Emergency Ultrasonic Inspection Testing For U.S. Reactor Plants like Belgium Reactors

Update July 1: setting the record straight.

I got as call back. Seems Mr. Kim is busy and traded me off to the new guy in the department. It would have been proper to email me a notice that Mr. Kim is no longer my petition manager, your new manager is so and so. The new guy don't get how important it is to get this information down in the system. His intention was to send the transcripts along with the acceptance letter. How does everyone else do it, does he think he gets to decide on his own. Seems I am training him. I wonder what kind of systematic training this guy has had over administering the 2.206 process???

Is the agency "throwing the new guy" sand in the gears as a way to gum up the system.

Does the NRC have enough money and manpower to properly administrate the 2.206 process?  

I don't like the way this guy answers me, we talked a little about why the Belgium reactors have delayed startup till Nov 2015. He says it unrelated to the vessel cracking issue. Basically the expert committee decided the agenda the licensee needs to meet to be safe and a restart...the licensee needs to write a report according to the committee's agenda explaining how they will be safe with the flaws. We have no idea what the additional inspections or requirements they will need in order to be accepted by the regulator and then the restart.      

The theme is with the NRC in 120 days; they are going to send me a directors decision on whether the industry is safe or not with hydrogen flaking. They are going to tell everyone we are safe with what we got. The theme is, there has been a lot of secret government to government non publically disclosed discussions going on with the hydrogen flakes, the director decision is going to explain what was discussed...update the nation on the hydrogen flakes. 

What the agency seems to be doing is answering their own questions posed as my questions...      

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So I called my petition manager Mr. Kim, left a message on his phone(about 2:15 pm...asking him to explain my option up in front of me. 

Submitted Petition March 26

The Petition pre-hearing accepted April 28 

Got to speak to their material expert May 14 

scheduled and occurred May 18

NRC notified me by phone the petition was accepted on 6/24. I'll have to get out my 8.1 directive out.

I had to ask to talk to the vessel metallurgist twice. The first time they just conveniently dropped it. I stated to the NRC official I was irked when he didn't acknowledge my first request to converse with a metallurgist (good agency communication), then it was conveniently forgotten. So I had to ask twice. I wrote it up to agency confusion. 

Look at this 2.206: "Jet Pump Riser Weld Crack At Columbia Nuclear Plant" 

The date the preceding took place is is June 12 (mine occurred May 18) 

The transcript came out today on adams. 

Why did this guy come out way before mine? How come mine is out yet? 

It is obvious I got the agency on some technical issue...they are trying to get their story straight. They are gaming the disclosures on this. I wish I could remember what I said that was so important.

If the would send me a acceptance letter I would remind them again.     

Questions for NRC: 

• Has anyone received any update regarding the inspection findings and corrective actions taken regarding the Belgium Reactor Pressure Vessel quasi flaw indications?

• Have been any other indications found in any other NPP RPV?

• Please describe how the vessels are ultrasonically inspected(for cracks)?

• Explain the testing of capsules.

• Explain the sensitivity of ultrasonic detector used in vessel inspections…the difference between the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 Nuclear plants and USA plants. What is the best technology?

• I have issues with the codes and regulations under which some of the vessels were accepted for nuclear plant operation.

• Please explain the difference between the vessel codes, regulations and an inspection technology of a 1975 vintage reactor to a current new reactor vessel?

6/25

Doel 3 and Tihange 2 Nuclear plants

It seems Doel 3 and Tihange 2 are having issues with getting permission to restart…not safe enough.  Might just start for the winters only. 

Update 6/24: The NRC Accepted my petition.

Seems the NRC forgot to release my 2.206 transcripts...going to release it soon. Lucky I am not paranoid.    

The NRC has accepted my petition. It is the first one they accepted ever.

Seems they were unclear in IN 2013-19 and they want to fix it...what they want the licensees to do.   

• NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2013-19: QUASI-LAMINAR INDICATIONS IN REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL FORGINGS ADDRESSEES

Basically more clearly explain why it is safe to continue to do what they always been doing.

Basically the NRC covering their ass operation...

I wonder if new information has become available from Europe? I believe in the phone call today with the NRC, they would have tipped me off new information has become available. The new information doesn't seem plausible to me. But you never know.

By the way, I give great credit to the NRC with them basically doing an agency research on this problem and them finding they need to be clearer on their take over the Belgium reactor cracks problem. They want to get it right on the documents…

I told the NRC, I operate mostly in a environment which is way out of my league...but this is way way way out of my league.  

Originally posted on 5/13...reposted

Update May 19:

So, the NRC entered my Belgium cracks 2.206 into their system. I spoke to the Petition Review Board yesterday. The five takeaways:

  

2.206: Belgium Nuclear Plant Vessel Cracks in USA Plants

Date: Thursday, March 26, 2015 10:56:12 AM
 

1) The Belgium’s were originally looking for flaws underneath their cladding. They had to use more sensitive ultrasonic detectors to accomplish that. This discovered the hydrogen flakes by accident. Then they had to jack up the sensitivity of the ultrasonic detectors even more to inspect the flakes. The level of the detector's sensitivity is crucial in detecting these kinds of flaws. I think they use not sensitive ultrasonic detectors in the USA dictated by the USA nuclear industry.

Imagine that, they found these flaws shutting down two reactors for years by accident. I reminded the PRB with the new Areva vessel weakness...it occurred due too little league forging shortcomings and at least one new bad vessel was buttoned up in a reactor building before they discovered it. It can happen in reactor heads also.     

How FANC Discovered Hydrogen Cracks 

01.1 The findings in Doel-3 and Tihange-2 "In 2012 a new type of in‐service inspection (ISI) of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) by ultrasonic testing (UT) was introduced in Belgian nuclear power plants. These inspections were introduced earlier in France to search for underclad cracks that may be present in the base metal directly below the interface to the cladding. These underclad cracks, if present, have perpendicular orientation to the surface and were created by the welding process of the austenitic strip cladding onto the ferritic base metal." Underclad: Looking for Cracks under the vessel cladding.

2) The US only does vessel seam weld UT inspection according to the NRC’s top vessel metallurgist once a decade from the inside. He reports in the USA, there never has been discovered in the vessel seam one flaw. I think it is an inch or two on each side. This seems to be nonsensical...the detectors are set too low with over a hundred vessels.

3) Much greater than 95% of the vessel are never inspected by any means. That is the main takeaway: we don't inspect these vessels because the agency defines them as mystically invulnerable.

4) The Belgium’s threw a hydrogen flake into a high flux test reactor. It came out more susceptible to cracking than the operating theoretical models. It worries me the metallurgic theoretical models might not match reality.

5) The NRC’s vessel metallurgist thought it invaluable to grab dead vessel samples for inspection that backs up theoretic models and add to the world knowledge concerning metal responses in a high temperature and radioactive environment. He thought my idea of grabbing sample was great and he would back me up to the hilt with this. There is always an issue of getting dose versus the value of scientific knowledge that stymies getting these specimens. I told him the nuclear utilities generally feel there is no benefits with studying the vessel metal, it will just lead to spending more money and increase regulatory burdens (Yankee Rowe)...   

     

I first assumed the hydrogen causing the flakes came from the hydrogen in the coolant. This is wrong. It comes from the forging process with water in the metal...oxygen and hydrogen separate. The hydrogen comes from that.      

Update May 14:

Robert Hardies 

Mr. Hardies started his U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) career in 2005 as a Senior Materials Engineer in the Vessel and Internals Integrity Branch of NRR in DCI. In 2006, Mr. Hardies became Chief of the Component Integrity Branch in the Division of Engineering in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research where he was responsible for research related to structural integrity of reactor coolant primary pressure boundary piping and vessels. Prior to joining the NRC, Mr. Hardies worked for the David Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center and for 16 years in the commercial nuclear power industry for Constellation Energy. Mr. Hardies received a Bachelor of Science degree in Metallurgy from the Pennsylvania State University and a Master of Science degree in Materials Science and Engineering from the George Washington University. 

Belgium Crack in US Vessels? 

I requested for my 2.206 to be able to talk to a reactor vessel expert. He’s got to be a PhD. I going to let him do most of the talking and keep my mouth shut as much as I can. I don't want him to really see how stuppid I am? The NRC scheduled a telecom with him with me this afternoon on 24 hour notice. He certainly fits the bill as expert. 

Anyone got any good question you want posed to Dr. Hardies this afternoon.

.

They say it’s a casting problem, but in the process of this investigation they discovered the metal was much weaker than expected.

Update:May 13 

So I'll get to try and pump this  NRC reactor vessel expert. I certainly will get the NRC's take concerning the Belgium Reactor cracks problem.  

It was gracious of the NRC to let me talk to the expert. 

Today at 9:27 AM

Dear Mr. Mulligan,Regarding your 2.206 petition: Belgium Nuclear Plant Vessel Cracks in USA Plants

 

I was able to schedule a half hour telecon with our subject matter expert for tomorrow, May 14, 2015 from 1430 to 1500. Please confirm this time works for you.

We have scheduled an opportunity for you to discuss your petition with the petition review board on May 19, 2015, from 1400 to 1500. Please confirm this time, also. 

RegardsSteveStephen S. KoenickSenior Project ManagerPlant Licensing Branch IV-2 (LPL4-2)Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL)

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)US Nuclear Regulatory Commission(301) 415-6631Stephen.Koenick

First posted on 4/30/2015

It is interesting how the NRC framed my 2.206 in this? 

"requesting emergency ultrasonic inspection testing for U.S. reactor plants similar to the cracks discovered in Belgium nuclear power"

2.206: Request Emergency Vessel Inspection Within Six Months On Most USA Nuclear Plants? 

To'Michael Mulligan' (steamshovel2002@yahoo.com) Apr 28 at 9:29 AM

Mr. Mulligan, 

Your petition dated March 26, 2015, requesting emergency ultrasonic inspection testing for U.S. reactor plants similar to the cracks discovered in Belgium nuclear power plants, was assigned to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for review. My name is James Kim, the NRR project manager in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL) and I have been assigned as a petition manager.In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the Petition Review Board (PRB) is offering you an opportunity to address the PRB to provide any additional explanation or support for the petition before the PRB makes an initial recommendation. Please let me know whether you would like to address the PRB.

Thanks,

James Kim Project Manager, DORL  

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1-301-415-4125E-mail: james.kim@nrc.gov

Entergy's Waterford Tripped Yesterday?

June 25

now up to 80% 

June 24

still shutdown and not a peep with why?

Lot of trouble with Grand Gulf, River Bend and Waterford...lots of signs of financial stress.

Did it trip or was it shutdown? Nothing in the news.


June 4, 2015

The New River Bend Feed Pump Scram?

Employee Sabotage: Knocking Off Line The Waterford Nuclear Plant?

$350 Billion in Weather Related Damage in Next 20 Years

That is seven nuclear plants...  

US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz wants Louisiana's ideas for a better power grid 

U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz delivers his presentation before the Edison Electricity Institute during its annual convention at the Hyatt Regency in New Orleans, Monday, June 8, 2015. (Photo by Ted Jackson, NOLA.com | The Times-Picayune) (TED JACKSON) 

The U.S. electricity grid faces an array of threats, including rising sea levels, storms and cyberattacks. The federal government is looking to states such as Louisiana to develop ways to protect it, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said Monday (June 8). 

Moniz was one of several featured speakers Monday during the Edison Electric Institute's annual convention in New Orleans. 

Severe weather, cyber threats, the rise of solar and other renewable energy sources, and aging equipment are "a daunting set of complex issues," Moniz said, "but we have to get the electric system right." 

Moniz said hurricanes Katrina and Rita underscored the need to harden substations, high-voltage power lines and other electricity infrastructure from future storms.
Storm threats are only expected to worsen. The U.S. is bracing for more than $350 billion in weather-related damage to the electricity system over the next 20 years, about $20 billion on the Gulf Coast alone, Moniz said.
Old transmission lines need to be replaced with newer, more durable lines, substations have to be built above flood levels, and back-up power systems developed, he said. 

As Louisiana copes with rising sea levels and future storms, it and other states will play a "pivotal role" in developing innovative ways to improve the power grid, he said. 

Moniz said the Energy Department is pushing for a new program that would offer between $3 billion and $5 billion in competitive grants over the next 10 years to states with innovative solutions to enhance energy infrastructure resilience, reliability and security. 

Moniz pointed to New Jersey's effort to develop a microgrid to provide back-up power to its rail system during severe weather. The Energy Department partnered with the state in 2013 to design the system. The partnership was part of the response to Hurricane Sandy, which hit the Northeast in 2012. 

Hardening the electricity grid is not the only place Louisiana could play a role. 

Moniz added Louisiana ports are at the heart of the country's push to export natural gas amid a glut in domestic supply. 

The nation needs to improve its waterways to accommodate traffic from large liquefied natural gas tankers, for example, he said.

Indian Point Double or Nothing Philosophy

What about iodine production and xenon burnout?

I don't have inside information, but this fast restart seems to be reckless to me. We will see as time goes by? Do they double or nothing philosophy once a plant gets into trouble...under intense NRC special inspection scrutiny and the state is trying to shut them down.

Indian Point 3 returns to service 

BUCHANAN – Indian Point’s Unit 3 nuclear power plant was returned to service Tuesday afternoon, generating electricity less than 24 hours after the unit automatically shut down following the failure of an electrical switch, ro breaker, in a switchyard outside the plant. 

The switchyard is located across the street from Indian Point and receives electricity generated by the plant before distributing it out to the electrical grid. 

The failure of the breaking led to Indian Points Unit 3 shutting down as a protective measure.
All equipment operated appropriately. There was no release of radioactivity and no threat to the safety of workers or the public. 

Unit 2 continues to operate at full power.

So this is what caused it. It is too bad, this didn't eliminate from Entergy.

Indian Point: Balloon triggered reactor shutdown

BUCHANAN – A balloon that got tangled in electrical wires led to a sequence of events that caused a shutdown of a reactor at the Indian Point nuclear power plant Monday night, regulatory officials said Tuesday. The shutdown occurred at 7:20 p.m., after Consolidated Edison asked Indian Point operators to open an electrical breaker so that workers could safely remove a large Mylar balloon that got tangled in wires leading to the Millwood substation south of the plant. Soon after that breaker was opened, a second breaker opened, resulting an an automatic shutdown of the reactor, according to Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The shutdown occurred without any complications, with all safety systems functioning the way they were supposed to, he said. The reactor went back online at 11:45 a.m. Tuesday, according to Jerry Nappi, a spokesman for Entergy.

ALBANY—One of the two nuclear reactors at the Indian Point nuclear center shut down again on Monday, just weeks after it returned to service following a transformer fire that drew the concern of Gov. Andrew Cuomo and other elected leaders.

When a transformer at the plant caught fire on May 9, Cuomo rushed to the scene and reiterated his long-standing concerns about the plant. Shortly after that, a top state energy official acknowledged that the administration was actively working to pressure the plant to shut down.


The cause of the transformer fire, which sent a dark plume into the sky and frightened nearby residents, is still under investigation. Unit 3 returned to service on May 24.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51156
Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [ ] [3] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: LUKE HEDGES HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	Notification Date: 06/15/2015 Notification Time: 20:15 [ET] Event Date: 06/15/2015 Event Time: 19:20 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP "On June 15, 2015 at 1920 EDT, Indian Point Unit 3 received a Turbine trip which directly led to a Reactor trip. Operators entered [plant procedure] E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. All control rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as expected. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system actuated as expected. Offsite power and electrical lineups are normal. No primary or secondary code safety valves lifted. All MSIVs are open and the Main Condensers are being used as the heat sink. The Reactor is in Mode 3 and stable. Unit 2 was unaffected and remains at 100% power. Preliminary investigation determined that Breaker Number 1 in the Ring Bus was intentionally opened [by plant personnel on switching orders from the district operator] due to a problem on W93 [output feeder from Ring Bus]. Subsequently Breaker #3 went open and caused a Turbine/Reactor trip of the Unit." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Massive Warming In NE Continental Shelf: Implication For Coastal Nuclear Plants?

June 26

The Atlantic 'conveyor belt' and climate: 10 years of the RAPID project

The question is, how often will the wind be coming in the Northeast direction...

Dangerous jellyfish appearing at Jersey shore – News

June 23, 2015 at 9:24 pm

It’s not what Harvey Cedars Beach Patrol Captain Randy Townsend usually sees on the resort’s beaches: a risky jellyfish-like creature called a Portuguese man o’war. “When the wind is coming from the northeast, warm water from the Gulf Stream comes to shore”, the post read. According to National Geographic, it moves by floating on the water’s surface, drifting on the currents, catching the wind.

 

June 16

Why can't the main stream media help us understand these interactions? I bet they will say not enough people interested in it. 

The Atlantic Ocean's Cool Phase Will Change The World's Weather

By The Conversation  

May 29th 2015 11:30 AM 

The Atlantic Ocean’s surface temperature swings between warm and cold phases every few decades. Like its higher-frequency Pacific relative El Nino, this so-called “Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation” can alter weather patterns throughout the world.

The warmer spell we’ve seen since the late 1990s has generally meant warmer conditions in Ireland and Britain, more North Atlantic hurricanes, and worse droughts in the US Midwest.

However a colder phase in the Atlantic could bring drought and consequent famine to the developing countries of Africa’s Sahel region. In the UK it would offer a brief respite from the rise of global temperatures, while less rainfall would mean more frequent summer barbecues. A cold Atlantic also means fewer hurricanes hitting the southern US.

The good news is our latest research, published in the journal Nature, gives us a much better understanding of these Atlantic oscillations. We now know that accelerations in sea-level rise in cities like New York and Boston on the north-east coast of the US are linked to a cold spell in the Atlantic...

Did they make worst the heating of the Long island sound last heat spell.

The Greatest Ever Thermohaline Superstorm Approaching the Millstone Nuclear plant!

Is this implicated with the North Carolina shark attacks...

Accelerated Warming of the Continental Shelf Off Northeast Coast 

June 11, 2015 

A couple of unexplained large scale changes in the waters off the northeast coast of the U.S. have oceanographers perplexed: an accelerated rate of sea level rise compared to most other parts of the world; and the disturbing signs of collapsing fisheries in the region.
A new study by physical oceanographers at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), published in the Journal of Geophysical Research, shows that water temperatures in this continental shelf region have been trending upward, with unprecedented warming occurring over the last 13 years. The study also suggests a connection between sea level anomalies and water temperature along the continental shelf. 

“The warming rate since 2002 is 15 times faster than from the previous 100 years,” says co-author Glen Gawarkiewicz, a WHOI senior scientist. “There's just been this incredible acceleration to the warming, and we don't know if its decadal variability, or if this trend will continue.” 

The scientists compared their findings with a study of surface waters using data collected by Nantucket Light ship, and other light ships up and down the East Coast between 1880 and 2004, previously analyzed by Steve Lentz of WHOI and Kipp Shearman of Oregon State University. The new study shows that recent accelerated warming is not confined to the surface waters, but extends throughout the water column...

Grand Gulf’s Power History: Entergy’s Junk Southern Fleet?

June 12

Finally 100%

Update June 11

Miserable progress now at 94%. Six days to recover from a 50% down-power...  

Update June 10

at 77% today...they ain't making money at this power level. River Bend is at 66%.

Everyone in Region 1 is at 100% power.

*********************

Hmmm, River Bend and Grand Gulf is a struggling single unit facility? 

The whole deal reminds me of Pilgrim's shutdowns and power reductions over their junk new safety relief valves for six years.

It is driving me crazy why the exact same NRC event report came out on June 8 and June 9. Bet you it was a NRC screw-up, entergy came up with a update and the NRC just copied over the original by mistake today.

All plants in the same vicinity?

Grand Gulf's recent power history. 

June 9  95%

8  94%

On June 8^th at 8:15 pm Grand Gulf had a fire in their Electro Hydraulic Pump C terminal box. Again in 24 hours the reactor power level being stuck at 95% is highly unusual. 

7  79%

6  50% 

5  100%

River Bend: What A Junk Plant’s Power History Looks Like

7/20

95%

 

7/17

91%

 

7/13

What the hell, back to 63%

7/4

Finally 100% 

7/3

80%

 

7/2

80%

 

7/1

84%  

6/30

75% 

6/29

down to 74% over the weekend

6/28

31% 

6/27

50%

 

6/26

still at 94%

6/25

94%

6/24

94%

6/23

94%

6/22

94%

June 19

94%

June 18

93%

June 17

88%

June 16

River Bend is at 90% power and Indian Point 3 is a 0% power. 

June 15

Wow, great progress over the weekend. Now 89% power. At least Grand Gulf didn't trip.  

June 12

71% power 

Update June 11

At 70% power. Gained a whole lot in 24 hours, a tiny 4% power.  

Update June 10 

Well, there is progress. They are at 66%. Grand Gulf is at 77% power. Can't make money this way?

Everyone in Region 1 is at 100% power.

****************************** 

June 1: The New River Bend Feed Pump Scram?

June 9 33% reactor power
  

The started up on June 8 (actually June 7), 24 hours later they are only at 33% power? This means something is highly abnormal. It is shocking just the before scram, RB were at reduced power on May 30 and 31, upon start up they are drastically at reduced power for over 24 hours. This isn't the looks of a professional outfit? 

8 3%

7 0%

6 0%

5 0%

4 0%

3 0%

2 0%

June 1 92%-this is when they scrammed on feed level control problems.

May 31 81%

30 52%

29 100%

Grand Gulf Fire: Another Entergy plant

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51137
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RONNIE WALTERS HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE	Notification Date: 06/08/2015 Notification Time: 00:45 [ET] Event Date: 06/08/2015 Event Time: 22:59 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/08/2015
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): JACK WHITTEN (R4DO) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) ALLEN HOWE (NRR)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	92	Power Operation	92	Power Operation

Event Text

FIRE IN PROTECTED AREA LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES At 2359 EDT on June 7, 2015, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event in accordance with Emergency Action Level HU4 for a fire in the protected area lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire started in the wiring of a terminal box for Electro Hydraulic Pump C, the running pump located in the turbine building. The running pump was then deenergized by operators and the standby pump started. The site fire brigade responded and extinguished the fire. The emergency was terminated at 0030 on June 8, 2015. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Whitten), NRR EO (Howe), and IRD (GOTT). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA via email.

Employee Sabotage: Knocking Off Line The Waterford Nuclear Plant?

Update 5 pm 

I didn’t have to through decades of NRC documents to discover this. It is the newest inspection report. These are the guys who have long term issues with keeping their diesel generators operable. The DG day tank vent corrosion and not have a direct indication on DG room ventilation flow, the broken fan event.

So the below indicates an intentional and malicious attitude of Entergy with not following the rules, only following the rules Entergy thinks are valid. The below basically surrounds the facility capability to resist fires per licensing and for the crew to alternately shut down the reactor if the control room becomes uninhabitable. Most other plants have fixed this issues decades ago.

I think the staff feels, my plant’s operations is becoming chaotic...the nuclear industry has made the NRC too impotent to control the licensees. My plant is becoming dangerous to me and my community...I secretly tripped the plant hoping to drag in all the officials trying to get them to fix my plant.

Say Entergy refuses to comply with appendix R. The wrong doing has two components to it.

1) The risk of the non-compliance creating a severe core meltdown. Admittedly it would be an extremely infrequence event. This is the normal way the NRC comes up with a violation.

2) Destroying the safety culture in three components. Not carried in traditional enforcement. Traditionally the NRC treats risk as a isolated condition, while if the licensee is promiscuously with not following the rules, it creates the condition where nobody has to follow the rule. Now you got a nuclear plant staff with global integrity problem without bounds. 

  

a) If my company violated the rules and the NRC is powerless to make them to comply...this behavior means it ok for me to not follow the rules as long as I don’t get caught.

b) The idea the licensee is impervious to control by outsiders and the NRC...my company can crush me if I don’t behave their way. Make me behave contrary to my conscience, licensing and following the rules.

b) Configuring the plant contrary to licensing and the NRC rules...have no way to know what configuration the plant is in. Declaring a component is operable when management knows it is not or a employee thinks that is what management wants.

Check out how many of these violations are decades old. Even though a licencee is currently not in conformance with plant licencing... becuase it is a decades old and a current violation, this means it not a violation or can be giving  paper-cut not sited violation. Only the NRC can frame crazy language like this. 

It obvious agency and licencees contempt for following the rules. This naturally leads to chaotic plant operations and many safety components knowingly and unknowingly degraded or broken. What if you were employee in a totally out of control plant and you had many legitimate reason not to trust the agency or your company. What if you didn't trust anyone. What would you do...how would you drag attention to the agency and the plant. tripping a plant is really not safety related, but it is a attention getter.

A plant equipment operator or licensed operator got a thousand ways to trip with zero chance of getting caught. The example is in the feedpump room. Isolating a pressure instrumentation line, then open the vent line....the putting the valves back into the normal position. It would take second for this and you guarantee

a plant trip without getting caught.    

May 27, 2015: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2015007 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(9), “Fire Protection,” for the failure to ensure the required separation between fire areas. Specifically, the licensee installed fire barriers on two ventilation ducts which were not in a configuration demonstrated to provide the required three-hour fire-rated separation between fire areas. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2015-00540 and established an hourly fire watch as a compensatory measure until corrective actions can be taken (Fire Impairments 15-30 and 15-31). The failure to ensure the required separation between fire areas was a performance deficiency.

This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of current licensee performance since this fire barrier configuration was installed in the 1980s.(Section 1R05.02.b)

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.9, “Fire Protection,” for the failure to correct adverse conditions associated with fire protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct longstanding deficiencies with the Appendix R emergency lighting units. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2015-00593 and operators had flashlights available as a compensatory measure.

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.9, “Fire Protection,” for the failure to periodically test and demonstrate the 8-hour capacity of the Appendix R emergency lighting units. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2015-00856 and operators had flashlights available as a compensatory measure. The failure to periodically test and demonstrate the 8-hour capacity of the Appendix R emergency lighting units was a performance deficiency.

• Enforcement discretion. Specifically, the team identified four examples where the licensee failed to maintain an alternative shutdown procedure that successfully mitigated all postulated alternative shutdown scenarios. This finding affects 10 CFR 50.48 and has been screened and determined to warrant enforcement discretion per the Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48).

A employee cry for help? More like Entergy is sabotaging plant capacity factor on a maintenance and plant upkeep ideological philosophy with putting stock price above plant safety. 

I see this kind of fire accident as extremely infrequent. But if you get to the point of having to run a diesel generator without cooling water for ten minutes with most of your safety systems already  stripped away from you, at this point to a licenced operator, one error or miscalculation has the strong possibility of creating catastrophic problems for the local community. One error has the high possibility to be stratospherically signifiant. The operator is going to be upset and his plant is in such a condition...an error is highly likely. Here is when the engineers screw the operator putting them in the position of getting blamed for the accident, with the calculation of the risk outcome of the fire being too complex to understand. This is when all their self interested assumptions will show up to screw to the operator. There just got to be simple systems and procedure at this point...it has to be absolutely be bullet proof. The system today is set up where as the consequences of a misstep increases, the operator has less qualified testing, components and procedures. As the consequences of a accident increase, the quality if the system and components decrease.  

Green. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.9, “Fire Protection,” for the failure to adequately correct a previous violation. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide a bounding calculation for the amount of time available for operators to establish component cooling water during an alternative shutdown. The licensee developed this calculation in response to Non-cited Violation 2012007-02. Description. During the 2012 triennial fire protection inspection, the team identified a violation for the failure to perform a safe shutdown design calculation.

Just look at this, in 2012 the NRC discovers a not safe calculation in this extremely grave emergency procedure, gives Entergy a minor violation over it. The expectation is if the NRC violates them, the problem will be fixed conservatively and right. Entergy throws up the middle finger at the agency in 2012, gives them back a half ass correction to the calculation. The object is, how much time does the operator have to perform a step in the procedure without cooling water to the diesel generator before damage occurs. Have they ever done a experiment on a similar diesel generator with no cooling water...does anyone have the actual proof with how long a diesel generator  has without cooling water before failure. All they talk about these calculations and formulas without any proof they reflect the truth.   

You are in the realm here where these rules and procedures are sacred at this point..

So the NRC violates them again on their first 2012 violation and then gives them non sited green violation on a host of rules breaking over appendix R and the alternate shutdown on this inspection. You know, our rules aren't sacred. They are really telegraphing to all the employees on site following or not following the secret rules is insignificant in the big scheme of things. This occurs over and over again at this site telling the employees rules are insignificant. Management treat the NRC rule as just optional.  Basically all of risk perspectives teaches the staff that not following the sacred rules is insignificant.

At the bottom of this pile of horseshit might be one employee with a conscience thinking, my management and the federal agency overseeing the whole shebang is completely and utterly crazy. My plant is running totally out of control. Don’t you wish this employee was there in TMI or Davis Besse? Holy shit, the rules and polices of the NRC might not contain the control of this site. It won't be the first time a employee felt this in the industry. I don’t know anyone I can trust and  the outsiders won’t understand the technical issues behind my concerns. My only hope is a big attention getting ploy dragging the multitudes toward the plant's problem. This surely can fix my plant's problems.

What will happen if I secretly trip the plant? Will that sober everyone up?     

Michael Mulligan

Dear Sir, It must be an extraordinary coincident feed pump trips took out two plants (River Bend, Waterford) Entergy plants within 24 hours and 50 miles from each other. I think you need early to get

To: allegation@nrc.gov  Today at 7:48 AM 

Dear Sir, 

It must be an extraordinary coincident feed pump trips took out two plants (River Bend, Waterford) Entergy plants within 24 hours and 50 miles from each other. I think you need early to get out front of this and publicly explain these events. 

1) Entergy treating their employees in a draconian manner...is causing their employees to retaliate by sabotaging the plants. They secretly tripped Waterford to get even? 

2) Or the electrical troubles is spanning across two plants indicating it is a fleet wide problem?3) Request a special inspection and FBI investigation on the Waterford Plant?

Sincerely, 

Mike Mulligan 

Hinsdale, NH 

16033368320

You get it with unreliable equipment, a feedwater trip and issues with a automatic bus transfer that didn't occur? 

05000382

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51116
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 06/03/2015 Notification Time: 21:36 [ET] Event Date: 06/03/2015 Event Time: 17:05 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): JACK WHITTEN (R4DO) SCOTT MORRIS (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. "At 1705 [CDT] the reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of an automatic trip due to loss of main feedwater pump 'A'. "The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with emergency feedwater feeding and maintaining both steam generators due to an automatic emergency feed actuation signal. "During the trip, the 'B' electrical safety and non safety busses did not automatically transfer from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer causing a loss of off-site power to the 'B' electrical busses. This resulted in a loss of main feedwater pump 'B'. "The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as designed and reenergized the 'B' safety related buses. "The plant entered the emergency operating procedure for loss of main feedwater. "Off-site power has been restored to the 'B' safety and non safety busses, and the emergency diesel generator 'B' is secured. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LER 2014-006-00: The River Bend Christmas Scram Causing the First Special Inspection

So here is the 2014 Christmas scram that got the first inspection. An event like this happens with the mixture of poor plant maintenance and general incompetence of the employees...poor training across the board.  

Doesn't it raise the hairs in the back of your neck with all degradation of components showing up in one event? 

This is a dangerous plant in many ways...

I believe the first half scram with the turbine control scam over instrumentation problem was basically a  turbine grounding problem throwing electrical spikes at the instrumentation...creating a set of scrams.

I see the problem as in many cases as  intermittent equipment and electrical problems...they really don't have a means to record the event. They are uncertain what caused it...they guess what did it or on a quick and expensive fix...then quickly startup into the next scram.   

Licensee Event Report 50-458 /2014-006-00:Automatic Reactor Scram and Primary Containment Isolation Due to Loss of Power on the Division 2 Reactor Protection System With a Concurrent Division 1 Half-scram On December 25, 2014. at 0836 CST, a reactor scram occurred while the plant was operating at approximately 85 percent power. This event resulted from the loss of power on the Division 2 reactor protection system (RPS) (**JD**) bus, in conjunction with a preexisting half-scram on Division I. The loss of Division 2 RPS power also resulted in a Division 2 containment isolation signal. Approximately four minutes after the scram, reactor water level increased to the Level 8 setpoint, causing the running main feedwater pump (**SJ**) to trip. As reactor water level decreased back through the normal operating range, operators attempted to re-start main feedwater pump "C," but its supply breaker failed to close. Main feedwater pump "A" was subsequently returned to service. As reactor water level decreased to the point at which the startup feedwater regulating valve (FRV) should have opened to establish automatic control, the valve failed to open. Attempts to open it with a manual input signal were unsuccessful, and the "C" main FRVwas put back into service. By that time, reactor water level had decreased slightly below the Level 3 RPS actuation setpoint, resulting in a second scram signal. INVESTIGATION and IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 

The Division I half-scram had been inserted two days prior to the event, in compliance with Technical Specifications, following the failure of an instrumentation channel on the no. 2 main turbine control valve. Teams were formed to investigate the separate significant aspects of the event, as follows: Loss of Division 2 RPS Bus 

Power was lost when the output breaker on the RPS motor-generator (MG) in the Division 2 subsystem tripped. The mostly likely cause of the output breaker trip was an intermittent failure of the MG field flash card due to a degraded capacitor. The capacitor was replaced, and the MG was tested and returned to a standby condition as a backup power supply. The alternate power supply will remain in service carrying the bus until completion of a modification to eliminate the field flash card as a potential source of recurrence of this problem. Misoperation of the Startup FRV The operation of the startup FRV was investigated to determine why it was unresponsive to either the automatic controller or the operator's manual input. Maintenance technicians discovered a failed circuit card in the "manual" side of the valve controller. The ".automatic" function of the controller had operated correctly in the post-scram environment once reactor water level had returned to normal, and this was confirmed again during the troubleshooting. Additionally, Engineering personnel determined that the performance of the valve was consistent with its design criteria. The valve and its control logic are designed for flow control, and not simply for isolation. When the valve receives a gradual "open" signal from the closed position, there is no specific time response requirement. This design feature can allow a delayed response that, in the scram recovery scenario, may be too slow to arrest a significant downward trend in reactor water level. Malfunction of Main Feedwater Pump "C" The failure of main feedwater pump "C" was found to have been was caused by an "over-racked" condition of its supply breaker (that is, the breaker racking mechanism had slightly over-travelled the last time the breaker was returned to service). This caused the limit switches that detect the position of the breaker mechanism within the cabinet to give the control logic circuit a false indication that the breaker was not connected to the bus. Interim instructions have been implemented to have electricians verify the condition of all similar breakers each time they are racked in.

I Now Know What Is Wrong With The NRC. It's a Alien Invasion Coming.

The Whispers Season 1 Episode #01 – XMarks The Spot Review

Posted by Chris Beveridge
June 2, 2015 at 11:25 AM

The central idea of the series is one that’s certainly an interesting one, an approach you don’t see often when it comes to alien invasion shows. At least not ones that are treated seriously when you get down to it. As we see with the prologue here, these aliens are looking for a way to take care of business by working through the children. Not just any children though, but carefully selected ones that will give them the access they need. Seeing the way a young girl is enthralled by an imaginary friend she calls Drill is certainly eerie with how it unfolds, since Harper just views it all as a game and her mother finds it cute. But when it leads to the mother’s death in a creative way, that sets things into motion since the child’s father is the head of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That elevates things up several notches to be sure among those that investigate such things.