Entergy In 2014 Top Dog With OI's Significant Investigations

2014 NRC's Office of Investigations’ (OI) Annual Report SIGNIFICANT (NUCLEAR PLANT) INVESTIGATIONS

2014 NRC's Office of Investigations’ (OI) Annual Report of SIGNIFICANT (NUCLEAR PLANT) INVESTIGATIONS  

SALEM 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that, on two occasions in 2014, a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) at Public Service enterprise group’s (PSeg’s) Salem Nuclear generating Station (Salem) engaged in deliberate misconduct by having used an illegal substance and performing duties authorized under the SRO’s NRC license at Salem while under the influence of an illegal substance These duties included serving as the Salem shift manager Based on the SRO’s misconduct, the licensee, PSeg, terminated the SRO’s NRC license On July 9, 2014, based, in part, on the OI investigation, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of violation to the SRO. 

INDIAN POINT 

This OI investigation, which was reported in the FY 2013 Annual Report, substantiated an allegation that, in February 2012, an Indian Point energy Center (IPeC) chemistry manager deliberately falsified the sample test results for diesel generator fuel oil. 

In July 2013, OI and DOJ special agents arrested the chemistry manager, who was subsequently charged with one count of Title 42 U.S.C 2273, “violations of Sections generally,” and one count of 18 U.S.C. 1001, “False Statements.” On October 16, 2013, the chemistry manager pleaded guilty to a one-count Information charging him with deliberate misconduct in connection with a matter regulated by the NRC, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2273 In January 2014, the former chemistry manager was sentenced in U.S. Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, to 18 months’ probation and a monetary fine. Additionally, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of violation and an Order prohibiting the chemistry manager from participating in NRC activities for 1 year The chemistry manager is required to notify the NRC before seeking employment involving activities licensed by the agency. 

In addition, the NRC issued the licensee, Entergy, which owns and operates IpEC, a Severity Level III Notice of violation after identifying two related violations by the company.

PALISADES 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that a security supervisor performed the duties of an armed responder at Entergy’s palisades Nuclear Facility with the knowledge of the security manager, who knew that the security supervisor was not qualified to perform those duties The security supervisor had not completed the required armed responder training in accordance with the licensee’s training and qualification plan and informed the security manager when assigned
OI determined that the security supervisor acted with careless disregard when he failed to follow security plan procedures while performing as an armed responder Additionally, the security manager acted with careless disregard when he (1) failed to follow security plan procedures in assigning the security supervisor to perform as an armed responder when unqualified and (2) failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding the security supervisor’s qualifications.
On July 21, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order, with commitments, to entergy as a result of an alternative dispute resolution mediation session

RIVER BEND STATION 

An OI investigation substantiated an allegation that a security officer at entergy’s River Bend Station (RBS) deliberately falsified training records on October 6, 2013, by taking an RBS test required for maintaining access authorization for her son, who was a contract carpenter at RBS for Chicago Bridge & Iron OI determined that the son secretly obtained the proctor’s testing information, without the proctor’s knowledge or consent, and provided that information to his mother, a security officer, who in turn used the proctor’s information to complete the test for her son OI determined that both the former security officer and her son deliberately falsified training records to facilitate the completion of the access authorization test entergy terminated the security officer’s employment.OI referred this investigation to the DOJ for prosecution consideration and to the NRC for regulatory review.