Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant: More Junk

I think we are poorer maintenance and degraded component wise today...with the burdens of winter taking a toll on this plant. Pilgrim transformer and high voltage power lines are in the same group as these guys.
What I noticed last month was how sloppy Calvet Cliffs is with their service water system. It now leaks like a sift and the metal is a thin as aluminum foil in spots. 

Nuclear regulators send inspectors to Calvert Cliffs

Reactors at nuclear power plant in southern Maryland shut down last week after an electrical malfunction.

By Jamie Smith Hopkins, The Baltimore Sun

4:50 p.m. EST, January 27, 2014

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced Monday that it is conducting a special inspection at the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant in southern Maryland after an electrical malfunction caused the two reactors there to shut down.

The plant, which restarted both reactors over the weekend, suffered the shutdown after snow and ice during a storm Jan. 21 apparently affected a ventilation louver filter and caused a short circuit. After the electrical supply system shut down, so did several plant systems and components that rely on electricity, the nuclear regulatory agency said Monday.

Those components included motors for moving control rods and water circulating pumps for the Unit 2 reactor, the agency said. The main turbine control circuit for the Unit 1 reactor also malfunctioned after the electricity loss.

http://newhinsdalebridge.blogspot.com/#!/2013/12/calvert-cliffs-crap-service-water-piping.html

I am below saying Calvert Cliffs sweared their EPDM rubber pipe patches in a report said there was no failures ever with this material...then in another report this rubber patch material failed.
They aren't trust worthy!

Calvert Cliffs Crap Service Water Piping

Following is a listing of nuclear plants known, as cited by the vendor of the mechanical sleeve assembly (Altran), to have installed EPDM internal mechanical sleeves that are similar in design to the proposed mechanical sleeve assembly for Calvert Cliffs.

So these are the guys with crap saltwater piping system. What should you think about the Salem site with 200 units?

Facility System Pipe Size & - Quantity* Installation Date Environment

Seabrook Service Water 24", 65 Units 1995-2000 Saltwater

Millstone 1 Service Water 30", 30 Units 1995 Saltwater

Millstone 2 Service Water 24", 15 Units 1999 Saltwater

Millstone 3 Service Water 20-30", 20 Units 2000 Saltwater

Indian Point 3 Service Water 24", 60 Units 1999 Brackish Water

Salem U-I & 2 Service Water 24", 200 Units Mid 2000s Brackish Water

Have they thought about this accident?

The patch fails under the turbine building. It washing away dirt and undermines a significant portion of the building. The building collapses?

OK, so we have large segments of piping lined with deteriorated cement mortar. How about a earthquake shows up or some other undefined event that knocks off or shakes off a significant amount of the deteriorated mortar. Tons of this stuff clogs a host of heat exchangers and emergency diesel generators leading to a core meltdown. These guys must have been picking out cement pieces from heat exchangers, valves and orifices for years.

They says all the salt water system piping has a one quarter inch thick layer of cement mortor on the inside.

Proposed Alternative for Mitigation of Buried Saltwater Piping Degradation

"It should be noted that much of the buried Saltwater System piping to be inspected runs under the 3 feet thick steel reinforced concrete base mat of the Turbine Building. The base mat supports numerous equipment and components that are located directly above the path of the buried piping.

During previous internal inspections of the piping, areas of missing or deteriorated cement mortar liner have been identified and the mortar lining repaired.

I see, build a turbine building over a emergency cooling pipe line, then you got the excuse for the rest of the life of the plant to put in cheap quick fixes. Right, they could have put in a reinforced concrete tunnel or a concrete vault around the seawater pipe during construction where it would have been relatively easy to replace the pipe in the future.

"The construction cost, impact on outage duration, and operational challenges to replace a portion of the buried Saltwater System piping during an outage are substantial."

So Calvert Cliffs had been watching the wall thinning for a year or more until it leaked. They all got this problem!

"The plant, owned and operated by CENG, a joint venture between Exelon and Électricité de France, has two 2700 megawatt thermal (MWth) Combustion Engineering Generation II two-loop pressurized water reactors. Each generating plant (CCNPP 1&2) produces approximately 850 megawatt electrical (MWe) net or 900 MWe gross. "

EPDM rubber

They are asking ASME and for regulatory relief before they even find a leak.

Proposed Alternative for Mitigation of Buried Saltwater Piping Degradation

During future refueling outages Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (Calvert Cliffs) will be conducting required inspections of our buried Saltwater System piping on both Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Unit 2. The buried Saltwater System piping for both units are American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Inservice Inspection Class 3 systems. In case any of these future inspections identify defects requiring repair it is prudent that Calvert Cliffs submit a proposed alternative repair (RR-ISI-04-08) for Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval. The proposed alternative repair request is contained in Attachment (1). Since much of the Saltwater System piping runs beneath our turbine building floor, replacement of the buried Saltwater System piping would be a hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety, therefore the proposed alternative repair is submitted for approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii). This proposed alternative would be applicable to the repairs of future defects identified in buried portions of our Saltwater System piping throughout the Fourth Ten Year Inservice Inspection Interval.

Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer

Unit one 05000316 ** Unit two 05000317

November 14, 2013

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318

Proposed 10 CFR 50.55a Request for Unit 2 Repair of Saltwater Piping Leak

(RR-ISI-04-09)
1. ASME Code Component(s) Affected Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Saltwater (SW) System pipe line 12"-LJI-201 1. This is a 12 inch schedule STD (12.75 inch OD by 0.375 inch nominal wall) American Society for Testing and Materials A-53 Gr B carbon steel pipe that is rubber lined to prevent interaction of the carbon steel with brackish Chesapeake Bay water. This 12 inch line ties into the 24 inch SW discharge header via a reducing tee. The 24 inch header routes the heat exchanger discharge from both trains of SW to a 30 inch underground pipe and then discharges into the Unit 2 circulating water discharge conduit going back to the Chesapeake Bay.

How come Seabrook doesn't had this service life of 50 years EPDM rubber stuff?

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELIEF REQUEST RR-ISI-04-08 REGARDING MITIGATION OF BURIED SALTWATER PIPING DEGRADATION.

Operating Conditions

The NRC staff questioned the operating temperature and pressure of the subject pipe. In Reference 2, the licensee clarified that the saltwater system operating temperature varies in accordance with Chesapeake Bay temperature throughout the year. The licensee stated that based on the past operating experience on rare occasions the temperature of the saltwater recorded a low of 30 degrees Fahrenheit CF). The range for saltwater should be adjusted between 30 and 95 OF, versus the stated range in the relief request of 32 to 95 OF. The licensee stated that the temperature range of 30 to 95 OF and the design pressure of 50 pounds per quare inch gauge (psig) bound the system's parameters during normal, emergency and faulted conditions.

Durability

The licensee stated that the EPDM rubber has a service life of 50 years in submerged conditions similar to those experienced at Calvert Cliffs. The licensee noted that the operating history of the rubber used in safety-related service water systems of other nuclear power plants has been excellent and no deterioration of the rubber has been identified. The EPDM rubber is designed to withstand a non-steam environment temperature of up to 300 OF. The general...

You get it, widespread breakdown in the quality of the seawater system piping caused by aging. These are recent events. Calvert’s trick is to ignore the ASME and get easy relief from the NRC... stick temporary patches on the pipes.

Are they is falsifying federal documents and its gross engineering fraud...

These nuclear plants and the NRC are lying their asses over their delapated service water and seawater cooling systems.

I am pretty sure the "rubber lining" in the first leak is same EPDM rubber in the patch job. But I don't have absolute proof. That is the weak link...

The new leak.

"A manufacturing defect has resulted in a local failure of the rubber lining, such as a seam split, that has allowed SW to come in contact with the carbon steel."

Metal reinforced polymeric patches in the seawater system the crap 35 inch piping.

The EPDM rubber has also been designed for a 50 year life. The licensee stated that the EPDM rubber has a service life of 50 years in submerged conditions similar to those experienced at Calvert Cliffs. The licensee noted that the operating history of the rubber used in safety-related service water systems of other nuclear power plants has been excellent and no deterioration of the rubber has been identified.

Posted 22nd December 2013 by Mike Mulligan