Was Waterford A Precursor To Arkansas Nuclear One?

June 12:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM

REPORT 05000313/2013011 AND 05000368/2013011

Basically the temporary crane was supposed to be tested with 125% of the weight of the stator...it wasn't.

You get it; the crane company isn't participating with the Entergy investigation...
You see how the Waterford event covered all the bases of the Arkansas event?

What i see is, they made the complexity of the heavy lift rules so massive...that no one can understand the extremely infrequent lift rules or follow them. The extreme complexity of the rules basically makes the heavy lift rules unenforceable and inherently dangerous.




So this caused the death of one employee, the injuries of eight, and rumors of the amputation of a leg.

Is the 2012 Waterford Inspection Report actually the 2013 dropped stator...

　
　
Is this how they game rules for short term advantage?

I suspect May 9 would go like, we overly depended on the contractors to do the heavy lifting...

November 14, 2012

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2012004

Heavy Lifts and Failure To Perform Proper Risk Assessment.

"Description. On August 15, 2012, the licensee conducted heavy load lifts over the B train of the dry cooling tower area in order to assemble portions of a temporary work platform (TWP) used to support steam generator replacement maintenance activities. The licensee used procedure EN-WM-104, “Online Risk Assessment,” to perform an initial risk for this activity while at-power and determined that the risk was a normal level with no additional risk management activities needed. The inspectors reviewed the online risk assessment and noted that the risk assessment associated with the lifts failed to identify that some of the activities associated with the assembly of the TWP met the definition of a non-standard lift. The risk assessment procedure EN-WM-104 identified that non-standard lifts should be considered as high risk and additional requirements for preparation, approval, and oversight of such activities are needed.

The inspectors noted that to determine if a lift is non-standard, the licensee should use procedure EN-MA-119, “Material Handling Program.” Numerous lifts associated with assembling the TWP met the definition of a “critical lift” given in EN-MA-119. Specifically, the lifts involved handling large equipment “over spaces in which high value or safety-related equipment or systems are located.” EN-MA-119 defines all critical lifts as non-standard lifts. However, the licensee used the contractor’s assessment of what constitutes a critical lift. The inspectors determined that the licensee did not follow processes in place to properly assess and manage the risk associated with performing non-standard lifts. Due to this failure, the licensee inappropriately categorized the activities as having normal risk, rather than high risk, when performing EN-WM-104. The licensee also noted at that time the licensee scheduled reactor trip breaker testing. However, since this activity was deemed normal, no other risk management actions were in place due to the inadequate assessment. The categorization of the activities as having normal risk resulted in the licensee’s failure to implement the more stringent risk management actions required by EN-WM-104 for high-risk activities.

The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-4195 and CR-WF3-2012-4489. The immediate corrective action taken to restore compliance was to re-evaluate and change the integrated risk classification from a normal risk to a high-risk level and implement the required risk management actions.