Where was the NRC…
Can you even believe this, the maintenance actively happened
on Aug 26, 2014 and this very serious violation was discovered on April 19,
2016…
Licensee Event Report 2016-002:.01, Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications
As specified under Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) Action Statement 3.9.B.2, "From and after the date that incoming power is not available from both startup and shutdown transformers, continued operation is permissible, provided both diesel generators and associated emergency buses remain operable, all core and containment cooling systems are operable, and reactor power level is reduced to 25 percent of design".
The potential safety consequence of this event if response (recovery) actions were delayed is the possibility of losing 4kV Buses AS &A6 for an extended period of time, resulting in a prolonged station blackout condition.
The potential safety consequence of this event if the "operator" barrier was removed is a station blackout
condition. Had the resulting consequence of th'e August 2014 maintenance testing been a station blackout, PNPS Procedure S.3.31, Station Blackout, would have been entered and the prescribed immediate and subsequent actions taken until the preferred (34S kV Offsite) power source or the standby (onsite) EOG power source was restored.
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