Hinsdale-Brattleboro Route 119 Bridge

With new Hinsdale-Brattleboro bridge on horizon, committee plans old spans' future

By Meg McIntyre Sentinel Staff
Jul 28, 2019 Updated 34 min ago 

With the completion of a new bridge connecting Hinsdale to Brattleboro still several years away, a local subcommittee is already hard at work to determine the future of the existing bridges between the two towns.

Remember this wasn't the original names of the bridges. I think it had no name. I wonder when the new bridge inspection is comming. Remember it was red listed last year. It should have been on the highly politicalized list for many decades.    

Named after Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh, the Route 119 bridges are Pennsylvania truss-style spans built in 1920 and rehabilitated in 1988. A new bridge is set to be built several hundred feet downstream, with construction slated to begin next year and finish in 2023.

A project to replace the bridges has been included in New Hampshire’s 10-year transportation improvement plan since fiscal year 1994, with its start date being delayed several times.

A subcommittee comprising representatives from both communities has been meeting to discuss the existing bridges for a little more than a year, according to J.B. Mack, principal planner for the Southwest Region Planning Commission. Mack said he’s facilitating the committee process to gather feedback and input from community stakeholders.

An environmental assessment document created as part of the state’s overall bridge replacement project identified the existing bridges as a historic “extension of downtown Brattleboro,” according to Mack. That document proposes using the bridges for pedestrian and bicycle use.

I never seen the term "Hinsdale Island" before. It was once termed as Island Park. It seems the floating name of the island is a open question. As with everything in this area very little public information gets to the public including metting times and dates.  

The subcommittee is also looking at the future of Hinsdale Island, which connects the two bridges, Mack said. After speaking with the N.H. Department of Environmental Services, it appears that extensive construction on the island would not be possible because it is in the floodplain zone and is primarily composed of alluvial deposits.

“They’ve talked about maybe putting a gazebo or having a park out there, but in terms of intensive development, it doesn’t look like it’s a good idea,” Mack said.

The group is also looking at the possibility of creating a trail loop connecting the old and new bridges that would allow pedestrians and bicyclists to cross on one bridge and return on the other, he said.

“We’ve talked about working with local groups to do some interpretive signage where basically people can learn more about the history of the river, or people that used to live on the river,” he said. “The native Abenaki has been one idea, and sort of the industrial past of Brattleboro.”

Funding is still being secured for the refurbishment of the existing bridges, according to Mack, but the N.H. Department of Transportation has applied for a federal BUILD Grant for the project.

The subcommittee has met three times so far, according to Mack. At this point, there is no concrete timeline for the group to complete its work, he said, but members plan to continue brainstorming before ultimately bringing their proposal to the community for feedback.

“We’ve got quite a bit of time to do our planning, but at the same time, it’s so close especially to Brattleboro that it’s an important resource, and we’ve got to start planning for it as soon as possible,” he said.

The Existing Bridges Subcommittee plans to meet again in August, Mack said, but a specific date and time have not yet been set. Once scheduled, information about the next meeting, along with general information about the wider bridge replacement project, will be available at www.nh.gov/dot/projects/hinsdalebrattleboro12210.

Nuclear Agency Considers Reducing Inspections

U.S. NEWS

07/17/2019 06:58 am ET

Nuclear Agency Considers Reducing Inspections Of Reactors
Opponents denounce the cost-cutting move as a threat to public safety.
 

Associated Press 

The construction site of Vogtle Units 4 at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant is see on March 22, 2019 in Waynesboro, Ga. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will look at cutting back on inspections of the country’s nuclear reactors. 

WASHINGTON (AP) — Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is recommending that the agency cut back on inspections at the country’s nuclear reactors, a cost-cutting move promoted by the nuclear power industry but denounced by opponents as a threat to public safety.

The recommendations, made public Tuesday, include reducing the time and scope of some annual inspections at the nation’s 90-plus nuclear power plants. Some other inspections would be cut from every two years to every three years.

Some of the staff’s recommendations would require a vote by the commission, which has a majority of members appointed or reappointed by President Donald Trump, who has urged agencies to reduce regulatory requirements for industries.

The nuclear power industry has prodded regulators to cut inspections, saying the nuclear facilities are operating well and that the inspections are a financial burden for power providers. Nuclear power, like coal-fired power, has been struggling in market completion against cheaper natural gas and rising renewable energy. 

While Tuesday’s report made clear that there was considerable disagreement among the nuclear agency’s staff on the cuts, it contended the inspection reduction “improves efficiency while still helping to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the public.”

Commission member Jeff Baran criticized the proposed changes Tuesday, saying reducing oversight of the nuclear power industry “would take us in the wrong direction.”

“NRC shouldn’t perform fewer inspections or weaken its safety oversight to save money,” Baran said.

The release comes a day after Democratic lawmakers faulted the NRC’s deliberations, saying they had failed to adequately inform the public of the changes under consideration.

“Cutting corners on such critical safety measures may eventually lead to a disaster that could be detrimental to the future of the domestic nuclear industry,” Rep. Frank Pallone, D-N.J., chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and other House Democrats said in a letter Monday to NRC Chairwoman Kristine Svinicki.

Asked for comment Tuesday, NRC spokespeople pointed to the staff arguments for the changes in the report. Trimming overall inspections “will improve effectiveness because

There is a common definition of a word and the industry's and nrc's definitions of words. "Safety" and "significance" are such slimy words. Those words means anything the agency wants?  

inspectors again will be focused on issues of greater safety significance,” staffers told commission members in the recommendations.

Edwin Lyman, a nuclear-power expert at the nonprofit Union of Concerned Scientists, faulted the reasoning of commission staff that the good performance of much of the nuclear power industry warranted cutting back on agency inspections for problems and potential problems.

“That completely ignores the cause-and-effect relationship between inspections and good performances,” Lyman said.

Brattleboro-Hinsdale Bridge: My Vision of a New Island Park.

Update

I will probably get a email from Brattleboro Reformer I am infringing again on their newspaper copy rights. But are they a newspaper?

***Right, I been thinking what to do with this Park since I parked my ass next to the bridges during my protesting days. I was the first one who conceived of this project.

'Pie in the sky' vision for island, bridges

Posted Tuesday, July 16, 2019 7:51 pm

By Bob Audette, Brattleboro Reformer

BRATTLEBORO — While the new bridge connecting Hinsdale, N.H., to downtown Brattleboro won't be complete until the fall of 2023, discussions are underway as to what to do with the two existing bridges and the island between them.

On Tuesday, the Existing Bridges Committee, which is a subcommittee of the Hinsdale-to-Brattleboro Project Advisory Committee, met at the Brattleboro Municipal Building to begin the process of deciding how the bridges and the island might be used once traffic is diverted to the new bridge.

The replacement bridge will cross the Connecticut River at the traffic signal for George's Field on the New Hampshire side and will land on the Vermont side, on Route 142, just south of the parking lot for 28 Vernon St., which was formerly known as the Marlboro College Graduate Center.

When asked why the old bridges shouldn't just be removed, J.B. Mack, Principal Planner for the Southwest Region Planning Commission, said as part of the environmental review for the replacement bridge, the Anna Hunt Marsh and the Charles Dana bridges were characterized as part of the historical heritage of the region.

"The state historical agencies also thought it made sense to keep the bridges," he said. "Some people disagree with that assessment, but that's a major milestone in getting federal funding for the project."

While there is debate on whether the bridges should stay or go, said Brattleboro Assistant Town Manager Patrick Moreland, the scope of the the Existing Bridges Committee "assumes the bridges will stay and people will have access to the island."

Moreland noted that the overall goals for the main project we were established in 2013. 

They included: Maintaining a transportation corridor between the two towns; fixing the safety, structural and functional deficiencies of the existing corridor; maintaining area social and economic relationships; preserving the integrity of area resources; and conserving fiscal resources.

Notably, "The Brattleboro/Hinsdale transportation corridor has numerous natural and cultural resources that contribute to the social, economic, environmental, and aesthetic qualities of the area," states "Purpose and Needs" statement for the project.

"To the extent possible," said Moreland, "we should consider minimizing the impact on the local taxpayers. There's going to be considerable money spent here, but it's important to consider ways in which to have it not hit the tax base in Brattleboro or Hinsdale."

The cost for the entire project is $50 million, with $26 million coming from New Hampshire, $4 million from Vermont and $20 million from either a federal grant or low-interest loans.

Robert Landry, the administrator for the Bridge Design Division of the N.H. Department of Transportation, said rehabilitating the existing bridges for pedestrian use is estimated to cost $8 million, which is included in the $50 million price tag.

How much it will cost to maintain the bridges and how long they will last after the new bridge is open is being studied and those numbers should be available soon, said Landry.

Who will be responsible for the upkeep of the bridges and any improvements to the island, which might include signage, lighting and some sort of low-impact event space, has yet to be determined. Currently, the state of New Hampshire owns the bridges and the island, and Hinsdale has shown little interest in assuming ownership, and the accompanying fiscal responsibility. The town of Brattleboro has also indicated it doesn't want to own the bridges or the island.

"There is an ongoing discussion, not at this committee's level, working toward resolving who ultimately will be the owners," said Moreland, adding how much it will cost to maintain the bridges and the island will help to inform that decision.

Nonetheless, said Moreland, it's important to define a vision for the space when the bridges are closed in 2023.

"What do we aspire to?" asked Mack. "The possibilities are wide open."

The committee spent some time discussing the recreational opportunities afforded by the bridges and the island, including access to hiking and biking trails on both sides of the Connecticut River and access to the river itself, such as for swimmers and kayakers and canoeists.

Moreland noted that whatever happens with the existing bridges, the community needs to know that the bridges and the island will be "clean and safe."

Currently, the island is being used as a camping spot for the homeless and for drug use. The Hinsdale Police Department has conducted sweeps on the island to clear the campers out, but they usually return.

"Actually making it a more active destination as opposed to people moving through the site like now, would be better for keeping it clean and safe," noted Kathy Urffer, a river steward with the Connecticut River Conservancy. "A little conscious development might go a long way, such as interpretive signs, maybe a deck or a vista where people could sit and paint or look at the river."

The committee agreed the area could be used for cultural events such as small concerts or museum exhibits, but expressed concerns about crowds that might be attracted to the island and the lack of bathrooms.

Porta poddies? NH is spending the most money on the project and the Brattleboro Refomer is soley allowing the Brattleboro losers to publically discuss these issues.   

"The number of people who can be on that island is limited," said Moreland.

"Pie in the sky," said Marion Major, a planner with the Windham Regional Commission, "we'd love to have events staged here with an extremely low-maintenance event space."

"It's important to keep it pretty broad," agreed Mack. "The next step is to get the public involved."

The committee discussed ways to get people involved and how best to solicit ideas from the public. They agreed that public meetings were a good starting point, but also suggested setting up information booths at local farmers markets and events.

The planning commissions also hope to set up an online commenting tool for people who can't make the meetings or don't necessarily like to speak in public.

Mack said if people want to submit ideas for the existing bridges or the island right now, or have any ideas on how to reach the committee can reach out to the public, they should email him at jbmack@swrpc.org.

Fermi: Overwhelmed By Problems And The Complexity of the Plant

Update July 15

The below list comes from the back of the inspection report. So Fermi identified severe corrosion in the 2018 outage and they put in a "WO" (work order)to fix the it. I highlighted in red the titles.

Check out all the cards on the CDRM system? The control rod drive system scrams, shutdowns and starts up the plant. The extent of the CDRM troubles is startling!!!!  

***May 9, 2019

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2019001 

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 

 71111.04—Equipment Alignment  

 - Design Basis Document for the Control Air System; Revision C  

- Drawing 6M721–2084; Residual Heat Removal Division 1; Revision BP  

- Drawing 6M721–5730–3; Non-Interruptible Control Air System Division I and II; Revision AL  

- Drawing 6M721 

–5734; Emergency Diesel Generator Functional Operating Sketch; Revision BG  

- Drawing 6M721N–2049; P&ID Diesel Fuel Oil System and Lube Oil System Division II RHR Complex; Revision AV  

- Drawing 6M721N 

–2052; Process and Identification Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Division 1 RHR Complex; Revision AE  

- Procedure 23.208; RHR Complex Service Water Systems; Revision 122  

- Procedure 23.307; Emergency Diesel Generator System; Revisions 125 and 126 

- Procedure 24.202.05; HPCI System Cold Shutdown Valve Operability Test; Revision 50 

71111.05AQ—Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly 

 - CARD 19–21289; NQA Audit 19–0102 Deficiency  

— Required Gear Not Staged Properly for the Fire Brigade Dress Out Areas; 02/19/2019 - CARD 19 

–21870; Request Chemical Storage Areas Inventory and Hazards be Implemented into Fire Protection Pre Plans; 03/11/2019  

- Drawing 6A721–2031; Radwaste Building 1st Floor Plan Elevation 583’6”; Revision AD - Drawing 6A721 

–2033; Radwaste Building 2nd Floor Plan Elevation 613’6” and 2nd Floor Mezzanine Elevation 628’6”; Revision AC  

- Fire Drill Evaluation LP–FP–940–06YX; 1st Floor RAD Waste Chemistry Lab Storage Room Elevation 583’6”; Revision 1  

- MOP10; Fire Brigade; Revision 10  

- MRP09; Respiratory Protection; Revision 15A  

- Procedure 20.000.22; Plant Fires; Revision 46A  

- Procedure 65.000.768; Inspection of MSA Firehawk M–7 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus; Revision 5 - Procedure FP 

–RDWST; Radwaste Building Zones 22, 23, 24, and 25; Revision 6  

- WO 52580752; Perform Unannounced Fire Drill; 03/07/2019
 71111.06—Flood Protection Measures  

 - CARD 19–21537; Missed Classification and Initial Notification During an As Found Assessment; 02/28/2019 - SS–OP–904–1901; Fermi 2 Evaluation Scenario; Revision 0 

 71111.11—Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance 

 - CARD 19–21547; N3021C013, Number Five Low Pressure Intercept Valves Unitized Actuator Oil Temperature High; 02/28/2019  

- Procedure 22.000.03; Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%; Revisions 103A and 104 

- Procedure 23.107; Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems; Revision 146  

- Procedure 23.109; Turbine Operating Procedure; Revision 94  

- Reactivity Maneuvering Plan; February 2019 Major RPA; Revision 0  

 71111.12—Maintenance Effectiveness  

 - CARD 14–23623; Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Placed C1107 in (a)(1) Status; 04/24/2014  

- CARD 14–23625; System Monitoring Under Maintenance Rule Program Identified Adverse Trend of PIP Failure; 04/24/2014 

- CARD 15–27522; Loss of RPIS Due to a Temporary Overcurrent Condition Crowbar on the C11KA01 5V Power Supply; 12-09/2015  

- CARD 18–20006; RPIS PIP Problems Identified During Suppression Testing; 01/01/2018  

- CARD 18–21250; Received 3080 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on HCU 34-03; 02/14/2018  

- CARD 18–21252; Received 3080 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on HCU 46-07; 02/14/2018  

- CARD 18–22007; CRD Accumulator Trouble HCU 26-51; 03/10/2018 

- CARD 18–22264; Received 30-17 IPCS Computer Trouble Due to Loss of MCD Data Link; 03/18/2018  

- CARD 18–23029; Control Rod 30-35 Missing Full In Light; 04/14/2018  

- CARD 18–23030; Control 42-11 has Blue Scram Light On with Only Half Scram In; 04/14/2018

- CARD 18–23122; Control Rod 18-15 Full In Light Did Not Extinguish when Rod Withdrawn; 04/17/2018  

- CARD 18–23131; Missing CRDM PIP Indications; 04/17/2018  

- CARD 18–23648; Loss of Position Indication Control Rod 42-27; 05/07/2018  

- CARD 18–23656; Control Rod Select Pushbutton for 54-23 Failing; 05/07/2018  

- CARD 18–23721; Received 3D80 ‘Control Rod Drift’ on CRD 46-07; 05/09/2018  

- CARD 18–24252; Control Rod Drift Alarm 06-15; 05/29/2018 

- CARD 18–26075; Control Rod 46-19 Briefly Lost Position 46 Indication; 08/11/2018  

- CARD 18–27225; Drift Lights for CRD 26-31 and 50-23 Do Not Indicate on the Full Core Display; 09/24/2018  

- CARD 18–27279; Control Rod 26-19 and 30-11 Missing PIPs; 09/24/2018  

- CARD 18–27324; Trend CARD — Crud Found in HCI DCV During Inspection; 09/26/2018  

- CARD 18–28185; Control Rod 26-43 Loss of Full in Light; 10/11/2018  

- CARD 18–28201; During Control Rod Exercising 38-31 Notched Out and the Full In Light Remained Illuminated; 10/12/2018  

- CARD 18–28242; CRDM 50-31 Missing PIP Indications; 10/13/2018 

- CARD 18–28253; Control Rod 26-43 Full In Light Goes Out when Lifting at Position 00; 10/13/2018 - CARD 18–28311; Control Rod 14-27; 10/14/2018  

- CARD 18–28349; CR 30-15 Became Uncoupled When Fully Withdrawn; 10/15/2018  

- CARD 18–28354; Multiple Rod Movement Message Received on RWM-OD During Performance of Scram Time Testing; 10/15/2018 

- CARD 18–28388; Control Rod 26-43 ‘ Full Out’ Light Not Lit with the Rod at Position 48; 10/16/2018  

- CARD 18–28443; 3D76 Control Rod Over-Travel for Rod 26-19; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28445; 3D80 Control Rod Drift for Rod 06-23; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28448; Control Rod 30-43 Missing ‘18’ Indication; 10/17/2018  

- CARD 18–28449; 50-31 Missing Various PIP Indications; 10/18/2018 

- CARD 18–28450; Control Rod 50-51 Missing Various Indications; 10/18/2018  

- CARD 18–28550; PMT Failed for Rod 18-15 WO 50495365; 10/20/2018  

- CARD 18–28588; Full In Light 42-27 Momentarily Flickered; 10/21/2018  

- CARD 18–28673; CRD 54-23 Missing Various PIP Indications; 10/24/2018  

- CARD 18–28759; Control Rod 38-19 Full In Light Lit with Rod at Position 12; 10/26/2018  

- CARD 18–28892; Control Rod Drift Alarm 06-15; 10/29/2018  

- CARD 18–28989; Control Rod Drift Alarm 58-43; 11/01/2018  

- CARD 18–29030; RONOR Switch Failed; 11/03/2018  

- CARD 18–29201; RONOR Switch Failed; 11/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29679; Received 3D80, Control Rod Drift, Alarm for Control Rod 42-19; 12/03/2018  

- CARD 18–29830; 58-23 Abnormal Indications After Scram; 12/07/2018  

- CARD 18–29862; Rod Drift 42-27; 12/08/2018  

- CARD 18–29876; Rod 26-43 Double Notch; 12/09/2018  

- CARD 18–29912; Control Rod 50-31 Missing PIPs 30, 31, 34, 35, and 38 Entering FO18–02; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29914; Control Rod Drift 58-23; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29915; Control Rod Drift 06-23; 12/10/2018  

- CARD 18–29954; RONOR Switch is Working Intermittently when Placed in Override; 12/11/2018  

- CARD 18–30119; Control Rod Drift Alarm Received for Rod 46-55; 12/14/2018  

- CARD 18–30228; Rod 46-19 Received a Rod Drift Alarm while Moving from Position 00 to 02; 12/19/2018  

- CARD 18–30342; AB5/RB5 Secondary Containment Airlock Door will Not Open; 12/22/2018

- CARD 18–30369; Door Not Allowing Access; 12/25/2018  

- CARD 19–20015; Rod Drift 06-23; 01/01/2019  

- CARD 19–20020; Rod Drift 42-19; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20026; Rod Drift 26-23; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20048; Control Rod Drift Alarm Rod 34-19; 01/02/2019  

- CARD 19–20054; Rod Drift 06-15; 01/03/2019  

- CARD 19–20462; Control Rod 18-59 Full Out Indication Light Remained Lit When Driven to Position 46; 01/19/2019  

- CARD 19–20465; Received Rod for Rod 50-19; 01/19/2019  

- CARD 19-20614; Control Air Compressor Room North Airlock Malfunction; 01/26/2019  

- CARD 19–20854; RMOC 2019 RMOC Action Item Tracking; 02/06/2019  

- CARD 19–21227; AB5/RB5 Interlock Switch Needs Adjustment; 02/17/2019  

- CARD 19–21292; RB5 and AB5 Airlock Doors Opened at the Same Time Resulting in a Temporary Loss of Secondary Containment; 02/19/2019  

- CARD 19-21474; MRC Cognitive Trend:  Door Airlock and Interlock Malfunction; 02/26/2019  

- LCO Tracking Sheet 2018-0267C; Secondary Containment Doors Without Interlocks; 06/26/2018  

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual, Appendix E, Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions; Revision 23A  

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual, Appendix F, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria; Revision 21  

- Procedure 23.428; Secondary Containment Airlocks and Penetrations; Revision 35A 

- Procedure 24.000.01, Situational Surveillances/LCO Action Tracking; Revision 77  

- Procedure MGA03, Chapter 3, Procedure Use and Adherence; Revision 27A  

- WO 48136887; Perform Reactor/Aux Building Airlock Interlock Verification Test; 12/02/2018  

- WO 51444881; Restore Normal Operation to RB4/RB3 Interlock Doors; 08/01/2018  

- WO 52890935; Investigate/Repair RB5 Reactor/Aux Building Airlock Interlock Not Functioning; 01/04/2019 

 71111.13—Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 

 - CARD 19–20212; RPS Relay C71A-K10B Deenergized; 01/09/2019  

- CARD 19–20214; 1 HPCV Low Pressure Light Did Not Illuminate; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–20215; Erratic Reading on 2 HPCV Indicator; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–21375; Enhancement to ODE-20 (Protected Equipment) for Protecting CREF Equipment; 02/21/2019  

- CARD 19–21711; WO D302210100, Refurbish West Circulation Water Makeup Pump P4100C011.  After Tagging, it was Discovered that Isolation had Not Been Achieved; 03/06/2019 

- Drawing 6I721–2040–07; Arrangement Trip System ‘B’ RPS Cabinet H11P611; Revision R  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–06; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘A’ System Relays;  Revision V  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–07; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘B’ System Relays; Revision X  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–09; Reactor Protection System Trip System ‘B’ Scram Trip Logic; Revision L  

- Drawing 6I721–2155–09A; RPS Trip System ‘B2’ Scram Trip Logic; Revision D  

- Drawing 6M721–5720; Circulating Water System Functional Operating Sketch; Revision BC  

- Drawing 6M721–5726; General Service Water System Functional Operating Sketch; Revision CG 

- Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual MMR12; Equipment Out of Service Risk Management; Revision 20  

- Procedure 23.101; Circulating Water System; Revision 103 

- Procedure 23.610; Reactor Protection System; Revision 24 

- Procedure 24.110.05; RPS — Turbine Control and Stop Valve Functional Test; Revision 47  

- Procedure 44.010.064; RPS — Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Closure Calibration; Revision 33  

- Risk Management Plan, EDG 14 Safety System Outage; 02/20/2019  

- WO 52936137; RPS Relay C71A-K10B De-energized; 01/10/2019 

- WO D302210100; Refurbish West Circulation Water Makeup Pump; 03/05/2019
 71111.15—Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments  

- CARD 19-20353; Mispositioned Component APRM 3 Not Bypassed during 45.604.001; 01/16/2019  

- CARD 19–20871; 9D18 Division 1 48/24V Battery 21A Trouble Due to Low Voltage; 02/06/2019  

- CARD 19–20951; Trip of 24/48 Volt Battery Charger 21A-2 and Erratic Division 1 IRM Recorder Readings; 02/08/2019  

- CARD 19–20965; Prompt Investigation IAW MGA23 for Trip of Division 1 48/24 Volt Battery Charger; 02/08/2019  

- CARD 19–21475; Abnormal Reactor Building Sump Input/Lifting RHRSW Relief Valve  Division 2; 02/26/2019  

- CARD 19–21535; RHRSW Thermal Relief Valve Lifted; 02/28/2019  

- Drawing 6SD721–2530–17; One Line Diagram 48/24 VDC Instrumentation Batteries Distribution; Revision AM  

- EFA–E11–19–001; E1100F056B Division 2 RHR Heat Exchanger Tube Side Relief Valve Stuck Open; 03/01/2019  

- MQA11–100; Operability Determination Process; Revision 2A 

- Procedure 20.300.24/48 VDC; Loss of 24/48V DC Battery Busses; Revision 2 - Procedure 23.310; 48/24 VDC Electrical System; Revision 29  

- Procedure 23.601; Instrument Trip Sheets; Revision 40 - Procedure 24.000.02; Shiftly, Daily, and Weekly Required Surveillances; Revision 154  

- Procedure 44.030.056; ECCS — Reactor Recirculation Riser DP, Division 1, Functional Test; Revision 30  

- Procedure 45.604.001; LPRM Testing and Preparation for Removal; Revision 47 - Procedure 57.000.10; LPRM Operational Status; Revision 40  

- Procedure ARP 9D18; Division 1 48/24 VDC Battery 21A Trouble; Revision 13 - TE–R32–19–008; Past Operability Review of Division 1 24/48 Volt Batteries; Revision 0  

- WO 49664080; Perform IV Curves on APRM 3 LPRM Detectors; 01/18/2018
 71111.19—Post Maintenance Testing  

- CARD 19-21301; EDG 14 Air Coolant Pump Backlash; 02/19/2019  

- CARD 19–21308; During Cross-Drive Contingency Implementation, Flex Drive Gear Teeth Found Significantly Fretted and Pitted; 02/20/2019  

- CARD 19–21333; Missing Parts from EDG Flex Gear Kit; 02/20/2019 

- CARD 19–21479; Relief Valve E1100F056B Lost its Traceability After RF19; 02/26/2019  

- Drawing 6I721N–2201–50; Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan ‘A’ High and Low Breaker Cont. E1156C001A; Revision W  

- Procedure 24.208.03; EESW and EECW Makeup Pump and Valve Operability Test; Revision 81  

- Procedure 24.307.17, Emergency Diesel Generator 14-Start and Load Test; Revision 5 

- Procedure 24.307.48; Emergency Diesel Generator 14-Fast Start Followed by Load Reject; Revision 15  

- Procedure 35.000.237; Alignment of Vertical Equipment; Enclosure B  

- Procedure 35.307.008; Emergency Diesel Generator-Engine General Maintenance;  Revision 44  

- Procedure 35.318.009; Inspection and Testing of ITE Ground and Overcurrent Protection Relays Revision 32  

- Procedure 46.000.105; ITT General Control Milliampere Hydramotor Actuator Model 91; Revision 28  

- Residual Heat Removal Complex HVAC Design Basis Document 

- WO 48522230, Perform 24.307.48 EDG 14 Fast Start Followed by Load Reject; 02/25/19  

- WO 49005245; Perform 24.208.03 D2 EECW M/U Pump and Valve Operability (Section 5.2); 03/28/2019  

- WO 51526965; Refurbish RHR HVAC EDG-14 Room Return Air Damper Actuator; 02/18/2019 

 71111.20—Refueling and Other Outage Activities  

 - CARD 19–20217; Fatigue Management Violation Associated with Torus Coating Activities; 01/10/2019  

- MGA17; Working Hour Limits; Revisions 10A and 11  

- MMR Appendix E; Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions; Revision 23A  

- Procedure 22.000.02; Plant Startup to 25% Power; Revision 101  

- Procedure 23.109; Turbine Operating Procedure; Revision 94  

- Procedure 23.118; Main Generator and Generator Excitation; Revision 67  

- WO 48693770; Extensive Coating Defects Identified During Torus Underwater Inspection; 09/22/2018  

- WO 48693800; Inspect and Repair Torus Coating, Above Water; 09/18/2017 

 71111.22—Surveillance Testing 

 - Procedure 24.137.01; Main Steam Line Isolation Channel Functional Test; Revision 46 

- WO 47498965; Perform 44.010.062 RPS MSIV’s Inboard Valve Limit Switch, Divisions I and II, CAL; 10/09/2018  

- WO 49253018; Perform 24.137.01 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Channel Functional Test; 03/02/2019  

 71114.06—Drill Evaluation 

 - RERP Plan Implementing Procedure EP-101; Classification of Emergencies; Revision 42C  

 71151—Performance Indicator Verification  

 - LER 2018-002-00; Loss of Division 1 Offsite Power Causes Partial Loss of Feedwater Leading to ECCS Injection and Reactor Scram; 06/12/2018  

- LER 2018-006-00; Emergency Diesel Generator Load Sequencer Inhibits Automatic Start of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Under Certain Scenarios Due to Unrecognized Original Design Defect; 12/14/2018

- Licensee PI Data Submittal Reports for Scrams/Scrams with Complications, January 2018December 2018  

- Licensee PI Data Submittal Reports for Unplanned Power Changes, January 2018- December 2018  

- Licensing Performance Indicator Safety System Functional Failure CDE Data Entry, Verification and Approval Reports: February 2018 and September 2018  

71152—Problem Identification and Resolution 

 - CARD 17–27506; The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off; 09/09/2017  

- CARD 18–25847; Division 2 MDCT Fan Brake Inverter Found with No Power; 08/03/2018  

- CARD 18–27984; AECOM Threatened to be Laid Off if They Write a CARD; 10/08/2018  

- CARD 18–29027; E1150F068B Did Not Close as Expected; 11/02/2018  

- CARD 18–29322; Potential Issue with E1150F068A Noted by Abnormal System Response for RHRSW Pump ‘A’ Startup; 11/16/2018  

- CARD 18–29727; The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off; 12/04/2018  

- CARD 18–29745; Evaluate Vendor Suggested MDCT Inverter Replacement; 12/04/2018  

- CARD 19–20118; NQA Evaluate Adding Reference to NRC Information Notice 85-89 to Item Descriptions for Fabrication of 410 Stainless Steel Valve Stems; 01/04/2019 

- CARD 19–20217; Fatigue Management Violation Associated with Torus Coating Activities; 01/10/2019  

- CARD 19–20652; Provide Additional Training/Information Regarding the Purpose and Value of the Site Corrective Action Process; 01/29/2019 

- CARD 19–21516; 27.2019-5 Recorded Triggers on Division II by the Astromed Monitoring the Division 2 MDCT Inverter; 02/27/2019  

- LER 2016–006–00; Inadequate Interpretation of Technical Specifications Related to Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brake System Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, Loss of Safety Function, and Unanalyzed Condition; 10/20/2016  

- LER 2017–005–00; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 11/03/2017  

- LER 2018–005–0; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 09/29/2018  

- LER 89–016–00; Residual Heat Removal Service Water Cooling Tower Fan Brake Inoperable Due to Low Nitrogen Pressure; 07/11/1989  

- Procedure 35.000.235; Bolted Bonnet Globe Valve General Maintenance; Revision 29 - Procedure 46.205.001; Calibration of RHR Cooling Tower Fan Overspeed Protection System; Revision 30  

 71153—Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion  

- CARD 18–28572; Degraded Grid Relaying is Not Bypassed when the EDGs are Supplying their Respective ESF Bus; 10/20/2018  

- CARD 18–28990; Root Cause Evaluation Identified that EDP 80065 Inadvertently Changed 4160V ‘6’ Close Permissive; 11/01/2018  

- LER 2018–005–0; Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function; 09/29/2018 

- LER 2018–006–00; Emergency Diesel Generator Load Sequencer Inhibits Automatic Start of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Under Certain Scenarios Due to Unrecognized Original Design Defect; 10/19/2018 - Operating Logs; 8/2/2018 – 08/05/

Fermi Had Employee Safety Intimidation Issues In the Same Outage They Falsified Inside The Torus Paint Inspection?

Technically they didn't falsify documents. It is a much more sophisticated corruption than that. It is systemic and widespread ethics and morality corruption on a grand scale. Everyone knows how to play the rules to not piss off their bosses at Fermi and higher levels at the NRC to appease them. Bury them in paperwork complexity to the higher managers so they blinded them...make them better than they should be.  There is plausible deniability all around here. I am sure there is a host of rule and code violations all around here. But everyone know nothing not much will happen even if caught. I'll bet they played the complexity of the plant and paperwork figuring the NRC would never dig deep into the paperwork. 

There are millions of components and parts in this plant. They amount of procedures, rules, engineering          


CARD 18-27984

May 9, 2019

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2019001 

 On October 8, 2018, a plant employee generated condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 18-27984, which detailed a potential safety conscious work environment (SCWE) issue where an AECOM contractor working at the plant stated he was told that he would be laid off if he wrote a CARD.  In response to the issue, the licensee initiated various actions that included, but were not limited to:

• On October 10, 2018, the licensee convened an emergent Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP) meeting to discuss the concerns outlined in CARD 18-27984 and to ensure that the proper investigation, actions, and communications were being conducted. • The Plant Manager held numerous meetings with AECOM and licensee craft employees at the plant to reinforce the importance of raising nuclear safety concerns and to emphasize the importance of a healthy SCWE. • The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Coordinator conducted an investigation into the incident and performed an assessment of the nuclear safety culture at the plant, specifically focused on the AECOM contractor workforce. • The licensee performed a study of the number and types of CARDs initiated by the AECOM organization to confirm CARDs were being generated and that issues were being documented. • The Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) discussed the licensee’s expectation in the area of problem identification with AECOM senior management.
 On January 18, 2019, the inspectors completed a review of the actions taken by the licensee associated with CARD 18-27984.
 The inspectors interviewed the ECP Coordinator and reviewed documents pertaining to the investigation of the events surrounding the CARD, which included written statements from individuals at the scene when the comment in question was made.  The inspectors also reviewed ECP records and performed a corrective action program (CAP) document search for issues relevant to SCWE for the previous 3 months leading up to the inspection.  In addition, the inspectors reviewed CARD initiation data from previous refueling outages at the plant and compared them to RFO 19 when CARD 18-27984 was written.
 The inspectors reviewed training material provided to new employees arriving at the plant to ensure that all personnel, particularly supplemental personnel brought in for refueling outages, were made aware of their responsibilities for raising nuclear safety concerns and the licensee’s expectation for maintaining a healthy SCWE.
 The inspectors conducted one focus group, consisting of seven AECOM craft personnel, and five individual interviews, comprised of three AECOM craft personnel and two AECOM supervisors, to assess the SCWE fostered by AECOM.  Additionally, the inspectors interviewed the Plant Manager and CNO regarding the actions taken in response to CARD 18-27984 and discussed any feedback that they received concerning those actions.
 Overall, the inspectors did not identify an environment where AECOM craft personnel at the plant were reluctant to raise nuclear safety concerns for fear of retaliation.  During the inspection, all of the individuals that participated in the focus group and interviews stated that they did not fear raising nuclear safety concerns and, in general, felt supported by their supervisors to do so.  None of the individuals who were interviewed identified with the comment

18

made by the individual in CARD 18-27984 stating that they would be fired for writing a CARD.  None of the individuals interviewed had witnessed or heard of anyone in their organization being told not to write a CARD or being retaliated against for writing a CARD.  Pertaining to the ECP Coordinator’s investigation into CARD 18-27984, given the information that was available, the inspectors concluded that the investigation was reasonable in depth and scope and was sufficiently thorough to conclude that there was not a SCWE issue within the craft in the AECOM organization.
 The inspectors did not identify any additional issues pertaining to SCWE in their record review of the ECP and CAP.  The inspectors noted that the rate of CARD generation for contractors during the outage was consistent with previous outages indicating that conditions adverse to quality were being identified and documented in the CAP by AECOM personnel at an expected level.  Additionally, the inspectors did not identify any issues with the content of the training provided to new plant employees concerning their responsibilities for raising nuclear safety concerns or the licensee’s expectation for maintaining a healthy SCWE.
 The inspectors provided observations from the inspection to licensee management regarding opportunities for improving the knowledge retention of SCWE training received by new employees being processed into the plant as well as opportunities for licensee management to raise the level of understanding among the craft on how the CAP system functions to address issues.  These observations were documented by the licensee in CARD 19-20652.