Feb 15: Yep, you got to wonder if the NRC OIG initiated the CAL investigation after reading my Casablanca-Palisades 2.206 on Feb 22, 2011... The NRC says the investigation started 9 months ago?
You notice I stayed with the themes of the Casablanca 2.206 on my newest 'Nothing Ever Matters-Palisades' 2.206.
OIG-12-A-09 February 10, 2012
Audit of NRC’s Use of Confirmatory Action Letters
I think they got a lot of neat tools, but the NRC doesn't have the skills and training in order to properly and effectively use these neat tools. You catch the similarities with the OIG event reporting...mass confusion with contradictory NRC policies. Can you imagine all the confirmatory Actions letters awarded to Palisades and Entergy...and why are they so ineffective with getting a change of heart out of Entergy?
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Jan 10, 2012: Request Emergency Palisades Shutdown
"We are broadly worried about in 2009 over the Palisades security falsification, in the outcome of the violations...whether all the reports and employee cultural surveys with the assortment of NRC and Entergy processes over this very serious violation ever had any meaning at all. According to the Palisades Fukushima Emergency Power System DC short and plant trip, the most recent root cause Entergy admits there is deep and widespread safety cultural problems at the Palisades plant. I feel Palisades safety culture was in the pits in 2009 and before...and the cultural safety survey was a grand Entergy and NRC falsification. The NRC Alternate Dispute Resolution secession over this, the Confirmatory Order, the Entergy investigative reports and safety cultural survey, the willing acceptance of this insanity by the NRC and Entergy...the NRC created the inaccurate falsified impression to the outsiders that Entergy had discovered all the cultural safety problems and corrected them. Nothing could be farther from the truth, all these corporate and agency processes covered up and deepened, took the public’s eyes off fixing Entergy...where Entergy now is in much worst condition than they were then. I request independent outside investigation on this dangerous agency corruption before Palisades start-up."
Part 21 component defect reporting issues exist because NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 are contradictory and unclear. Specifically, NRC regulations and guidance for implementing Section 206 contain stipulations that have been interpreted as not requiring a report under Part 21 if an LER was not required. This interpretation seemingly contradicts Section 206, which requires reporting of component defects that could cause substantial safety hazards. Furthermore, applicable NRC reportability guidance is not utilized by some licensees and NRC staff, and NRC’s Baseline Inspection Program does not include requirements to inspect licensee reporting of Part 21 defects."
You know, I don't know. Maybe the NRC ought to hire somebody independent or something like -- I don't know what the question is but, you know, that was -- we could have -- Entergy should have found the problem two years ago and they didn't.
The problem is they go through another ADR process. It began in 2010. It just came out as an enforcement finding with the employee that stormed out of the control room. Basically, the same thing is --another agreement. This thing isn't, you know --Entergy, you do it or stay shut down. This is another-- you know, a gentleman agreement, essentially -- I can't even say the word, confirmaternity [confirmatory action] letter, whatever you call it.
By M. Alex Johnson, msnbc.com
The federal government's nuclear watchdog has faulted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for failing to follow through on safety agreements with nuclear facilities, saying its system for tracking corrective action raises questions about its oversight of nuclear safety and security.
After an eight-month audit, the NRC's Office of Inspector General concluded last week that the commission has no centralized way to oversee or follow up on documents confirming that a nuclear facility has committed itself to address "significant concerns regarding health and safety, the environment, safeguards or security."
The documents — known as Confirmatory Action Letters, or CALs — are one of the last measures before the NRC cracks down with a stringent binding order like suspension or revocation of a nuclear plant's license.
Because CALs are reserved for a small number of potentially serious cases — 15 to 20 of the hundreds of incident reports the NRC issues each year, according to its records — effective oversight of the confirmation process is of "utmost importance," the inspector general said. But in some cases, the action letters are so poorly drafted that they don't even make it clear who the intended recipients are, the report asserts.
Bureaucracy to blame
The problem is one of red tape, not willful inaction or neglect, the report says. But the weaknesses — which include lack of consistent guidelines for regional NRC offices, regional offices' failure to comply with those guidelines and some offices' lack of any tracking system whatsoever — "degrade" the agency's accountability, it says.
A spokesman for the NRC said the agency believes "the CAL process has been effective" and that it would have a formal reply "in the near future." In an informal meeting last month, the NRC generally agreed with the inspector general's recommendations to update its main enforcement manual, centralize tracking and submit to occasional audits of the action letter system, the report said.
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