Helicoptor Intimidation Phenomena below the Vernon Dam

Update Dec 22

Can't you hear these Aliens talking to themselves: All these people want from us is our freakin money?

Update Dec 21

As I was walking away from this encounter, my first thoughts was this is a mirage. I really wondered if I was crazy. Is my mind creating it? Then, was it a apparition of the universe? What has happened to me recently, is I am having really vivid dreams like I never had before. Some are naughty, some are the model of my life with some disorientation(a little painful but accurate)and then some are astonishing insightful. Some gives me future hints in my life. It is about very minor events and it models my emotions in these insignificant situations. It feels like something knows me at very deep personal level. Today I pray for more dreams, just before I go asleep and I talk to it. Most people would be very terrified with what I am going through. I tell it over and over again I want to be your friend, I want to be in relationship with you. I never hear voices in my head. Basically the incident happens, then it hits me I seen it before in a dream. Then I stand in complete wonderment and awe. Hey, if you really love me, how about giving me the numbers in the next $500 million dollars lottery? I wonder if it has a sense of humor?           

Update Dec 16

Well, there is a alternate interpretation of why this occurred. My buddies in high places were sending me a message. A test of my intelligence and torturing me for laughs. It is a at-a-boy for doing a hard job and don't ever give up. They are laughing their ass off at this terribly whiny Mike Mulligan. 

Update: Dec 14

The storm occurred on Dec 2. So the event occurred on Nov 30 or Dec 1.    

Update

wop wop wop wop wop wop wop wop wop wop wop wop...  

Oh, come on, you know I passed the test. Everyone knows I passed the test...

By the way, they know I am a really smart guy. If this was a intimidation event, somebody must have been monitoring my daily activities for a long period of time. They would be picking up patterns of my life. Figure out what is the best contact area and what tools will be needed like a helicopter. Scheduling a helicopter for the immediacy of this operation and coordinating must have been a pain in the ass. I am very erratic with my biking and hiking. 

It might be a soft holograph type of thing. Imagine the advanced technology this is and it may not be earth based. 

I am ready for this!!!      

Here is a map link to area just below the Vernon dam:

https://goo.gl/maps/1QtmZD1gLrTsXdhX9

I spend a lot of time on the little peninsula just below the dam on the NH side. A lot, a lot of time. I walk and bike that circular trail all the time. The foliage in that area is spectacular. In the winter, I still walk this area. I walk almost all winter storms on this island, all the blizzards...the howling winds and swaying trees, snow that utterly blinds you, the isolation in a storm all by myself, it is such a beautiful experience.

This happened about two weeks ago. I was considering just ignoring this, not disclosing...making them think I was too stupid to catch what was going on. I have been confronted with death threats many times and I have just learned to ignored it as a tactic.  

So you walk the trail directly up to the dam. On the left, there is a trail. That is the beginning of the circular trail on the little peninsula. Oh, the miraculousness of spring time with all the birds building their families. Chipmunks everywhere and all those always busy squirrels. The geese, ducks, robins, owls, hawks, a eagle's nest that's been active for twenty years, and occasionally a turkey vulture clan visiting. The beavers who always scare the shit out of me by loudly whacking their tails on water trying to protect their homes...   

There is a spot at the beginning of the trail where I park my bike and take breaks. I am eating my lunch at this time. Maybe smoking a little : ) I begin hearing a low level helicopter noise about 5 miles north east of me. I could hear it taking a wide circle around me. It seemed interesting to me . I thought it was somebody sightseeing or the utility checking the lines. It flew a mile or two north of Vermont Yankee rather close. I just don't see that very often. The helicopter ends up just west the Vernon dam. The forest is so thick I haven't been able to see the helicopter yet. I really have no use of seeing the helicopter, but I am now monitoring the noise of the helicopter because it has got me curious.

I hear a small drop in the noise level of the helicopter, then the wop, wop starts to radically increases. I feel the helicopter is right at the beginning of the pool at the Vernon side at a low level. The wop, wop, wop really increases at this point. I on the far side of a small bluff. About 100 feet from the waters edge. The top of the bluff is about 50 feet in elevation above the pool water level. The sides of the bluff are at a very steep incline. I usually climb that bluff every time I am down there for exercise purposes and to enhance my balancing capabilities. Balancing exercises including biking are very important for old people like me. It is even more fun doing this in the winter and especially during a snowstorm or blizzard. It is a short climb. My heart at the end of the climb is jumping out of my chest and I am gasping for breath.        
I feel the helicopter noise was coming from below ground level, meaning it was at a very low altitude just above the pool. The helicopter was coming directly at me, the wop wop wop noise dramatically was increasing. It was so loud it scared the shit out of me. I thinking man, I am witnessing a helicopter crash. The wop wop wop noise was unbelievable. Then I see the helicopter blades coming up from the ground level just in front of me. I mean, I am pissing my pants noise. He is passing me about 30 feet north of me at a very slow speed at a low altitude. I now feel he was manipulating his engine speed and blade rotation to enhance the frightening wop wop wop. He slowly passes me, the pilot window was directly facing me, I can see him staring at me. I can see his fucking smile.

The helicopter looked somewhat like a Vietnam era type helicopter. It looked like a rather new or shinny light whitish or yellowish color commercial helicopter. It looked like a work horse type of helicopter. I didn't see sight seeing windows on the ship. Kind of a utilitarian kind of design. I don't think I seen any windows other than the pilot and passenger windows. I raked my eye sight carefully around the ship looking for electronic gear, windows and freakin open doors. The body of it was quite long and slender. Like a commercial cargo or executive helicopter. It was by no means a tiny, small or medium size helicopter. This was a very expensive operation. 

I wouldn't be talking about this if it was just one pass. Was it the FBI or something? A military or homeland security helicopter?  As the ship passes me, all I am thinking this is so fucking cool. I think this is just a coincidence. I had a nice cell phone on me with a beautiful camera. It just never crossed my mind to get the cell out. The second pass, did he want me to take a picture of him?   

The helicopter noise just begins to fade away directly east of me on this first run. I can't see it from in the woods. But I am keeping track of it. Then the noise start increasing and I realize he is circling me again. I am thinking, can he be circling me? Oh yea, there is this little guy on my shoulder saying, mike you are getting paranoid again? The outsiders are going to think you are crazy or something. Same track as before. I am a little bit flustered by the first run. 

I can hear him now lining directly west of me. I am actually kind of paralyzed. I can't believe this might be happening to me again. I am thinking he will never take the same tract as before. Yea, I am thinking is somebody is trying to assassinate me. Then I think, if they are, they will eventually get me anyways. So then I think, fuck you, I am going to stand there like a man and look right up at you. But the guy on my shoulder says, be cool, it is impossible he will take the same track. So now he is on the exact track as before, directly at the beginning of the pool. 

I hear the exact dip in the wop wop wop noise like he is reducing altitude. Remember the bluff is directly in front of me and I believe this is what is obstructing the noise from the low altitude ship. The noise seem to be coming amazingly from below my ground level as the ship gets closer. Almost couldn't believe it. I am then thinking, steal yourself from the scary loud wop wop wop noise you know is coming. The noise is really loud and it feels like it is heading directly towards me again. I see the helicopter blades rising above the trees directly in front of me.  I can't believe the blades are not hitting the branches of the trees. I begin to see the body of the helicopter...I see him slowing down. The noise is ten times as loud as the first run. I am utterly terrorized and having a hard time not bolting. He is on the same path as before, but seems to be even slower and louder. These were very frightening events. I can now feel the wop wop wop on my fucking chest. I estimate the altitude of the copter as 50 to 100 feet above me in horizonal flight. The pilot is staring at me in a serous face. I see his head move to keep eyes on me as he moves past me. It is a really slow motion movement. And I am staring him back with my hands on my hips thinking mother fucker, fuck you. My mother knows me as terribly oppositional.

I was thinking I am going to laugh this off. Somebody thinks I am so important to spend all this money on me. Should I never go into the woods again by myself? Is somebody threatening to assassinate me or silencing me? It has somewhat rattled my cage. No, it big time rattle my cage and I am still haunted by these events today. You got my attention. I wish I knew why you want me to shut up on. I am going do my typical coping strategy done all my life. It never worked really. Going to make believe my feelings aren't real. I was considering never go back to this area again. I have been back there maybe four times since by myself. Really on the alert status the first time back. Am stealing myself for contact...I wish you would talk to me. I would welcome it. These events still haunt me big time.

     

Yankee site survey shows contamination

Yankee site survey shows contamination

Posted Monday, December 9, 2019 7:42 pm 

By Susan Smallheer, Brattleboro Reformer

BRATTLEBORO — Environmental groundwater and soil monitoring of the Vermont Yankee site has turned up 17 "areas of concern," but only five of those areas are so polluted they need additional cleanup, according to representatives from NorthStar Nuclear Decommissioning Co.

The contaminated areas stem mostly from historic fuel oil leaks, NorthStar said.

"Five need attention," said Corey Daniels, NorthStar's decommissioning manager told members of the Vermont Nuclear Decommissioning Citizen Advisory Panel last Thursday.

In addition, two diesel fuel spills also need minor cleanup, Daniels said.

Did they sample underneath the main and startup transformer? They had big transformers explosions in the early days. These guys were filled with the deadly transformer fluid PCB. All the fluids soaked into the ground and I believe into the Connecticut river. You should check mud in the Conn River

Daniels said the 17 areas are mostly polluted from oil products — specifically diesel fuel or fuel oil — and are located near underground pipes carrying the oil, including near the 75,000 gallon underground diesel tank that provided fuel to Vermont Yankee's backup diesel generators.

He said there is a "legacy" spill near the site of the former Yankee cooling towers, which were demolished earlier this year.

He said that NorthStar had responded to concerns raised by state officials and had drilled six additional monitoring wells. NorthStar was already working with 32 existing wells.

NorthStar is working with Vermont state officials to locate and clean up any contamination as part of the overall decommissioning of the nuclear plant.

NorthStar is now updating its site investigation report, which was submitted in July.

The revised plan, including the requests from state environmental officials, addressed "data gaps" at seven areas of concern. It will be completed in the first quarter of 2020.

He said of the areas that will need to be remediated, the soil will be dug up and sent to a low-level radioactive waste facility in Texas... 

Additionally, he said a detailed radioactive sweep of most of the 143 acres that make up the Vermont Yankee site has so far only turned up two minor spots of radioactivity — one site was a tool box and the other was "minor shine" from where radioactive materials were staged before they were shipped.

"Other than that, there have been no surprises," he said

He said NorthStar is using what he called "an ultra all terrain vehicle" that can measure the radiation on the site to the depth of several feet. He told the panel that the special vehicle, which can measure wherever it can be driven, has already made 1.3 million "discreet measurements."

Daniels said NorthStar is updating Yankee's site investigation report to include additional data. The contaminated soils in areas that can be accessed will be remediated.

In the meantime, NorthStar is continuing biweekly meetings with the Agency of Natural Resources, which is overseeing the non-radiological cleanup of the Vernon site.

Daniels said the state, with its heightened awareness of PFOA chemicals, has required that NorthStar test the areas, and Daniels said he is glad to report that no PFOAs were detected.

He also gave an update on the infiltration of groundwater into the turbine building. Back in 2015, when the problem was discovered, the infiltration amounted to about 6,000 gallons a day and forced Entergy Nuclear, the owner at the time, to store the radioactive water in portable swimming pools and tanks.

Thanks to efforts to divert groundwater away from the contaminated building, the infiltration has dropped to about 300 gallons a day. The lightly radioactive water is still being shipped to a facility in Idaho, Daniels said, about a tanker car's worth every two months.

"Technically, it's safe to make coffee with," he said, referring to the low level of radioactivity in the water.

He said the water being intercepted before it reaches the turbine building has tested clean of any radioactivity. NorthStar is still in the process of setting up more intercept wells.

Daniels said that since decommissioning began in January, NorthStar employees and contractors have logged 260,000 hours without a lost-time accident. And he said radiation exposure to those employees and contractors is well within NRC limits.

Hope Creek: SRV Problems Worst Than Exspected and New Phenomena Showing up

Inadequate SRV Performance Monitoring and Analysis Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Coverup Aspect

Report Section
Initiating Events

Green FIN 05000354/2019003-01  Open/Closed

[P.5] - Operating Experience  

71152  

The inspectors identified a Green finding (FIN) because PSEG did not adequately monitor and analyze safety relief valve (SRV) performance data, in accordance with ER-AA-2003, “System Performance Monitoring and Analysis,” Revision 11.  Specifically, PSEG’s main steam system performance monitoring plan did not identify appropriate SRV tailpipe temperature (TPT) values to detect critical leakage degradation and establish an adequate action plan in anticipation of exceeding action levels.  As a result, the ‘H’ SRV operated for extended periods of elevated TPT, with mischaracterized leakage rates and an inadequate action plan to address the degraded conditions. Description:  Hope Creek has 14 safety-related main steam SRVs that provide reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection.  The ‘H’ SRV consists of two stages: a pilot stage that senses main steam system pressure, and a main stage that actuated by the pilot stage to relieve elevated main steam system pressure.  Each SRV discharges through a tailpipe that directs the steam through a downcomer into a suppression pool.  Internal SRV leakage has been known in the industry to occur through the pilot and/or main stages, even under normal main steam system operating pressures.  Industry operating experience (OE) indicates the consequences of SRV leakage can include relief setpoint drift, failure of the pilot stage to reseat, delayed actuation, spurious opening, suppression pool cooling margin reduction, cycling of the SRV tailpipe vacuum breakers, and condensate-induced void collapse stresses on the tailpipe t-quencher.

Allowing prolonged leakage on Pilgrim's  SRVs causeed two failures, which led to the NRC to jack up their inspection activities leading to the permanent shutdown. I led the outside activities which questioned the reliability of these valves. The NRC was terribly embarrassed as I predicted one or more valves would eventually fail. And it happened. I spent a lot of my time a few years ago on confronting the SRV issue at Hope Creak. I had them admit the valve reliability problem crossed their quality assurance standards.

Basically this is a series of facilative assumption fraud or corruption situation. They make a continuing series of engineering assumption that favor corporate profits or minimizes losses. Fundimentally management says we only operate with conservative facts and within the well warn path conservative safety, but it is all a lie. They operate under a set of assumptions not backed up by science. They get increasing comfortable operating on assumption. It is the boiling frog situation. They get comfortable making assumptions calling it facts leading to a meltdown or a lost of credibility leading to shutdown.

The inspectors reviewed the main steam system performance monitoring plan, and noted that it required weekly monitoring of SRV TPTs by system engineering.  The inspectors also noted that PSEG identified elevated ‘H’ SRV TPT, beginning in November 2016 at the beginning of cycle 21, and monitored elevated TPT through start-up for cycle 22 operation in the spring of 2018. PSEG replaced the ‘H’ pilot stage during the refueling outage at the end of cycle 21, but did not replace the main stage.  A highlight of elevated ‘H’ SRV TPT in cycle 21 and 22 is included below: 

 On November 21, 2016, approximately one week after start-up for cycle 21, notification (NOTF) 20748846 identified the ‘H’ SRV TPT rose from 125 degrees to 210 degrees F.  The inspectors noted that the main steam performance monitoring plan specified a normal SRV TPT temperature range of 90-190 degrees F.  On April 12, 2018, NOTF 20789878 identified the ‘H’ SRV TPT rose above 220 degrees during the planned shutdown at the end of cycle 21, and documented that a TPT of 225 degrees correlated with a leak rate of approximately 5 pound-mass per hour (lbm/hr), in accordance with calculation AB-0076, Tailpipe Temperature versus Leak Rate for the ‘H’ SRV, Revision 0.  On October 1, 2018, NOTF 20806034 captured a rising SRV leak rate trend from 155 lbm/hr in June of 2018, to a current value 325 lbm/hr at 223 degrees.  The NOTF did not discuss the large increase in correlated leakage for approximately the same TPT reported on April 12, 2018.  On December 20, 2018, NOTF 20814836 identified a periodic loud banging noise in the torus area, which was a recurrence of a similar banging noise in 2014 due to ‘H’ SRV leakage and condensate-induced water hammer in the discharge line to the torus (see NCV 2014-005-01).  

 During cycle 22, PSEG engineering was performing informal weekly monitoring of SRV leak rates, and the inspectors periodically requested to review the data as part of routine inspection.  During review of leak rate data in late December of 2018, the inspectors identified data from October and November reflected significant changes from data previously reported for the same time period.  Specifically, as reported in late November of 2018, the weekly leak rate data from October and November of 2018 was reported to range between 155 lbm/hr and 245 lbm/hr.  However, on January 2, 2019, the data from the October and November of 2018 was reported to range between 613 lbm/hr and 755 lbm/hr.  The inspectors questioned PSEG as to the reason for the change in the data, and the station ultimately determined the leak rate trend data was incorrectly monitored from August of 2018 through December of 2018, and initiated NOTF 20816775.  The inspectors also noted that equipment apparent cause evaluation (EQACE) 70168630, performed in response to 2014 ‘H’ SRV leakage that resulted in torus noise and a maintenance outage, determined that calculation AB-0076 was not accurate, and assigned an action to address it, but the action was subsequently cancelled.

 
On December 27, 2018, in response to NOTF 20814836, documenting 2018 torus noise as mentioned above, PSEG initiated action to develop adverse condition monitoring plan (ACM) 19-001.  On February 4, 2019, PSEG determined the ‘H’ SRV leak rate was approximately 961 lbm/hr, utilizing ACM 19-001, which established enhanced monitoring and analysis methods similar to ACM 14-0014 following the onset of torus noise in 2014.    

On February 12, 2019, PSEG determined that a planned maintenance outage would be scheduled in the Spring of 2019, in response to ‘H’ SRV leakage that was projected to exceed the ACM limit for torus heat-up rate prior to the summer period.  The limit was established under Technical Evaluation 80124191-0020, to support compliance with the Technical Specification 3.6.2.1.a.2 suppression pool temperature limit of 95 degrees. 

 On March 28, 2019, Hope Creek entered a planned maintenance outage to replace the ‘H’ SRV pilot and main stages. As-found bench testing of the ‘H’ SRV determined that the ‘H’ SRV lifted within the Technical Specification limits of +/- 3 percent, identified pilot stage seat leakage to be minimal, and identified main seat leakage was very high at approximately 900 lbm/hr. Hope Creek operations procedures state that spurious opening may occur with leakage as low as 200 lbm/hr.  The inspectors also noted that industry owner’s group reports state that industry data shows plants may be effected at approximately 2000 lbm/hr, either spurious opening or relief setpoint drift, though the data can vary from plant to plant.  As such, industry owner’s group reports also state that some plants use 1000 lbm/hr as an administrative limit for defining operator actions (e.g., plant shutdown). 

 The inspectors review PSEG procedure ER-AA-2003.  Step 4.2.3 required the system engineer to identify the data required to effectively detect critical degradation that can effect performance, and step 4.4.3 required establishing action plans to address conditions in anticipation of exceeding action levels.  An action level is defined as the parameter which, when reached, indicates that preventive or corrective maintenance is required.  Within the main steam system performance monitoring plan, there was an action plan established at a specific TPT, which required notification of the shift manager to consider plant shutdown in accordance with the limits established in operations procedure HC.OP-SO.SN-0001, Nuclear Pressure Relief and Automatic Depressurization System Operation (controlled copy), Attachment 2.  The inspectors reviewed Attachment 2, and noted that it established unique SRV TPT shutdown limits for each 2-stage SRV.  However, the TPT limits were based on calculations that PSEG had previously identified to be inaccurate, as described in 2005 evaluation 70049218 and 2014 EQACE 70168360.  The inspectors questioned the adequacy of an action plan and procedure limits based on calculations with known inaccuracies.  In response, PSEG wrote NOTF 20836010 to evaluate any necessary changes to the monitoring plan and operations procedure.  Establishing proper SRV action plans is important, because industry operating experience (OE) indicates that excessive SRV leakage can potentially result in a plant transient or challenge critical safety functions.   Therefore, the inspectors determined that PSEG was not in compliance with ER-AA-2003, steps 4.2.2 and 4.4.3, because PSEG’s SRV performance monitoring plans did not identify appropriate SRV TPT values to detect critical leakage degradation and establish an adequate action plan in anticipation of exceeding action levels.   Corrective Actions:  PSEG’s corrective actions included performing a maintenance outage on March 28, 2019, to replace the ‘H’ SRV pilot and main valves, performing a root cause evaluation (RCE) 70206428 to evaluate repeat elevated main seat leakage on the ‘H” SRV.
 Corrective Action References:  20748846, 20789878, 20806034, 20814836, 20806034, 20818407*, 20819899*, 20823472*, 70206428, 70205765 and 70205995 Performance Assessment:   Performance Deficiency:  The inspectors determined that PSEG’s SRV performance monitoring plans did not identify appropriate SRV TPTs to detect critical leakage degradation, and did not establish an adequate action plan in anticipation of exceeding action levels, in accordance with ER-AA-2003, steps 4.2.2 and 4.4.3.  

 Screening:  The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor, because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations.  Specifically, the inspectors determined that not adequately monitoring and analyzing SRV performance during conditions of elevated TPT and leakage affected PSEG’s ability to limit likelihood of an events such as spurious SRV opening; and PSEG’s ability to limit the likelihood of challenging critical safety functions such as suppression pool cooling and SRV pressure relief at the Technical Specification setpoint.  

 Significance:  The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.”  

 Cross-Cutting Aspect:  P.5 - Operating Experience:  The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. P.5 - OE: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external OE in a timely manner.  This finding, in accordance with IMC 0310, has a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area associated with Operating Experience, in that PSEG did not systematically and effectively collect, evaluate, and implement relevant internal operating experience in a timely manner.  Specifically, PSEG’s main steam performance monitoring plan did not implement relevant internal operating experience to effectively monitor and analyze critical leakage degradation prior to operation with elevated ‘H’ SRV TPT in 2018 and 2019.  For example, and PSEG identified in 2005 and 2014 that SRV TPT and leak rate calculations were not accurate, and used an ACM to calculate leak rates in 2014, but did not incorporate these learnings into the system monitoring plan. (P.5) Enforcement:  Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Observation:  Missed opportunities associated with the ‘H’ safety relief valve (SRV) and its discharge line vacuum breaker (VB)  

71152 

The inspectors identified the following missed opportunities associated with the ‘H’ safety relief valve (SRV) and its discharge line vacuum breaker (VB):  ‘H’ SRV monitoring and CAP evaluation missed opportunities: o PSEG did not download and graph SRV TPT data from operating Cycle 21 (November 2016 through April 2018), which was needed to properly trend the recorder data during periods of elevated 'H' SRV tailpipe temperature (20819899). o 2019 RCE 70206428, and 2014 Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EQACE) 70168360, stated that 2014 was the first occurrence of ‘H’ SRV main seat leakage, but missed an opportunity to include ‘H’ SRV leakage evaluated in 2011 RCE 70119769. o 2019 RCE 70206428 confirmed a previous NRC observation that 2014 EQACE 70168360 cause determination, performed in response to ‘H’ SRV leakage, was not supported with adequate technical rigor (20803213).
 

‘H’ SRV vacuum breaker missed evaluation opportunities: o PSEG did not consider the ‘H’ SRV vacuum breaker as a potential source of elevated drywell leakage during periods of ‘H’ SRV leakage and condensate induced water hammer in operating cycle 22, after the vacuum breaker was found by to be failed open during preventive maintenance in the spring of 2018 refueling and maintenance outage (20818407 and 20821310). o PSEG did not update the ‘H’ SRV failed-open vacuum breaker CAP evaluation in a timely manner once results from the failure analysis were obtained (20823472). 

The inspectors did not identify that any of the above observations would be considered more than minor performance issues.

Hope Creek: Indications Of Big Maintenence Issues (2) At The Plant

Licensee Event Report 2019-001-00

At 1906 EDT on August 3 2019, while in OPCON 1 at 93.8 percent power, operators identified degrading main condenser vacuum and commenced reducing power. Degrading vacuum was due to the circulating water cooling tower bypass valve failing open. At 1947, the reactor was manually scrammed from 37 percent due to loss of condenser vacuum. Reactor feedwater pumps (RFP) tripped when reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level rose to level 8 (+54 inches) because the reactor feedwater startup level control valve (SULCV) failed open. Operators initiated the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, recovered a RFP and secured RCIC after establishing control of RPV water level. The failed equipment was replaced.
This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Dates: August 03, 2019 Discovery Dates: August 03, 2019
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 1 - Power Operation, 37 percent power.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE At 1906 EDT on August 3, 2019, while in OPCON 1 at 93.8 percent power, operators identified degrading main condenser vacuum and commenced reducing power. Degrading vacuum was due to the circulating water {KE} cooling tower bypass valve failing open. At 1947, the reactor was manually scrammed from 37 percent due to loss of condenser vacuum. Reactor feedwater {SJ} pumps (RFP) tripped when reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level rose to level 8 (+54 inches) because the reactor feedwater startup level control valve (SULCV){JB} failed open. Operators initiated the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC){BN} system, recovered a RFP and secured RCIC after establishing control of RPV water level. The failed equipment was replaced.

 

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

CAUSE OF EVENT A Bailey solid-state logic module failure caused the cooling tower bypass valve to open; which led to loss of main condenser vacuum. A pneumatic relay failure caused the SULCV to fail open.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The Reactor Protection System {JC} system operated as designed to shut down the reactor. The RCIC system operated as designed to inject water into the reactor core. 

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of station Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action program for the past three years was performed. No LERs were identified and no issues were documented in the corrective action program for similar conditions.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354
NARRATIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205550001, or by internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
3. LERNUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2019 - 001 - 00
The Bailey solid-state logic module for the cooling tower bypass valve was replaced and guidance was issued to tag the cooling tower bypass valve closed to prevent spurious opening when not needed. The SULCV pneumatic relay was replaced.
COMMITMENTS This LER contains no regulatory commitmen

EDF Owns Half Of Some Exelon's Nuclear Plant

So why does a giant troubled French utility own half of some Exelon's nuclear plants? Why couldn't they use the US financial system?

Exelon wants full ownership of nuclear plant trio

November 22, 2019

Exelon Generation announced its partner EDF is exercising the put option in their pact to sell its 49.99% interest in the R.E. Ginna, Nine Mile Point and Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plants to Exelon, Kallanish Energy reports.

The put option was established in connection with the joint operating services agreement signed by Exelon and EDF in April 2014, to allow Exelon to take over operations at the three nuclear plants.

Exelon Generation already is the majority owner and operator of the plants, which are located in Upstate New York (R.E. Ginna and Nine Mile Point) and Maryland (Calvert Cliffs).

"Since Exelon Generation took over operations, we have created value for both Exelon and EDF by integrating the three plants into the nation’s largest and best-run nuclear fleet. Leveraging the Exelon management model, we’ve improved overall fleet performance and efficiency while reducing costs in a challenging market environment,” said Chris Crane, Exelon president and CEO.

As part of the acquisition process, EDF and Exelon Generation will seek a negotiated agreement on the sale price. If an agreement can’t be reached, the price will be set through a third-party arbitration process to determine fair market value.

The transaction will require approval by the New York Public Service Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The process and regulatory approvals could take one to two years or more to complete.

The trio of nuclear power plants include the single-unit R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (576 megawatts capacity) and the dual-unit Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (1,907 MW), and the dual-unit Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (1,756 MW).

Exelon Generation, a subsidiary of Exelon Corp., is the largest producer of nuclear power in the U.S., operating 12 facilities, 21 reactors, with total capacity of 18,700 MW, located in Pennsylvania, New York State, Maryland and Illinois.

Mike Mulligan Resigns From Thew NECNP Decommissioning Panel

Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>

To:NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION INC

Nov 21 at 2:42 PM

Dear Ms. Cartwright,

So after all the missing members of NorthStar group, why didn't you call around to the missing members to understand why everyone was missing? Because your communications skills suck and its so unreliable. I can see this kind of crap happening  to the nuclear site is clear. Did Nothrstar pick you guys because the NECNP is such a bungler? 

The NECNP is so erratic and incompetent and NorthStar is making as much hay out it as they can.     

I am afraid all that's going to happen is arguing and fighting between the members and very few people showing up. You guys are going to ruin my reputation. I hereby resign NDCAP. Please remove my email address from you advertising list. 

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan 

Hinsdale, NH

Cell-1603209420

NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION INC <necnp@necnp.org>
To:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

Nov 21 at 12:26 PM

Dear Friends, 

I write today to inform you of the next meeting of the Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel (NDCAP) regarding Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. As many of you know, although the reactor has closed, it is currently in the process of being decommissioned by its new licensee, NorthStar. NDCAP meets to learn about what is occurring at the site and to inform the public of such. NDCAP's role is limited and advisory in nature. For now this is more or less the only way the public has of learning about the status of the site. We continue to support NDCAP's work. 

For some reason or reasons people have stopped attending these NDCAP meetings and it may indicate to NorthStar and the State that the public has lost interest at this important juncture in Vermont Yankee matters. In fact our very own Clay Turnbull was the only member of the public to attend the last meeting of NDCAP held on October 16. Thank you, Clay!

We implore you to make every effort to attend the next meeting of the NDCAP.

WHEN: December 5, 2019 from 6pm to 9pm
WHERE: Brattleboro Area Middle School, Brattleboro, Vermont

The backstory: New England Coalition fought hard to convince NorthStar to agree to a public participation process. Why a separate process? Especially since NDCAP was created with the input of Entergy we wanted to give the public an opportunity to influence issues and not simply report out on them. Of course this influence would remain consistent with our mission of striving for the betterment of human and environmental health.

We are in regular contact with NorthStar about the specifics of this public participation process. Know it has been slow to manifest due to the complexities of getting it right.

Please attend this meeting of NDCAP. Let us demonstrate public interest in the clean-up which will in turn aid our continuing efforts to create a body of citizen watchdogs who will monitor and negotiate the clean-up of this radioactive waste site (NDCAP has not and will not).

The NECNP now needs to be removed from NorthStar decommission panel. They have shown themselves to be too disorganized and erratic to run this panel.    

More backstory: the new NDCAP chair, a member of the Vernon Selectboard, was publicly reported as saying the NDCAP needed to dissolve. The agenda of this NDCAP meeting includes restructuring the NDCAP!

On another note I want to report the Coalition is considering filing an action regarding the degrading concrete at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station in Seabrook, New Hampshire and we want to open dialogue with our membership regarding the Coalition's role in Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford, Connecticut. 

Sincerely,
Lorie Cartwright

The New England Coalition has been the people’s advocate for safe energy since 1971. The Coalition was founded by several groups of citizens and scientists concerned about the nation’s growing civilian nuclear power program. Our mission has not changed: we investigate the safety, suitability, and environmental effects of nuclear power plants; we participate in government hearings; and we inform the public and government agencies of the hazards and risks of nuclear power. A combination of the NEC’s network of technical advisors, engineers, lawyers, students, activists and citizens, and the many years of experience and document collection, has earned the Coalition the respect of industry, government and citizens’ groups. They are currently involved in issues about the decommissioning of Vermont Yankee. 

We are a 501(c)(3) and any donations are tax deductible. Thank you in advance.

Got a Call From Chinese Consulate General in Washington DC...the Chinese Desk?

This is the number that sent the message: 12122273786. Well, maybe it is. I reversed called it. It comes from a apartment abutting downtown Manhattan. Isn't the UN in Manhattan located pretty close to the  apartment. She lives on Pike Street near the Manhattan bridge.

So here is me trying to protect myself. I am way more sophisticated than my educational level. I understand the crisis Hong Kong, China and USA is in right now. I got a call from the Chinese Consulate General in Washington DC this morning and they left a recording on my phone. The person on the line said they have a document they want me to see. So I am thinking big shit is going on in Hong Kong and China today. What the hell would the Chinese Consulate want anything to do with me. I am thinking it is a spam of some sort. The recording gave a ero telephone of sorts. Then told me ask for the "Chinese desk".  I am as curious as a cat over everything. I am bored, thinking what the hell, I am going to give them a call. We are basically at a state of pseudo war with anything China at this moment is time. I am thinking anything China phone line is bugged by the USA, let alone by NASA and the CIA. So I know for a fact the US would be curious as hell why I called the Washington Consulate. I knew I was going have difficulties handling the switchboard. I am a whistleblower. I know how to get by any switchboard by one way or another. I ended calling the consulate three time hunting for the key to get in.  So you get a list of departments to call, none of them useful to me. On the third try I finally hear "emergency dial 1000". So I called that number. I said, "I am Mike Mulligan". "I am a us citizen". Then I hear from the Chinese guy say " this is bad for you". I am thinking, duh.   I explained I got a call from your consulate saying you want me to see some documents. I was probably talking to the Chinese CIA guy or their operations center. He says something in Chinese, then says again "this is bad for you". I said, well, I am a US citizen and I don't give a shit what my government thinks about this.  

Grand Gulf, Again

It is just like they flipped a switch.  For the last three months, Grand Gulf has had a very good capacity factor.  Throw  a little attention their way, like a lot of newspaper stories and NRC official Toy Preuett throwing a 2.206 at GG...have they finally changed their minds,

Good Job Grand Gulf!