Why is Wolf Creek In Trouble II?

As a message to the employees of Wolf Creek nuclear plant, throw me some insider not known executive wrongdoing. Tell me about secret problems they wouldn't fix or if they are not following the rules...I promise you I will get the NRC's attention. I will make their lives so miserable I will make them cry. I will fix Wolf Creek for you. My phone number and email is at the top of my blog...

For everyone else, you can talk to me about training or simulator troubles. You executives would regret they lived?  

I ask the right question worry about if something deeper was going in early Oct 2014. This is a horrible report card for the whole training and licensed operator ranks. There is no question the NRC down played this. But it is only going to get horrible worst.    

Why is Wolf Creek In Trouble? 

***During the facility-administered annual operating tests of licensed operators, the licensee training staff evaluated crew and individual operator performance during dynamic simulator scenarios and individual operator performance during job performance measures. There were two crew failures and 11 individual failures. The licensee remediated and retested the staff prior to returning them to licensed duties. Analysis. In accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.11, each of the following was a performance deficiency against expected licensed operator knowledge and abilities: 1) Greater than 20 percent of the crews failing their scenarios and 2) greater than 20 percent of the licensed operator staff failing their operating tests. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," the inspection determined that the finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined that this finding could be evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process." This finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was related to the requalification

I'd like to know how they come up with the 40% failure rate is unsafe?

exam results, did not result in a failure rate of greater than 40 percent, and the licensed operators were remediated prior to returning to shift. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with Green. The inspector reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with licensed operator performance on the annual requalification operating tests. Specifically, 2 of 8 crewThmance measure portions of the operating tests. The licensee remediated and retested the staff prior to returning them to licensed duties. Wolf Creek entered this finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 75336.

This kind of plant ownership is very dangerous. A split ownership between two small potatoes utilities. 

You are see the worst of the NRC here. So the simulator was inaccurate and the safety knowledge of the licensed operators was really poor. They bufucated the depth of the problem or diluted the magnitude the the problems by separating these problems between two independent inspection reports. I am certain the NRC seen the inadequacies of the licensed operators training and the inadequacies of accurate simulator modeling at the same time. They strategized to separated the issues to minimize the violations for their buddies. 

If they would have hit these guys with these two problems at the same time, jacked up the violation level...threw it into the special inspection...these guys would have gotten the message to clean up their act really hard. Everyone else would have seen this saying, we can't let this happen to us.

Better yet, failed training and shut them down for a month or so for retraining...this wouldn't be seen in the nuclear industry for a decade or more.        

Enforcement. This finding does not involve enforcement action, because no violation of a regulatory requirement occurred. Because this finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000482/2014005-01, “Failure to Conduct and Evaluate Simulator Testing In Accordance With ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 and ANSI/ANS 3.5-1998.”

Can you believe from the latest inspection report in the above... that training the licensed operator with a inaccurate simulator is not against the rules. Only campaign contributions buys you that 

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC INSPECTION REPORT - Dated February 10, 201 

by Bob Meyer : How comfortable are you with your simulator performance? Does your simulator provide negative training to the operators? This inspection finding is a shot over the bow for the industry. If you are putting up with poor performance on your simulator, look at this inspection report. 

Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11) 

Violation: The inspectors identified a Green finding for the inadequate conduct and evaluation of simulator performance testing in accordance with the standards of ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 and ANSI/ANS 3.5-1998, “Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Examination.” Specifically, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) did not adequately identify that the simulator responses during 2008 through 2014 tests of Transient 3, “Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves,” did not meet the acceptance criteria described in Section 4.1.4 of ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 (or the 1998 edition), which if left uncorrected, could have resulted in negative training of licensed operators and call into question Wolf Creek’s ability to conduct valid licensing examinations with the simulator. WCNOC initiated condition reports 90179 and 90417 and simulator discrepancy report. A14-154. WCNOC also plans to conduct benchmarking at other sites to compare simulator responses during applicable testing, and is evaluating the need for additional procedure revisions or other corrective actions. 

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could have become more significant in that not correcting noticeable differences between the simulator and the reference plant could cause negative training of licensed operators and call into question WCNOC’s ability to conduct valid licensing examinations with the simulator. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 4, Tables 1 and 2 worksheets, issued June 19, 2012, and flowchart block 14 of Appendix I, “Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP),” issued December 6, 2011, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green), because the deficiencies were associated with simulator testing, modifications, and maintenance, and there was no evidence that the plant-referenced simulator does not demonstrate the expected plant response or have uncorrected modeling and hardware deficiencies.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, Identification, because WCNOC personnel did not implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Specifically, this issue was first identified when the RETRAN-3D code analysis was first used in 2008 transient testing, and additional tests performed in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012 were opportunities to identify the performance deficiency; however, the issue was not entered into the corrective action program, a noticeable difference was not evaluated, a training needs assessment was not performed, and the process used to conduct simulator transient testing, as described in Procedure Al 30C-006, was not updated to include all of the minimum acceptance criteria described in the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. Hence, simulator issues expected to be identified during the testing process could potentially be missed by implementing the AI 30C-006 procedure, which did not include all of the minimum acceptance criteria described in the ANSI standard [P.1]. 

71111.11 Findings 

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green finding for WCNOC inadequately conducting and evaluating simulator performance testing in accordance with the standards of ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 and ANSI/ANS 3.5-1998, “Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Examination.” Specifically, WCNOC did not adequately identify that the simulator responses during 2008 through 2014 tests of Transient 3, “Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves,” did not meet the acceptance criteria described in Section 4.1.4 of ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 (or the 1998 edition), which if left uncorrected, could have resulted in negative training of licensed operators and call into question Wolf Creek’s ability to conduct valid licensing examinations with the simulator.

Description. In order to maintain an NRC approved simulation facility, licensees are required to conduct performance testing throughout the life of the simulator to ensure that it can be used to model control manipulations consistent with the actual plant. An acceptable method for conducting this testing is by using industry standard ANSI/ANS 3.5. This industry standard has been endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.149, “Nuclear Power Plant Simulation Facilities for Use in Operator Training, License Examinations, and Applicant Experience Requirements,” Revision 4 (and Revision 3), as an acceptable method to complete required simulator testing to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46. WCNOC procedure AI 30C-001, “Continued Assurance of Simulator Fidelity,” Revision 15, references ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 as the standard for its simulator testing.

Part of the required testing detailed in the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard includes transient performance tests, which include simulator tests on 11 specific transients specified in Section B.3.2 of Appendix B of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. Section B.1.2 of Appendix B of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard states that the acceptance criteria for these tests are documented in Section 4.1.4 of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. This section states that simulator response during transient testing will meet the following acceptance criteria:

(1) “The simulator allows the use of applicable reference unit procedures;

(2) Any observable change in simulated parameters corresponds in direction to the change expected from actual or best estimate response of the reference unit to the transient test;

(3) The simulator shall not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action if the reference unit would have caused an alarm or automatic action under identical circumstances; and

(4) The simulator shall not cause an alarm or automatic action if the reference unit would not cause an alarm or automatic action under identical circumstances.”

A failure to meet these acceptance criteria constitutes a difference in the dynamic response between the simulator and the reference unit that is distinguishable by an observer and confirmed by a subject matter expert. This is defined as a noticeable difference by the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. Noticeable differences are evaluated by performing a training needs assessment in accordance with Section 4.2.1.4 of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. This assessment helps in determining the appropriate corrective actions, as well as in identifying potential negative effects the noticeable difference can have on licensed operator training.

Procedure AI 30C-001 describes how WCNOC maintains and tests the simulator to meet the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. Section 6.4.2 of AI 30C-001, sub-item 4 states, in part, that transient testing acceptance criteria are contained in procedure AI 30C-006, “Simulator Transient Testing.” Section 6.6.1 of AI 30C-006, Revision 11, states, in part, with respect to acceptance criteria, that “The test plots shall be reviewed by the LSI-Simulator or his designee to ensure that the observable change in parameters correspond in direction to those expected from a best estimate for the simulated transient and do not violate the physical laws of nature.” This is the only portion of the procedure that addresses the acceptance criteria, and it only addresses acceptance criteria (2) of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. 

For a comparison of the simulator results during the testing, licensees use baseline data representing the reference unit, consistent with the preference of data sources stated in Section 5.1.1 of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. In this case, WCNOC used the results from a RETRAN-3D engineering software code analysis prepared in 2006 to specifically support ANSI/ANS transient testing.

During the 2014 performance of Transient 3, the simulator initiated a reactor trip based on steam generator lo-lo level signals between 3.4 and 3.85 seconds into the test. The RETRAN-3D code analysis for Transient 3 showed a reactor trip based on high pressurizer pressure between 7 and 7.5 seconds into the test. In this case, the simulator caused an alarm and automatic action (reactor trip based on steam generator lo-lo levels, showing with lit indication on reactor protection system channels A through D) that the reference unit did not initiate. This test was not successful based on acceptance Criterion 4 of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. In accordance with the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard, this should have resulted in observation of a noticeable difference. However, an observation of a noticeable difference was not documented, and corrective actions were not evaluated using a training needs assessment.

WCNOC conducted Transient 3 on the simulator on April 10, 2014. The test was considered complete and satisfactory on September 10, 2014. On December 3, 2014, the NRC inspectors communicated to WCNOC that the test results did not meet the acceptance criteria stated in the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. On December 9, 2014, further discussion with WCNOC revealed that this issue had been identified when the RETRAN-3D code analysis was first used in 2008 transient testing. With this information, NRC inspectors requested documentation showing that this noticeable difference was evaluated during this time period consistent with Section 4.2.1.4 of the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard, which would include a training needs assessment. There was no documented evidence provided showing that this evaluation took place. WCNOC initiated Condition Reports 90179 and 90417 and simulator discrepancy report A14-154. WCNOC also plans to conduct benchmarking at other sites to compare simulator responses during applicable testing, and WCNOC is evaluating the need for additional procedure revisions or other corrective actions. 

Analysis. The failure to adequately conduct and evaluate simulator performance testing in accordance with ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 (and the 1998 edition), as referenced by site procedure AI 30C-001, Revision 15, and as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.149, Revisions 3 and 4, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to become more significant in that not correcting noticeable differences between the simulator and the reference plant could cause negative training of licensed operators and call into question WCNOC’s ability to conduct valid licensing examinations with the simulator. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 4, Tables 1 and 2 worksheets, issued June 19, 2012, and flowchart block 14 of Appendix I, “Licensed Operator Requalification

Significance Determination Process (SDP),” issued December 6, 2011, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green), because the deficiencies were associated with simulator testing, modifications and maintenance, and there was no evidence that the plant-referenced simulator does not demonstrate expected plant response or have uncorrected modeling and hardware deficiencies. 

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, Identification, because WCNOC personnel did not implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Specifically, this issue was first identified when the RETRAN-3D code analysis was first used in 2008 transient testing, and additional tests performed in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012 were opportunities to identify the performance deficiency; however, the issue was not entered into the corrective action program, a noticeable difference was not evaluated, a training needs assessment was not performed, and the process used to conduct simulator transient testing, as described in Procedure Al 30C-006, was not updated to include all of the minimum acceptance criteria described in the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard. Hence, simulator issues expected to be identified during the testing process could potentially be missed by implementing the AI 30C-006 procedure, which did not include all of the minimum acceptance criteria described in the ANSI standard [P.1].

Enforcement. This finding does not involve enforcement action, because no violation of a regulatory requirement occurred. Because this finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000482/2014005-01, “Failure to Conduct and Evaluate Simulator Testing In Accordance With ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009 and ANSI/ANS 3.5-1998.

What The Hell is Going On With Region 1: Millstone, Pilgrim and Oyster Creek

What the hell is going on with Region 1. Millstone 2 and 3, Oyster Creek and Pilgrim is going into serious decline.

I think half the reason is the agency is too predictable...

Lets see, out of 25 plants with 4 in steep decline....gives you 16% of regions 1 plants on fire.

The Region 1 northeast quadrant...  Indian Point 1 and 2,  Millstone 2 and 3, Oyster Creek and Pilgrim...

67% of the oil rigs are are on fire and burning in the gulf.

Hmm, two in the same Independent System Operator grid authority,

Dominion, Exelon and Entergy...

Region One 

Valley 1	100
Beaver Valley 2	100
Calvert Cliffs 1	100
Calvert Cliffs 2	100
FitzPatrick	100
Ginna	100
Hope Creek 1	100
Indian Point 2	100
Indian Point 3	100
Limerick 1	100
Limerick 2	100
Millstone 2	100
Millstone 3	100
Nine Mile Point 1	100
Nine Mile Point 2	100
Oyster Creek	100
Peach Bottom 2	89
Peach Bottom 3	100
Pilgrim 1	100
Salem 1	100
Salem 2	100
Seabrook 1	100
Susquehanna 1	100
Susquehanna 2	100
Three Mile Island 1

The Barnstable Patriot : Deconstructing Pilgrim

The Barnstable Patriot  Deconstructing Pilgrim  Written by Diane Turco

February 12, 2015

We can’t wait for another storm  The Cape Cod blizzard on Jan. 26 provided yet another scary warning. The real danger during the automatic emergency shutdown, or scram, which occurred at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on Jan. 27, had more to do with multiple equipment malfunctions than with the loss of offsite power caused by the storm. What transpired at Pilgrim was a series of failures that highlights the lack of oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the hubris of Entergy Corporation while our state government downplayed the unfolding events.  The morning of the scram, Entergy quickly put out a press release stating that “All safety systems worked as designed.” Governor Baker and Secretary of Energy Beaton repeated the upbeat announcement and reported there was “no threat to public health or safety.” But what was described primarily as a loss of offsite power by the downing of transmission wires was not the whole case. Hours after the loss of electricity, a primary emergency cooling system, a safety relief valve and an air compressor failed. Two days later preliminary notification was sent by the NRC to state officials, an early notice of “events of possible safety or public interest significance.” That announcement didn’t make it into the public venue. If the following sequence does not inspire the state government to act on behalf of public safety, we are all in real trouble.  On the day before the storm, Jan. 26, the NRC released their 2014 assessment of Entergy, owner of the reactor. The findings are alarming. Entergy will remain under federal oversight and Pilgrim on the NRC list of the worst operating reactors in the country. Citing the lack of implementation of corrective actions related to inadequate safety performance, Entergy management was effectively told to “try again.” The follow-up plan allows Entergy to contact the NRC when the plant is ready to be inspected again.  The fact that the corporation is in charge of the timeline for following through with NRC recommendations throws a spotlight on the cozy relationship between the industry and the regulator. Essentially, Entergy can fix problems at the nuclear reactor at their convenience, while public health and safety can be ignored. Heightened attention from the NRC should not be the only consequence for a corporation left to complete corrective actions. On Feb. 4, the NRC released a second report on the 2014 investigation at Pilgrim. The cooling system that failed to function as the primary safety system during the blizzard shutdown was evaluated by the NRC staff just two months ago. With “no findings identified,” that same equipment passed inspection with flying colors only to malfunction weeks later. Eight days after the storm, yet another equipment failure was reported. Water level measuring instruments had failed due to the loss of the air compressor during the storm. The resulting assessment revealed there were no clear emergency procedures in place to fix this problem. This situation was serious enough for the NRC to determine it was reportable because it is considered that the event “results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.” After 12 days of reviewing the problems, the NRC inspectors left town without reporting preliminary findings or holding a public hearing. Why should we, the public, be expected to trust Entergy Corp. with our health and safety? Isn’t it the job of the government to step in to stop this ongoing threat to all of us? Once again, Entergy pushes aside public safety for profit, ignoring activist requests and prior serious plant problems for a precautionary shutdown prior to the blizzard. This was reasonably predicable event. The storm has proven that Pilgrim is a failed design run by a failed corporation regulated by failed oversight. It is time for Governor Baker and the state Legislature to demand on behalf of the citizens of Massachusetts that the NRC withdraw the operating license for Pilgrim and begin its decommissioning. Enough is enough. We can’t wait for another storm.

Controversy At The Pilgrim Nuclear Plant

Feb 12: I added the below to the NRC Blog

Additional Scrutiny at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Set to Continue

‘Controversy at the Pilgrim nuclear plant’ 

Here is another Brian Williams moment. The Pilgrim spokesman and NRC Public Affairs Office Neil Sheehan rope-a-doping the antis. 

Pilgrim Spokesman Lauren Burm “The shutdown occurred safely as plant operators were reducing power in response to the onset of a historic storm. Plant conditions were stable and there was never any threat at all to the safety of plant workers or the public.” 

The NRC’s PNO: “On January 27, 2015, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station experienced an automatic scram following a turbine trip due to a partial loss of offsite power. The station was experiencing high winds and heavy snowfall during a severe winter storm when the station began experiencing degrading switchyard conditions.”

At 4 am when the plant tripped Boston had 24” of snow on the ground. They were past the middle of the blizzard and these were the exact same grid instability they’d seen in Juno. They were getting control room annunciators of shorts on the line for an hour or more indicating a duel line trip was approaching. It got so bad, they were in an emergency procedure to bring them into a shutdown condition as fast as they could. They showed astounding incompetence in the shutdown as it was started too late…one line had tripped and everyone knew that plant wouldn't get to a safe shutdown condition on one line. Nuclear professionalism dictates you never accept an automatic protection…you manually insert the scram before the automatic action.

Mr. Sheeheen is supposed to be the neutral third party here…why didn't he explain the true conditions of the plant scram. I do understand it is against the NRC policy to never interrupt a licensee’s spokesman no matter how bad the Brian Williams moment is?

Millstone Power Station site Vice President John Daugherty slept on a cot in his office at the plant during storm Juno. The new guy sees the light. Did the equivalent (top dog) at Pilgrim ever show such concern for his employees and his plant? You are putting the individual safety of your employees at risk by forcing them to run around the plant like chickens with their heads cut off by allowing your plant to scram with a high potential of a LOOP in the middle of historic blizzard.     

Personally, in the condition they were in, the evacuation would have needed to occur after 6 to 8 hours. They weren't anywhere close to that. Core cooling was never impaired, but a lot of the safety systems had been stripped away from the plant Pilgrim is in a terrible state.

I am thinking the NRC fears if Pilgrim collapses...then Indian Point will soon follow... 

Does anyone think this is true:(Entergy)"were reducing power in response to the onset of a historic storm."

My interpretation would be they were responding to the shorting lines and  control room annunciators of troubles on the lines. This was hours from the onset of the storm.They were getting instrumentation indications that line trips were moments away.  

Posted to the NRC page: 

This is what I got a problem with…everyone only showing the most prettified version of self. Not the most completely accurate version of events. The selective release of information that only creates the most handsome profile of self. The Brain Williams in the nuclear industry? 

"During winter storm Juno, operators observed that water level indicators at the plant water intake were non-functional.” 

Why didn’t the NRC admit this was missed by Entergy in storm Nemo? Why didn’t the NRC catch it in 2013? If you had a special inspection in 2013, you would have caught it then and preventing its reoccurrence in 2015? 

 What are you guys going to do if another blizzard knocks Pilgrim into another LOOP in 2015? I am predicting one diesel generator failure this time due to the accumulation to all the fast start-ups creating excessive stress on these machines. How many fast start-ups are these machines designed for considering all the LOOPs at this site and the integrated eccs testing ? 

Don’t even get me talking about the broken meteorological tower I caught in Nemo…it being unreliable for a long period of time before this. This impaired a possible evacuation.  I got it on the Pilgrim docket. 

I do admit the water level is kind of insignificant in the big picture…but not knowing the limitation of your indications in a big event is bad.   

The Enterprise New: 

Controversy at the Pilgrim nuclear plant 

By Frank Mand Posted Feb. 11, 2015 at 5:00 AM

PLYMOUTH – Did Pilgrim come within minutes of sounding its sirens during the recent blizzard, dubbed Juno, or was it just a matter of tempers nearing the boiling point in the week after the nuclear power plant shut down at the peak of the historic storm? 

Neither Entergy nor the NRC is mincing words.

When plant critic and EcoLaw founder Meg Sheehan tweeted, “Insider says #Entergy Pilgrim #nuclear scram during #Juno2015 on 1/27 closest ever to meltdown, within minutes of sounding evacuation sirens,” Pilgrim Spokesman Lauren Burm used social media to call Sheehan's comments “irresponsible.” 

“These claims are completely unfounded and irresponsible,” Burm later wrote in a statement. “They have absolutely no basis in fact. The shutdown occurred safely as plant operators were reducing power in response to the onset of a historic storm. Plant conditions were stable and there was never any threat at all to the safety of plant workers or the public.”

Burm’s response led to a short but passionate exchange of tweets, with Sheehan posting that “a spokesperson for Entergy lacks any credibility.” 

But the NRC weighed in shortly thereafter backing Burm, commenting both on the reports of anonymous insiders and the condition of the plant during Juno. 

“We received similar comments on our blog,” NRC Public Affairs Office Neil Sheehan said. “We have seen nothing that would have qualified as a crisis during the shutdown.” 

Its confidence in the safety of the plant was backed up by its approval for the reactor to be restarted last Saturday, Feb. 7. 

But potentially complicating the matter is a new report saying that along with the loss of power and the failure of other noncritical systems during Juno, the plant also experienced a loss of “instrument air.” 

Instrument air, according to the NRC, is a non-safety-related system used to provide control air to a number of valves and instruments in the plant. If those controls are not working, the plant has to rely on a person with their eyes on the actual conditions. 

Burm acknowledges that the plant did not report this occurrence on a timely basis. The report Pilgrim should have filed, called a 5072 Report, was issued Feb. 5, nine days after the scram, or shutdown. But Burm said the loss of instrument air did not impact safety. 

"During winter storm Juno, operators observed that water level indicators at the plant water intake were non-functional. Actual sea water levels at the intake bay did not rise above typical levels at any time during the storm,” Burm said. “Although the facility did not immediately report the issue with the water level indicators, equipment reliability was never challenged and the plant remained safe and in stable condition."
Page 2 of 2 - The NRC’s Neil Sheehan backed up Burm's statement. 

“In general, a loss of instrument air can complicate plant operators’ response to an event,” Neil Sheehan said, “but the plant can be - and was - safely shut down without it.” 

At Pilgrim, Neil Sheehan explained, “instrument air feeds level instrument bubblers used to measure the sea water intake bay level. These instruments are used by operators to assess Emergency Action Levels." 

It was the NRC that identified the issue, during the inspection that followed the Juno scram."During our Special Inspection, the NRC identified that the level instruments were not functional once instrument air was lost.” Entergy then submitted an Event Notification on the issue. 

“During the storm, the company had an operator outside in the sea water intake structure, and water levels never rose to a level that would have challenged any plant equipment,” Neil Sheehan added. “In addition, our review of tidal conditions, including worst-case forecast storm surge, determined that intake bay levels never actually exceeded an Emergency Action Level, nor were the water levels close to exceeding an Emergency Action Level.”
Was this instrument failure the basis for the allegations that the plant had come close to a catastrophic failure during the storm, and that it was within minutes of sounding its sirens? 

The Old Colony was unable to identify the “insider” who supposedly made the claim that Pilgrim had come close to meltdown and was within minutes of calling for evacuations. 

When EcoLaw’s Meg Sheehan, who tweeted the allegation after, she says, having communicated with this “insider,” was asked why the NRC would have allowed the plant to restart if there were systemic issues and what the insider knows that the NRC does not, she said she didn't want to “debate” the issue. 

She did, however, offer a personal comment. 

“Since the 1970s, I have been told by many friends and acquaintances many things about what goes on inside Pilgrim,” Meg Sheehan said. “This is just one more thing I’ve heard, and happen to believe. 

“During Juno I stayed with my elderly parents who live 8 miles from Pilgrim to make sure they were OK,” Sheehan added. “After what happened at Pilgrim, I realize acutely the danger we are all in.”

Pilgrim Trips Twice in 2015 Blizzards

Feb 9: Pilgrim up to 97% power early Monday morning... 


Winter Storm Marcus: maybe be historic in nature. Kids don't go to school till Wednesday. Talking about 18 inches...

If I were them I would ride out the storm on the turbine by passes not connected to the grid. I don’t think that is a approved mode…once the LOOP they would have scram anyways.

A far as fixing anything on the grid preventing the next LOOP…they only repair a tiny part of the system. The majority of the 345 lines supporting the plant are extremely vulnerable to winter storms. The onsite gear are extremely vulnerable…

My guess on the NRC special inspection…it was done only as a means to support Entergy post storm. It was a NRC public relation stunt!!!

Boston canceled their schools tomorrow over this snow storm going on right now. I don’t think this snow storm winds are large enough to trip the plant…but we are at a much large risks with it happening in their weakened conditions. Imagine how this stupidity could play out in the media. They are all dummies anyway.

Pilgrim trips again in next blizzard…more equipment problems show up in the trip and afterwards.

This banging around the plant and grid components in LOOPs puts a tremendous amounts of stress on the components. The plant and lines are in a very fragile condition…I imagine poles sustained damage not yet see-able .

As a example, it is very stressful for a diesel generator to pick up loads so quickly in a LOOP. They have had LOOPs up the ying yang. They slowly increase picking up loads when testing these machines. I suspect these machines right now are damaged.

I suspect in next blizzard LOOP a diesel generator will fail…think about the emergency classification that will get you into…

Pilgrim Up At Power: Very Little Information Released on what Happened in Juno?

What happens on Next Blizzard...they going to shutdown before the blizzard. Or let ur trip...

Plymouth: Pilgrim up and running again after blizzard forces shutdown
By Garo Hagopian

– Posted on February 8, 2015Posted in: Local News

The Pilgrim nuclear plant in Plymouth is back online.

Lauren Burm, a spokeswoman for Entergy, which owns the Plymouth facility, says it was reconnected to the grid on Saturday and began generating electricity at 2:40 p.m.

Pilgrim had been offline since its two main transmission lines were knocked out during the blizzard January 27.

Following the storm-related shutdown, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission sent a special investigation team to find out what happened.

Inspectors reportedly discovered a failure of one of the plant’s safety relief valves, among other things, but they point out that the facility was safely shut down.

Although the transmission lines were restored within a few days of the shutdown, Pilgrim remained offline for maintenance that Entergy says can only be done when the plant is dark.

Pilgrim is continuing its own investigation into what happened

Entergy In 2014 Top Dog With OI's Significant Investigations

2014 NRC's Office of Investigations’ (OI) Annual Report SIGNIFICANT (NUCLEAR PLANT) INVESTIGATIONS

2014 NRC's Office of Investigations’ (OI) Annual Report of SIGNIFICANT (NUCLEAR PLANT) INVESTIGATIONS  

SALEM 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that, on two occasions in 2014, a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) at Public Service enterprise group’s (PSeg’s) Salem Nuclear generating Station (Salem) engaged in deliberate misconduct by having used an illegal substance and performing duties authorized under the SRO’s NRC license at Salem while under the influence of an illegal substance These duties included serving as the Salem shift manager Based on the SRO’s misconduct, the licensee, PSeg, terminated the SRO’s NRC license On July 9, 2014, based, in part, on the OI investigation, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of violation to the SRO. 

INDIAN POINT 

This OI investigation, which was reported in the FY 2013 Annual Report, substantiated an allegation that, in February 2012, an Indian Point energy Center (IPeC) chemistry manager deliberately falsified the sample test results for diesel generator fuel oil. 

In July 2013, OI and DOJ special agents arrested the chemistry manager, who was subsequently charged with one count of Title 42 U.S.C 2273, “violations of Sections generally,” and one count of 18 U.S.C. 1001, “False Statements.” On October 16, 2013, the chemistry manager pleaded guilty to a one-count Information charging him with deliberate misconduct in connection with a matter regulated by the NRC, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2273 In January 2014, the former chemistry manager was sentenced in U.S. Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, to 18 months’ probation and a monetary fine. Additionally, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of violation and an Order prohibiting the chemistry manager from participating in NRC activities for 1 year The chemistry manager is required to notify the NRC before seeking employment involving activities licensed by the agency. 

In addition, the NRC issued the licensee, Entergy, which owns and operates IpEC, a Severity Level III Notice of violation after identifying two related violations by the company.

PALISADES 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that a security supervisor performed the duties of an armed responder at Entergy’s palisades Nuclear Facility with the knowledge of the security manager, who knew that the security supervisor was not qualified to perform those duties The security supervisor had not completed the required armed responder training in accordance with the licensee’s training and qualification plan and informed the security manager when assigned
OI determined that the security supervisor acted with careless disregard when he failed to follow security plan procedures while performing as an armed responder Additionally, the security manager acted with careless disregard when he (1) failed to follow security plan procedures in assigning the security supervisor to perform as an armed responder when unqualified and (2) failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding the security supervisor’s qualifications.
On July 21, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order, with commitments, to entergy as a result of an alternative dispute resolution mediation session

RIVER BEND STATION 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that a security officer at entergy’s River Bend Station (RBS) deliberately falsified training records on October 6, 2013, by taking an RBS test required for maintaining access authorization for her son, who was a contract carpenter at RBS for Chicago Bridge & Iron OI determined that the son secretly obtained the proctor’s testing information, without the proctor’s knowledge or consent, and provided that information to his mother, a security officer, who in turn used the proctor’s information to complete the test for her son OI determined that both the former security officer and her son deliberately falsified training records to facilitate the completion of the access authorization test entergy terminated the security officer’s employment.OI referred this investigation to the DOJ for prosecution consideration and to the NRC for regulatory review.

Oyster Creek/NRC: You got Cancer, We Discovered It Two Years Ago

Previous occurrences

None: The “B” and “D” EMRV actuator was a first time event during the operational history of Oyster Creek. 

Personally, as the economic conditions at these nuclear plants deepen…the NRC is going to get exhausted and overwhelmed by companies not being able to support safety and reliability.

Then we have the severe budget cutbacks forced on the NRC by the Republicans.  

LER 2014-002-00

This is what I am talking about: 

Lkcnse Event Report (LER) 2014-002-00, Tchnical Specification Prohibit Condimon Cauind by' RRewlWe fVlta ves lnopeabl for Grealer Oiaw Alwed W*1a~Tm

So these maniacs took out the EMRV valve in Oct 2012 and never tested it until June 20 2014.  

During 1R23 refueling outage(November 2010) the fully refurbished EMRV actuators were installed . Subsequent, actuators were remove during refueling outage 1R24 (October 2012). As-found testings was performed on June 20,2014, and two (C and DD) of five EMRV actuators failed to operate. Further inspection of these actuators found unexpected ware of the he posts, spring and guides.

The first thing I noticed, this is a infrequently maintained valve...the plant personal didn't have the experience to even carry these components. 

Upon completion of the Root Cause Evaluation, it was determined the design of to EMRV actuator was inadequate that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between pole and guides can create a condition where the spring can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts.

I call this a cover-up. They are afraid if they tell the truth the plant will get permanently shutdown. I believe they are scheduled to permanently shutdown in 2018. 

My take is they used inferior replacement parts... the parts didn't meet the dimensional requirement in the valve specs. Chances are the manufacturer, more likely this line of valves are not supported anymore. I believe this is basically a falsification of documents by Exelon.  

I'd copy a lot more of this LER over to my blog, but the quality of the print is terrible. Half the words come out as gibberish.

During the refurbishment of the EMRV actuators, actions were necessary to ensure proper alignment of the plunger and spring guide to prevent fretting/ binding. The potential for fretting is created due to the guide posts mounting on the solenoid brackets, and subsequent alignment by bending to achieve proper alignment If the EMRV actuators are set up in a condition where the post are not optimally aligned, preferential wear of the post is observed due to the interaction of the post spring, and guide.

Bottom line, Exelon is not putting adequate monies into this plant for maintenance and upkeep because of the near term permanent shutdown.

Exelon Unfazed By Juno; NRC To Look Into Pilgrim Shutdown

I’d tell Exelon’s CEO Crane to stop fixating on Entergy…you need to watch carefully the Dresden and Quad Cities facilities….

Exelon Unfazed By Juno; NRC To Look Into Pilgrim ShutdownRate ThisNuclear Street News Team
Tue, Feb 3 2015 12:19 PM      

Exelon Corporation said that its seven nuclear reactors in the path of winter storm Juno ran at full capacity throughout the blizzard.
While the storm dumped from 10 to 40 inches of snow across the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern portions of the country, Exelon's seven plants in New York, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania operated without a hiccup, producing 10,832 megawatts of electricity per hour, the company said, adding that this was enough power for more than 10 million homes. 

While other power sources struggle to maintain production, nuclear power plants are engineered to run uninterrupted for up to two years. “Beyond that, highly skilled plant workers prepare nuclear facilities months in advance for the worst conceivable winter storm,” Exelon said. “When extreme weather hits, procedures are in place to increase equipment monitoring to minimize or eliminate weather-related problems,” Exelon said in a statement. 

The fundamental difference between nuclear power and conventional fossil fuel-burning power plants is that nuclear stations have fuel on hand that will outlast seasonal weather conditions. “Importing fuel can be challenging or even impossible in dangerous weather conditions,” said Exelon President and Chief Nuclear Officer Bryan Hanson. 

Exelon's statement offers a contrasting view from the headlines that declared that the storm had caused a shutdown at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Mass, which is operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. 

According to media reports, the storm caused disruption of two major transmission lines, which led to the plant being shut down. This suggests that the problem was outside of the plant, in the distribution system, and that the plant was, otherwise, operating smoothly. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, however, is investigating the unplanned Jan. 27 shutdown, plant spokeswoman Lauren Burm said. 

Winter affords the nuclear power industry one of its fundamental bragging points. Last week, however, the headlines looked at the industry both ways. In one Google search, the first two headlines listed said, back to back, "Nuclear Power: Keeping Us Warm During Winter," followed by one that said, "Winter Storm Exposes Vulnerability Of Nuclear Power Plants." 

Exelon Generation operates the largest fleet of nuclear plants in the nation. The fleet consists of 23 reactors at 14 locations in Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. 

Entergy operates and owns nuclear power plants in Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York and Vermont and has a management contract with Cooper Nuclear Station in Nebraska. Entergy Nuclear with nearly 10,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity, has a workforce of about 6,000 employees.

Industrial Sized Blood Suckers (NEI): You See What I Am Up Against?

These guys are Washington K street guys...how they survive is to blindly lobby with to reduce regulation for the nuclear industry. 

These guys are rich fundamentalism governmental hating teabaggers....a form of fascism. I consider them monies corporate fascist. Basically hired terrorist out to sew chaos in society.

Guess who solely supports them...you do if you pay for electricity.

The below is code words for severely weaken the nuclear Regulatory Commission and neutering and lobotomizing any government employee. They generially weaken the NRC employees and surely weakening all the employees in the control rooms.

Industry Urges Congress to Scrutinize NRC Operations in FY2016 Budget Request 

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 2015 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The nuclear energy industry is calling on federal appropriators to demand additional efficiencies at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and to reject the Obama administration's latest attempt to impose a multibillion-dollar tax on the industry for a federal facilities cleanup program that electric utilities already have funded. 

 Reacting to the administration's budget request for fiscal 2016, the industry also is urging Congress to ensure sufficient funding for nuclear waste management program activities, including money to advance the U.S. Department of Energy's license application for the proposed repository for used nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nev. 

DOE's budget request for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1 is $29.9 billion, a 9.5 percent increase from the current budget; however, funding for nuclear energy programs would be cut to $907.5 million. The NRC budget proposal of $1.03 billion is 1.7 percent higher than the current budget. 

Given nuclear energy facilities' strong safety performance and the fact that several utilities' plans to add new nuclear generating capacity still are being shaped by the recession's lingering impact on electricity demand, the NRC's oversight priorities merit close scrutiny," said Alex Flint, the Nuclear Energy Institute's senior vice president for governmental affairs. "Reducing the cumulative impact of regulatory requirements—which includes some 60 rulemakings—remains a priority for NEI. 

 "The industry's primary goal is to ensure that our resources and regulatory resources are focused on those activities most significant to safety. That priority is being challenged by the workload that the NRC has imposed over the past decade. We urge Congress to insist upon NRC adherence to its principles of good regulation and so that nuclear energy facilities can most safely and effectively meet their customers' need for reliable, clean air electricity supplies." 

The industry strongly opposes the latest attempt by the administration to tax consumers of electricity in more than 30 states for the cleanup of DOE uranium enrichment facilities. The government's Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund has a balance of nearly $5 billion. The administration's attempt to impose a new tax of more than $200 million annually for 10 years comes despite the fact that the industry first paid for the expense when it purchased the fuel enriched at the facilities and then met an additional $2.6 billion cleanup obligation established under a 1992 law. 

"We recognize that the federal government has significant budget pressures, but reinstating unjustified taxes on parties that have met their funding obligation while the government has failed to meet its funding obligation is outrageously unfair. The Uranium Enrichment D &D tax proposal should be dead on arrival in Congress," Flint said. 

The importance of nuclear energy to the nation's economic and environmental well-being isn't reflected in the funding decrease for DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Flint said. 

 "Nuclear energy is uniquely capable of meeting our nation's need for 24/7 electricity generation from low-carbon sources. Surely there's room within a 10 percent budget increase for the Department of Energy to better support a technology that matters as much as to our nation's energy diversity and energy security as nuclear energy does. It makes absolutely no sense, for example, to zero out university nuclear energy programs as this budget request would do."

The fiscal 2016 budget proposal also includes $62.5 million to continue a public-private cost-sharing program to develop small reactor technology. NEI welcomes the administration's endorsement of this innovative program, Flint said.

The budget seeks $108 million for development of one or more facilities for used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste management using "consent-based siting" and preparations for transport of used nuclear fuel. However, it does not propose funding to advance the proposed Yucca Mountain repository program, even though DOE's license application for the facility is pending before the NRC. The request includes $345 million for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina.

Nuclear energy facilities operating in 30 states provide electricity to one of every five U.S. homes and businesses. - See more at: http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/02/03/702734/10118542/en/Industry-Urges-Congress-to-Scrutinize-NRC-Operations-in-FY2016-Budget-Request.html#sthash.c1VAOqex.dpuf

Monticello: Junk Engineering Services Going On All Though Nuclear Power Industry

This is what I see with the Electromatic Relief Valve and Safety Relief Valve problems bursting out into the scene with the nuclear power industry recently. The extremely poor engineering services is systemic and very troubling. 

What caused the radiation problems at Monticello?  

Investigation: Xcel failures led to reactor cost overruns

Xcel Energy repeatedly mismanaged a major upgrade to its Monticello, Minn., nuclear power plant, and deserves blame for $402 million in cost overruns that more than doubled the final price tag, according to investigative findings released Monday.

The report by an administrative law judge investigating the matter rejected virtually all of the Minneapolis-based utility’s explanations for how the project, approved in 2006 and completed in 2013, ended up costing $748 million, an increase of 114 percent in today’s dollars.

“We are disappointed with the administrative law judge’s recommendation regarding the Monticello nuclear plant’s life extension and power uprate project,” Chris Clark, president of Xcel’s Minnesota regional unit, said in a statement.

The project increased the output of the 1970s-era power plant by nearly 12 percent, although Xcel still hasn’t run the reactor at the higher output. The work, done mainly during shutdowns in 2009, 2011 and 2013, also replaced equipment to keep the plant running another 20 years.

Judge Steve Mihalchick, who presided over the state’s investigation, concluded that Xcel mishandled the project from the beginning, failing to recognize the complexity of the upgrade and the resulting higher costs.

“Xcel’s principal failure was that it did a very poor job managing the initial scoping and early project management up until beginning installation during the 2009 refueling outage,” Mihalchick wrote in a 38-page report to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.

Despite the findings, ratepayers may not be off the hook for the overruns.

The commission will decide how much of the extra costs Xcel and its investors must bear — and how much should be applied to customers’ rates. Mihalchick said he agreed with a state Commerce Department recommendation that would sock Xcel for only a share of the costs —$71 million — with the remainder applied to rates.

Mark Cooper, a senior research fellow who analyzes nuclear industry economics at Vermont Law School’s Institute for Energy and the Environment, said the judge’s findings are further evidence that the price of building, maintaining and upgrading reactors has gotten too high for consumers.

“The message here is really overwhelmingly clear — it’s time to move on from nuclear power,” Cooper said in an interview. “The utilities can’t keep aging reactors online at an economic price.”

Response pending

Clark said Xcel is still reviewing the decision and will respond to the commission.

“We take seriously the responsibility for delivering quality projects and believe this project benefits our customers by providing fuel diversity, reliability and reducing the carbon impact of electricity production,” Clark added.

The Monticello plant, 45 miles northwest of the Twin Cities, went into operation in 1971, and generates enough power for about 500,000 homes. Federal regulators in 2006 extended the plant’s original operating license to 2030.

One of Xcel’s explanations for the cost overruns was that upgrading a 40-year-old power plant turned out to be more complex than envisioned, and forced workers to install large equipment in small spaces that sometimes had high radiation levels.

But Mihalchick, relying on testimony from outside nuclear experts hired by the state Commerce Department, concluded that “the company’s failure to recognize problems with spacing, clearances, access and physical arrangements of the plant was a direct failure of its … project management. Nothing related to the characteristics of the plant, including its size, should have surprised Xcel or led to cost overruns.”

Mihalchick also questioned Xcel’s decision to put the project on a fast track, saying the aggressive schedule “dramatically increased project costs.”

During the Monticello upgrade, Xcel also added major items to the project, such as a new feedwater heater and in-plant electrical wiring that drove up costs by $261 million. Mihalchick concluded those extra costs “were caused by Xcel’s imprudent management.” Overall, he said, “Xcel has failed to demonstrate that the cost overruns it seeks to recover were prudently incurred and are reasonable.”

In 2011, as Xcel struggled with the project, it brought in a new contractor, Bechtel Power Corp., to oversee the work. That same year Xcel also hired industry veteran Karen Fili to oversee the project and later manage the plant. Fili resigned last week to join Southern Co., as a site vice president overseeing completion of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia. They are the first new U.S. nuclear reactors to be planned and built in three decades.

It was not immediately clear what effect the judge’s recommendations will have on Minnesota customers’ bills, partly because the PUC could decide on a different remedy. The outcome likely will be clear in March, when the commission is scheduled to vote on a proposed rate hike for Xcel’s 1.2 million Minnesota customers.

Xcel customers have gotten only partial benefit from project. The increase to the boiling-water reactor’s electricity output from 600 megawatts to 671 megawatts was supposed to happen last year, but has been repeatedly delayed.