Bam, ANO 2 IS Up At Power And Waterford Took A Forced Shutdown

Entergy has had one plant down out of their southern fleet all summer long.  Collectively they have had a poor record with protecting their grid this summer.

So lazy and incompetent Waterford found a crack in the charging pump discharge header piping and put off emediately fixing it. Then next check of the area it worsened leading to the shutdown. Is their predicting piping flaw growth any good.

Or worst, the first flaw test was inaccurate?    

Power Reactor Event Number: 54191 Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4     State: LA Unit: [3] [] [] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: BRIAN BUSCHBAUM HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD Notification Date: 07/31/2019 Notification Time: 16:20 [ET] Event Date: 07/31/2019 Event Time: 12:06 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/31/2019 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION Person (Organization): JEREMY GROOM (R4DO) Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 3 N Y 100 Power Operation 65 Power Operation Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE BORON INJECTION FLOW PATHS AND CHARGING PUMPS "On July 31, 2019, at 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced initiation of a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Prior to this, on July 31, 2019, at 1108 CDT, the boron injection flow paths were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.2, 'Flow Paths - Operating,' and the charging pumps were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.4, 'Charging Pumps-Operating.' This was due to visual examination identifying that propagation had progressed on a previously identified flaw on piping upstream of the header supplying the charging pumps. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to the action statements of LCOs 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 not being met. LCO 3.0.3 requires that action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours. At 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced direct boration to the reactor coolant system. "This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."