirstEnergy's stock price high just before our stock market and real estate 2009 collapse was $83. It is a historic collapse of a electric utility stock price. Today they are struggling at maintaining $30 a stare. How much of their nuclear plants are effectively stranded assist?   

2014, the sight glass was replaced with one that has a lower viewing window and a placard was attached with minimum and maximum oil levels. In May 2014, a notification was written to add oil to the motor because oil level in the lower motor bearing had dropped to the minimum level. 

The notification was incorrectly closed to an existing outage work order for the motor. A second notification was written in June 2014 to add oil to the motor which was converted into a work order and assigned a priority in accordance with NOP-WM-1003. Three additional notifications were written in July 2014 to add oil to the motor. In August 2014, CR 2014-13579 was written to identify that motor lower bearing oil level was below minimum. In September 2014, the superintendent of work planning took ownership to resolve the issue identified in the condition report and incorrectly determined that oil should not be added until the oil level reaches the bottom of the sight glass. This was based on the assumption that the original sight glass was installed. The existing work order and notifications were cancelled, and a corrective action was initiated to install a new placard on the sight glass to show a minimum oil level at the bottom of the sight glass.

In February 2015, the old placard was removed and the new placard was installed. On April 15, 2015, the control room received a high temperature alarm on the condensate pump lower motor bearing. Operators reported oil misting, smoke, and high vibrations at the motor. Operations commenced an unplanned power reduction to 85 percent power. The motor tripped on overcurrent, causing operations to insert a manual reactor trip in accordance with their loss of feedwater procedure. 

The inspectors determined that the corrective actions implemented to resolve CR 2014-13579 were not in accordance with NOP-LP-2001. Section 4.2.3 of NOP-LP-2001 states that condition report/correct action owners should ensure that actions are developed to resolve the primary cause identified in the condition report. The corrective action implemented did not resolve the low oil level in the motor. 

Analysis. The inspectors determined that failure to correct the low oil level condition in the ‘A’ condensate pump motor lower bearing in accordance with NOP-LP-2001, was a performance deficiency that was within the capability of FENOC to foresee and correct, and therefore should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, cancelling the work order to add oil to the motor bearing subsequently caused the operators to trip the plant when the condensate pump motor bearing overheated due to oil starvation and the motor tripped on overcurrent. 

In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued June 19, 2012, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, because FENOC did not seek input from the appropriate work group (engineering) prior to cancelling the work order to add oil to the condensate pump motor [H.13]. 

Enforcement. This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 2015-05256. Because this finding did not involve a violation and was of very low safety significance (Green), it is identified as a FIN. (FIN 05000334/2015003-01, Failure to Correct a Low Oil Level in the Condensate Pump Motor)

Way Abnormal Amount Of Jet Contrails In The Sky Today

Update 11/16 11 am

Not a jet contrail in the sky this late morning. Is it a afternoon deal? You would assume there is more jet traffic in the air above me on a Monday morning? What the hell?

I got out of house today at about 1pm. We normally have lots of air traffic from Logan Boston above us…heading to points west and Chicago. Today there were many more than normal jet contrails high above us. It was the worst I’ve ever seen it and I am outside a lot. Contrails are just harmless condensed water particles from the jet engine. Some contrails were heading east to west…this is what we normally see. There were contrails zig zagging all around us. There was many jet trails heading north south.

I didn't think their is much passenger traffic on a Sunday morning? 

This might be some kind of normal atmospheric conditions making the jet contrails more prominent.
 

But I think we are drastically jacking up military posture over the France massacre and ISIS. Maybe moving military people and gear around in preparation to moving some 100,000 troops into Iraq and Syria.

Right, the proper posture is "all in" and crush them, or defense USA.      

Pilgrim's Scram On MSIV Closure-Damaged Tubing Unistrut

Two recent events shows problems during refueling drywell/primary containment maintenance. This pulled out unistrut and Hope Creeks misaligned SRV and discharge line.    

So what about the extent of cause/condition on all relays?  

During the post trip review of the event, an anomaly was identified in the reactor protection system (RPS) channel A2. Reactor pressure exceeded the value for generating a reactor pressure trip signal. However, the channel A2 reactor high pressure trip was not recorded in the plant process computer log of the event.  The most probable cause was oxidation on the relay contacts that provide the signal to the plant process computer. The relay contacts were burnished.

All I can say is, think about all the tremendous energy that is going on here and just seconds for relays to do they protective functions.

Can they get away from relays today... 

Licensee Event Report 201 5-007-00, Single Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Resulting in Automatic Reactor Scram 

On Saturday, August 22, 2015, at 1628 [EDT], with the reactor at 100% core thermal power the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station experienced an automatic reactor scram due to Average Power Range Monitor High Flux signal from the rapid closure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV). All plant systems responded as designed.

The Root Cause of this event is inadequate worker practices resulting in an excessive load being applied to the unistrut enclosed pneumatic line (during or prior to 2001) causing it to lay on a Main Steam Line subject to vibration. The excessive load caused an initiating crack in the nipple threads that over time resulted in a shear of the line.

The pneumatic supply line nipple was replaced and the line was re-supported. 

This event posed no threat to public health and safety.

BACKGROUND

There are four Main Steam lines and each line contains two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), one inboard valve located in the Drywell and one outboard valve located in the Steam Tunnel. The MSIVs are normally open during normal plant operation. Each MSIV is a 20" diameter Y-body globe valve with a pneumatic actuator to open and pneumatic & spring to close. The valve is a fail-safe closed design. A hydraulic cylinder sharing a common piston rod is used to control the closure speed via a needle valve. The safety function of these valves is to automatically close on a Primary Containment Isolation System Group 1 isolation signal.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On Saturday, August 22, 2015, at 1628 [EDT], with the reactor at 100% core thermal power the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) experienced an automatic reactor scram signal due to the rapid closure of one MSIV. Inboard MSIV AO-203-1 C had closed.

Primary Containment Isolation System Group II - Sampling Systems, Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System and Reactor Building Isolation System isolations occurred as expected due to the reactor scram at 100 percent power.

Reactor water level was restored to normal and maintained by the feedwater system. Reactor pressure control was maintained using the main turbine bypass valves. The plant was brought to a cold shutdown condition using the normal systems. All plant systems responded as designed to perform the safety functions.

The primary containment was de-inerted. A drywell entry was made to investigate the cause of the inboard MSIV AO-203-1 C closure. The pneumatic supply to the inboard MSIV AO-203-1 C valve control manifold was found sheared.

During the post trip review of the event, an anomaly was identified in the reactor protection system (RPS) channel A2. Reactor pressure exceeded the value for generating a reactor pressure trip signal. However, the channel A2 reactor high pressure trip was not recorded in the plant process computer log of the event. Due to the de-energize-to-actuate circuit design, once a scram trip signal is generated within the channel (in this case a reactor high flux signal), actuation of another signal has to be determined by other means, usually by review of the plant process computer log. Investigation of the circuit did not determine a definitive cause. The instrumentation loop was calibrated and a relay replaced prior to return to service. The most probable cause was oxidation on the relay contacts that provide the signal to the plant process computer. The relay contacts were burnished.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

Direct Cause: The cause of the event is that the pneumatic supply to the inboard MSIV AO-203-1C valve control manifold was found sheared at a threaded nipple location.

Root Cause: The Root Cause of this event is inadequate worker practices resulting in an excessive load being applied to the unistrut enclosed pneumatic line (during or prior to 2001) causing it to lay on a Main Steam Line subjecting the line to vibration. The excessive load caused an initiating crack in the nipple threads that over time resulted in a shear of the line.

Contributing Cause: Inadequate identification and repair of adverse conditions. When the support failure was identified in 2001, an inadequate repair was performed.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Completed:

1. The pneumatic supply nipple was replaced and the piping was re-supported.

2. A leak check of all fittings to the inboard MSIVs was performed.

Planned: 

Additional corrective actions are captured in the corrective action program by Condition Report CR-PNP-2015- 07285.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

UFSAR Appendix R.2.1 .3.2 provides a summary of the initial core analysis for "Closure of One Main Steam Isolation Valve." A single MSIV closure with initial power is expected to cause a high neutron flux scram, increased reactor pressure, and increased fuel temperature. UFSAR Figure R.2-5 illustrates the predicted transient response including flux above the high neutron flux scram setpoint which causes the reactor scram.

No fuel damage or challenge to safety limits occurs.

Abnormal Operational Transients (AOT) are evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to ensure that fuel cladding Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limits are satisfied given transients caused by a single operator error or equipment malfunction. The spectrum of postulated initiating transient event categories is identified in U FSAR Section 14.3.2. The transient analysis contained in UFSAR Section 14 is supplemented by the original transient analysis contained in UFSAR Appendix R.

Closure of a single MSIV is an evaluated transient that is not required to be evaluated for each core reload because the transient is non-limiting. Only the most limiting AOT events affecting MCPR are addressed for each core reload to validate safety system settings and establish reactor fuel thermal limits.

This event is bounded by the analysis.

More Millstone Junk?

Update 11/11

Reported from Nov 9.

So the same type oil leak on the same pump knocked off both Millstone 1 & 2 nuclear plants. Can it get any worst. 

Dominion's Millstone-2 nuclear power unit shuts due to coolant pump leak

Washington (Platts)--11 Nov 2015 527 pm EST/2227 GMT

Dominion's Millstone-2 nuclear power unit in Waterford, Connecticut, was shut at 1 pm EST (1800 GMT) Tuesday "to address an oil leak from a reactor coolant pump," plant spokesman Kenneth Holt said in an email Wednesday. 

Holt said he cannot comment on when the 918-MW unit is expected to return to service.
The oil leak is "a different leak" from the one that required Millstone-2 to shut Sunday, though it is from the same coolant pump, Holt said, without providing details.

The 1,276-MW Millstone-3 reactor was operating at 100% of capacity early Wednesday morning, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in its daily reactor status report. 

Was the fire in the diesel generator leaking oil also? Got a rework problem?

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51521
Facility: MILLSTONE Region: 1 State: CT Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: BARRETT NICHOLS HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	Notification Date: 11/08/2015 Notification Time: 02:55 [ET] Event Date: 11/08/2015 Event Time: 02:30 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	15	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL LEAK During power ascension following refueling outage, a decreasing oil level in the 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump was noted. When the oil level reached 69 percent, with the reactor at approximately 56 percent rated thermal power, per plant procedure, a rapid downpower was initiated which brought the plant to approximately 15 percent power and a manual reactor trip was initiated at that point. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all plant equipment responded as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Millstone Power Station Terminates Alert Caused by Fire

By Published: Nov 4, 2015 3:26 p.m. ET 

HARTFORD, Conn., Nov. 4, 2015 /PRNewswire/ -- An Alert at the Millstone Power Station has been terminated at 2:46 p.m. without any injuries or release of radiation.

The Alert was declared at 11:33 a.m. as the result of a fire in a backup diesel generator for Unit 3. The fire quickly burned out. Millstone fire control personnel responded to the fire. The station did not request offsite assistance. 

FitzPatrick's Botched Roof Job-You Need To Be Afraid Of These Guys

If you don't know working on the containment roof (reactor building roof-roof job)is a direct threat to radiological containment, you have no business being up at power. Should of had a operator bird dogging roof job with the power to halt the job.
Maybe Entergy feels these guys will be a threat to their corporate reputation. Entergy wants these guys shut down as fast as possible so they won't ruin the rest of their reputation.   

November 6, 2015

FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2015003

Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 1 sample) (Closed) LER 05000333/2015-003-00: Roof Maintenance Results in Secondary Containment Vacuum Below Technical Specification Limit

Inspection Scope

On July 20, 2015, while operating at 100 percent power, work commenced to replace the roofing materials (insulation, felt paper, and a mix of asphalt and gravel) above the metal deck of the reactor building roof. Shortly after work started, operators noted that reactor building differential pressure (d/p, measured relative to outside pressure) was degrading. TS 3.6.4.1, “Secondary Containment,” requires, in Mode 1, 2, or 3, that secondary containment be maintained at a vacuum of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge, relative to the outside. Operators placed both trains of the standby gas treatment system in service and isolated normal reactor building ventilation, however, these actions were not successful in preventing d/p from decreasing to less than 0.25 inches of vacuum. This condition placed the plant in a four hour TS action statement to restore secondary containment or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours. Work on the roof was stopped and efforts were commenced to reseal the roof. These actions were successful and d/p was restored to greater than 0.25 inches of vacuum after a period of 92 minutes. Secondary containment operability was not restored within four hours due to continuing roof restoration work and testing to verify operability, however, it was restored prior to a plant shutdown being required. This represents a self-revealing Green NCV, which is discussed below. This LER is closed.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a self-revealing violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” because FitzPatrick staff failed to provide instructions appropriate to the reactor building roof replacement project. Specifically, inadequate instructions were provided to ensure that roofing material removal would be performed in a slow, deliberate manner, such that its effect on secondary containment could be assessed and operability maintained. As a result, this activity caused secondary containment to be inoperable for a period in excess of its TS allowed outage time.

Description. The reactor building roof replacement project originated due to the need to eliminate leaks, as well as to extend the functionality of the roof to the life of the plant. The EC package that was developed to support the roof replacement, EC 56686, “Reactor Building Roof Replacement - 2015,” concluded that the metal roof decking formed the secondary containment pressure boundary and that the portion of the roof that was to be replaced was not safety-related. Nonetheless, it was recognized that removal of the top materials could uncover degraded portions of the metal roof decking, as well as fastener holes, and thereby challenge secondary containment. As a result, the EC placed a limit of 740 square feet of decking that could be exposed at any one time.

When removal of the existing roofing material commenced on July 20, 2015, workers cleared the first 740 square foot area of roof. At that time, it was not recognized that the decking plates were not overlapped and welded together, but rather had gaps between them which allowed for significantly more air in-leakage than had been anticipated. As a result, workers sealed the anticipated fastener holes and proceeded to clear the next 740 square foot area. At the same time, plant operators were observing secondary containment vacuum degrade. Operators placed both trains of the standby gas treatment system in service and isolated normal reactor building ventilation in an effort to maintain secondary containment. These actions arrested the degradation, but only resulted in holding secondary containment vacuum at 0.15 inches of water gauge. Work on the reactor building roof was stopped and secondary containment was declared

inoperable.

As a corrective action, the new roofing materials were installed to reseal the affected area of the reactor building roof. This was successful in restoring secondary containment vacuum to greater than 0.25 inches water gauge after a period of 92 minutes. After completion of work and satisfactory PMT, operators declared secondary containment operable after a period of five hours and 26 minutes. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-03260.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that FitzPatrick staff’s failure to provide appropriate instructions for the reactor building roof replacement project, such that this work resulted in a loss of secondary containment for longer than the TS allowed action time, was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy’s ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, RCS, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the WO did not provide adequate instruction to ensure that roofing material removal would be performed in slow, deliberate manner, coordinated between operations and maintenance personnel, and allowing adequate time after actions that could impact secondary containment such that their effect on secondary containment could be assessed and operability maintained. As a result, secondary containment was rendered inoperable and remained so for longer than the TS-specified allowed outage time.

In accordance with IMC 0609.04, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” and Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At- Power,” the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a pressurized thermal shock issue, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment, and only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the reactor building and standby gas treatment system.

The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because FitzPatrick staff did not adequately plan for the possibility of latent issues and inherent risk associated with the reactor building roof replacement project, such that the commencement of work resulted in a loss of secondary containment [H.12].

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” states, in part, “Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings…” Contrary to the above, on July 20, 2015, instructions provided to FitzPatrick maintenance personnel for removal of reactor building roofing material were not of a type appropriate to the circumstances, in that they were inadequate to ensure that roofing material removal would be performed in a slow, deliberate manner, in coordination with Operations department personnel, such that its effect on secondary containment could be assessed and operability maintained. As a result, secondary containment vacuum could not be maintained at or above the TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 limit of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge, and secondary containment remained inoperable for a period in excess of the TS 3.6.4.1.A allowed outage time of four hours. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and FitzPatrick staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-03260, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000333/2015-02, Inadequate Instructions for Reactor Building Roof Replacement Result in Inadvertent Loss of Secondary Containment)