ANO: First Killing A Employee Yellow Finding, Now A flooding Yellow Finding

Right, the design bases flood would have distroyed all the cooling systems...

The repeated theme here across many plants…some seminal event happens usually a yellow or red finding, a broken RHR injections valve ignored for years, a dropped stator, a hole in the head, historic flooding and safety electrical problems like Fort Calhoun…then the NRC comes in with more intensive inspections finding many other hanging around not addressed safety issues for decades and not related violations finding at the plant.  Talking about the power of the gods, it is as if the NRC has a special secret process where some secret rule breaking is tolerated by the NRC. It might be against the rules, but everyone knows some violations are acceptable to the NRC and maintain secret from the public.

 

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE- NRC INSPECTION REPORT - PRELIMINARY YELLOW FINDING - September 09, 2014

I am not that far off with picking on Entergy. These guys are the most dishonest fleet operators in the USA.

This is the intolerable theme with many sentinel issues in the US industry. The sentinel issue shows up, like TVA with the broken RHR injection…then in the intensified public scrutiny and NRC inspections they find a gaggle of non-related violations hanging around for decades that the NRC ignored. You have no idea how damaging this is to the safety culture of a nuclear when the NRC telegraphs they won’t act on well known violations in which all the plant staff knows. So this flooding issues comes out of the delayed NRC response to negligently dropping the 600 ton stator at the site, killing one and injuring eight.

Again, this flooding yellow violation was hanging around for decades and subsequent to Fort Calhoun and Fukushima…

You know, how much do we really know about any plant in the USA…

Why was the Killing of one employee a yellow finding based on nuclear risk, a year to see the light, and then another yellow finding about flooding? It sounds like absolutely no forward motion in a year at ANO-Entergy. Even if it was a yellow finding today, why wasn’t it bumped up to a red finding or shutdown, as for deterrence for not immediately correcting their attitude from the stator drop accident? I asked at Entergy-Palisades to be returned to the yellow oversight regime.

I got another swing at the Palisades RCP issue a few days ago. It was basically a speech about there is absolutely no deterrence with the ROP. I brought up many recent industry events that I thought are all connected to an ineffective regulator. Even from one event to another similar event at the same plant. I spent a lot of time getting transcribed, risked getting thrown out of this 2.206 for drawing outside the lines. Even the NRC has issues with me staying on subject. I tried explained waht the meaning of Fort Calhoun was to the all these NRC employees.

I’ll throw a link on the transcription of my speech…the NRC should be ashamed of themselves. I am sure you would wonder what I really knew, when I was on the phone to the NRC.

And by the way, I called the Cooper senior inspector today… Once the senior resident figured out what I was asking, he threw me to the NRC PR spokesman.

Again, you should read my 2011 2.206 excepts I submitted recently here…it is as relevant today as it was in 201, predicting the future at Palisades and all the rest of the plants in the USA…

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE- NRC INSPECTION REPORT PRELIMINARY YELLOW FINDING -September 09, 2014 

Submitted by NUCBIZ on September 11, 2014 - 18:20

By Bob Meyer

This report is a shot over the bow of the nuclear industry for each plant to review flood walkdowns and review plant specific flood analysis. Based on my experience, some of the conditions that resulted in NRC violations exist at other plants. The NRC concuded that all long-term core makeup and cooling could have failed during an external flood.

Read this very important, detailed NRC inspection report and compare it to the conditions at your plant. Here is the redacted report.

Apparent Violation. The inspectors identified a finding of preliminary substantial safety significance (Yellow) for the failure to design, construct, and maintain the Units 1 and 2 auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings in accordance with the safety analysis reports' description of internal and external flood barriers so that they could protect safety-related equipment from flooding. Two apparent violations were associated with this finding:

• Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, "Design Control," the licensee failed to assure that regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, and that design changes were subjected to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.

• Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," the licensee failed to prescribe documented instructions for activities affecting quality and accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with drawings.

The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the vulnerability to flooding of safety-related equipment necessary to maintain core cooling in the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings.

The following were the dominant considerations in reaching a preliminary risk determination conclusion:

• With respect to the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings, there were more than 100 unknown ingress pathways for a flooding event, therefore if an external flood above grade level were to occur, the buildings would flood.

• The unexpected rate of flooding would likely be beyond the licensee's capability to prevent or mitigate as equipment and connections associated with alternative mitigating strategies, could be submerged.

• All reactor core cooling and makeup could fail due to significant flooding of the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings.

• The change in core damage frequency was quantitatively bounded below 2 x 10-3 and qualitatively determined to likely be less than 1 x 10-4 . The bounding and qualitative results are based on the frequency of the probable maximum flood event and a loss of all equipment needed for core cooling and makeup.

This finding was preliminarily determined to be of substantial safety significance (Yellow) for Unit 1 and Unit 2, as determined by a Significance and Enforcement Review Panel.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance related to maintaining design margins. Specifically, the licensee did not design, construct, and/or maintain over 100 flood barriers to ensure design margins were sustained [H.6].

Unit 1, Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 26, Section 5.1.6, "Flooding," defined the design basis for external flooding and stated, in part, that the seismic class 1 structures are designed for the maximum probable flood level at elevation 361 feet above mean sea level (MSL). All seismic class 1 systems and equipment are either located on floors above elevation 361 feet MSL or protected. Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.5.2 identified the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings as seismic class 1 structures.

Unit 2, Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 25, Section 3.4.4, "Flood Protection," defined the design basis for external flooding and stated, in part, that seismic category 1 structures were designed for the probable maximum flood . All category 1 systems and equipment were either located on floors above elevation 369 feet MSL, or are protected. Table 3.2-2, "Seismic Categories of Systems, Components, and Structures," identified the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings as seismic class 1 structures.

At the end of the inspection period, the following deficient flood protection features had been identified:

1. Unsealed Conduits

Over 100 unsealed conduits that penetrated flood barriers for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings between 335 feet MSL and 361 feet MSL.

2. Degraded Seals

The March 31, 2013, stator drop event revealed degraded hatch seals that allowed fire water in the turbine building to leak into the Unit 1 auxiliary building. During extent of condition reviews, the licensee identified 13 degraded hatches for Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 354 feet MSL (site grade elevation). The licensee determined that some hatch seals were degraded from age and some hatch seals were rolled out of place upon installation. From its extent of condition review, the licensee also identified that the building expansion joint between the auxiliary building and containment buildings was significantly degraded and could be subjected to external floodwater by backflooding through un-isolable floor drains.

The inspectors determined that the degraded hatch seals failed to protect safety-related systems from flooding, and that the licensee failed to establish instructions that prescribed how to adequately inspect, replace, and test the seals. The licensee corrected the hatch seal deficiencies by establishing adequate instructions, replacing the seals, and smoke testing the hatches or seal welding the hatches shut. The licensee implemented compensatory measures to plug the floor drains upon notification of a flood to prevent external floodwater from impacting the auxiliary building to containment building expansion joint.

3. Ventilation Penetration

...during construction, the ductwork blind flange was not fabricated and procedural instructions to isolate this flooding pathway were never developed.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to stage the blind flange and translate the design for flange installation into Procedure OP-1203.025, "Natural Emergencies," Revision 37.

4. Floor Drains

During extent of condition reviews for the degraded hatches, the licensee identified that floor drains at 354 feet MSL from the turbine building and old radwaste building sump were routed to the Unit 1 auxiliary building and the lines did not contain isolation valves in case of flooding. The inspector determined that the licensee failed to translate the design requirement to have isolation capability into specifications and drawings for the floor drain system . The licensee corrected the condition by installing a blind flange on the old radwaste building sump drain line and implemented compensatory measures to plug the drain line from the turbine building upon notification of a flood.

5. Auxiliary Building Extension

During extent of condition reviews for the degraded hatches, the licensee identified that some Unit 2 auxiliary building extension pipe penetrations between 335 feet MSL and 354 feet MSL were not sealed between the turbine building and auxiliary building extension. Unit 2 Drawing A-2002, "Architectural Schematic, Fire and Flood Protection Plans and Sections," Revision 10, referenced which walls, ceilings, and floors are flood barriers that required seals. Unit 2 Drawing Series A-2600, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Details," Revision 5, showed seal installation details that met flood barrier requirements.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to install seals for pipe penetrations that could be subjected to floodwater. The licensee designed the auxiliary building extension to be watertight in order to protect the auxiliary building because the buildings were connected by a non-watertight door below the design flood elevation. The unsealed pipe penetrations combined with the non-watertight door could lead to flooding of the Unit 2 auxiliary building. The licensee corrected the condition by modifying the non-watertight door connecting the auxiliary building and the extension, so that if the Unit 2 auxiliary building extension flooded, the Unit 2 auxiliary building would not flood.

6. Non-Watertight Door and Hatch

During extent of condition reviews for the degraded hatches, the licensee identified non-watertight Unit 1 Hatch 522 and Unit 2 Door 253 that could be subjected to floodwater at 358 feet MSL. The licensee found that the door and hatch in the area between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building and containments could be subject to external floodwater because the area was below the design flood level, and the area floor drains were connected to Lake Dardanelle without backwater (check) valves. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to translate design requirements into specifications and drawings for the Hatch 522 and Door 253. The licensee implemented compensatory measures to plug the floor drains upon notification of a flood.

7. Abandoned Equipment

During a flooding walkdown, the inspectors identified unsealed abandoned pipes that penetrated the Unit 1 auxiliary building flood barrier at 354 feet MSL. The inspectors discovered two pipes that penetrated the auxiliary building from the turbine building that were open on both ends. The licensee cut the pipes as part of a modification to abandon the waste solidification system. However, the design change failed to protect the Unit 1 auxiliary building from floodwater, a design requirement. The licensee corrected the condition by installing a blind flange and a pipe cap to seal the pipes.

8. Decay Heat Vault Drain Valves

The March 31, 2013, stator drop event revealed an open decay heat vault drain valve that allowed fire water internal to the auxiliary building to leak into Unit 1 decay heat vault B at 317 feet MSL. Unit 1, Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 26, Section 5.3.2, "Auxiliary Building," stated, in part, that the floor area at elevation 317 feet containing engineered safeguards equipment was partitioned into separate rooms to provide protection in the event of flooding due to a pipe rupture. In addition, the auxiliary building, which contains the decay heat removal vaults, is classified as seismic category 1 and is a safety-related structure; thereby the decay heat removal vaults are also safety-related. Each decay heat vault room contains a decay heat removal pump (low head safety injection) that is needed for accident mitigation.

The licensee determined that the reach rod for the valve was loose, so that the position indication was inaccurate, and that the condition applied to both Unit 1 decay heat vaults' drain valves. The inspectors identified that valve position indicated that the valve was closed for approximately 36 degrees of valve rotation. Consequently, when the valve indicated closed, it could actually be open. As stated above, the Unit 1 Safety Analysis Report indicated that the decay heat vaults were designed to be watertight, and the auxiliary building was designated seismic category 1 (safety-related), which includes the decay heat vaults; however, the inspectors determined that the vault drain valves were classified as non-safety-related components.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to identify the loose reach rods during daily operation or surveillance testing, correct the inaccurate position indication, and properly classify the vault drain valves as safety-related. The licensee corrected the deficiencies by replacing the reach rods and ensuring the position indication was accurate. In addition, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2014-01477 to document the inspectors concerns with maintenance and classification of the vault drain valves.

9. Startup transformer 2 Buswork

The inspectors identified that startup transformer 2 buswork was installed at 360.5 feet MSL. The licensee credited offsite power for Unit 1 and Unit 2 through startup transformer 2 up to the design flood level of 361 feet MSL, as an alternating current power source for vital and non-vital loads. The licensee implemented compensatory actions to seal the buswork upon notification of a flood.

Due to the number and relatively large area of unsealed penetrations affecting both Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary buildings at plant grade or below, an external flood could cause an inflow of approximately 2,000 gallons per minute and overwhelm the total sump pump capacity of 300 gallons per minute. For unsealed penetrations, the inspectors calculated the inflow by creating a matrix of the penetrations, with a static head of water at the penetration given a flood height of 354 feet , 1 inch MSL. The inspectors calculated the potential flow through those unsealed penetrations using the Bernoulli and Darcy Weisbach equations, with the penetration lengths, number of elbows and other restrictions, as indicated on plant drawings, being included in the calculations. The inspectors estimated the flow through hatches by calculating the flowrate through the hatches during the stator drop event based on water volume and time and applying that potential flowrate to the remainder of hatches and doors. The static head of water on the hatches during the stator drop could approximate a flood height of 354 feet, 1 inch MSL. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel fuel storage building had 14 unsealed conduits that penetrated the flood barrier, and the inflow could overwhelm the sump pump capacity of 15 gallons per minute. The inspectors determined that the auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings could flood if water level exceeded site grade elevation.

The inspectors conclude d that, for Unit 1 and Unit 2, the licensee failed to protect safety-related systems below the design flood level from external floodwater, including equipment inside of vaults. Most importantly, all long-term core makeup and cooling could have failed during an external flood.

The emergency diesel fuel storage building could have flooded, submerging the Unit 1 and Unit 2 diesel fuel oil transfer pumps, which could have starved the emergency diesel generators of fuel. Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent fuel pool cooling could have been lost because both units' pumps are in the auxiliary building below flood elevation and are not flood protected. Unit 2 outside containment isolation valves were affected because breakers for the valves could be submerged, however the valves were accessible for manual operation and the inside containment isolation valves would be available. Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment spray systems could be submerged. Unit 1 and Unit 2 portable recovery equipment, connections, and other recovery strategies, such as gravity feeding tanks, could be unavailable due to submergence from flooding.

The NRC and licensee identified multiple floodwater paths into the auxiliary building after the licensee had performed flooding walkdowns, as directed by the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter, concerning actions to be taken by licensees that resulted from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant event. The licensee failed to properly identify all flood protection features, as specified in NEI 12-07, "Guidelines for Performing Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features," Revision 0.

Licensee Personnel

J. Browning, Site Vice President

D. James, Director, Regulatory and Performance Department

S. Pyle, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

NRC ADAMS: ML14253A122

Oconee Turned Into Junk

My bad, I assumed this happened yesturday... I guess leaking SRVs are normal??? At least I self check myself...I was looking for if Oconee had repeated issues with SRVs. If I paid attention to the date of the event on 10/24/2013 I wouldn't have put it up.

LER-287/2013-01

It is bad when two broken components show up in one plant trip (broken feedwater thing and a leaking relief)...but four misoperating reliefs???

I am certain they reduced pressure by 30 psig by the nature of the trip on their own without going into the procedure...

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM FULL POWER DUE TO FEEDWATER SYSTEM OSCILLATIONS

"At 0553 EDT on 10/24/2013, Oconee Unit 3 was manually tripped due to oscillations in the feedwater system in anticipation of an automatic reactor trip. At 0549 EDT, Unit 3 began experiencing small feedwater oscillations. The feedwater control system was placed in manual in an attempt to stabilize feedwater flows. Feedwater oscillations continued to grow in magnitude and at 0553 EDT, a manual trip was directed to prevent an automatic reactor trip.

"Due to an RPS actuation, this event is being reported as a 4 and 8 hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)

"Following the reactor trip, four main steam relief valves failed to reseat. Procedure guidance was utilized to reduce main steam system pressure by approximately 30 psig to reseat the main steam relief valves. All main stream relief valves are now reseated. All other post trip conditions were normal and all other systems performed as expected. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable.

"Operations have been stabilized on Unit 3. A post-trip investigation is in progress, per site procedures and directives."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM BOB MEIXELL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1439 ON 9/10/14 * * *

"Duke Energy reviewed NRC Event Number 49471 against NUREG 1022, Rev 3, section 3.2.6, "System Actuation" and determined this event should have been reported only per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation (while critical). Thus, Duke Energy is revising NRC Event Number 49471 to remove the 8-hour report criteria 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this revised report.

"This update has no effect on safety significance."

Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

More Loony Tunes at Salem/Hope Creek

Sept 11: LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK TWP. — The Hope Creek nuclear reactor has returned to service after being shut down for repairs to a key safety relief valve, officials said.
The plant began sending out electricity over the regional power grid at 12:26 a.m. Thursday, according to Joe Delmar, spokesman for the plant's operator, PSEG Nuclear.
"The maintenance outage was well executed and we were able to make the repairs we needed to ensure the continued safe operation of Hope Creek," Delmar said.

Hope it is not a primary coolant pump or other broken large reactor component. I doubt it is not a loose safety relief valve...they would know if was was leaking through detectors.

Mystery noise shuts Hope Creek reactor

Mystery noise inside PSEG Nuclear's Hope Creek nuclear plant containment building prompted a shutdown of the 1,219 megawatt operation Friday, federal regulators reported Monday.

"Plant personnel believed the source of the noise was a faulty safety relief valve, but they have not been able to confirm that thus far," said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regional office in King of Prussia, Pa.

Joseph Delmar Sr., PSEG spokesman, described the shutdown as a maintenance outage, and said that the company could not say when the reactor would return to service.

Delmar said that the company had planned to replace one of the plant's many safety relief valves designed to keep the reactor's piping and systems from from exceeding pressure limits.

Repairs to leaks in the plant's cooling water system also are planned during the shutdown, officials said.

A quarterly inspection report released by the NRC in late July noted that 5 of 14 main steam safety relief valves at Hope Creek had failed to open within a specified pressure range, but did open and would have protected the plant from over-pressurization. PSEG made repairs and attributed the problem to "corrosion bonding/sticking" and said that it planned to install new valves with a different design.

The reactor's next regular refueling shutdown is scheduled for the Spring of 2015. Commercial operation of the reactor began in 1986.

Neither of the PSEG-operated, 1,180-megawatt Salem reactors, partly owned by Exelon Corp., were affected and continued operating at full power.

NRC Prevents New Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants

I think when they present the idea of building a new nuclear plant to a surroundings...forces are going to fight back saying nuclear waste is going to be staying on your site for 500 years. I don't think a community will tolerate this.
 
Now, I'd be with a temporary on the surface centralized repository for cask say out in a desert or desolate area until say 2050.

Nuclear Waste Is Allowed Above Ground Indefinitely

By MATTHEW L. WALDAUG. 29, 2014

As the country struggles to find a place to bury spent nuclear fuel, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has decided that nuclear waste from power plants can be stored above ground in containers that can be maintained and guarded indefinitely.

The decision, in a unanimous vote of the commission on Tuesday, means that new nuclear plants can be built and old ones can expand their operations despite the lack of a long-term plan for disposing of the waste.

The chairwoman of the commission, who voted with the majority but dissented on certain aspects, said Friday that the vote risked allowing Congress to ignore the long-term problem.

“If you make the assumption that there will be some kind of institution that will exist, like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that will assure material stays safe for hundreds or thousands of years, there’s not much impetus for Congress to want to deal with this issue,” the chairwoman, Allison M. Macfarlane, said Friday. “Personally, I think that we can’t say with any certainty what the future will look like. We’re pretty damned poor at predicting the future.”

I think Macfarlane is not patriotic, her implying the USA is some run of mill institution and she emplies the USA no staying power in history.  I honestly think her geologic time frames and PhD in geology has gone to her head in a bad way.

In the 1980s, Congress picked Yucca Mountain, near Las Vegas, as the prime location for a burial site, but that consensus fell apart in the face of sharp opposition from Nevada and a changing political balance. The Energy Department is now saying that a burial site will be established by 2048, but the agency has no method for finding one.

The commission approved a generic environmental impact statement, under which nuclear activities can continue, but did not address the impact to the environment if the stored nuclear waste were abandoned, which would leave it vulnerable to attack or allow the containers to break down.

Ms. Macfarlane said it was wrong to predict institutional control indefinitely. “Best not to say anything about something so uncertain,” she said, “and just to work with what we can know for sure.”

For decades the commission has allowed nuclear plants to operate under what it called its waste confidence rule, which said that although there was no repository, there would most likely be one by the time it was needed, and in the interim, the storage of the highly radioactive waste in spent fuel pools or in dry casks would suffice. But in June 2012, a court ruled that the commission had not done its homework in studying whether the waste could be stored on an interim basis. As a result, the commission froze much of its licensing activity two years ago.

On Tuesday, however, the commission approved a finding by its staff that waste could be stored — as opposed to disposed of — indefinitely. The vote was 4-0.

Some nuclear opponents say the issue is certain to wind up back in court. At the Natural Resources Defense Council, Geoffrey H. Fettus, the lead lawyer in the original case, said in a statement: “The Nuclear Regulatory Commission failed to analyze the long-term environmental consequences of indefinite storage of highly toxic and radioactive nuclear waste; the risks of which are apparent to any observer of history over the past 50 years. The commission failed to follow the express directions of the court.”

The action, though, allows the commission to extend the licenses of two reactors in Pennsylvania, Limerick 1 and 2, and to extend the license for storage casks holding spent fuel at another two-unit plant, Calvert Cliffs, in Maryland.

Several other license renewals would have had to have been denied had the new policy not been put in place, including Indian Point 2 and 3, in Buchanan, N.Y., but those license applications still have other unresolved issues. Likewise, several applications to build reactors would eventually have been blocked, except that those plants were not very likely to be built in the near future.

In coming years the agency will need to reconfigure its staff to handle a different problem: an increased number of plants shutting down and entering the decommissioning process, Ms. MacFarlane said. And, she said, the commission needs to rewrite its rules for decommissioning plants. For example, she said, once the nuclear fuel has been removed from a reactor core, the security requirements at the plants should probably be relaxed because the risk is reduced.

The Local Cult of Teenager Death: Brattleboro Ford and the Local Newspaper

Sept 12: She fell 60 feet and the unprotected bridge is known for rock climbing?

A woman who went over a bridge off Route 101 was taken to the hospital with serious injuries, according to Keene police and firefighters.
Keene Fire Capt. Robert Diluzio Jr. said firefighters and police responded to a call at 7:05 Thursday evening for a woman who had fallen off the Stone Arch Bridge.

Sorry, Drew is not associated with Brattleboro Ford.

The lot of them are nothing but addicted thrill seeking punks!!! 

Did Drew, Brattleboro Ford or the Reformer get permission from the owners of the bridge? Did he go around to the local police and rescue authorities to get their sign off on the jump. 

Honestly, can you imagine the "Reformer" passing this by their lawyers? They would be in stitches laughing breathlessly on the floor for an hour.

Me: Edward, It is not perfect grammar or English but it gets the message across…ask the right questions. "The Local Cult of Teenager Death: Brattleboro Ford and the Local Newspaper" 

http://steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

To: ewoods@reformer.com 

CC: tderrico@reformer.com 

Today at 2:30 PM

Edward,

It is not perfect grammar or English but it gets the message across…ask the right questions.

"The Local Cult of Teenager Death: Brattleboro Ford and the Local Newspaper"

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

Honestly, this should be a firing offence forTom. He is begging for a new job!

As atonement from your poor corporation, you should go on a campaign to fence off this bridge. You should see all the teenage graffiti on the bridge! It is just a matter of time before one of our children die.

The adult message should always be…nobody should go on these dangerous relics. Especially on top of that superstructure without safety gear and professional experience! The way communities normally handle this throughout our nation is these bridges are fenced off. It is such an known and established risk to the kids and young adults. The fencing makes it just about impossible to get on that bridge. 

The way we have always handled this in the past, is you demolish the bridge for safety sake. That is not a toy or advertising tool. Where is your corporation’s decency!

This is like putting a revolver to your head with one bullet in the chamber and pulling the trigger!

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

16033378320

Drew Christiansen stands on the Fort Hill Branch Rail Bridge that crosses the Connecticut River from Brattleboro to Hinsdale, N.H. Christiansen jumped from the top of the bridge into the river after pouring a bag of ice in for an ALS Ice Bucket Challenge video. (Kayla Rice/Reformer)

You know this is going to cause a local mother to be waiting on the side of the Connecticut river while the rescue departments are fishing with a rope and a grappling hook trying to find her child's dead body in the Connecticut River. Will his dead body get chewed up in the dam?

Is this how morally bankrupt we've become? Are Drew, the Reformer or Brattleboro Ford going to be liable when a teenage jumps to his death off this bridge. You are teaching teenagers to take terrible risks.  This is basically Russian roulette...putting a revolver to head with one bullet in the chamber and pulling the trigger. Is this what you are trying to do. Next the Reformer will trying trying to boost circulation by producing a article on Russian roulette and a Brattleboro Subaru employee will You Tube it by pulling the trigger for Parkinson disease funding.   

Drew is not on the railroad bed...he is on the top of the superstructure.

Lets say, Drew upon trying to climb to the top of the superstructure, he lost his footing and fell to his death. Would it become a cover-up with the Reformer and Brattleboro Ford. Imagine how this would look for these guys.

I see numerous routes of injury  or deaths.

1) Hitting something on the way down.

2) Climbing to the jump perch...slipping off the bridge by accident.

3) That ski pole puncturing your chest or skull.

4) Teenagers jumping in shallower water.

5) Tripping over his flip flops and falling to his death. 

Hey, I got a idea...all the local newspaper and car dealerships could create a trifecta or perfecter. It would be really cheap advertising. Nobody in their right mind would put a horse to such risky behavior. The first to jump off all three, the superstructure of the Seabees bridge, the rail bridge  and the French KIng Bridge while playing Russian Roulette on way down. It is cheating if you know the depth of water where you are going to jump. Think of how much free advertisement you could get out of this? it would even be better if somebody died! 

This is nothing but free "junk"newspaper circulation and advertising...these local companies should just put the money into these organizations instead of risking their valuable employee. You know, it is tax deductible?  

This is going to get out of hand with escalating the risk...these crazies trying to outdo each other.

What an ice thing to do!

Locals join nationwide trend of ALS Ice Bucket Challenge for charity

By DOMENIC POLI / Reformer Staff

BRATTLEBORO -- The latest trend in humanitarian efforts is to simply get doused with water.

In an effort to raise money and/or awareness of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), more commonly referred to as Lou Gehrig's disease, people have started to record ice water getting dumped on themselves and post it online. The exact origins of this fad, known as the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, are debated, but it has recently spread like wildfire.

And plenty of locals have taken up the cause. The Reformer has found videos of employees at Brattleboro Ford, the Hampton Inn of Brattleboro, the Brattleboro Memorial Hospital's radiology department, the Chester Fire Department and Mount Snow and Stratton Mountain ski resorts -- to name just a few -- getting water poured onto them.

Those Nukie Cheaters?

This goes well beyond the Chaleston. These guys get cycled back and forth to the fleet and the schools many times. Many times a school engineer will bring back to a boat some of their enlisted friends. It was called the school and prototype mafia. I think the CO of the school gained benefits... better pass rates. I can't imagine they weren't involved in it. 

Notice how they don't talk about who gained the benefits...why did they take such a risk?

So they would pass those corrupting forces into the the boats and ships...the disease model.

Navy kicks out 34 for cheating at nuclear training site

WASHINGTON — At least 34 sailors are being kicked out of the Navy for their roles in a cheating ring that operated undetected for at least seven years at a nuclear power training site, and 10 others are under criminal investigation, the admiral in charge of the Navy’s nuclear reactors program told The Associated Press.

The number of accused and the duration of cheating are greater than was known when the Navy announced in February that it had discovered cheating on qualification exams by an estimated 20 to 30 sailors seeking to be certified as instructors at the nuclear training unit at Charleston, South Carolina. Students there are trained in nuclear reactor operations to prepare for service on any of the Navy’s 83 nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.

Neither the instructors nor the students are involved in handling nuclear weapons.

After further investigation the Navy determined that 78 enlisted sailors were implicated. Although the cheating is believed to have been confined to a single unit at Charleston and apparently was not known to commanding officers, the misconduct had been happening since at least 2007, according to Adm. John M. Richardson, director of naval reactors. The exact start of the cheating was not pinpointed.

“There was never any question” that the reactors were being operated safely, he said in an AP interview, yet the cheating was a stunning violation of Navy ethics.

Richardson said he was “loaded for bear” at the outset of the investigation, unconvinced the cheating was confined to a single training unit. But he now believes that it had not spread, and that this was one reason that the ring managed to operate so long without being discovered.

In addition to the 34 enlisted sailors who were removed from the nuclear power program and are being administratively discharged from the Navy, two more who were implicated as “minimal” participants had their non-criminal punishment suspended due to their “strong potential for rehabilitation.”

Also, 32 sailors were implicated by investigators but later exonerated by Richardson, and he gave one officer a verbal warning. The officer, whom Richardson declined to identify by name or rank, was not accused of participating in the cheating. He was faulted for “deficiencies” in his oversight of the exam program, but Richardson said this was not severe enough to merit punishment.

The Navy investigation also concluded that commanders were not directly at fault. “It was not the result of ‘wishful blindness,” it said.

The 68 implicated sailors are in addition to the 10 whom Richardson said are believed to have been “at the center” of the cheating ring and remain under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

The scandal rocked the Navy, but details until now had remained under wraps as senior Navy officials sought to determine the scope of the cheating — including whether it was happening elsewhere — as well as the root causes and possible remedies.

Unlike an Air Force exam-cheating scandal that came to light in January at a Montana base that operates land-based nuclear-armed missiles, the sailors involved in the Navy cheating had no responsibility for nuclear weapons.

Navy investigators did, however, find one key link between the two episodes. Their investigation report said “a triggering event” for the unidentified sailor at Charleston who alerted superiors to cheating on Feb. 2 was media reports a few weeks earlier about exam cheating at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

“This increased his concern enough about being caught to outweigh the group behavior of his peers,” the report said, apparently alluding to peer pressure this unidentified sailor may otherwise have felt not to report the misconduct.

Richardson said he met individually with each of the accused and heard at least two common themes: a belief that there was little risk of getting caught, and a work environment at the nuclear training site that created stresses and pressures on the approximately 300 sailors who serve as instructors.

In an interview in his Navy Yard office Tuesday, Richardson said he is taking steps to ease the pressures and to strengthen ethics training.

Richardson said the accused at Charleston fell into two main categories:

■ Sailors who cheated on the tests.

■ Sailors who enabled the cheating by providing answers in advance to others taking the test and tipping them off about what test they would be given.

Richardson called the latter group of 10 sailors the ringleaders and said their offenses are considered more serious because they had facilitated the illicit transfer of classified test answers.

An extensive investigation ordered by Richardson and led by Rear Adm. Kenneth M. Perry found that an electronic master file of “engineering watch supervisor” tests and answers was illegally removed from a Navy computer “sometime before 2007.” Investigators failed to identify who took it or exactly when.

The set of test and answer keys became known among the cheaters as the “Pencil Files.”

These files were secretly passed via personal email accounts, compact disks, thumb drives and other non-official electronic systems. Richardson said the Pencil Files contained all 600 answers to questions on five sets of tests.

Also, a “Pencil Number” was passed to sailors to tip them to which of the five exams they would be given.

“The result was a deliberate scheme to cheat ...,” the report said. It found no evidence of espionage.

Exam security was weak. For example, investigators found that the five tests were used in a predictably rotating order and the questions had not changed significantly since 2004, even though written rules require they be changed frequently.

NCIS investigators interviewed four people thought to have knowledge of the origin of the Pencil Files. Three of them denied involvement in the scheme and the fourth invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney.

“Thus, no further evidence of the origin of the ‘Pencil Files’ was obtained,” the investigation report said.

Aug 2114: Hinsdale Bridge Inspection

Aug 21: I put a call into the NHDOT's bridge inspection group and they told me they will get right back to me:)

(The NHDOT called me within a hour and they reminded me to call them again if I had any issues. He was really decent to me)  

I swear, I was going to razz the bridge inspectors with, “is that you knocking off the rust”. The NHDOT says that was them knocking off the rust with a hammer yesterday to see the true metal thickness. I said it wasn’t a hammer, it was a sledge hammer or bigger.

The question that comes up, so that amount of rust gets generated in six months? The layered rust they were hitting takes decades to develop. Why weren’t they whacking the hell out of it six months ago on that spot.

He says the bridge is in poor condition and they been trying to get it replaced. Basically the bridge is in the same condition it was six months ago.

I reminded him, you are communicating with the legislator and the local people. You got to down grade that bridge in order to get everyone’s ass in gear.    

Funding remains not a chance in the next decade!!! 

Last week began bridge inspections. So I approach the hinsdsle bridge  , I can see a emplyee shaking his head in disbelief I showed up at just the right time. There was three nhdot guys on my brand new walkway. They had generator going to something. Gas bottles and a welded setup too. Who knows how many guys where under the bridge. They were hammering the piss on a beam or something under the bridge. I mean heavy heavy hammering the beam like it was out of place.

I asked what  are you doing...he said there were just working. I knew that was all I was going to get from him. I mocked, this is the is the USA ain't it? I asked, how do like my new deck. He said it was nice job.