Summer Nuclear Plants: Indications Of Massive Corrruption With Inviromental Requirements

Remember, the NRC just samples environmental qualification issues like this. By no means it is a full count with similar issues. The industry knows the NRC doesn't have the deep resources in order to catch them at everything...

And service or shelf life. How often do you change your plugs?

 Inspection Report 

“Failure to Justify Activation Energy for Valcor SOV (XVX06050A)” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect
Report Section
Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2018010-01 Closed
None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(5) when the licensee failed to justify the basis for the activation energy used for Valcor solenoid operated valve (SOV) XVX06050A in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.89 Section C.5.c. Description:  The qualification of the Valcor SOVs, completed in 1979, used the 10ºC rule to determine the accelerated aging rate, which was equivalent to a 0.831 eV activation energy derived for Valcor’s ethylene propylene rubber (EPR).  The inspectors determined that 0.831 eV for EPR, although realistic, it was not the most limiting identified for EPR.  Valcor originally qualified the SOVs for 40 years at 120ºF, however many of the valves are normally energized and will see temperatures exceeding 120ºF.  The SOV, XVX06050A, is a normally energized open valve that de-energizes to close on a containment isolation phase ‘A’ signal and opened post-accident for hydrogen analyzing in the reactor building.  In 1988, Impell Corporation, the licensee’s contractor, reanalyzed the qualification and determined that DuPont Tefzel insulation was the most limiting component instead of EPR and that a 50% loss of tensile strength was the limiting failure mechanism at 0.95 eV activation energy.  To extrapolate a new activation energy, Impell estimated data points from a rudimentary log life plot that did not have any actual test data points.  Impell obtained the plots from a DuPont Tefzel design handbook which also contained the log life plot for the elongation to break failure parameter of Tefzel, which appeared more limiting than tensile strength.  Because the new activation energy extrapolation did not use actual test data, the extrapolation of that data was less limiting than the original qualification activation energy, and the elongation to break failure parameter was not evaluated, the team determined the new activation energy was not justified.

FSAR Section 3.11.2.1.3 stated that the environmental qualification of Class 1E equipment is in conformance with RG 1.89, Rev. 1.  Section C.5.c of the RG stated that “the aging acceleration rate and activation energies used during qualification testing and the basis upon which the rate and activation energy were established should be defined, justified, and documented.”  The licensee did not find the original qualification activation energy to be in error or non-conservative.  The licensee chose to develop an activation energy from less limiting log life plots, which was non-conservative.  In addition, without actual data for the log life plots, the licensee was unable to demonstrate acceptable margins for uncertainty.  The team determined that the valve would have exceeded its qualification based on the original qualification and unjustified use of the new activation energy. 

Corrective Actions:  On February 19, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00754 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the valve could still perform its intended safety function.

Corrective Action Reference:  CR 18-00754

6 Enclosure
Performance Assessment:  The failure to justify the basis upon which the activation energy of Valcor SOV XVX06050A was established in accordance with RG 1.89 Section C.5.c was a performance deficiency (PD).  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure to justify the activation energy used for Tefzel adversely affected the reliability of the solenoid to maintain its qualification over the entire 40 year qualified life of the plant.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for barriers, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred in 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(5) states “Equipment qualified by test must be preconditioned by natural or artificial (accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed life condition. Consideration must be given to all significant types of degradation which can have an effect on the functional capability of the equipment.  If preconditioning to an end-of-installed life condition is not practicable, the equipment may be preconditioned to a shorter designated life. The equipment must be replaced or refurbished at the end of this designated life unless ongoing qualification demonstrates that the item has additional life.”  Contrary to the above, since August 30, 1988, the licensee failed to age Valcor SOV XVX06050A to its end of life condition and to replace the equipment at the end of its designated life.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

“Failure to Verify the Seismic Qualification of Valcor Solenoid Operated Valve XVX06050A” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2018010-02 Closed None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design for the seismic qualification of valve XVX06050A in accordance with IEEE 344-1971. Description:  Calculation VCS-0423-DC-1, “Valcor Voltage and Current Reducing Resistors,” Rev. 0, dated September 10, 1981, located in Tab E1 of EQDP-H-VO4-V01 for solenoid operated valve XVX06050A, indicated a 300 ohm resistor was in series with the valve and that it reduced the voltage in the coil to approximately 32VDC at minimum conditions.  The team questioned if the valve was seismically qualified at the lower voltage since the seismic qualification in test report QR 52600-515, Section 4.2.5, “Seismic Vibrations,” stated that it was performed at 108VAC.  The team noted that the Valcor SOV was not installed in the same configuration that it was seismically qualified.  The failure to ensure the valve was seismically qualified, as configured, did not ensure that damage would not occur during a seismic event.  FSAR Section 3.10 stated that seismic qualification must be done in

7 Enclosure
accordance with IEEE 344-1971.  Section 3.2.2.2 of IEEE 344-1971 states the device being tested should demonstrate its ability to perform its intended safety function and sufficient monitoring equipment should be used to evaluate its performance.  The team determined that the licensee did not demonstrate the seismic qualification of valve XVX06050A in its current plant configuration at reduced voltage.

Corrective Actions:  On February 15, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00686 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the valve could still perform its intended safety function.

Corrective Action Reference: CR 18-00686

Performance Assessment:  The licensee’s failure to verify the adequacy of the seismic design and qualification of valve XVX06050A in accordance with IEEE 344-1971 was a performance deficiency (PD).  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure to verify the adequacy of design for seismic qualification of the valve resulted in the valve being installed in an unqualified configuration.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for barriers, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred on August 30, 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
 Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III “Design Control,” requires, in part, that “The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.”  Contrary to the above, since August 30, 1988, the licensee failed to verify valve XVX06050A was seismically qualified in its current configuration in accordance with IEEE 344-1971.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

“Inadequate Radiation Harsh Environmental Qualification of Reactor Building Spray Pump A” Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000395/2018010-03 Closed None 71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Introduction:  The NRC identified a Green Finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(4) when the licensee failed to verify that RB spray pump A could perform its function under the radiation conditions expected during an accident in accordance with Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588.

8 Enclosure
Description:  During the review of EQDP-H-MO1-G03 for RB spray Pump A, the team noted that the pump was qualified for a maximum harsh environment of 1x106 radiation absorbed dose (rad);  however, the total integrated dose (TID) was expected to be greater than 6.1x106 rad TID over its 40 year life.  Tab F1 of the EQDP, containing the equipment qualification report of the motors dated June 1977, stated that the maximum integrated radiation dose justified by the report over the 40 year operating life of the motor was 1x106 rads.  The EQDP stated that component data shows that “all components are suitable for the rated 1x106 rads integrated dose with the exception of (a) unfilled polyester resin and (b) the Dacron felt. In all cases, the polyester resins are filled to various degrees with glass or similar products. Such filling of the resin results in a significant increase in the radiation resistance of the combination -- as high as 9x108 rads. The Dacron felt by itself, at a threshold resistance of 8.6x105 rads, approaches the required radiation resistance but the felt is designed to be saturated with the impregnating epoxy resin and occurs only in this state. No specific data is available on the radiation resistance of the combination (Dacron filled epoxy), but the evidence indicates that the combination will exceed the required 1x106 rads.”  The team noted that the expected TID dose over the 40 year life of the RB spray pump A motor exceeded the original qualification provided in this test report. In order to ensure the pump was qualified for its radiation environment, the licensee had Impell Corporation perform Calculation 0980-036-030, “Qualified Radiation Levels for GE Motors,” Rev. 0, in August 31, 1988, which concluded that the motor was qualified for 1.5x107 rads.  The re-analysis was not based on partial type testing of the motor or a similar motor in accordance with NUREG-0588, but only reinterpreted the same material information previously provided by GE.  The team noted that the reanalysis made different assumptions than GE did on the material characteristics of an unknown polyester resin fill material and Dacron felt.  For the polyester resin, Impell could not determine what the fill material was or how much fill was used, but determined that it had a higher radiation resistance.  For the Dacron felt, Impell assumed that the Dacron would not be a weak link in radiation resistance because of the epoxy.  These assumptions were used to justify increasing the radiation qualification of the RB spray pump motor.  The team determined that the original qualification of 1x106 rads was appropriate and was not proven to be inadequate by Impell because of the uncertainties documented by GE, and the lack of actual type testing information for the motor to support the Impell assumptions. FSAR Section 3.11.2 states that the licensee is committed to NUREG 588 Category II requirements.  Section 2.1.2 of NUREG 588 states “The choice of the methods selected is largely a matter of technical judgment and availability of information that supports the conclusions reached.  Experience has shown that qualification of equipment subjected to an accident environment without test data is not adequate to demonstrate functional operability. In general, the staff will not accept analysis in lieu of test data unless (a) testing of the component is impractical due to size limitations, and (b) partial type test data is provided to support the analytical assumptions and conclusions reached.”  Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588 states “Equipment that must function in order to mitigate any accident should be qualified by test to demonstrate its operability for the time required in the environmental conditions resulting from that accident.”  The team determined that the basis for raising the radiation qualification was not justified and that the qualification test report did not demonstrate that RB spray pump A was qualified over its 40 year operating life. Corrective Actions: On February 16, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 18-00707 and performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the pump could still perform its intended safety function.

9 Enclosure
Corrective Action Reference: CR 18-00707 Performance Assessment:  The licensee’s failure to justify that RB spray pump ‘A’ could perform its function under the radiation conditions expected during an accident in accordance with Section 2.1(3)(a) of NUREG 588 was a PD.  The PD was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.  Specifically, the failure to qualify the pump to expected radiation conditions adversely affects the pump’s capability to perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.  The team used inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” issued December 7, 2016, for mitigating systems, and IMC 0609, App. A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.  Since the underlying cause of the issue occurred on August 31, 1988, the team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. Enforcement:  Title 10 CFR 50.49 (e)(4) requires, in part, that the electric equipment qualification program must include and be based on radiation, and the radiation environment must be based on the type of radiation, the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the equipment, and the radiation environment associated with the most severe design basis accident during or following which the equipment is required to remain functional, including the radiation resulting from recirculating fluids for equipment located near the recirculating lines and including dose-rate effects.  Contrary to the above, since August 31, 1988, the licensee failed to qualify RB spray pump ‘A’ to the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the pump and during the most severe DBA.  This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Unjustified Qualified Life for ASCO Valves” URI 05000395/2018010-04
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The NRC opened a Unresolved Item (URI) to determine if a performance deficiency was more than minor.  In 1993, the licensee’s contractor, Impell Corporation, reanalyzed the qualified life established by ASCO qualification report AQR-67368 and a field notification from ASCO dated 10/27/1989.  Impell erroneously used the heat rise temperatures from the field notification for both the AQR-67368 test samples accelerated aging temperature and the actual service temperatures in various plant locations.  Replacing the actual test specimen’s documented accelerated aging temperature with an assumed temperature was not justified.  As a result, when using the actual temperature identified in the qualification report, many of these solenoids are currently beyond their qualified lives.  

The licensee provided an alternate heat rise test report less limiting than the ASCO testing to justify that the ASCO valves were within their service lives, report 8058-001-2000-RA-0001R00, Environmental Qualification Temperature Test of ASCO 206 and NP Series Solenoid Valves, dated June 2000.  The team’s evaluation must determine whether the alternate report is applicable to the licensee, and, if so, whether the test report indicated that the ASCO testing was invalid to conclude that the valves are currently within their qualified lives.

10 Enclosure
NUREG-0588 Section 4(6) and Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1, Regulatory Position 5.c, required, in part, that the aging acceleration rate and the basis upon which it was established be described, documented, and justified.  The team determined that the failure to justify the aging acceleration rate was a performance deficiency.  However, a review of the additional information is warranted to determine if the performance deficiency is more than minor.  The licensee entered the performance deficiency into their corrective action program as CR-1800175 and determined that preliminary calculations indicated that the ASCO valves are currently operable based on the additional information provided for review.

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Potential High Radiation Dose Areas with Unqualified Components” URI 05000395/2018010-05
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The NRC opened a URI to determine if a performance deficiency exists.  The licensee did not perform analysis to determine the radiation exposure to shielded components adjacent to electrical and blank penetrations on the outboard side through containment.  As a result, many mild environment components may be adversely affected.  The inboard side of the penetrations is exposed to rad levels approaching 9X107 rads and the out board side is shielded by thin steel plates with electrical pass-thru holes.  The inspectors noted that there were many areas of the plant identified as mild environments with unanalyzed penetrations.  For example, the inspectors observed that the two trains for the plant service water were adjacent to unanalyzed penetrations. The components adjacent to the outboard side of the penetrations may be unqualified for service conditions expected during the most severe DBA as required by 10 CFR 50.49(e)(4).

NUREG-0588 Section 1.4 "Radiation Conditions Inside and Outside Containment," required, in part, that "(8) Shielded components need be qualified only to the gamma radiation levels required…" and that "(12) Equipment that may be exposed to radiation doses below 104 rads should not be considered to be exempt from radiation qualification, unless analysis supported by test data is provided to verify that these levels will not degrade the operability of the equipment below acceptable values.”  The licensee provided a white paper for this issue that asserts that consideration of radiation streaming was not part of their licensing basis, thus enforcement would be addressed through a backfit analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.  The team must determine whether the site licensing basis required consideration of radiation streaming and whether a backfit analysis would be appropriate in lieu of enforcement.  The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as CR-1800684 and determined that “the process for qualification of equipment used was found acceptable per the VCS SER. Further evaluation will be performed under this CR but currently all components are qualified to their expected operating conditions and will perform their design functions. At worst, the EQ life of components may be reduced. All equipment in penetration areas are operable.”

Unresolved Item (Open)
“Potential Unjustified Activation Energy for Barton Transmitters” URI 05000395/2018010-06
71111.21N-Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) Description:  The contractor, Impell Corporation, changed the activation energy for the Barton transmitters from 0.5 eV to 0.78 eV.  The 0.78 eV was based upon an academic paper documenting experimental work, apparently, performed for the early space program and apparently first published in 1965.  The paper cautioned the reader that the methods used were experimental and were not validated.  A 0.5 eV activation energy for electronics was documented by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report NP-1558, which attributed

11 Enclosure
it to electron migration of aluminum.  The report was available to the licensee at the time of the change.  Reports published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) indicated that activation energies for various electronic failure modes could range from 0.50.66.  Impell did not document an independent failure modes and effects analysis to justify the activation energy that they used.  

The licensee did not find the original qualification activation energies to be in error or nonconservative.  The licensee chose to use less limiting activation energies that may not have been proven to be justified.  In addition, the licensee was unable to demonstrate acceptable margins for extrapolation uncertainty.  FSAR Section 3.11.2.1.3 stated that the environmental qualification of Class 1E equipment is in conformance with RG 1.89, Rev. 1.  The RG in Section C.5.c stated that “the aging acceleration rate and activation energies used during qualification testing and the basis upon which the rate and activation energy were established should be defined, justified, and documented.”  NUREG 0588 Section 5(2), “Qualification Documentation,” specified, in part that “a certificate of conformance by itself is not acceptable unless it is accompanied by test data and information on the qualification program.”  The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as CR-18-00500, and determined that the “NRC challenged the qualified life for Barton installed as IPT00456 based on an activation energy.  VC Summer engineering does not agree with the NRC, nor do the OEMs Barton, Weed/Foxboro and Rosemount who have reviewed their prior research and state that it is suitable and adequate for our applications.”  The team must determine whether the activation energy used for the Barton transmitters was appropriate and, if not, whether the licensee had the responsibility to verify the information provided by their vendors and contractor

I Started The Massachusetts State Police Overtime Scandal

April 8 

This is getting really dangerous. How much distance do you really think there is between the towing contract and corrupt/defective fingerprint readers contracts as indicated in the Russell and Springfield barracks???

Embattled State Police Troop Had Been Assessed Over A Towing Contract In 2016

April 07, 2018

The Associated Press

A state police troop currently under investigation for an alleged overtime scam has been previously assessed for contracting irregularities.

The Boston Globe reports State Police Troop E pushed thousands of motorists to use Perfection Towing of Watertown when it favored the business with a three-year contract.

Members of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation and three lieutenants from Troop E also allegedly rigged the system against Perfection Towing's competitors.

The inspector general office believes the three officers "influenced" the team to award lower scores to competitors from assessing internal police e-mails and operations dating from 2013 to July 2016. The investigation was first reported on by MassLive in 2016.

MassDOT says it has adopted" changes" in its contracting, and did not say if the state police are part of a new team to acquire future contracts.

April 5

The more I investigate, the more i realized the Boston Globe has been shaping the story as protection of high officials. The Boston Globe gets a plum story all to themselves and the state police gets to shape the story . Maybe high executives at the paper and police having a secret back channel designed to enhance each other careers. You have to wonder why the epicenter of the scandal was shifted from Western Massachusetts to the eastern side of the state. Was it done to protect me? Or to bury my activities in this. Believe me, nobody wants to give me any stature??? I actually think this is the exact model at all newspapers. What would be the outcome if the upper state police officials no longer participated in the secret back channel with newspaper? No more free stories and all that invaluable state police insight...

Obviously, the Newspaper’s delay in reporting this story was to distant my tip from the first story… Hopefully I would forget about everything. I am sure the state police secret channel was sharing confidential information before the story was even conceived. They carefully outlined the story before it was given to the reporter. Had a decent breadcrumb path outline for the reporter.

Update

Evan emediately called her state police special insider contacts and the state police knew then the overtime scandal was going to break. They must have been pissing their pants. From there on out, it was all about mitigation of damage to the state police... 

I did mention the possibility it was overtime to the POV guy...

Update

Something looked really looked stinky...I was struggling to figure out what was going on. The is no doubt on Fed 5, 2017 the mass state police upper brass knew massive overtime abuse was going on and the dam was going to burst eventually because of my call. 

Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com>

To:

evan.allen@globe.com    April 5 2017

‎Apr‎ ‎5‎, ‎2017 at ‎3‎:‎59‎ ‎PM

I was driving my son's tiny car 2011 Mazda 2 car. It's a typical college age car. I think they were picking and choosing (profiling) what car was a target of a stop.

His police car lights and flashers were so bight, I couldn't see out of any mirrors. The heavy lighting was chosen to inspect my car with me seeing him before he knocked on the window.

The non standard approach to my car with him first knocking at the passenger window. The delay in knocking on the window. He was carefully looking for contraband. I had two wheels on the dirt to protect the cop from the traffic .

All those police cruisers parked on the pull off with flasher blasting and no so call customers.

As I was complaining about the police safety ruse, he explained, "it was no difference that a radar unit". The statie was always respectful to me.

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

16023368320

Update

So my warning ticket is dated Feb 22, 2016... It is posted on my blog. 

I did send a e-mail to the Boston Globe and a reporter discussed my blog article.

You idiots!!!

...I kicked off Massachusetts State Police Overtime Scandal

Masslive: "That first trooper investigated appears to be Eric Chin, according to reports from the Boston Globe. He was suspended without pay in April 2017 while he was investigated for receiving overtime cash for shifts he didn't work, the newspaper says." 

"MSP Citizens Response Reports (POL) <citizensresponsereports@MassMail.State.MA.US>

To:Michael Mulligan

‎Feb‎ ‎24‎, ‎2017 at ‎9‎:‎03‎ ‎AM

We are in receipt of your citizen response report.  A complaint intake officer will contact you within the next few days to discuss your concerns.  Thank you." 

Junk Plant Ginna MSSV: Disfgracefull Standard With "The Most Probable Cause"

LER 2017-001, During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Technical Specifications Limits Due to Stiction.

On April 23, 2017, with the plant in Mode I, during in-place testing of main steam safety valve (MSSV) 3509, the as-found lift pressure did not meet the acceptance criteria of+ I%/ -3% of setpoint (1140 psig), required by Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance SR 3.7.1.1. This was the second unsatisfactory MSSV as-found lift pressure, as MSSV 3508 had failed to meet the same as-found acceptance criteria during earlier in-place sequential testing (on April 21, 2017). Later, on May 5, 2017, a third MSSV (3512) tested at a vendor's facility failed to meet the same as-found acceptance criteria. (All three of the MSSVs have the same manufacturer and model number.) The most probable cause of exceeding the MSSV upper acceptance limit is the programmatic issue of the narrowness of the as-found acceptance band. A contributing cause was minor stiction on the disc. The as-found settings of all three MSSVs remained within analytical bounds; therefore, operation of the facility in this condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

Sounds like a new emergent failure with the new valves. You catch it, nobody yet knows what caused the mircro fouling. 

The most probable cause of the MSSVs' as-found lift pressures being outside +1 % / -3% of setpoint is the programmatic issue of the narrowness of the as-found acceptance band. A contributing cause was minor stiction in the disc. Note that all the Ginna MSSVs were upgraded in 2009/2012 to lnconel 618 flexi-discs and 316SS nozzles, so corrosion of these sub-components (a contributor to some MSSV failures) is insignificant.

• Evaluate changing the test frequency from 5 years to 3 years. This will prevent the formation of micro-fouling and reduce the likelihood of stiction.

Junk Plant Grand Gulf: 91% Power Scram Is So Unprofessional

On January 30, 2018, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was operating in Mode 1 at 91 % power and was in the process of. increasing power. At 1739 hours CST on January 30, 2018, GGNS experienced main turbine control valve (TCV) position changes of between 3 and 5 percent and main generator output load cha.nges of approximately 20 megawatts with a periodicity of approximately 3 seconds.

At 1822 on January 30, 2018, operators performed a manual shut down of the reactor by moving the reactor mode switch from RUN to SHUTDOWN to place the unit in Mode 3. Upon reactor shutdown all systems performed as designed and no subsequent safety system actuations occurred. The cause of the manual shutdown was conservative operator response to unanticipated main turbine generator output changes. Corrective actions include adjustments to the control circuit, and revision of work task documents for adjustment of the control circuits.
There wer~ no consequences to the general safety. of the public, nuclear safety, industriai safety and radiological safety for this event.
Page

More Mass State Police Corruption: Pushing Again The Override Button On Bad Background Checks

With Mass State Police in an widespread integrity crisis, you now have to wonder how many staties have criminal records unaddressed in their initial "extensive bad background checks"? How many non functional fingerprint readers is in the state police system, which forces them to use that god dam override button? You see where I am going???  

She was coached on how to lie on the background paperwork. Say a police commissioner was doing favors for family, a girlfriend or gangster buddy to get their bad kid into the Mass State Police. So the police commissioner has the power pull a bad initial background check of any trainee and they train the trainee on how to answer the background check questions with a fake background investigation? This in no worst than the quality of their fingerprint readers and using the override switch.

Really, how deep does this go. You really need the FBI now do an extensive investigation on the Mass state Police. But, can you really trust the FBI under trump to do the right thing.

State police investigating how trooper with criminal past was hired

Most Popular

13

18 at 6:13 AM

Massachusetts State Police Trooper Leigha A. Genduso was suspended without pay last week in the wake of an internal affairs investigation that will review, among other things, the process through which the Worcester native was hired, according to a state police spokesman.

Trooper Genduso, 36, was suspended without pay Friday after it was revealed that she participated in a large-scale marijuana business in the early 2000s run by her then live-in boyfriend. She had been placed on paid administrative leave on Monday last week.

State police spokesman David Procopio said Friday that a hearing was scheduled to determine what Trooper Genduso’s duty status would be pending completion of the internal affairs investigation.

Trooper Genduso’s criminal past was publicly available in a 2007 federal case in which she testified against her then-boyfriend, Sean P. Bucci of North Reading. That testimony enabled her to avoid prosecution for her participation in the enterprise, which she said in court documents included helping package, transport and sell marijuana, as well as launder some of the proceeds.

Mr. Procopio said state police conduct rigorous background checks on all recruit candidates, requiring a lengthy application, oral interviews, and criminal, driving and credit histories; asking questions about use of controlled substances; and conducting interviews with previous employers, acquaintances and references. If during that process the department learns of any information that disqualifies a candidate for employment, the candidate will not be hired, he said.

“A multifaceted background check was done on Trooper Genduso as on all other recruits,” Mr. Procopio said. The department had no comment on questions involving how and whether Trooper Genduso’s background escaped detection by the state police when she was hired, first as a dispatcher in 2008, and when she entered the State Police Academy in 2013.

A 1999 Shrewsbury High School graduate, Trooper Genduso graduated from the academy in 2014 and was assigned to the state police K-9 section, where she has remained.

Mr. Bucci was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute over 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering, two substantive counts of money laundering, seven substantive counts of structuring currency transactions and four counts of tax evasion.

The evidence at trial showed Mr. Bucci used drug money to buy real estate, vehicles, a boat, and for extensive travel to, and gambling in, Aruba.

In sworn testimony in 2007, Ms. Genduso said she started dating Mr. Bucci in 2000. He was a DJ at a bar in Salem and she was a cocktail waitress at the time.

She testified that three months into the relationship, Mr. Bucci told her he sold marijuana for a living. She also said she began smoking marijuana “basically every day” when she was involved with him.

In 2000 and 2001, Ms. Genduso said, she got more involved in Mr. Bucci’s marijuana business. She said she would be present for deliveries that were usually around 200 pounds of marijuana.

“A lot of times I helped him break up the bales to be able to put them into pounds,” she testified.

In addition, she said she would take money from Mr. Bucci’s customers when he wasn’t in the house or was sleeping, and in 2002 and 2003, she started delivering and selling it herself to a customer in Worcester.

“I would put it in boxes and then wrap them up as presents,” Ms. Genduso said, “because of the smell, and because it’s miles to drive with that in my car.”

Furthermore, Ms. Genduso said, she made “well over 20” deposits of usually $9,000 for Mr. Bucci.

After their guilty verdict, the jury returned a general forfeiture judgment of $2.7 million against Mr. Bucci, and judgments of forfeiture of his North Reading house, a 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche SUV, a boat and $35,000 in a bank account.

Mr. Bucci was also sentenced to 151 months in prison.

A year later, Ms. Genduso was a state police dispatcher. She was honored with a State 911 award in 2009 for keeping a 6-year-old girl calm on the phone while her mother was experiencing a medical emergency.

Perry, Davis Besse and Beaver Valley Are Goners, That is Four Nuclear Plants

So that is four nuclear plants, plus Pilgrim and Oyster Creek. Many more to come. We are in a phase we never seen before. All these plants have been starved for funding for years. And it is only going to get worst as they head towards shutdown. A risk for a meltdown has drastically increased. And Pilgrim and Oyster Creek are closing in tough shape. Will these bad plants overwhelm the NRC. It wouldn't be the first time where a set of terribly bad operating nuclear plants overwhelm the NRC. They draw a lot of NRC away from the rest. Then A moderately bad plant erupts into a terrible accident. That is the Davis Besse accident. 

And don't forget the NRC is undergoing politically inspired severe restructuring and downsizing. It is secret deregulation and heading into Russian style secrecy.    

First Energy Solution Will Close Its Nuclear Plants, But Is Silent On Bankruptcy Restructuring  

By John Funk, The Plain Dealer

CLEVELAND, Ohio -- FirstEnergy says it is getting out of the nuclear power business within the next three years. 

The company's power plant subsidiaries FirstEnergy Solutions and the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. late Wednesday informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and regional grid manager PJM Interconnection that it will close its nuclear power plants within three years.

The companies plan to close the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Toledo in 2020, and both the Perry nuclear plant in Lake County as well as the two-reactor Beaver Valley nuclear plant near Pittsburgh in 2021.

The companies announced the decision well after the close of business, but made no mention of filing for bankruptcy.

Arkansas Unit 1 Mysteriously Trips On March 25

More indications with Entergy's southern fleet...capacity factor problems...

Mike Mulligan Gets Arrested By the Mass State Police and Their Lemon Fingerprint Reader With A 98% Failure Rate

Note on my arrest

I was fully treated with dignity while in police custody in the Russell barracks. The state troopers who arrested me and all the rest I'd seen in the barracks, they are truly the best that comes out Massachusetts. The state police didn't engineer my arrest...initiated the arrest.  

Update

George, 

The move over law is what got the officer in the car. This law is driven by groups wanting favors from the police and they made money from the campaign. Is there any sense in this law...science...proving it reduces safety? So how do I make a story line with three separate things...the law that got  me stop, the fleet of staties cars on the highway, my first complaint to their arm that receives public complaints and how the fingerprints machine problem came to my attention. My covert operation to get into the processing area. Basically Monday I had to make a plea to the courts. I complained to judge of systemic police corruption. I had a summations of my investigation in a flash drive in my hand waving it to the judge in open court. By the way, that arm of the state police who accepts police complaints, I called this first complaint a cover-up. I understand the officer who worked on my case, he now is under suspension. So I was allowed  to have a meeting with assistant DA to see if we can make a deal. I spent a lot of time discussing state police corruption. I slid that flash drive across the table saying the "corruption" is all detailed in a report on the flash drive. He wouldn't even look at it, spoke to his boss who wouldn't even touch it. My trespassing issues was a covert operation to check out the finger printer issue and make as assessment of the courts. Basically I have been talking to state police officials all through this...I don't trust any of them. So this was a secondary and independent path to get my concerns known. I have told them all, I got evidence challenging the credibility of all the troopers in the Russell and Springfield barracks. Ultimately this broad scandal is going to challenge the credibility of all troopers in the state. I basically got the charge dropped. No fines and I never had to promise to stay out of the property. If this thing blows up, I have taken out the Judge, the DA and his assistant DA. I taking to the Springfield newspaper. 

Mike Mulligan Gets Arrested By the Mass State Police and Their Lemon Fingerprint Reader With A 98% Failure Rate.

March 25, 2018

Your Honor Respectively,

I basically I made a AIRE like police complaint to the “MSP Citizen Response Report (POV)” in early 20017. It was a mass collection of police cruisers sitting in the breakdown lane  on I 91 abutting the Holyoke Mall. I am thinking eight or more police cruisers sitting in the breakdown lane on both sides. The area was dark and curvy. It was really a bad and unsafety area to be having this kind of thing. They had their flasher blinding us and not a civilian car to be seen with the police cruisers.

I thought it was a police quota type of deal. Maybe an overtime abuse type of thing. Later, I realize the state police were staging a fleet of police cruisers on I 91 nefarious purposes. They were looking into our cars without ethical probable cause. In mass quantities. I have an assortment of other issues on this to justify my position.

One of them being science. You do these mass state police stunts, then you measure the accident suppression results. I doubt the state police has any evidence this works at all over history. You and I know, the only way you can control the accident rate on an interstate like I91, is to drastically reduce the speed limit or redesign the road. Then enforce the speed limits. Everything else is for show or it inflate the image of the state police. This AIRE type thing was to make the state police feel better, not make the public safer.

Here is my bog posting on my early thinking. It kind of a scratch or note pad to help me think…a contemporaneous log book thing. I am a whistleblower…I have seen and reported a lot of corruption over the last few decades. To tell you the truth, everyone calls me nuts and hates my guts.

Massachusetts State Police In illegal Alien or Terrorism Alert On I-91?

https://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2017/02/massachusetts-state-police-in-illegal.html

Recently because of the state police corruption all around, I resubmitted that early 2017 complaint. I didn’t think the POV recorded my complaint and I called it a coverup. Last week I spoke to state inspector general and the Ma state police internal affairs (for about an hour) over this 2017 complaint. I emailed my coverup complaint to this very same agency. Towards the end of the week, is when the digital electronic fingerprint reader problem came to my attention (fell in my lap). I’ll bet you my fingerprint machine issue is a good one for the Ma IG. 

A important broken tool like this for the troopers, it can devastatingly effect the moral of a group. If my bosses don’t care about my working environment, why should I. My aim to make a better working environment for the bottom level troopers. They have a very dangerous job. I just want best quality tools money can buy for the Ma troopers. This is how they serve the peoples of Massachusetts most efficiently and effectively. 

“Donald, (Me to Donald)

Just watch this. I am going to clean up state police bureaucracy. One the largest state police contractual kickback and corruption cases in the state history. I'd stood in front of a electronic state police fingerprint reader for about an hour yesterday. Remember, I have only ten fingers. I was in the Russell Barracks. They attempted to read my fingerprints some 60 times yesterday. They got maybe one high quality readable print into their system out of this mess. The rest were poor quality and unreadable. Extremely poor quality prints were stuffed into the state system through an override button. I’d seen the multitudes of caution windows right before my eyes   The machine was only successful and recorded readable and high quality fingerprints in less than 1% of the time. That is definitely not a 1% error rate??? 

I know the Springfield Barracks has the same problem. I suspect this is going throughout the state. I know multitudes of troopers protested about this shity component by not checking in or putting fingerprints into the system. The just didn't take any fingerprints during in-processing, which is strictly against police policy and ethics. The key phrase to ask, how many times state wide has the fingerprint reader override buttons been used in the last year? 

I know senior management intimidated the lower lever troopers into not complaining...to protect the high level fraudulent contracting and the state police senior leadership... Basically the two troopers right in front of my eyes were knowingly, like a machine themselves…were cramming the unreadable fingerprints into the state police system though the override button. What is the extent cause and condition with this widespread lemon device? How long has this been going on. How many unreadable fingerprints are in the system. You could let a really bad guy through the grasp of the Ma state police or any police department in the nation. What does the state police use fingerprints for? 

I got this all recorded. It is in their system. I am sure the new digital fingerprints machine records everything. The arrest processing area is all video cam'd up and bugged. Sometimes bad criminals say the most incriminating things in this processing area.”

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

cell phone-16032094206

Junk Plant Pilgrim's Happy Talk.

update

The feed water system goes upwards to 1300 psa, steam about 600psi...a leak in the main condenser side might get to a low vacuum type of thing.       

***I doubt it went down like this. We are talking about a 500 to 600 psi system. I have seen heater/pipe steam plumbs 20 feet long and roaring like a B-52. They use to send me into the heater bay, very high radiation...to monitor. They later had tv cameras in there and we monitored it from the control room. Although they might have a steam leak into the main condenser...   

"Operators shut down the reactor March 6 because of a suspected leak in a system needed to heat water before it is pumped into the reactor vessel."

The plumb could cut you head off and the vast majority of the plumb is not seeable.

FirstEnergy Vows to Go Into Bankruptcy Next Week (Perry, Besse)

Will this be the first parent corporation who goes into bankruptcy that owns Nuclear power Plants?  

FirstEnergy bankruptcy restructuring likely, power plants would be closed or sold

Updated 11:45 AM; Posted 11:45 AM

By John Funk, The Plain Dealer

CLEVELAND, Ohio -- Brutal competitive financial forces are poised to remake FirstEnergy into a utility without power plants and focused solely on delivering electricity.

The Akron-based power company that a decade ago hired former George W. Bush administration Solicitor General Ted Olson to bully state lawmakers who were considering a return to state-regulated power prices now appears ready to sell or close its remaining coal and nuclear power plants because the state won't subsidize them and neither will federal authorities.

Those include Perry nuclear plant in Lake County east of Cleveland and Davis-Besse in Ottawa County near Toledo.

The draconian move may come in a corporate "restructuring" plan that could get under way next week in a federal bankruptcy court, either here or any other federal jurisdiction where the company has offices.

FirstEnergy Solutions, the debt-ridden subsidiary that owns the corporation's power plants, would be seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., a separate FirstEnergy subsidiary that holds the federal nuclear operating licenses, could also be involved…

Pilgrim Start-Up Transformer: Bum Degraded Voltage Relay Discoverd in Sept 2017

So they lost outside power, obviously they had degraded voltage. Were these relays somehow involved in this.

I hope there was no combustion gases discover in the transformer coolant oil before these recent event... 

Start-Up Transformer Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside Technical Specification Limit

.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER .PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 1 OF3
4. TITLE Start-Up Transformer Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside Technical Specification Limit
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
SEQUENTIAL
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A NUMBER NO. 05000 N/A
09 13 2017 2017 - 012 - 00 11 13 2017
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER N/A 05000 N/A
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: 'Check all that apply)
N
D 20.2201(b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) D 20.2201(d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) D 20.2203(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(4) D 50.73(a)(2)(iii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 73.71(a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) D 50.36(c)(2) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) D 73.71(a)(5) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 73.77(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i) D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) ~ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT ~ELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) IMr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr. - Regulatory Assurance Manager 508-830-8323 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX B EA 27 ABB y N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR ~ YES (ff yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) D NO SUBMISSION DATE 02 01 2018 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On September 13, 2017 with the unit at 100 percent power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station discovered during calibration of four Start-Up Transformer Degraded Voltage Relays (ABB model number ITE27N) after the relays had been removed from the plant, relay 127 A-604/1 had an as-found setpoint value outside the Technical Specifications Table 3.2.B limit of 110.6 plus or minus 0.56 Volts ac (Vac) (110.04 - 111.16); the as-found value was 109.90 Vac. This relay was replaced with a spare relay that was calibrated prior to its installation.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is submitting this Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)-Any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
This event was not risk significant. There was no threat to public health and safety from this condition.
NRC FORM 366 (04-2017)
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
u_s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
NARRATIVE
BACKGROUND
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 012
REV NO.
-00
The startup transformer supplies power to the station auxiliary power distribution system whenever the main generator is offline_ After the main generator has been synchronized to the 345 kV system and has been partially loaded, the auxiliary power distribution system is manually transferred from the start-up transformer (SUT) to the unit AC power source (unit auxiliary transformer [UAT]).
Automatic fast transfer capability is provided in the design to restore the auxiliary power distribution system to its preferred offsite AC power source, the SUT, in the event that the unit AC power source (UAT) is lost for any reason_ The diesel generator load shedding logic will also be actuated immediately upon the fast transfer of the safety related buses A5 and A6 to the SUT if a Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident signal is present when the SUT secondary voltage is below the degraded voltage alarm reset setpoint.
The primary function of the 127 A-604/1 degraded voltage relays and their settings for the SUT is to ensure a minimum voltage at which the emergency buses can be operated indefinitely to provide their intended safety functions. If voltage drops below that point for a specified time limit, the degraded voltage relays will initiate transfer of the emergency buses from offsite power to the onsite emergency diesel generators.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
During calibration of four SUT Degraded Voltage Relays (ABB model number ITE-27N) after the relays had been removed from the plant, relay 127 A-604/1 had an as-found setpoint value outside the Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.2.B limit of 110.6 plus or minus 0.56 Volts ac (Vac) (110.04 - 111.16). The asfound value was 109.90 Vac. This relay was replaced with a spare relay that was calibrated prior to its installation.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
rThe cause of the relay's potential inoperability is still under investigation at this time.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The relay was replaced, restoring the safety function of the SUT degraded voltage relay to initiate transfer of the emergency buses from offsite power to the onsite emergency diesel generators.
NRG FORM 366A (04-2017) Page 2 of 3
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nureqs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
NARRATIVE
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 012
REV NO.
- 00
The 127 A-604/1 Degraded Voltage Relay As-Found setpoint value was outside the TS limits. However, per calculation PS147 "Degraded Voltage Trip Relays, Revised Voltage Setpoint" the as-found value was within the analytical limits, which indicates that the degraded voltage relay would operate within safety limits albeit outside the TS limits.
Calculation PS147 "Degraded Voltage Trip Relays, Revised Voltage Setpoint" establishes the trip setpoint, analytical limits, and the no adjust limits for the voltage function of the degraded voltage trip relays (127A-504/1,2,3,4 and 127A-604/1,2,3,4). The upper and lower analytical limits are the limit of a measured or calculated variable established by the plant safety analysis to ensure that a safety limit is not exceeded. The as-found value found for this relay was 109.9 Vac which was outside the TS limits. However, per PS147, the lower analytical limit is 109.75 Vac. Therefore, the as-found value for 127A604/1 does not exceed the established safety limit, and the relay is capable of performing its safety function.
There were no public safety, nuclear safety, industrial safety or radiological safety consequences from this event. No actions to reduce the frequency or consequence are necessary.
REPORT ABILITY
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is submitting this Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)-Any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
PREVIOUS EVENTS
~ review of PNPS LERs for the past five years did not identify any other LERs that were submitted for the same reason as this submittal.
REFERENCES

Junk Plant Pilgrim Recent Set of Problems: Now Blatantly Don't Give A shit What The Community Thinks About Them

Really, a lot of problems to shows up at the same time after all this NRC attention. What is different this time is how extremely close to the vest they disclosed to the public. These guys were always tight, but it is amazing what is going on now. Something has changed drastically. It is as if they don't give a shit over what the public thinks about them. blatantly  

Pilgrim Remains Offline Due to Repairs

March 23, 2018

PLYMOUTH – The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station remains out of service after plant officials discovered they needed to replace a start-up transformer at the Plymouth facility.

The station was taken off the grid on March 6 due to a leak in a feedwater heating system. Pilgrim staff made to the decision to stay offline after the repairs were made in anticipation of power difficulties with the March 13 nor’easter.

The station has been plagued by a series of unplanned shutdowns during winter storms in recent years.

After Eversource restored power to the off-site lines on March 15, a series of tests were conducted and inspectors reported that the start-up transformer on the non-nuclear side of the plant would have to be replaced.

The equipment brings power from the 345kv transmission lines into the station.

According to a statement, the replacement process is now underway. It’s not yet known when the plant will return to service.

Pilgrim is scheduled to permanently close in 2019. The station is under the highest level of federal oversight due to a series of safety violations

Big News: River Bend and Grand Gulf at 100%

Its been months...