ASME Corporate Facism and Palisades

Aug 31:


...Basically the ASME code failed to make them check in the right place...

Based on the location of the fault and destructive analysis of CRDM 24, the licensee concluded that CRDM 24 experienced a failure due to TGSCC. The licensee described the extent of condition examination. The licensee reported that the ASME Code In Service Inspection (ISI) requirements did not apply in this case as the weld in question (weld no. 5) was not a pressure retaining weld addressed by the Code. This weld was an overlay located inside the housing. However, they applied the guidance in the ASME Code to inspect 10 percent of the CRDM housings. They stated that although less than five CRDMs (10 percent) were required to be inspected per the ASME Code, they were conservative in selecting eight peripheral CRDMs for additional inspections. Based on their knowledge of the history related to previous CRDM failures (most failures in both the upper housing and seal housing occurred on the peripheral), they selected CRDM 25 (which experienced a seal housing leak), CRDM 22 (which experienced a seal housing crack), CRDM 21 (which experienced the upper housing crack in 2001), CRDM 2 and 26 (which experienced a seal housing leak) and CRDMs 23, 27, and 28...

....Basically they are all guessing where the next crack will show up...they replaced the housing with a different metal in 2001 and its cracking faster than the first metal type...

 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM (CRDM) 24

The licensee shut down the plant on August 12, 2012, due to unidentified leakage exceeding 0.3 gallons per minute. After the shut down, the licensee identified the CRDM 24 upper housing as the source of the leakage with a pinhole leak of 1/8”x1/16” rough dimensions and located approximately 2 feet above the reactor head.

Based on the location of the fault and destructive analysis of CRDM 24, the licensee concluded that CRDM 24 experienced a failure due to TGSCC. The licensee described the extent of condition examination. The licensee reported that the ASME Code In Service Inspection (ISI) requirements did not apply in this case as the weld in question (weld no. 5) was not a pressure retaining weld addressed by the Code. This weld was an overlay located inside the housing. However, they applied the guidance in the ASME Code to inspect 10 percent of the CRDM housings. They stated that although less than five CRDMs (10 percent) were required to be inspected per the ASME Code, they were conservative in selecting eight peripheral CRDMs for additional inspections. Based on their knowledge of the history related to previous CRDM failures (most failures in both the upper housing and seal housing occurred on the peripheral), they selected CRDM 25 (which experienced a seal housing leak), CRDM 22 (which experienced a seal housing crack), CRDM 21 (which experienced the upper housing crack in 2001), CRDM 2 and 26 (which experienced a seal housing leak) and CRDMs 23, 27, and 28.



Palisades from the May 12 outage start-up to now has a horrendous capacity factor of 59%...they were only operating 59% of the time since the last outage...

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-705

Code Case N-705 “Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Degradation in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Vessels and Tanks” and defer repair of this flaw until the next refueling outage.

Class 1 primary system
Class 2 Components (III, Subsection NC) Those components that are part of various important to safety emergency core cooling systems
Class 3 Components (III, Subsection ND)Those components that are part of the various systems needed for plant operation

You get that engineer's word smith corporatese engineer under ethical obligations...moderate energy...there is no distinction between class 2 and 3?  Is the SIRWT a class 2 or 3, or does it matter. Don't we got a new plain language NRC chairwomen...

In order to apply the provision of the ASME Code Case N-705 for a tank leak from a hidden flaw and allow plant start-up with the leak, conservative assumptions regarding flaw characteristics and locations were made. Engineering calculation documents a critical flaw size of 1.2 inches and an allowable flaw size of 0.33 inches.

So why couldn't the agency link the N-705 directly to the actual code?

I get this right off the bat in a meeting with four NRC official...Mike, the codes are propriety to the ASME. We can't send then to you. He goes on saying you can purchase the code off ASME for $81.00 or something.

I tell them these are the kind of sickening codes that drives the organization mad. The good guys know this is wrong and management comes back saying the codes allow us to do this. This is corporate insiders going behind closed door making engineering codes...they are paying ASME to administer a private corporate engineering code system.

The NRC told me, well mike, this is a low pressure system. I asked them how long does the codes allow a unknown flaw to be in a reactor cooling system. They say the codes allow 26 months of operation like this. I ask, from when the leak begins or when it is discovered. They discover it in 2011 something. So Palisades gets to start the clock in a outage at there connivance...they can carry a unknown leak though two or more outages without knowing why the core cooling system is leaking or repairing it. This is object insanity!

You know, is ASME god...it is to them.

I mean, did high level engineers writing this code envision their codes could be twisted in such a manner?

How does this private code authority enforce their codes?

The NRC says they got a got a NRC official on their board of directors or something...

You got a highly secretive private corporate code authority overseeing the standards of this nuclear industry...utterly disconnected from participating in our democratic transparency and our Constitution Ideals. You got a bunch of arrogant senior engineers who hates government and our Democracy running this show...

And i will tell you what, nothing in the world drives good employees into the safety culture ditch, as crazy rules built on leveraging corporate profits...

And if a plant gets into bad trouble as a meltdown....we will be talking about the fascist corporate ASME engineering codes...

Standard can be defined as a set of technical definitions and guidelines that function as instructions for designers, manufacturers, operators, or users of equipment. 

A standard becomes a Code when it has been adopted by one or more governmental bodies and is enforceable by law, or when it has been incorporated into a business contract

The largest ASME standard, both in size and in the number of volunteers involved in its preparation, is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC).

You know, if you don't pay a employee and he doesn't works for the ideals of his organization...then who does he really serve?

I'll bet you they got a exemption from a legal suit?


I 'll give you the straight skinny, the corporations get to write their/our engineering codes and laws, while the congressionally dis-empowered "independent" NRC enforces the weak or non existent corporate rules. Does anyone wonder why all these employees are disillusioned with the world?

Yep, there has been a lot of talk about making the NRC a private corporate regulator...


I 'll give you the straight skinny, the corporations get to write their/our codes and laws, while the congressionally disempowered NRC enforces the weak or non existent corporate rules. Does anyone wonder why all these employees are disillusioned with the world?

I would call it my polite meeting with these NRC officials as the hour of Palisades-Entergy cheerleading section...not a tell me all the vulnerabilities of the NRC and Palisades hour so I could effectively interact with the 2.206 process. I just never can get a cold blooded independent and objective evaluation of what is going on at Palisades and the NRC...it all ends up about protecting self interest.