I am interested in why a LER wasn't written up for the plug leak. When did Watts Bar first discover the leaking indications? They measure airborn radiation as a sensitive indicator of a pressure barrier leak. How did the end up ignoring this symptom?
Reg guild 1.45RCPB leakage is leakage from a nonisolable fault in the material of an RCS component, pipe wall(including welds), or vessel wall. Leakage from seals, gaskets, and mechanical connections (e.g., bolts, valve seals) is not considered RCPB leakage although these components are part of the RCPB, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions” (Ref. 2). Thus, RCPB leakage is indicative of degradation of pressure retaining components that could ultimately result in a loss of component structural integrity.
***See, these guys spend all their intelligence on illegally getting around the rules instead using their god given intelligence of blindly following the rules.
I just don't think the NRC educated enough on the specific plant technical specification and how to use power to make these guys follow the rules. So why didn't the NRC order them to shutdown over the out of position rod? Are they getting complacent with leaks and out of position rods?
They had a reactor coolant leak over a control rod drive mechanism drain plug and they didn't know it. I bet they knew it was a leak, but didn't emediately know it was a pressure boundary illegal water leak. They had a reactor pressure barrier leak...they are required to emediately shutdown to repair it.
Basically they had a unaddressed dreaded pressure barrier leak (Davis Bessee)that shorted out the rod position indication.
They violated two tech specs shutdown requirements over this to protect profits and capacity factor.
1) They intentionally overrode the Tech Spec requirements over a inop rod position indication system and the NRC did not intervene.
2) They had a dangerous and illegal reactor pressure boundary leakage.
They got probably 6 inches of concrete around the reactor and the containment is poorly instrumented containment. They are half blinded on their best days and they know it. It is not like they got a god's eye view of every possible leak. Of course these guys defense with this is, we couldn't discriminate between pressure boundary leak and insignificant leak. But believe me, they always agonized over how blinded they are with things happening behind the six inches of concrete.
What did I say about the money grubbing NRC, plant engineers and management always screwing the licensed operators. The control room guys are just powerless to maintain professional nuclear standards. Aren't these the guys where the NRC charged TVA with systemic safety intimidation of the employees. How can you not come to the conclusion that the NRC facilitated this broad intimidation of employees and poor safety culture, if the agency is not enforcing their regulations over and over again. They are letting TVA run around with uncontestable power never contemplated by congress and the peoples who voted for them.
There are tons of electrical equipment and electrical instrumentation in containment. There are strict QA requirements, but not enforced, to make all this equipment water and moisture proof and temperature resistance. In the big bad meltdown accident LOCA, the environment is upward to 600 degrees. with long term steam, moisture and water saturated conditions. How the hell are we getting electrical shorts in the extraordinary safety related rod position indication system in these benign normal operation conditions in 2015? This was a warning to everyone that is ignored.
My considered accidents:
1) A quick puff of steam filling the area around the CDRM positon indication area but not big enough to create a scram. It shorts out numerous rod position indications leading to numerous rod drop accidents... The control room operators aren't quick enough to scram the reactor and control the core rod density. The core partially melts down leading to the greatest nuclear scandal the US ever seen. The plants are destroyed including the untouched new nuclear plant, but little release of radioactivity. You just cratored the nuclear industry and it will have grave consequences to our nation way beyond the nuclear industry.
2) You come to a mid size or largest design LOCA...but on the big picture is easily controllable. The plant might be easily repairable after it. They allowed again illegal pressure boundary leakage (wink, wink)...the piping tiny crack mysteriously blew open months after knowing about the illegal tiny leak. But all is safe, we are designed and trained for this. But a host of equipment and instrumentation electrical shorts in containment begin to show up. The crew gets terribly confused, become effectively blinded by the magnitude if shorting equipment in containment. A easily controllable events turns into a partial meltdown or a full blown meltdown.
The real risk of the big one is a lost of integrity with the NRC and TVA...everyone is spinning engineering analysis for self interest in a secrecy driven system. Everyone is allowed to have their own special secrets and outsiders can't protect themselves. They have to create a widespread severe employee intimidation system to accomplish this engineering paper whipping spinning.
Nobody knows what the true conditions of the plant is and everyone is lying through their teeth to keep their jobs. This is when you have mind boggling stupid plant accidents that any idiot should have prevented. This happens more than you think. These kinds of new events in a much smaller event are emerging more and more at these plants because of the financial pressures.
Nobody knows what the true conditions of the plant is and everyone is lying through their teeth to keep their jobs. This is when you have mind boggling stupid plant accidents that any idiot should have prevented. This happens more than you think. These kinds of new events in a much smaller event are emerging more and more at these plants because of the financial pressures.
Intention falsification of federal documents...or a falsification of licensee documents that impairs the oversight of the NRC. Why didn't the NRC have the expertise to catch it?05000390Licensee Event Report 390/2016-007-00, Technical Specification Action Not Met for Rod Position indication
On April 21,2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 concluded that a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.8, Rod Position lndication, had occurred during the dropped rod event on November 05, 2015. The Surveillance Requirement for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position lndication, (ARPI), agrees within 12 steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position lndication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within 12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A. Because the actions of TS 3.1.8 were not taken within the required times, WBN Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by TS.
On November 05, 2015, WBN Unit had a dropped rod event and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits - Condition B, and TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (OPTR) - Condition A. The control room staff took the actions according to TS and reduced power to less than 75%. However, upon review after the event, it was determined that TS 3.1.8, Rod Position indication for the Control Rod Drive System [El|S:AA], should also have been entered. The Surveillance Requirement (SR) for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position indication (ARPI) agrees within 12
steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position indication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within
12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
A. The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.
The dropped rod occurred as a result of an electrical ground caused by moisture intrusion from a reactor coolant system leak. The leak was found during a subsequent maintenance outage on a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) threaded vent plug which had decreased torque. A sealwelded vent plug was installed to prevent further leakage.
Wink, wink, wink: another intentional misinterpretation of tech specs in a operational bind uncontested by the NRC. I am sure the NRC rules allow this. These guys spend tremendous amounts of time studying and training on teck specs. These guys brag they are highly detailed oriented. That is what they get promoted for. Believe me, they knew what they should have done, and they expected the agency's pitiful response.
While there was a dropped rod event, this issue was the result of an incorrect licensing position (CR 979285) addressing how to comply with TS 3.1 .8, specifically, whether TS LCO 3.1.8 for Rod Position indication (RPl) should be entered after a dropped rod as a result of not being able to successfully perform the associated 18-month TS SR 3.1.8.1.
B. The cause(s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause.
The cause of this event was an incorrect licensing position of how to comply with TS 3.1.
Previous similar events at the same plant
LER 2016-002, Technical Specification Action Not Met for lnoperable Containment lsolation Valve, describes a similar event of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications. ln this LER, WBN Unit 1 entered TS 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, for a containment isolation valve being inoperable. The requirement to isolate the penetration associated with this containment isolation valve was not completed within TS time requirements. The cause of this event was operations staff misunderstanding the applicability of the Note associated with TS 3.6.3, which allows administrative controls under certain conditions. ln response to this event, a shift order defining the correct response when entering TS 3.6.3 Condition A was provided to the operating staff, and is to be a topic of future operations training. The response to this issue was specific to TS 3.6.3 and would not have prevented this event.
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