The experts and NRC knows I set up the NRC to be more interested Pilgrim's SRV problems and the massive Pilgrim downgrade. I wonder why I never get credit for my activities?
More on the Safety Relief Valves.
***Waiting for the event report.
Here it is. What I am looking for.
1) Did they isolate from the main condenser, did the MSIVs go shut?
2) Any troubles from the safety relief valves?
3) Was it a clean shutdown or scram, did they have lots of equipment or employee problems.
Really, history proves this plant isn't designed for the winter weather?
The event report.
Having the switchyard breaker trip is grossly incompetent. But they kept the MSIVs open. It makes the scram really easy and doesn't challenge equipment as much. Is a easy scram good or bad? On the bad side, you don't get a wider view with the condition of the equipment? But on the big picture, they done good with the scram.
Power Reactor Event Number: 53147 Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRDNotification Date: 01/04/2018
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2018
Event Time: 14:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/04/2018Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATIONPerson (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 M/R Y 81 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM
"On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted.
"As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System.
"Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset.
"Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design.
"This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation."
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser.
Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure.
The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release.
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