Honestly, doesn’t look like this isn’t a coincidence with my 2.206.
There is no question the agency knew I smelled something was going on.
See how these things are sickeningly repeating themselves
over and over again...there is a periodicity of these things.
The NRC
never holds a utility accountable to the public also. The agency doesn't assume
their interaction with a license are going to enter into a enforcement activity
and thus necessitating court level qquality evidence. These guys are still stuck in the
1970s regulatory regime where all of the advantages go to congressional
ly protected licensee. It always becomes a “he said, she said”...the licensee and their
employees know they can tell half-truths and outright lies without professional
accountability.
At the end
of the day, an inspector goes back into his office sometimes after many days
and writes up his recollection of events and complicated discussions.
Right,
these inspectors should have to go into this teleconference with full audio recording
capability. Most of the NRC activities should be recorded...most of these
activities should have them go into a recorded conference room and all this
stuff should be available for public scrutiny.
So what about the court
of the public? The public gets such a limited window on what goes on with a
licensee and the NRC ...and this allows the licensee to portray horrible
behaviors to the inspector. Basically the agency has to collect not obtainable
quality of document evidence...the licensee knows how to not collect the bad
information or write around not getting caught!
And if a inspector or NRC management is
a friend to the industry, looking for a industry job...a lot of issues just get sterilized.
Right, we are talking about the security officer lying to the NRC here below. Actually we are talking Entergy lying to the NRC...probably to meet budgets and save a few pennies? These lies are always about pennies and promotions...
Telephone Conference (Director, Nuclear Security / NRC Inspector) (February 2008)
Recollection of the two participants differs.
1) SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT – PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
AND RESOLUTION
FOCUSED INSPECTION (REPORT 05000255/2014009)
As documented in the inspection report, Safety Culture deficiencies,
in part, contributed to these findings. In 2013, the NRC observed that although
your efforts were generally on track with your Recovery Plan, the NRC received
several concerns related to SCWE/Safety Culture. Collectively, these issues
prompted questions into progress made in the plant’s Recovery Plan regarding
Safety Culture. Therefore, the NRC performed this limited scope PI&R
inspection to continue assessment of Safety Culture at Palisades, focusing on
SCWE.
The NRC identified a chilled work environment in the
Security Department. The NRC concluded that staff within the Security Department perceived that:
(1) recent actions to terminate the employment of two supervisors was in retaliation for
their raised concerns; (2) the Corrective action Program (CAP) was ineffective at addressing
equipment and other concerns raised by Security staff; (3) the Security management was
unresponsive to employees’ concerns; and (4) the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) could not be
relied upon to maintain employee confidentiality.
The NRC inspectors concluded that the Palisades
management team did not recognize the
extent of SCWE related concerns within the Security.
2) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2009-0505]
CONFIRMATORY ORDER
[NRC-2009-0505]
(EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY)Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation (OI Case
No. 3-2008-020). Based on the evidence developed during the inspection and
investigation, the NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 for inaccurate and
incomplete information. This violation is described in the separate Notice of
Violation, included as Enclosure 3 to the transmittal letter.
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