Entergy-River Bend fined $70,000 for Improper Security Department Decorium.

I had a high NRC OIG official asked me if I know about any more security department events at the Palisades plant. Now we know why she asked me that. What a terribly troubled company. How many of these Confirmatory Orders with the repeated basic aims of training the plant staff and flee, all surrounding ethics and NRC requirements have we seen in recent years at Entergy-nuclear? There has been a tremendous amount of similar Confirmatory Orders and the focus always is telling the truth, following NRC regulations and ethics fleet wide. It is call crazy doing the same wrong thing over and over again without change.

I bet you this is about offensive materials in the security watch stations or offices. You notice Entergy's management and the  NRC can't figure out who are the culprits with violating the decorum not stated policies.  I thinking it is either porn, racial intimidation and it even might be right wing anti government propaganda. Is these even against any NRC rule.

You get it, it is national security terrorism secrecy information where they can't publicly describe what this $70,000 decorum violation is all about?  

Basically we are talking about two systems of accountability...a NRC secret system of withholding information that obviously doesn't work and the transparently shaming a bad utility actor with openly disclosing all security violations. If you can’t control these guys through your regulations, we can control them through public shaming and shutting down nuclear plants.

But mike, that would give information to terrorist. The vulnerabilities are giving terrorist information or allowing these utilities in a secret system of bloodless paper cuts of no NRC accountability ...not requiring a change in behavior that allows the security staff to cycle down into hidden dysfunction. We have seen this as example at Vermont Yankee. I think we would all be a lot more safer if we'd seen all the security violations and we effectively shamed a corporation publicly with their bad behaviors. Then the public and community could drive the NRC and utility into behavior change with a bad actor utility.

As this system of security secrets stands now, is these secret protect the industry and the NRC from accountability. The system allows these licensees to spend less money on security. It is a tragic abuse of using national security as a tool to protect these corporations...it is in our highest societal interest to maintain faith in a centralized organizing force or government in time of a crisis. If these security staffs at these nuclear plants are more dysfunctional than disclosed through the paper cut punishment NRC bad behavior change...then we will lose faith in government if the security staff collapses in the face of insignificant terrorist like pressure.

In other words, shaming these utilities with the truth on violations would create a system that bolsters and increases the public safety more than the vulnerabilities of giving terrorist insignificant advantages with insider security information prior to an attack. The sin would be if the NRC gave River Bend the old wink wink and documentation paper cut punishment of no bother...their security department cycles down unseen into dysfunction more that the community can see and correct. Then a terrorist attack occurs and the security department isn't really prepared for it.
The last time I put terrorism and nuclear plant in the same sentence, I had two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force agents at my door asking questions and threatening to out me into jail. 

Democracy in not a system for cowards!!!    

CONFIRMATORY ORDER, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND CIVIL PENALTY- NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2014407 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2012-022- RIVER BEND STATION

On September 22, 2014, the NRC and Entergy met in an ADR session mediated by a
professional mediator, arranged through the Cornell University Scheinman Institute on Conflict
Resolution. ADR is a process in which a neutral mediator, with no decision-making authority,

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION

assists the parties in reaching an agreement on resolving any differences regarding the dispute.
During the ADR session, a preliminary settlement agreement was reached. The elements of
that preliminary agreement, with the exception of the section that includes SRI, are described
below. The portions of the agreement that contain SRI, as well as the sections of this
Confirmatory Order that address SRI, are described in the aforementioned non-public
Attachment. The following description of the preliminary ADR agreement, and the required
actions described in Section V of this Confirmatory Order, include references to the non-public
Attachment to allow for public release of this Confirmatory Order. The publicly available
elements of the agreement consist of the following:

The NRC recognizes the corrective actions that Entergy has already implemented associated
with the apparent violation and preliminary finding. Entergy's corrective actions are described in
the non-public Attachment.

A. The NRC and Entergy agree that a willful violation of Title 1 0 Code of Federal
Regulations (1 0 CFR) Part 73 occurred on March 18, 2012, at River Bend Station.
However, the NRC and Entergy disagree on the specific aspects of that willful
characterization of the violation. The details regarding these aspects are described in
the non-public Attachment.

1. The NRC concluded that the security-related violation occurred because of the
deliberate misconduct of an unidentified security officer at River Bend Station.
2. Entergy does not believe that willful intent was involved in all aspects of the violation.
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B. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will revise its security
procedures.

C. Within 3 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will, at each of its
nuclear plants, conduct a review of its controls for SRI and communicate to the NRC the
results of the review. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy
will establish new controls and will provide its proposed controls to the NRC for its
review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the controls
within 60 days of submittal for resolution in a manner acceptable to both parties.
Entergy will implement the controls within 15 months from the date of this Confirmatory
Order. The details regarding these controls are described in the non-public Attachment.
D. Within 9 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will review and
evaluate the location and storage of SRI at each of its nuclear plants. The details are
described in the non-public Attachment.

E. Entergy will develop a "commitment to compliance" statement or a similar document
highlighting the special responsibilities of nuclear security personnel. This document will
explain that nuclear security personnel need to comply with regulations and procedures,
and it will describe the potential consequences if compliance does not occur. Within
12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will require at each of its
nuclear plants that nuclear security personnel read and sign the statement (subject to
any collective bargaining obligations it may have). Entergy will include the reading and
signing of this statement in the initial qualification process of nuclear security personnel.
The details are described in the non-public Attachment.
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F. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will identify those
security posts in each of its nuclear plants that should be subject to certain decorum
standards that will ensure a professional environment in those areas. Once identified,
Entergy will establish decorum protocols for those security posts. In addition, within
6 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will provide its proposed
decorum protocols to the NRC for its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any
concerns regarding the proposed decorum protocols within 60 days of submittal for
resolution in a manner acceptable to both parties. Entergy will implement the decorum
protocols within 12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order.

G. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare a
"lessons learned" presentation to be delivered to Entergy nuclear employees at each of
its nuclear plants describing the event that formed the basis for this violation. Prior to
making the presentation, Entergy will provide its proposed presentation to the NRC for
its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the
presentation within 30 days of submittal. Entergy will deliver the presentation to Entergy
nuclear employees within 12 months of this Confirmatory Order.

H. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare a
presentation describing the event that formed the basis for this violation. The
presentation will be delivered to the Nuclear Security Working Group and the National
Nuclear Security Conference (subject to acceptance of the conference-organizing
committees). This presentation will include, among other subjects, the subjects covered
in the non-public Attachment to this Confirmatory Order. Prior to making the
presentation, Entergy will provide its proposed presentation to the NRC for its review.

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION

The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the presentation within
30 days of submittal. Entergy will deliver the presentation within 12 months of this
Confirmatory Order.

I. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will ensure that an
independent third party conducts a safety culture assessment of the Security
organization at River Bend Station. The results will be incorporated into Entergy's
corrective action program as appropriate. A copy of the completed assessment will be
made available for NRC review.

J. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare refresher
training on the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9 for Entergy employees at each of its
nuclear plants. Prior to conducting the training, Entergy will provide its proposed
refresher training plan to the NRC for its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy
any concerns regarding the plan within 30 days of submittal for resolution in a manner
acceptable to both parties. Entergy will complete administration of this refresher training
within 12 months of