Junk Facility Brunswick: The Mixure Of A Flaccid NRC and Contempuous Licensee

For most plants this is a security door. A security system at other plants monitors the opening and closing of the door. Why didn't this system catch it?

Thus if a explosion, the door would fly open and damage both DGS.

With the inspection findings of prolonged wear on the mechanisms, one can only wonder how long the door was really inop. Bet you the employees knew about the broken latch for years and just gave up writing up a work order because of a bum prioritization system.

How bankrupt the NRC, why isn't this written up by the NRC as three independent violations and violation lever escalated each time the agency caught it.

It should be a green, then yellow and finally a red finding...

As to throw salt on the wound, they just threw a warning ticket to the licensee on the three violations...

The ROP is completely broken down and throws no incentive to fix their organization.

It is a absolution system building a mountain of paperword and requiring no change of heart.  

New Inspection Report: Brunswick 05000325/2017007 AND 05000324/2017007 

Findings

Introduction: The NRC identified a Green NCV of Brunswick OLC 2.B(6) for Units 1 and 2, for the licensee’s failure to correct a nonfunctional fire door in the DG building.

Specifically, on three occasions, NRC inspectors identified door 2-DGB-DR-EL023-118 as having a stuck open latch, which prevented the door from closing and latching securely.

Description: Door 2-DGB-DR-EL023-118 was a single, hollow metal, swinging door equipped with self-closing hardware. It is an Underwriters Laboratory listed, threehour

rated door installed for access/egress between diesel generator cell no. 1 and diesel generator cell no. 2. The door is credited as a three-hour fire rated barrier

The NRC caught the door broken the first time and licensee reported it fixed?

separating the diesel cells. On February 10, 2017 the NRC inspectors found the latch mechanism for the door intermittently sticking, such that the door would not secure in the closed position. The licensee initiated AR 02099153, and dispatched an operator to investigate the door. The operator reported that they manipulated the door several times with no deficiencies noted, but recommended

The NRC caught it broken the second time and licensee reported it fixed?

that maintenance lubricate the latch. On February 14, 2017, the inspection team followed up on the issue and found

the door unlatched upon arrival. The licensee investigated the condition, declared the door non-functional, and initiated AR 02099929. The licensee entered the appropriate

action statement in accordance with site procedure 0PLP-01.2, “Fire Protection System Operability, Action, and Surveillance Requirements,” and maintenance replaced the old latching mechanism with a new one. After repair, the door was reported working satisfactorily and the action

The NRC caught it broken the third time and licensee reported it fixed, and the NRC "means it" this time?

statement was exited. The following morning, February 15, 2017, the team returned to the diesel generator building to

confirm the door was repaired adequately. Upon arrival, the

The NRC here below gets too emotional.

team, again, found the door unlatched. In response, the licensee investigated the condition, declared thedoor non-functional, and initiated AR 02100405. The licensee entered the appropriate action statement in accordance with site procedure 0PLP-01.2. The licensee took actions to install a new thumb latch, and to install a new door closure mechanism. The door was tested satisfactorily and the action statement was exited. Examination of the old hardware noted wear and tear on internal hardware parts, as well as a burr on one of the internal metal parts that most likely prevented full and consistent closure of the door. As a part of the corrective action, the licensee also initiated a cause evaluation to evaluate the repetitive nature of the failure, and the adequacy of the post-maintenance testing.

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Unprofessionalism Abounds

How much time did the leakage occur? It would tell you if the control room personnel are alert.

A high torus water lever make containment less effective. Bottom line, it is a short term event.

Water floods from storage tank into base of Pilgrim reactor

Monday Posted Apr 3, 2017 at 6:07 PM Updated at 7:37 AM

By Christine Legere
           
PLYMOUTH — Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station failed to follow standard procedure last week and incorrectly re-aligned some valves, causing water to flood from a massive storage tank into the reservoir at the base of the reactor known as the torus.

The torus plays a role in depressurizing and cooling down the reactor in a severe accident.

At noon on Friday, Pilgrim operators were flushing out some piping in the reactor’s cooling system in preparation for the upcoming refueling. Workers opened a valve on the torus out of sequence, without first closing the valve on the water storage tank. This resulted in water being drained into the torus from the storage tank, setting off an alarm in the control room.

“This volume of water placed the torus level above the administrative limit for readiness should an unplanned event occur,” Patrick O’Brien, spokesman for Pilgrim’s owner-operator Entergy Corp. wrote in an email. “Station personnel appropriately responded to close the valves and processed and filtered the water from the torus back to the condensate storage tanks.”

The procedure took about four hours.

David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said such mistakes don’t built public confidence. “When control room operators err during low stress, fairly common activities, one has to wonder how they will perform in the highly stressful conditions during an infrequent accident,” Lochbaum wrote in an email. “Their proper responses can turn an accident into an incident. Their improper responses can turn an accident into a disaster.”

It is not even close to a guild. It's a rather simple procedure. Mostly flipping switches in the control room. Following a procedure exactly is mandatory for both the NRC and management. The public affairs officer is really working for the licensee. They sugar coat this events. Turning this into more or less a voluntary guild than following the procedure to the letter of the law is a example to that.

It sounds to me the torus was sitting at the upper limits of the normal operating band. Why was it there. One wonders if they got something leaking into the torus. Operating HPIC or RCIC raises water. Were they just too lazy to return the torus level to mid level of the operating range?    

Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said there are standard guides for operating the valve systems. “This was a breakdown in the process that shows lack of adherence to procedure,” he said.

The resident inspector from the NRC went to the control room immediately after notification of the event “and remained on hand to verify that the water flow to the torus had been halted and that the situation had stabilized,” Sheehan said There were no immediate safety concerns. “Nevertheless, the NRC staff is continuing to assess the event, including its risk significance,” Sheehan added.

The incident was the second involving operator error that occurred last week. On March 27, technicians doing heat testing on another reactor system triggered the wrong switch, which caused the temporary shutdown of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System — another of the systems needed to cool the reactor in an emergency.

It is a very large tank. It would take a lot of water to raise  the water level that high.

Why didn't the employees hear the leakage? Was the pump on? The torus is at a much lower elevation than the condensate storage tank.

I still say we got the inexpensive technology in real time to give us the position of every valve in the control room including all manual valves. A new plant would have that capability.   

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Unprofessionalism Abounds

Power Reactor    Event Number: 52655

Facility: PILGRIM

Region: 1 State: MA

Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]

RX Type: [1] GE-3

NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA

HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO    Notification Date: 03/31/2017

Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]

Event Date: 03/31/2017

Event Time: 11:55 [EDT]

Last Update Date: 03/31/2017

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY

10 CFR Section:

50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION

Person (Organization):

BILL COOK (R1DO)

Unit    SCRAM Code    RX CRIT    Initial PWR    Initial RX Mode    Current PWR    Current RX Mode

1    N    Y    97    Power Operation    97    Power Operation

Event Text

PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TORUS HIGH WATER LEVEL

"On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours [EDT], with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood.

"The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County.

Svinicki: NRC's Feminized Black "Darth Vader"

Heard an NRC independent source about the mass firing.

This begins queuing up the Walking Dead Video at the question point.   

Wiki:

The Walking Dead takes place after the onset of a worldwide zombie apocalypse. The zombies, colloquially referred to as "walkers", shamble towards living humans and other creatures to eat them (they are attracted to noise, e.g., gunshots, and to different scents, e.g., humans). Humans they bite or scratch become infected and slowly turn into walkers as well. It is revealed early in the series that all living humans carry this pathogen, so that if they die from any other cause, they will also turn into walkers. The only way to permanently kill a walker is to damage its brain or otherwise fully destroy the body, such as by cremating it.The series centers on sheriff's deputy Rick Grimes, who wakes up from a coma to discover this apocalypse. He becomes the leader of a group of survivors from the Atlanta, Georgia region as they attempt to sustain themselves and protect themselves not only against attacks by walkers but by other groups of survivors willing to assure their longevity by any means necessary

My linkedIn comments on the speech

Mike Mulligan What do you think in the written comment part of her speech about what she thinks about the TV program the "Walking Dead"? Was the comment respectful or disrespectful? She answered it perfectly. Was it a metaphor for our times and the condition of the industry? Are the zombie-walkers us (outsiders)? Was it a kind of pretest?

You get the paradox here? The mother-of-all industry crisis and most of what she was talking about is a form of deregulation and budget cuts. Show less 

Mike Mulligan It’s highfalutin code language. It designed to mean one thing to outsiders and a completely different thing to special insiders. It’s designed to booster a agenda of the insiders. 

Like, she said this season’s “Walking Dead” begins with a lot of violence and killings. But it gets back after a few shows to the regular theme of epochal survival of the fittest, she says. Was this intimidation to her employees? Is the agency heading for mass firings and getting rid of special people? After all, this is the beginning of her chairperson administration of the NRC just like the opening programs of this season’s Walking Dead? ?

I never seen such a disgraceful comment posed to an US agency head and disgraceful comment back.

Are all NRC employees required to watch “The Walking Dead.” She was prepared to answer that strange question. 

And she took out Jaczko. Was she referencing this event?  

Mike Mulligan Was the "Walking Dead" mocking the state of the industry?

I call it "getting off" on gratuitous human violence, death and human suffering...

'The Walking Dead' sets stage for war in tense season finale

Brian Lowry

Andrew Lincoln in 'The Walking Dead'

(CNN)The following contains spoilers about "The Walking Dead's" Season 7 finale.

"The Walking Dead" certainly seemed aptly named through the second half of this season, which didn't really go anywhere in much of a hurry. That ambling build-up set the stage for an extended tension-filled finale Sunday that contained a little bit of everything, and at least avoided the irritating cliffhanger stunts that have characterized seasons past.

There was, finally, something cathartic about seeing Rick (Andrew Lincoln) and the coalition he had painstakingly, gradually assembled fight back against the brutal Negan (Jeffrey Dean Morgan) and the Saviors. Not that the battle really settled anything, since Negan managed to escape, rallying his massive army at the end by announcing, "We are going to war!"

Since Negan first made his presence felt on the show -- in a stomach-turning sequence that milked his cheerful sadism for all it was worth -- AMC's signature hit has both been significantly altered and lost a substantial portion of its audience. While previous years were built around carefully constructed arcs as the central group sought elusive refuge in one location or another, Negan's vise-like hold on the disjointed communities under his thumb cast a very long shadow, even during those stretches where the charismatic Morgan wasn't on screen.

The finale, in a way, felt like an effort not just to spin the show into a state of open warfare -- with all the tactical aspects that entails -- but also to address some of the concerns voiced about its dramatic drift. Perhaps that's why there were so many different flourishes upon which to chew, from Sasha (Sonequa Martin-Green) engaging in her noble sacrifice to an unexpected betrayal to an old-fashioned last-minute rescue, sending Negan and his band into uncharacteristic retreat.

Read More

Having been pretty overtly emasculated by Negan in their early encounters, Rick was also given an opportunity to exhibit some of his trademark grit, telling his nemesis yet again that he would eventually kill him, despite being captured and beaten.

The writers even set aside what amounted to a calming moment near the close to acknowledge the various losses and provide the characters a momentary respite. Mercifully, they also spared die-hard fans from sweating out, say, who was on the wrong end of Negan's bat until October.

That chance to inhale felt welcome, especially if the coming season is indeed going to be one long martial exercise, in a show that has long since moved beyond fear of zombies to the horrors people will inflict upon each other when not bound by laws. (Notably, except for the Sasha interlude, "walkers" were an afterthought in this latest episode.)

The challenge facing "The Walking Dead" going forward is how to balance the more epic qualities the current storyline augurs without losing sight of the core characters. In that respect, Sunday's finale can be viewed as a tentative step in the right direction -- a victory, however modest, for a series whose biggest and best days appear well behind it.

Red Mercury: Homeland Secuity 12:15pm Cover Story, No Arrest..

This popped up just after I got involved with the story and phoning around.

But is the guy detained by police or Homeland....is he in custody pending interview?

Why nothing on the NRC web page and no one home in region 2?

What exactly was the substance and was it harmful in any way...

No arrests made after ‘red mercury’ investigation

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

12:15 p.m Friday, March 31, 2017 Atlanta News

No one was arrested Thursday afternoon after authorities determined that a substance that prompted an alert downtown was not “red mercury.”

 “The scene was cleared soon after,” Atlanta police spokesman Donald Hannah said Friday. “There were no arrests made.”

Officials investigated after reports that a man claiming to have “red mercury” from Africa walked into the regional office of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, police said.

Red mercury is reportedly a substance used to create nuclear bombs, but its existence has not been documented, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported.

NRC Region II's Office Complex Permanently Inhabitable By Red Mercury?

???

My god this is Pearl Harbor redux. Russia Putin's right hand man was on a major network this morning saying our relationships are worst than the cold war right now. 

Was this Russian blackmail?

Red Mercury

Basically the red mercury event began around 6pm yesterday and they discovered the fire on I 85 at around 7pm.

A coordinated attack on the USA and Atlanta???

Again, not to have a NRC official explanation on the NRC web page today about what went on in the region II office yesterday is highly suspicious!!!!

The scenario:

Terrorist pay a homeless guy $100 bucks to prank a guy in the NRC office. You take this jar of harmless material into the NRC office. It ends up being extremely poisonous or infectious...it is designed to get the attention of the US officials. But no connection to actual terrorist.

The implication are terrorist have the capability to deliver poisonous chemicals dispersed over a vast areas killing 10,000s of people on their call in the USA.

Is somebody blackmailing the US over this event????

Remember the north Korean step bother who was killed in a airport by rubbing chemicals on a face thus killing him...

Red Mercury In NRC's Region II's (atlanta) Main Office

Holy Shit Update

I called the NRC main number. The operator knew nothing. Said,  OK please connect me to the public affair office. Asked them if Region II's office is open. He started blabbering something about calling them thinking I was a mushroom, I interrupted with, "its a simple question, is region II's office open right now. He said just a second, I waited over a minute, then I get this, "you will have to call the Atlanta's PD to get any information on this".

Might the NRC's Atlanta office be shutdown for a prolonged period of time due to a contamination of some kind...  

Homeland is deep into this. This was a fictionist material as before yesterday. Region II is still not answering phone this morning. The shop is shutdown. I expected this was a nut job and everything would be quickly resolved. It still going on right now has got me worried.  It looks like Homeland Security has a secrecy shield surrounding this event. I called region II's main number and nobody is home.

Why no explanation about this on the NRC's web site?

Is the collapse of Atlanta's I 85 bridge connected to this?   

Streets have been closed and officers are redirecting traffic.http://www.ajc.com/news/local/just-downtown-streets-closed-amid-red-mercury-investigation/9xfH610HG8kqOlvNT6N3EP/

Officials are investigating in downtown Atlanta after reports that a man claiming to have red mercury from Africa walked into the Region 2 location of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, police said. 

 “We received a call regarding a male coming into the facility carrying red mercury from Africa,” Atlanta police Officer Stephanie Brown said. “We are still gathering details on the call.”

investigating in downtown Atlanta after reports that a man claiming to have red mercury from Africa walked into the Region 2 location of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, police said. 

 “We received a call regarding a male coming into the facility carrying red mercury from Africa,” Atlanta police Officer Stephanie Brown said. “We are still gathering details on the call.”

Junk plant Browns Ferry: Reactor Protection Sytem Going Cracy On Us

Sounds like a special inspection. It is a disgrace starting up a reactor in this runaway condition.

The pre startup testing is supposed to catch this.

Back to the bad old days???

Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE	Notification Date: 03/29/2017 Notification Time: 23:36 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2017 Event Time: 18:44 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/29/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	1	Startup	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL SCRAM INITIATED DURING STARTUP "At 1844 CDT on 3/29/2017, Unit 2 initiated a manual scram due to multiple rods inserting. "At 1842 during Unit 2 start-up, Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 'G' drifted low. The operator adjusted the range down one position with no immediate reaction. At 1844, a spike on IRM 'G' caused a half scram on Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'A' trip system. The half scram was being reset after evaluating no trip condition was present. As the operator reset groups 2 and 3, a trip signal from IRM 'F' was received on the RPS 'B' trip system, resulting in rod insertion for groups 1 and 4. When the operator identified multiple rods inserting, the actions of procedure 2-AOI-100-1 were followed and a manual scram was inserted. Investigation is ongoing. "All safety systems remained in standby readiness configuration. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. Primary Containment Isolations Systems did not receive an actuation signal and performed as designed. "This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) Reactor Protection System(RPS) including reactor scram and reactor trip'. This event requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Driving With Flat Tire Is Safer Because You Are Forced To Drive Slower

This implies during the upcoming summer, having too many condenser tubes plugged, they will be popping up and down with power based on the plant's service water discharge temp being too high or poor main condenser vacuum. 

They have a engineering program that can accurately calculate for the number of tubes plugged...how all the other parameters will change. There are no surprises here. They been plugging tubes for years and they have needed a new condenser for years too.   

Pilgrim powers down to meet discharge temperature limit
WednesdayPosted at 1:52 PM Updated at 1:52 PM

By Christine Legere

PLYMOUTH — Operators have powered down the reactor at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station a bit to comply with temperature limits on water being discharged from the plant into Cape Cod Bay.

The Environmental Protection Agency's water discharge permit for Pilgrim, which allows 500 million gallons to be drawn daily, requires that water leaving the plant after use be no more than 32 degrees hotter than water temperature in the bay.

Bay temperatures were at 40.3 degrees Tuesday, limiting the exit temperature to 72.3 degrees. Plant workers powered Pilgrim down to 97 percent, where it will likely remain for at least one more day, according to Patrick O'Brien, spokesman for plant owner-operator Entergy Corp.

The increased discharge temperature is believed to be related to the work done on the plant's condenser system, which contains 35,000 tubes filled with seawater and converts steam back into water for the reactor.

After a single tube was found to be leaking, hundreds were plugged last month. In an email to the Times, O'Brien wrote that "with the proactive tube plugging, the condenser is working harder, which can increase temperatures."

"Reducing (reactor) power relieves that pressure/stress and helps keep temperatures reduced," O'Brien wrote.

Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, reported that the presence of seaweed, algae and small clams also could be affecting the condenser's heat exchange efficiency.

"A diver was being sent in to explore that possibility," Sheehan said in an email.

Progress with NRC: Allegations Now Sends Automatic Acknowledgement On all Emails

google Popperville, yahoo and Daemon for more entries on this.

NRC MAILER-DAEMON message?

I have had my email to the NRC getting dumped from the system before say Allegation got my email. I wondered if I got blacklisted. But yahoo has a lot a spam, there is credibility issues with yahoo email. It took forever to figure what was going on. The NRC has a spam filter so yahoo wouldn't overload the system with spam. I began this questto understand ii in 2012.   

One of the big problems I uncovered was the agency never sends a reply email acknowledging they received my complaint. I found this highly disrespectful to people using yahoo in making a complaint.

Now I recently got this response.

The deal in the past with allegations, was a automatic NRC response getting a email, say, if sent at a friends house, then the automatic response would be sent to your friend (example). He could identify you to company. There is some really crazy thinking going on in the NRC. For security sake, we don't send automatic responses. If you are rude and disrespected, then your workload is less.

I can see the NRC saying,for your complete protection, keep all safety concerns or complaints to yourself. Any transmission of safety concerns from your head to us is a direct threat to your safety.

These dysfunctional complaint processes and little transparency, I think a lot of it is done with intention to protect the industry.

Here below is a new automatic Allegation response? Welcome to the modern ages NRC!    

	to me

Thank you for contacting us.  Allegations are an important source of information in support of the NRC’s safety mission.  One of our team members will respond to you as soon as possible. 

The NRC brochure “Reporting Safety Concerns to the NRC” contains information that you may find helpful in understanding our process for review of safety concerns.  It includes an important discussion of our identity protection procedures and limitations.  The brochure can be found on the NRC public web site at the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0240/.

Please be advised that we cannot protect information during transmission on the Internet and there is a possibility that someone else could read our response while it is in transmission to you.  If you are concerned that e-mail transmission may not be completely secure you can contact us by phone or in person. You may contact any NRC employee (including a resident inspector) or call the NRC's Toll-Free Safety Hotline, (800) 695-7403.

-NRC Allegation Team

New Nukes Doomed in USA?

I always thought politics, the system and organizations caused this...not the inherent technology...

Westinghouse files for bankruptcy after Toshiba approval

Reuters, Kyodo, Ap

• Mar 29, 2017       

Toshiba Corp’s troubled U.S. nuclear unit Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 protection from creditors on Wednesday, as its parent seeks to limit losses that have plunged it into crisis.
A bankruptcy filing will allow Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse, whose nuclear plant projects have been dogged by delays and cost overruns, to renegotiate or break its construction contracts, although the utilities that own the projects would likely seek damages.
For Toshiba, the aim is to mitigate liabilities stemming from guarantees it provided backing the contractor’s work. Toshiba said Westinghouse-related liabilities totalled $9.8 billion (about ¥1 trillion) as of December.
Westinghouse said it has secured $800 million in financing to fund and protect its core businesses during its reorganization.
Toshiba President Satoshi Tsunakawa said the move was aimed at “shutting out risks from the overseas nuclear business.”
“We want to make this our first step toward recovering our solid business,” he told reporters after the announcement.
Toshiba, whose shares have crashed as Westinghouse’s problems surfaced, said in a statement it would guarantee up to $200 million of the financing for Westinghouse, adding that the troubled unit would be removed from its consolidated books at the end of the month.
Westinghouse, which made the filing at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, said its operations in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa would not be impacted by the filing.
“We are focused on developing a plan of reorganization to emerge from Chapter 11 as a stronger company while continuing to be a global nuclear technology leader,” Westinghouse Interim President and CEO Jos Emeterio Gutirrez said in a statement.
The move will trigger complex negotiations between the Japanese conglomerate, its U.S. unit and creditors, and could embroil the U.S. and Japanese governments, given the scale of the collapse and U.S. government loan guarantees for new reactors.
A Westinghouse bankruptcy is a “concern” for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, which is in touch with the Japanese government on the matter, an administration official said Tuesday.
“If several different things happen in a bad way, there’s a potential national security issue here,” the official said.
The nuclear-to-electronics conglomerate is looking to finalize losses related to the unit within the current fiscal year ending Friday through the bankruptcy filing.
In February, Toshiba said it was expecting a loss of $6.4 billion (¥712.5 billion) in its U.S. nuclear business for the nine months through December on an unaudited basis. The company had to delay its earnings announcement twice, saying it needed more time to look into an accounting problem at Westinghouse.
Faced with ballooning losses, Toshiba had been considering a way to distance itself from the fallout from the debacle at Westinghouse, which it bought in 2006 to expand its nuclear power business overseas.
The cash-strapped company has decided to spin off its prized memory chip business and sell a majority stake, or even the whole operation, to raise funds to bolster its financial standing.

Rash of Problems Testing Instrumentation at Nuclear Plants

Having troubles at nuclear plants hiring I&C guys?

Event Number: 52643
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: KEVIN OROURKE HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE	Notification Date: 03/27/2017 Notification Time: 21:54 [ET] Event Date: 03/27/2017 Event Time: 18:25 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): BILL COOK (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO INADVERTENT ISOLATION "On March 27, 2017, at 1825 hours EDT, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, technicians inadvertently caused a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System isolation, by testing the incorrect temperature switches in the TIP [Traversing In-core Probe] room. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was performing testing on the temperature switches for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), but the HPCI temperature switches were inadvertently actuated causing HPCI to isolate. "The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement 3.5.c.2 has been entered and the planned testing has been secured pending further investigation. PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification that the HPCI System was declared inoperable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. HPCI was returned to Operable within 40 minutes." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Junk Plant Hope Creek: Their Employees Turning Agaisnt Them

05000354

Does this happen often? Why would a employee lie?

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-2016-003
Dear

Dear Mr. Sena:

This letter refers to an investigation initiated on November 5, 2015, by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) and conducted at the PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG) Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek). The investigation was conducted to determine whether an instrument and control (I&C) technician had deliberately failed to follow site procedures resulting in a reactor scram. Based on the evidence gathered during the investigation, the NRC preliminarily determined that a (now-former) PSEG employee at Hope Creek deliberately failed to follow a procedure...

Factual Summary of NRC Office of Investigations (OI) Case No. 1-2016-003

On September 28, 2015, an instrument and control (I&C) technician completed procedure HC.IC-FT.SA-0001, “Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS) – Division I Channel A” and successfully tested the ‘A’ channel of the RRCS. The I&C technician then proceeded into procedure HC.IC-FT.SA-0003, “RRCS – Division I Channel B” to test the ‘B’ channel of the RRCS. While the technician was performing this procedure, the reactor tripped. To determine the cause of the reactor trip, on September 30, 2015, PSEG performed complex troubleshooting, which included reviewing the data saved from plant parameters. Based on the troubleshooting, PSEG determined that the I&C technician had made an error during the surveillance testing, causing both RRCS channels to trip and the reactor to scram.

OI interviewed a PSEG staff engineer involved in the troubleshooting. The engineer testified that he analyzed real-time printouts of reactor parameters at the time of the event to recreate the scenario on the reactor simulator. The engineer stated that, from the simulation, it was determined that the I&C technician had incorrectly selected the ‘A’ channel of RRCS and then selected the ‘B’ channel with the test input still inserted in the ‘A’ channel. This error then caused the reactor recirculation pumps to trip leading to the reactor scram. Additionally, the engineer testified that the full RRCS system was reviewed as part of the troubleshooting and no other failures were identified.

The I&C technician testified that he had received training and was fully qualified to perform surveillances of the RRCS and had performed this particular surveillance   

The employee says something else broke.

numerous times. The technician acknowledged that he had received training on procedure use and adherence and understood that if an issue occurred, to stop and resolve the issue before moving forward in the procedure. The I&C technician stated that on September 28, 2015, he and another technician had been assigned to perform the RRCS surveillance on the Division 1 ‘A’ and ‘B’ channels. The technician testified that the cause of the reactor scram was “something went wrong with RRCS,” adding that he did not make any mistakes or deviate from the procedure. The I&C technician could not provide an explanation for the contradiction between PSEG’s determination for the cause of the scram (i.e. human performance error) and the technician’s own testimony.

OI reviewed the copy of HC.IC-FT.SA-0003, used by the I&C technician on September 28, 2015. The technician had initialed the warning at the start of the applicable section of the procedure which stated “Extreme caution should be exercised with key functions on Display Monitor. Careless keyboard manipulation can cause a reactor scram. If any doubt or questions arise, THEN CONTACT Job Supervision immediately.” Contrary to this warning, the I&C technician, as proven through plant data, did not stop and contact supervision after incorrectly selecting the ‘A’ channel of RRCS. Instead, he selected the ‘B’ channel with the test inputs still inserted in the ‘A’ channel.
OI concluded based on the preponderance of evidence, that the I&C technician deliberately failed to follow this procedure.

Hope Creek Generating Station Technical Specification 6.8.1.d, “Procedures and Programs,” requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment. HC.IC-FT.SA-0003, “Redundant Reactivity Control System – Division 1 Channel B, C-22-N-403E, N402E ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip,” cautions that “Careless keyboard manipulation can cause a reactor scram. IF any doubt or questions arise, THEN contact Job Supervisor immediately.”

ENCLOSURE 2
APPARENT VIOLATION

Contrary to the above, on September 28, 2015, PSEG did not properly implement a procedure for a surveillance activity of safety-related equipment when the individual performing an RRCS surveillance test made an error and rather than immediately stopping and informing the job supervisor, attempted to correct the error. Specifically, when manipulating the keyboard, the individual selected the wrong channel to test. Rather than contacting the job supervisor, the individual attempted to correct for the error by selecting the proper channel with test inputs still inserted in the other channel, which ultimately led to a dual recirculation pump trip, alternate rod insertion (ARI) initiation, and a reactor scram.

About a year later, the exact same kind of event, but different instrumentation occurred at shutdown.   

Licensee Event Report 2016-005-01

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On November 5, 2016 at 0404 a RRCS I ARI {JC} signal was generated while excess flow check valve testing was in progress. The RRCS/ARI signal was generated due to trip signals on reactor pressure vessel dome pressure high channel "B" (expected for testing) and RPV water level low channel "A" (unexpected for testing condition). The unexpected signal was generated during the performance of isolating transmitters during preps for excess flow check valve (EFCV) testing. This signal would have been reset in accordance with procedures if followed. There were two procedures being executed in parallel by technicians to perform the excess flow check valve testing. The test procedure is written to test all EFCV's, with the EFCV's being separated into 21 groups based on channel and instrument rack relationships. Only one of the EFCV groups, group J, was to be tested. A second procedure is used to align and isolate the instrument racks for testing. Since only one group was to be tested, the evolution required partial procedure performance and coordination of both procedures to accomplish the test. In marking up the procedures for partial performance, the steps to isolate transmitters that were not to be tested were marked Not Applicable (N/A). In the process of marking up the procedure, the steps to reset any RRCS trips was also inappropriately marked N/A. As a result, the trip of the "A" channel low RPV water level was not reset prior to performing the test of the "B" channel high RPV pressure.

The cause the event was inadequate procedural guidance which resulted in a personnel error associated with partial procedure use.

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Why not Employee Sabotage within this LER?

Update march 24

Lawmakers in Pilgrim zone urge NRC to shut nuke plant down
March 22, 2017

eclark@wickedlocal.com

PLYMOUTH – Some supervisors on performance improvement plans didn't know they were on performance improvement plans.

Wrong names appeared on some of these plans.

A part broke on a generator and a part that didn't match that part was used to replace it. An event report for an issue with the plant wasn't filed within the required 60 days.

A problem pertaining to the dry well was "closed out" without being fixed.

There was failures to take corrective action and to "adequately implement" a fix to the safety culture problem.

A temporary fix of injecting sealant to stop a water leak in the residual heat exchanger was treated as a permanent solution, not a temporary one.

The wrong part of a safety relief valve was fixed, and the root cause of the problem went unnoticed…

Reposted from 1/23/2017

I am getting from some plant employees there has been a agreement amongst them to minimally participate with the NRC. There are so pissed off with the bullshit spinning games of NRC and

"The failure is attributed to minimal engagement of the pressure adjusting threaded union for the relief valve setting of 15 psig, and there is some contribution from either engine vibration or possibly human error which makes the cause indeterminate."   

Entergy this is their way protesting it and getting attention. They are sick and tired of working in a poorly funded plant. They are sick and tired of constantly of being under the intimidation of being fired by everyone. They are sick and tired with Entergy threatening they will get fired for telling the truth to the NRC and NRC telling them they will get them fired for not telling the truth to the agency.

December 9, 2016

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report 2016-008-00, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' Past lnoperability

On September 28, 2016, while performing the pre-start checks prior to running the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-A •or the monthly Technical Specification (TS) surveillance, the oil level in the EDG radiator fan right angle gearbox was found ~o be low and additional checks found the gearbox oil pressure relief valve in a loose state which provided a pathway for gear oil to be pumped out of the gear box while the EDG was operating. EDG-A was declared inoperable, the relief valve was repaired, pressure tested and the pressure adjusting threaded union was staked to eliminate any risk from vibration induced motion in the future, the gearbox oil was replaced and the EDG run for a post-maintenance test.

A Functional Failure Determination completed on October 11, 2016 determined that the EOG would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days since the last surveillance test on August 31, 2016 which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame. This issue is reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition which was Prohibited by the plant's TSs. On September 15, 2016 EDG-B was made inoperable to perform its monthly operability run. This created a situation where •or a brief period of time both EDGs were inoperable which is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable in accordance with 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A), 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B), and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). EDG-B remained available and could quickly have been restored by manual action to an operable condition if needed during the operability run.

The safety objective of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) is to provide a source of on-site AC power adequate for the safe shutdown of the reactor following abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents assuming a complete loss of off-site power, as described in Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Two EDGs and their associated fuel supply systems provide a single failure proof source of standby AC power. Pilgrim EDGs are 2600 KW ALCO 251-F type diesel generators. These EDGs are designed to automatically start upon receiving a valid signal, and come to operating speed ready to assume load. Each generator is sufficient to power all loads on its emergency bus upon failure of all off-site power. Each generator has the ability to pick up loads in sequence within a specified time period. The two EDGs at PNPS are cooled by a self-contained system consisting of radiators and a fan that is driven through a right angle gearbox.

The standby AC power source provides two independent diesel generators as the onsite sources of AC power to ~he emergency service portions of the station Auxiliary Power Distribution System. Each onsite source provides ~C power to safely shut down the reactor, maintain the safe shut down condition, and operate all auxiliaries necessary for station safety.

Historical review revealed that this fan drive gearbox was replaced on the EOG-A in the May 2000 time frame. At ~hat time, the original gearbox, Cotta Transmission Model Number J1327-2 was replaced with an upgraded Model Number J1327-3. Correspondence with the OEM vendor indicated the inside of the cases were identical with the only major physical change on the outside which was the addition of a relief valve in the oil circuit. Changes to the gearbox inspections were not updated to include any inspections or preventive maintenance for the relief valve.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 28, 2016, while performing the pre-start checks prior to running the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-A monthly Technical Specification (TS) surveillance, the oil level in the EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox was found low and additional checks found the gearbox oil pressure relief valve was loose.

The two EDGs at PNPS are each cooled by self-contained systems consisting of radiators and fans that rotate through a right angle gearbox. At the time of discovery, even though the oil level was low, the EOG would have started on a valid start signal. However, it would have been losing gearbox oil and we conservatively assumed it would have overheated due to failure of the cooling fan from gearbox damage. ~Functional Failure Determination completed on October 11, 2016 conservatively determined that the EOG would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days, which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The failure was determined to be low oil level found in the EOG-A radiator fan right angle gearbox due to the external relief valve pressure setting screw and the cap which goes over it being disconnected from the valve body. This allowed a pathway for oil to escape the gearbox when the EOG was running.

The radiator fan right angle gearbox oil level is checked prior to every monthly EOG run and the last time it was performed was August 31, 2016 with no problem identified during the pre-start checks. The last maintenance performed on the EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox was part of the routine examination and checks during the 2 year Preventive Maintenance (PM), which was completed on March 7, 2015. The inspection includes draining and changing the oil, performing internal inspection of the drive gears and bearings and performing backlash measurements of the drive and driven gears. However, the two (2) year PM does not perform any maintenance on ihe gearbox oil pressure relief valve. The relief pressure of 15 psig was set at the time of installation in 2000. Changes to the gearbox inspections were not updated to include any inspections or preventive maintenance for the relief valve.

The failure is attributed to minimal engagement of the pressure adjusting threaded union for the relief valve setting of 15 psig, and there is some contribution from either engine vibration or possibly human error which makes the cause indeterminate.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

EOG-A was declared inoperable, the relief valve was repaired, pressure tested and the pressure adjusting threaded union was staked to eliminate any risk from vibration induced motion in the future, the gearbox oil was replaced and •he EOG run for a post-maintenance test.

PNPS conducted an extent of condition review for EDG-B by performing an inspection to ensure that a common mode failure did not exist. 1 -,

The following are additional corrective actions to address this issue which are being processed through the PNPS Corrective Action Program:

1. Update station procedure 8.9.1, "Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance," to identify the plug that is used to check the oil level and visually inspect the reli~f valve to ensure the cap is appropriately aligned before and after each EOG run.

2. Incorporate a vendor manual change to capture the upgraded EDG's Cotta Transmission gear box. The gear box was updated in the 2000 time frame but the drawings/vendor manual was never updated.

3. Establish PM's for both EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox relief valves.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There were no consequences to the safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, and radiological safety due to this event.

The safety objective of the EDGs is to provide a source of on-site AC power adequate for the safe shutdown of the reactor following abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents assuming a complete loss of off-site power, as described in PNPS UFSAR.

At the time of the event, the preferred AC and the secondary AC power sources were Operable and available to perform their intended safety function. In addition, the Station Blackout AC Power Source was Functional and available as the onsite source of AC power to the emergency service portions of the Auxiliary Power Distribution System.

REPORT ABILITY

In a determination completed on October 11, 2016 it was conservatively determined that EOG-A would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days, which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame. This issue is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition which was Prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

In addition, on September 15, 2016 EDG-B was made inoperable to perform its monthly operability run. This created a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), and 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D).

The date the condition was discovered was September 28, 2016. As such, this 60-day 10 CFR 50.73 Licensee Event Report was due to the NRC Staff on November 27, 2016. This LER is being submitted late, and PNPS is addressing this through the Corrective Action Program.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

Events involving LERs where both EDGs were inoperable were reviewed. One related LER was identified and is summarized as follows:

LER 2016-001, "Both Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable," dated June 9, 2016 stated while EDG-B was out for maintenance, EOG-A was declared inoperable due to a 130 dpm leak from the jacket water pressure boundary.

There were no other LERs involving EOG inoperability at PNPS identified in a search of the past five (5) years.

REFERENCES:

CR-PNP-2016-7443

CR-PNP-2016-9552

CR-PNP-2016-9653

CR-PNP-2016-9831