Entergy and River Bend Notes

extent of cause or condition investigation...?

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML050410438

February 10, 2005
Paul D. Hinnenkamp
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2004012

 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV. C 10 CFR 55.46.c states in part, “A plant-referenced simulator used for the administration of the operating test or to meet experience requirements . . . must demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond . . . .” RBS experienced two reactor scrams (August 15 and October 1, 2004) in which actual plant SRV manipulations caused shrink, swell, and level indications that were different than what was modeled in the simulator. After some investigation by the licensee, it was determined that level variations in the simulator were 6-8 inches different than in the actual plant. Considering that RPV level is normally maintained between Level 8 (51 inches) and Level 3 (9.7 inches), 6-8 inches constitutes approximately a 15-20 percent difference than actual plant condition. Coupled with the fact that most of the operators on shift during the events had never actually manipulated SRVs in the plant, this simulator fidelity deficiency could have an impact on operator performance. This issue was documented in the licensee’s corrective action program in Condition Report CR-RBS-2004-2334. This violation is of very low safety significance because it did not involve an exam or operating test, but did involve a simulator fidelity issue which impacted operator actions and resulted in negative training.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1504/ML15042A392.pdf

 

Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2014

EA-14-147

Mr. Eric W. Olson, Site Vice President
\Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 U.S. Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2014005

Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2014
Dear Mr. Olson:

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.46, "Simulation Facilities," for the failure of the licensee to retain the results of required performance tests for four years after completion, or until superseded by updated test results. The licensee could not locate scenario-based testing documentation conducted for the March 2014 initial license exam. The licensee asserted in writing that the testing was performed, but that the electronic test packages had been lost. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2014-04595.

Specifically, because of the lack of documentation the licensee was unable to demonstrate that its scenario-based testing would ensure the simulator is capable of producing the expected reference unit

response without significant performance discrepancies, or deviation from an approved scenario sequence, for scenarios used to evaluate licensed operators and applicants. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it is a "Simulator Testing, Maintenance, or Modification Deficiency." 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1413/ML14133A700.pdf

July 7, 2015

EA-15-043

Mr. Eric W. Olson, Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 U.S. Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

 

Analysis. The team determined that the failure of the plant-referenced simulator to demonstrate expected pressure response across the main steam isolation valves during conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems needed to respond to initiating events to prevent undesired consequences. Specifically, the incorrect simulator response could adversely affect the operating crew’s ability to assess plant conditions and take actions in accordance with approved procedures. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, “Significance Determination

Process,” Phase 1 Worksheets, and the associated Appendix I, “Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP),” Block 15, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the deficient simulator performance did not negatively impact operator performance in the actual plant during a reportable event. This modeling deficiency did not have any generic training implications, nor did it have any actual impact on operator performance. Therefore, the inspectors determined it did not have any cross-cutting aspect.