Unit 2 began the reporting period shutdown for repairs to the main condenser. The unit was started up on July 23, 2017, but was shutdown to hot standby later that day due to equipment problems. On July 25, 2017, startup resumed, but the reactor was tripped before criticality due to rod position indication problems during the startup. Startup commenced again on July 27, 2017, but was stopped due to additional rod position indication problems. Unit 2 started up after rod position indication repairs on July 30, 2017, and achieved 29 percent RTP on August 2, 2017. The unit remained at that power until August 8, 2017, when the turbine was tripped due to a steam leak on a turbine drain line. The unit stabilized at 8 percent RTP and remained there until power ascension resumed after drain line repairs. Unit 2 reached 100 percent RTP on August 8, 2017, and remained there for the remainder of the reporting period.
Very troublesome. The not counted violation is mostly not following
procedures which is very serious.
Six violations of very low safety significance, identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee’s CAP. These violations and the corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
So basically a NRC inspector below thought his peers were too tough on TVA. Was that the geneses of the not counted violations on the above inspection.
Integrated Report 2017003 documents a self-revealing NC\’ when licensee personnel did not properly implement a surveillance procedure (See attached 4-part writeup.)In the analysis section, the reason be a more that minor determination was the performance deficiency caused a depressurization that had to be stopped by operator action.” The rational used was detailed in an e-mail to me from Alan Blarney (see attached e mail); the opening of the PORV impacted plant stability (depressurization) and challenged the critical safety function of heat removal (loss of inventory). However, as stated in the analysis section “the resultant leakage from the open P0kV would not have caused the current decay heat removal method to fail (lit went undetected and leakage would be self-limiting such that it would stop before impacting the operating method of decay heat removal This statement directly contradicts the rational tor a more than minor determination that either depressurization impacted plant stability or the loss of inventory challenged the critical safety function of heat removal…
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