Renewal of deal to secure Russian arms in doubt

Posted 12/13/2004 11:38 PM



Renewal of deal to help secure Russian arms in doubt
By Peter Eisler, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — This was to be the year that Russia began getting tens of millions of dollars in U.S. assistance to build a plant to convert 34 tons of plutonium into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors.
But not a dime of the $50 million Congress set aside to start construction has been spent.
In 2002, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham called the project "central to enhancing our national security" in a post-Sept. 11 world. But construction of the plant, a pillar of U.S. efforts to help Russia protect and destroy nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, has been stalled for years, largely because of a dispute on how much liability the U.S. government and its workers would bear in any accident.
The dispute is one of several slowing U.S. efforts to help Russia deal with surplus arms. The work is done under Defense and Energy department programs that provide U.S. money to help former Soviet states protect and eliminate weapons of mass destruction.
"We need to get rid of these weapons in Russia ... (and) these problems are frustrating us," says Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind.
The bilateral agreement authorizing the programs expires in 2006. And disputes on liability and other issues threaten its renewal.
"Without (a new pact), I think all of our programs would have to stop," says Paul Longsworth of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration. "Obviously, we're concerned if we don't get resolution soon."
Destruction moves slowly
More than a decade after the United States set up programs to help former Soviet states protect and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, some goals remain less than half completed. Some of the weaponry destroyed:
Defense Department programs:
Weapon
No. destroyed
% of goal
Strategic nuclear warheads
6,472
49%
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
559
58%
ICBM silos
470
66%
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
541
75%
SLBM launchers
408
65%
Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines
27
65%
Strategic bombers
137
86%
Energy Department programs:
Upgrading security for 600 tons of nuclear weapons material at 115 sites:
Goals
% of material secured
Initial stopgap security upgrades
46%
Comprehensive security upgrades
26%
Source: Departments of Defense and Energy



But renewal talks haven't begun.
The programs were born in 1991, after the Soviet Union's collapse. Several of the emerging states inherited nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the United States feared the arms could reach rogue nations or terrorists.
The programs, spending about $1 billion a year, have destroyed thousands of nuclear warheads, missiles and submarines, and big stocks of chemical and biological agents. But they're controversial.
"On (the U.S.) side, there are people who say the Russians are cheating, they just want the money," says Vladimir Rybachenkov, counselor at the Russian Embassy. "On our side, there are some who say the Americans just want to get their noses into our" military sites.
The Pentagon's inspector general has cited several projects as wasteful. In one case, the Pentagon spent $100 million to build Russia a plant to destroy fuel from nuclear missiles. After it was built, Russia said it was using the fuel for commercial rockets. So the plant is idle.
Russia also has yet to use a high-security nuclear materials storage facility built with about $400 million in U.S. money. At issue is what material it will hold — and how the United States can verify that it won't store fuel for new weapons.
The Pentagon now wants binding agreements with Russia on how U.S. assistance will be used. But the pacts can take months to reach.
Other causes for delay:
•Access. Russia has refused U.S. demands to enter several nuclear, biological and chemical sites where security is in doubt. The resistance is mainly from Russia's internal security force.
The Pentagon refuses assistance unless its program managers can visit a site to verify that money isn't misspent. But Russian officials say some access demands exceed what they allow. "There are technical means to verify (work) ... without what we call 'intrusion,' " Rybachenkov says.
Access snags also have slowed an Energy Department push to upgrade security at Russian sites holding 600 tons of nuclear weapons material. Russian and U.S. officials are in talks on the problem, and the department forecasts increases in its rate of installing safeguards. But even if it moves at unprecedented speed, it will miss a goal for completion in 2008.
•Funding. Congress has put conditions on the release of money for several projects, especially those aimed at securing Russia's chemical and biological weapons. The conditions require the administration to "certify" that Russia is meeting a host of criteria, such as disclosing data on its chemical and biological stockpiles, or improving its record on human rights.
The rules stymied construction of a Russian plant to destroy thousands of tons of chemical munitions. At Lugar's urging, Congress gave President Bush authority last year to waive certification, but the plant now is years off schedule.
•Liability. The impasse on the plutonium-conversion program centers on a U.S. insistence that any work agreement include 100% liability protection for its agencies and workers, even for individual acts of sabotage.
That language is in the current agreement on U.S.-Russian cooperation, but the plutonium program isn't covered. And Russia's legislature has passed a law barring similar language if the pact is renewed.