Emergency Shutdown Of Peach Bottom over SRV Seals

Arrived today...

Mr. Mulligan,

I have attached the transcripts from the teleconferences held with you on February 17, 2012, and April 10, 2012, associated with your petition request dated January 24, 2012, regarding Peach Bottom Atomic Generating Station. Per your request during the April 10, 2012, teleconference, a copy of the transcript of that teleconference has been forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspector General.
I also wanted to inform you that the NRC staff is continuing to consider your petition request and is in the process of completing the review of Licensee Event Report (LER) 3-11-03 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11325A383) associated with the failure of the Unit 3, 71B Automatic Depressurization System Safety Relief Valve on 9/25/2011. The NRC staff anticipates that the review of LER 3-11-03 will be completed and addressed in the Peach Bottom 2nd quarter Inspection Report by September of this year, which will be publicly available in ADAMS. Once this LER evaluation is issued, the NRC staff will be able to make a final determination regarding your petition request.

Thank you,

 

John Hughey, Project Manager

NRR / Division of Operating Reactor Licensing

Phone: 301-415-3204

This was dated 2/1/2012 when I first put this on my site...

I made the NRC think and I am sure Exelon...I appreciate the NRC in this.

............

New Updated NRC Vender Issues


Exelon Fourth-Quarter Profit Misses Estimates on Costs, Weather
Jan 25, 2012 Bloomberg: Exelon is seeing profit margin shrink on electricity generated by its 17 nuclear reactors as contracts it signed when power prices were high begin to expire, said Andrew Levi, a New York-based power analyst with Caris & Co. A glut of U.S. gas supplies has cut prices for the power-plant fuel, in turn causing average electricity prices in PJM to fall 38 percent since 2008.

“Power prices in general have fallen off a cliff,” Levi said in a telephone interview before the earnings were released. “Whether it’s Exelon or some of the integrated names, they definitely have some big headwinds to fight.”

Jan 24, 2012

R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

　

　

Dear Mr. Borchardt,

Request an Emergency Peach Bottom nuclear plants 2 and 3 shutdown to replace all safety relief valves pneumatic actuators buna-n seals with nylon seals…or other high quality and durable materials designed and tested for elevated temperature.

Here are excepts from the License Event Report 05000278 2011-003-00 dated 11/18/2011.
“Based on evaluation of the 9/25/11 surveillance testing performed on Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) during the P3R18 Refueling Outage, site Engineering personnel determined that the 71 B SRV did not meet its allowable leak rate for the pneumatic actuation controls for the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) feature of the SRV. This resulted in a degradation of the number of times the 71 B SRV could be used during a design basis event. This event was considered as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. The cause of the excessive leak rate was due to a failure of the 71B SRV actuator diaphragm thread seal. The thread seal was replaced on 9/26/11. As-left leak testing was performed and the valve was restored to an operable condition to support startup from the P3R1 8 Refueling Outage.” Let me get this straight, this is a important nuclear core cooling safety system. One of the most important. We got terrible issues nationwide with internal nuclear safety engineering quality...also big troubles with communicating to engineering nuclear contracting parts venders and other engineering services. They have big troubles with controlling the quality of repair or replacement safety parts and all realms of engineering services. These safety parts and component venders can make more money not having adequate safety engineering support services for the components they sell on a nationwide basis. You can just make more money trading metal and rubber for profits. That is the short term hyper efficient business model we are using in manufacturing and part supplier than you can selling nuclear safety. You bet, you better be thinking to the new nuclear plants with this one.

This got to be backwards. So you had a contractor tell you in March the seals are substandard and 6 months later your LER states the apparent cause of a buna-n seal failure was thermal degradation of the thread seal material. And you don’t got the capability to immediately update the valve actuators knowing there are safety deficiencies. Is this a nuclear plant and is this the United States of America, the greatest nation on the planet? 

“Based on evaluation of the 9/25/11 surveillance testing performed on Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) during the P3R18 Refueling Outage...”
“Based on March 2011 vendor technical evaluation report, upgrades to the diaphragm thread seal for ADS SRVs on Units 2 and 3 are planned.”
...”There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. Lets get the wording right, this is how Peach Bottom nuclear plant words it. “When inspected by maintenance personnel, the thread seal had indications of being dry and brittle.”
“Subsequent review by Engineering personnel determined that the
apparent cause was thermal degradation of the thread seal material. A vendor technical evaluation report was issued in March 2011 and provides recommendations to upgrade the seal with a design that is more resistant to heat related failures.” Can you believe it coming out of a nuclear power plant engineering department they don’t ask themselves is this a expected failure? God help us all how this “dry and brittle” seal will perform in a design accident and being in a high temperature environment of a accident. If this is the way Peach Bottom does safety engineering safety systemically, when the rubber hit the road, you are all screwed. Was there more temperature around this seal than normal? How long was the seal in the actuator? Why did it fail early? Is it the exact same material as they used before with so much success? Why did it fail because of thermal degradation? Did any other plants have issues with SRV Buna-n seal and the parts or vender supplier? Was the vender parts or supplier trying to pull a fast one over Vermont Yankee, I mean Palisades Bottom? Is there anything to learn from the troubles at other plants” ...“There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event.Do you really trust this kind of vender who is known to be not forthcoming? Think of the self interest in this for both Peach Bottom and the vender. Why isn’t the deficiencies characterized in the LER and announced too all the other nuclear plants like the federal reporting system was initially designed for? Why the secrecy? I got to tell you something, we hammered the NRC over this at VY. We got a lot more information than we normally get. There is a lot of safety information that other plants should know about, and certainly the community should be notified about...that gets buried in a deep dark hole that only special people can see. It is happening every day in nuclear-land all around us. The single most important determinate for nuclear safety is democratic style disclosure and transparency....fundamental honesty.     
“A vendor technical evaluation report was issued in March 2011 and provides recommendations to upgrade the seal with a design that is more resistant to heat related failures.”
Inoperability of Vermont Yankee’s Safety Relief Valves Due to Degraded Seals LER
Here is Entergy-Vermont Yankee’s LER-02-01 dated 10/25/2010 over troubles with their SRV buna-n. I/we have been nipping at Entergy’s heels over Vermont Yankee and Palisades with many 2.206s. I am one of two 2.206’s over this. The NRC blew me off on this as they always do. Least they allow me to get it down on paper.
“During the 2010 refueling outage, the pneumatic actuators for the four main steam safety relief valves (RV), RV- 2-71 -A, B, C & D, were tested and leakage was identified through the shaft to piston thread seal on three of the four RVs. This leakage, when combined with the RV accumulator leakage, caused two of the four RVs to not meet design actuation requirements and therefore be considered inoperable. Technical Specification (TS)3.6.D requires at least three of the four RVs to be operable for overpressure
...Subsequent material testing of a seal from the same batch lot determined that the apparent cause of the thread seal condition was thermal degradation.”
I would like to know what the shelf life and service life is on these rubber nylon seals?
“The thread seals were manufactured in 2002, supplied to Vermont Yankee (VY) in new style actuators in 2008 and were in service for one operating cycle prior to the test. The thread seals in the new style actuators are made of Buna-N material, were manufactured by Parker Hannifin Corporation and dedicated for use in safety class applications by Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation, Target Rock Division.” Where did I hear Curtiss Wright and Target Rock Division before?  “Prior to the upgrade to the new style actuators, the thread seals were made from a silicon material.”
Hmm, thermal degradation and once made with a better nylon material? We will later get into environmental type 1 and 2 actuators and seals. 
“Material testing determined that the apparent cause of the thread seal condition was thermal degradation. The change to use Buna-N material in the new style seal resulted in reduced thermal margin when considering the potential local heat transfer affects on the seal material. The use of silicone material in the original application provided more margin.”
Oops! Vermont Yankee installed the SRV actuators with Buna-n in 2008. Then the next outage they discovered inappropriate material use for the seals...had to wait to another outage to replace them all. Doesn’t that sound familiar? Does Entergy have parts QA and later systemic issues with QA?

The idea in a critical nuclear power plant core cooling safety system the material engineers weren’t absolutely sure of the characteristic of the buna-n and couldn’t perfect predict with certainty the life span in the worst temperatures...we are in the realm of Fukushima Daiichi stupidity. 
VY will replace the Buna-N thread seal material in all four RVs during the 2011 refueling outage with a material that provides more temperature margin.”
It is a total breakdowns in material science and engineering. It is happening all over the place and I don’t understand why it is happening.

NRC VY Problem and Resolution Inspection 2011-008

You wouldn’t believe all the troubles Entergy’s Palisades plant is having with management...following procedures, adequate process system for following maintenance and fixing problems. Most perplexing is, management showing they actually don’t care what was going on in the site, by paying attention and being intrusive. I got a pending 2.206 on that. They are right up there with being in the top five worst plants in the nation. This is another indication how systemic their problems are and the NRC didn’t care. There computer document system is upside down...
“The inspectors determined that the licensee's evaluation “did not specifically identify” two apparent causes or significant contributing causes.”
Is the NRC and the industry still confused when to submit a Part 21? Should a Part 21 with Peach Bottom be submitted? Or is Peach Bottom using materials outside their design parameters? Where is the promised Part 21 from Target Rock with Vermont Yankee? 
“The SRV vendor did not submit a part 21 report for the SRV issue due to the Type 2 actuator being used in an application outside of two design parameters.”
Does Peach Bottom have type 2 or type 1 SRV actuators and seals? ...“Design ambient temperature for the Type 2 actuator is 150 degrees F according to the vendor design documents. The actuators at Entergy are exposed to an ambient temperature environment up to 185-190 degrees F according to the CR. This would result in a 35-40 degree F loss of margin for the BUNA N thread sealant (rated at 210-250 degrees F.)
... “The Type 2 actuator has cooling slots, where as the Type 1 actuator does not. These cooling slots were not accounted for when the Type 1 actuator was replaced with the Type 2 actuator and the cooling slots were covered by insulation.” Peach Bottom questions if the VY insulation story was made up or had nothing to do with the temperature failure. A improper, inaccurate and falsified safety engineering justification. The industry is riddle with these dangling justification and tons of junk science and engineering dressed up in highly educated suits. The dangling science and engineering justifications not a bit connected to any thread of truth, except somebody is making big bucks to get a nuclear plant over to the next outage for a problem that won’t get fixed anyways. It will just get lost in the complexity of the system and people. The nuclear industry is filled with the purveyors of third party service junk science engineering providers. It is easier and cheaper to buy a well suited scientific engineering lie than immediately correct the rubber seal on nuclear core cooling components. Oh, it is a engineer’s standard of ethics and codes issue. Don’t even get me talking about all the vague engineering codes purchased by the nuclear industry.        "This caused the designed convection cooling of the actuator internals to be lost. As a result, the BUNA-N thread seal material was exposed to high temperature for a longer period, which increased the potential for degradation of the BUNA-N thread seals.”
This admits it was a big screw up. But do you get it, VY upgrades in 2008 from nylon to the thermally failed buna-n. I don’t understand why Peach Bottom has buna-n now and their vender is talking upgrading after more failures. Why doesn’t Peach Bottom have nylon seals now... why do they have Buna-n?
“Entergy Engineering staff overly relied upon the vendor's
recommendation did not conduct an appropriate equivalency review on their own. Thus when the Type 2 actuator was used at VY the valve was exposed to higher temperatures which resulted in thermal degradation and air leakage from the actuator.
This is the type of massive communication and confusion crap that has gotten Entergy-Palisades into so much trouble. The VY NRC inspector told me the vender kind of put one over on VY. I think they didn’t have the proper qualified part or components. VY said stick it in there, I don’t care what the temperature qualifications are and told the vender they would pay them extra if you covered our backs. And the NRC just doesn’t care when these boys’ play word games and lie to the agency...more worst, lie to the community. You know, shit in their own nest with lies and run-a-way distortions too numerous to remember to make money.   “During RFO27, Entergy discovered that the SRV Vendor no longer supported the Type-1 SRV actuators which energy had. The vendor recommended replacing the Type 1 actuators with a Type 2 actuator. The Type 1 actuator has silicone thread sealants which are rated up to -390 degrees F while a Type 2 actuator uses BUNA-N polymer which is rated up to 210-250.” Respectfully request
1) Have Peach Bottom do a outside detailed investigation and root cause.
2) The NRC do a special investigation or equivalent...with contrasting and explaining the similarities and differences between Vermont Yankee and Peach Bottom SRV actuators and seal problems.

3) Need a generic notice on this?

4) That Peach Bottom nuclear plant be immediately shutdown.

5) All safety relief valve seals and actuators be replaced with a design with a sufficient margin of safety before start-up.

6) Request the formation of a local public oversight panel around every plant.

7) A emergency NRC senior official oversight panel with the aims of reforming the ROP.

8) A national NRC oversight panel of outsiders to oversee and report on the agency’s activities. There should be a mixture of professional academic people and capable lay people.

9) I request that President Obama fire Chairman Jazcko and the other Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse NRC Commissioners!
　
　
Sincerely,

　

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 03451
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
1-603-336-8320

　

　

The $400 million dollar Submarine

Man, have you ever seen such a thing? The navy is only talking though politician proxies. The competing shipyard proxies of Blumenthal in Conn and a assortment of Maine politicians. The he said, she said...the Navy told me.

General Dynamic's political proxy says the damage is a billion dollars hoping to steal work for Portsmouth, and the Portsmouth's Naval shipyard political proxy says it's $400 Million and we can keep the work here....

Another NCIS tip:  

So why doesn't the navy do a reenactment of the start of the USS Miami fire in identical mockup. Make a mock up of the room and the typical materials in the room that was first set on fire...with a identical vacuum cleaner. 

Do a identical wielding and cutting operation that was going on in the last moments before the fire, then vacuum up the hot slag or particles up as the first one. Stick the vacuum in the mock up room and hopefully watch the fire start and propagate in the appropriate time.

So why isn't anyone outrage that the navy department set this up, where so many Sailor's and firefighters lives were placed at risk. How come no outrage $400 to a $1 billion has been consumed up somebody's nose. I can think of all the many years the sailors lives that is going to be inconvenienced and the national security submarine missions that is going to be made more fragile when there aren't enough submarines in the first place.

Where is the outrage and why aren't heads rolling...

...All the concerns shown to date are over the survival of the Portsmouth shipyard or if another shipyard will get this new work. It is only the economics and politics that matter in the area.

Our political system is in horrible shape...

We got a monster hidden in the closet...how does a democracy and its people maintain control over such a program as nuclear submarines?  How does the people keep control of this program when so much is hidden in military secrets? This is the defense establishment in general. You trust these slimy politicians operating behind closed doors.

The older I get, the ultra highest nation security and national priority has become...is defense jobs, and the profits and power of the defense establishment.

And the media and forth estate is dead to what is in our national interest....the news interest is crippled.

...Honestly, the $400 million dollar repair job is going to be one of the most expensive submarine's ever. How do they value the worth of a submarine, divide the total cost and upkeep by the number of years of operation?  Maybe the total cost per100,000 miles? You are not going to get another decade out of this antique pig. All that new equipment is going to have only half its life before the end of sub life. And then new technology are going to make this half used equipment obsolete,. So you can't put this in a new sub. You can almost count on before this it over with, you know the defense establishment, the total cost to get the sub's screws to ever spin in the ocean again is going to double to $800 million dollar. And you're still going to have a obsolete nuclear power plant and propulsion system obstructing the operation of this ship. This ship is going to be in the sitting at the pier or in the yards more than out to sea after 5 years.

They tell me we are in crisis with not enough subs. They are going to put this thing together with duck tape and bailing wire in order to sate the crises. Can you see them all putting on a rush job at the other shipyards to push out defective new subs? They are going to charge big bucks for the rush jobs. Bottom line for the USS Miami, you are going to get a rush job sub with one eighth the capability of the ship going into this ship yard. The defense capabilities are going to be a shell of what it once was...probable a really expensive stand-off platform that can only throw tomahawks and torpedoes at great distances with the sub. This baby is always going to need to be within a hundred nauts of land because of break downs.

Right, you going to get but a shell of a great submarine out in the fleet. This crippled sub is going to save the asses of the Portsmouth's shipyard and the navy admirals...to save the economic interest of a dying and poor Maine. You see what I am getting at, you are placing out side the military establishment's burdens and saving navy brass's asses burdens on the future USS Miami. It is going to hobbly submarine fleet and fleet wide operations in general. You are hobbling the fleet operations to accommodate outside pressures and burdens, mainly distructive political pressures.

Iran's Response to Israel and the USA

Just for full disclosure...I got buddies in the FBI?
Translation:
 
You two ain't shit. You know I've already taken out a USA nuclear powered sub in Maine and its reactor. Think of what we will do to you if you militarily take our illegal nuclear weapons production sites? We will proportionally decimate Israel and the USA?

Iran vows 'proportionate' response to any strike on nuclear sites

Agence France-Presse Jun 3, 2012
TEHRAN // Iran will respond to any Israeli or US attack against its nuclear sites with a "proportionate" reaction, the military adviser to the country's supreme leader Ali Khamenei said on Saturday.
General Yahya Rahim Safavi, quoted by Fars news agency, said however that such an attack was unlikely.
Despite warnings from Washington and Israel that "all options are on the table" if negotiations between Iran and major powers on Tehran's controversial nuclear programme fail, conditions do not favour an assault, he said.
"They may be able start one but they can not end it and it remains in Iran's hands," the general said.
"The domestic political, economic and social conditions in America and the Zionist regime are not such as to have a new war in the region," he said.
US President Barack "Obama wants to get re-elected (in November) ... the cabinet of Mr (Israeli prime minister Benjamin) Netanyahu is a fragile one," he said.
However, in case of an attack, "we will act against their military operation smartly, proportional to any damage that they inflict on us ... meaning we will hurt them as much as they hurt us."

New: Asymmetric warfare

Scenario: They are politically and war gaming this right now in the pentagon.

Al Qaeda might be grasping to make a last statement. Iran or Syria might be fearing eminent attack by the USA. With our cyber warfare viruses attacking the middle East and Iran, we have admitted we have committed an act of war against Iran. The USA says it's a act of war if somebody does cyber terrorism act against us.

What if Iran preemptive or reactively demonstrates a show of force by secretly hitting a high profile American military target? By its demonstration you will understand our reach if you go to a proportional limited war against us. Do you really want to start a war with us when you are so economically weak and we can hit so many of your high profile targets to the world's media delights?

The evidence points to it and there are some wild rumors out there. Did Iran or Syria, or them both and with unknown parties conspire and commit a direct act of war by sabotaging a high profile United States nuclear attack submarine sitting naked and unprotected in a naval shipyard? Did Iran fire bomb the USS Miami SSN 755? What will the next one look like?

How would we know if this was a United State's false flag operation, to provoke us into attacking Iran and others?

Do you trust the Navy department to investigate this on their own? Remember the battleship the USS Ohio during the Reagan administration? Would they want to hide their own flaws and give us a partial investigation.

What Institution would you trust to tell us the truth and what level of truth and transparency is a necessity for a democracy?

Would the Navy department bury a terrorist attack or a act of war against us in anticipation of a upcoming presidential election? Would the administration provoke an attack to throw an election or take our minds off a upcoming depression? Is the new stimulus to save us from a depression, a war with Iran? Would the Department of the Defense and their related corporate interest start a war in order to mitigate the upcoming massive defense cuts?

I could make a case a new greater middle east is worth a lot of blood and guts. It has been the dream for 50 years of the greater world to modernize them. We are half way there? My philosophy is you don't provoke a wild and wounded rabid dog to attack you, so you can feel good about putting the dog down out of its misery.

What if the conflagration in the sub USS Miami was stupid accident and Iran is using the disaster to stick out its chest to the world and bag to its population how strong they are?

What if you are on the scene and the big story is different than what you know?

Who do you serve? Who do your trust? What do you believe?

Have you ever been so alone!

Al Queda attack on USS Miami submarine notes

Snowe, Collins: Navy will rebuild fire-damaged sub

KITTERY, Maine
(NEWS CENTER) -- The U.S. Navy is determined to rebuild the submarine damaged by fire at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. That word came from both of Maine's U.S. Senators after visiting the shipyard Friday. They also had high praise for all the firefighters and the sub's crew members who battled the fire for more than 12 hours.

The Senators say that shipyard workers are still ventilating the remaining smoke and fumes from inside the submarine and pumping out the three million gallons of water used to fight the fire.

The Navy is starting its investigation to determine how the fire started.

The flames broke out Wednesday night in what's called the forward compartment of the Miami, and officials report significant damage to that part of the sub. Senator Snowe and Collins say the Navy will investigate the cause, the extent of the damage and whether there was any criminal activity involved.

Sen. Snowe says there is no reason to suspect any wrongdoing, but regulations require that to be included in the investigation.

The Senators the submarine will be repaired and sent back to sea, and that the work will be done at the Kittery yard. They say Congress will have to find the money to make the repairs.

Snowe says it is believed to be the most serious fire ever at the shipyard, and possibly the worst on a Navy nuclear sub.

...Is she sick or what? If the fire was the shipyard fault, they get double bonus,  and get to benefit for their negligence.

Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree:

Pingree said Capt. Bryant Fuller told her the fire came at a good time because the USS Miami had been at the yard for three months, and so workers had already removed a lot of equipment from the damaged area. "It's in their favor that it had been emptied out."

...Ultimately, he is accountable for this fire, he is defending his bad behavior. The fire was good for us because we get a double bonus.

Capt. Bryant Fuller

The USS Miami's reactor was not operating at any time the fire broke out and remained unaffected and stable throughout, said Capt. Bryant Fuller, commander for the shipyard, which is in Kittery, Maine.

...pumped a million gallons out of the submarine, that is about 8 million pounds inside the hull. They are dam lucky the sub never collapsed into the dry dock. And the sub was up on blocks. Certainly the sub was never designed for that weight and that is probably the reason why the sub will never see the sea again.

..."Oops"

"All told, the firefighters rotated 75 times to battle the fire, using 3 million gallons of water, nearly filling some compartments, Snowe said."

Aluminum, cabling and insulation caught on fire?
24 million pounds
1200 tons
300 semis...

...where do they keep the diesel generator fuel oil in a sub for the diesel generator...did that contribute to the fire?

...Ultimately it questions if the fleet of nuclear submarines are fit for combat and fire casualties...unfit for human habitation out to sea.


Miami fire probe will take at least 3 weeks
By
Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Jun 1, 2012 11:40:24 EDT

Investigators are continuing their work to determine the cause of the fire that burned through the fore end of the nuclear submarine Miami over the night of May 23-24.

The conflagration, which struck while the sub was in drydock at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, burned for nearly 10 hours but, according to the Navy, did not endanger the vessel’s nuclear reactor.

Shipyard workers returned to work on the ship Tuesday, shipyard spokesperson Deb White said.

The effort to fix the cause and assess the damage to Miami is expected to take about three weeks, White said in a news release issued Wednesday.

Several Navy investigations already are underway, said Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Chris Johnson, including a safety review, a Judge Advocate General investigation and a NAVSEA technical review of the submarine’s condition — standard probes for this kind of incident.

The 22-year-old Miami was about two months into a scheduled 18-month engineering overhaul at the shipyard. The ship, planned for a service life of about 30 years, is scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal 2020.

Navy authorities so far are declining to speculate about possible causes of the fire or whether the submarine can be repaired.

“Once all the inspections and reviews are complete, the Navy will take the time to look at every possible scenario in regards to the ship’s future,” Johnson said Thursday.

Unofficial reports indicate the fire burned at very high temperatures inside the ship.

Temperature “readings on the hull during the fire were very high,” said one source with knowledge of the incident. “It was indicative of an incredible fire on the inside.”

Although NAVSEA chief Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy proclaimed shortly after the fire that the submarine would be repaired, speculation has been widespread that Miami’s service life is over. The intense fire could have buckled hull frames or weakened the pressure hull, and the cost of repairs could be prohibitive.

If the ship can’t be returned to service, she might be useful as a moored training ship for the Navy’s nuclear power school at Charleston, S.C., where the former ballistic missile submarines Daniel Webster and Sam Rayburn are slated for replacement. Two Los Angeles-class submarines, La Jolla and San Francisco, are scheduled to be converted to the MTS role when they’re decommissioned in 2015. Miami, with her reactor and machinery sections intact, might be swapped for one of those.

If the submarine cannot be returned to active service, it would become the first submarine and the first nuclear ship lost through a U.S. shipyard accident. And while two ships — the transport Lafayette (the former French liner Normandie) in 1942, and the minesweeper Avenge in 1970 — have been lost in commercial shipyard fires, Miami could become the first ship lost in a U.S. naval shipyard since the 19th century.

A Failure Of Imagination, again?

This isn't a failure of a technology, maybe a failure to keep modern a technology. I think the Japanese nuclear disaster for us in groups, organization and as a culture, as individuals and collectively, it is a failure of us to manage our brains, thinking and our hearts. Oh, the sorrows over all our failures to manage our hearts...

A failure of imagination?

Is there a exercise plan in which you can make your imagination muscle stronger? Can you productively strengthen the individual and group imagination muscle. I believe there is such a muscle in out heads.

How many times we going to hear heart sick people, who were involved in trillions of dollars and damaging thousands of people lives, lamenting it was a failure of my imagination after the tragedy. Why does organization culture kill imagination? And I will tell you a fact, imagination ain't shit unless you get it recorded on the organization's paperwork. The ability to create a organization wider discussion on it.

Do we get the choice, in order to fit into the group I am required to cripple my imagination. Or I can have infinite conscience imagination if I leave the group. Is it choice of starving or not?

And we know we are forced to be in groups where our thinking is forced to be stove piped into artificial ideological, culture or organizational bins. This is what we tell everyone what we know and this is what we say we don't know, when we do?

You know, like, who and what do you serve?

And a little altruism can overshadow a much larger altruism...altruisms abuse or altruism blindness. To what ends do to we use altruism for, to open up our eyes to the spectacularly beautiful wider world or to limit ours or our organizational field of view for selfish purpose?

Our greatest failures and sins occur over altruism blindness...our inability to discriminate altruism for self interest over altruism for our common good. Does doing good for another make me feel good or does it set another free? Does it make me feel good, when i should feel very troubled and compelled to act.

Isn't that at that at the bottom of the failures of the philosophy of our free and completive economic markets...?

METI boss fired for nuclear crisis regrets underestimating tsunami threat

Kyodo

The man who was the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's top official when the Fukushima disaster unfolded said he regretted underestimating the tsunami danger when METI was reviewing earthquake-resistance guidelines for nuclear plants before the crisis.

"We should have used our imagination," said Kazuo Matsunaga, who was vice minister of economy, trade and industry when the meltdowns began in March last year, told a Diet-appointed panel probing the disaster Wednesday.

I consider this an intentional distraction that allowed him to drive intoxicated?

..."My mind was occupied with handling the accident at Kansai Electric Power Co.'s Mihama plant," Matsunaga said, referring to a pipe rupture in August 2004 that killed five workers and injured six.

Does NRC's Director Troy Pruett Work in Region II?

Is the NRC's III Division Director Troy Pruett political disease in Region II?

I bet you if they had shut down Browns Ferry their could have concentrated their resources a lot more effectively. It would have made their job as a regulator a lot more easy?

Sounds like Swafford is saying, bug off NRC or I will sic my mad dog southern Republicans and the gang of four pro industry commissioners at you.

Browns Ferry isn't ready to inspect

excerpts:

TVA's nuclear operations chief told officials with the Nuclear Regulatory Agency on Tuesday that Browns Ferry is not ready yet for a third and final special NRC inspection to clear its "red" safety rating.

"We will not invite an inspection team in until have confidence we are ready. ... I can't even give you a ballpark estimate now when that will be."

NRC's regional administrator, Victor McCree, said after the meeting that the federal regulatory agency will take that answer in stride.

"I've been at the mindset that there's no point stressing accountability for procedures we know will change. Holding people accountable to inferior products isn't fair to the employees," Swafford said.

If I Won The NRC's $700 Million Dollar Reform Lottery

You know he is downplaying it...it is huge. And it's a spreading cancer on the nukes.

Exelon's CEO Mayo Shattuck:

"Even the existing fleet is feeling a little bit of the pressure in this kind of environment,” he said. The U.S. has 104 commercial operating reactors."

?
I would get the Allegation department outside the NRC...make them a stand alone entity.

　US Senator Bernie Sanders and Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell to speak at rally to support Vermont.

April 6, 2012
Saturday, April 14, 2012, Noon to 2:00 pm
Brattleboro Common, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
(rain location: Brattleboro Union High School)
statements issued day-of from
Governor Peter Shumlin and
Former Governor Madeline Kunin
and other elected officials
Special Musical Guest:
Fenibo (a rousing 12-piece Afro-beat ensemble1) April 2, 2012

...I have spent an enormous of time talking to NRC officials and local NRC plant inspectors over the last year at VY, Palisades and Peach Bottom nuclear plant. I've submitted many 2.206s. A lot of NRC officials know my name and have spoken with me over the phone and in person.

If you really wanted to help me and the nation...you would help me reform the NRC's 2.206 petition process.

The below is in a condensed from...it designed to protect careers. It is in a nuclear industry technical lingo-speak that the NRC understands. They know these people are Root Cause Analysis professionals and have broad vision over many plants.

I am absolutely certain we have understated the problem. I am certain if this was investigated and mandatory testimony...we could prevent a lot of trouble.

Remember, I think they think doing a RCA gives factual ammunition to the NRC and in pending regulatory or court proceedings.

My blog: 'The Popperville Town Hall'

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/

What we are talking about here in broad terms: it is the immune system of every nuclear plant in the nation and the nuclear industry.

...Of course, taking out the NRC Allegations section and the 2.206 petition process, that is call being in heaven.

I would want the NRC to be in partnership with me, not as a hyper rules based prosecutor or judge where I have no chance of ever getting past this corporate sponsored rules mandated to the NRC. I got to go up against this highly legalistic system even when it not really designed to be that way, where it is mostly laissez-faire and voluntary rules to a nuclear power plant. It is a check valve regulator!

They got a tons of laws and tools that limits my transparency to the problems of a plant and the agency; with very limited rules that mandates transparency to the public or me.

It is like a one way check valve on a host of issues, very little is spun my way in the interest of the USA (public), the vast majority are spun in the industry direction.

The overriding issue here is transparency and truth telling...the single most important determinate to nuclear and public safety is the nuclear industry showing their cards.

These guys got a lot of incentives to take shortcuts!

I won't bug you any more unless you ask for advice.

...Honest to god last time:

When I go through these NRC government processes...the 2.206 and Allegations...I feel it as the government is in a word, language, rules and process war with me. My government is at war against me and is using language as a weapon of war to me. It is not as a tool of understanding the issue or me. They become a understanding disruptor weapon.

A nuclear plant is so engineering, technically and organizationally complex...interacting with the NRC is 1000 times more complex.

I really need a seasoned senior NRC official who has seen everything and he has the horsepower to know the system and demand transparency. He needs to be assigned to me like my advocator and lawyer...his job is temporarily serve me and my issue ...to guide me through the agency's complex processes. All us outsiders need this kind of help.

I met and talked to a lot of NRC officials. Most of them are kind and decent when you get them by themselves. Most of them make us proud.

2) April 4, 2012

To who it may concern:

I can't believe I am doing this after having such a painful outcome talking to NRC Region 1 Allegation officials just a few days ago. I told myself I would never talk to Allegations again. If you want to talk to me I suggest it be outside Region I Allegations and preferably somebody from headquarters. I know there are lots more experienced people in the NRC than what I was recently exposed too.

I consider Region 1 Allegations compromised much like the March 2007 Peach Bottom sleeping guard incident where Allegations needed 500% absolute perfect inside evidence that was never obtainable in our existence. The NRC was too lazy to go down to Peach Bottom to investigate it on their own and they took the false assurances of Peach Bottom that there was no sleeping guards until the inside video came out that shook up the nation.

I consider the below a "cry for help" to me from multiple plant high nuclear employees and nuclear safety officials. And I certainly assert my confidentiality rights with this because this is so explosive to many careers. Nuclear Industry safety consultants might become blacklist from the nuclear industry. It exemplifies a pervasive of "I don't care" nuclear safety attitude throughout the nuclear industry. And these utilities are disrespectful to nuclear safety oversight in general.

I bet we are painting the most accurate leading indicator the NRC has seen in decades and we know the industry is in deep troubles as seen with all of your issues in recent years. These guys got a attitude problem and so doesn't the NRC!

I wish you would send a copy of this to the OIG?

　
...So is this about the reforming NRC Allegation process or RCA?

 Just kidding, or not.

 I kinda open here with my time. I could converse with you with within 24 hours, say tomorrow morning or beyond. I am good with before the end of the week, but I understand you people are busier than me.

What the hell does "specific information" mean?

　
...3:00pm on 4/10 is a excellent choice.

 By the way, what are my needs that enables the exercises of my democratic Constitutional ideals or rights with the agency's rules.

1) Full access to the target site, documents and employees of a nuclear power plant or NRC.

2) My sufficient funding, skills and education to do my own independent investigation to give the agency its rule enabler.

"Specific information (e.g., which site/plant, organization, personnel) is necessary, for the NRC to respond to any issues, which are raised by concerned citizens."

...Really, I am a ant...you would need a sufficient independent "organization" with sufficient uncontested access, resources and intellectual horsepower, which could counteract or challenge the Republican ideological influences over of the agency and the influences of the cohesive nuclear industry and their owners.

It should neither be pro nuke or anti nuke...just hunting for the truth!

You would need a transformational organization...

American Tissue Corp

American Tissue Corporation
I would gladly talk to people about my activities concerning American Tissue corp to any legitimate people. It is a fascinating story. I bankrupted the 4th largest paper mill company in the USA and this lead to putting executives in jail.

It was a fascinating learning experience for me. It was a $300 to $400 million dollar fraud case. It was a warning to us about the upcoming financial crisis we ignored.

Pilgrim's failed Target Rock SRV

New April 5, 2:30pm
The OIG gave me a call today.

...He humiliated and disrespected me with this phrase " if your were a decent whistleblower" you would have a complete report.

You know what I say, record and transcript every conversation I have with NRC official. If you were with me on my conversation you would see how disgraceful and uneducated some officials are.

Mostly the front line NRC inspectors and their bosses are really decent people...but the support people like Allegation and the OIG are atrocious and with their knowledge of the nuclear industry. They generally don't have the skills and are not trained to talk in a non threatening manner and have a open discussion.

This guy began exactly like the Allegation...what was the LER nmber?
  
...So were talking about target rock and why components immediately failed on new installs.

This guys didn't know what a safety relief valve did in a BRW. I had to educate him on its function.

You know what, these are really complicated components and organizational issues. You just can't come into a conversation with me without deeply researching my issues or I have to give you grammar school class in BWR designs. Both Allegation and the OIG did this.

If you don't do your background work before you get to me...i am going to lose you within the first five minutes.

The NRC OIG guy said its not fraud waste, misconduct or abuse within the rules of the OIG...so it a licensing or NRR thing. I said believe me i got it with your NRC people, you are going to pass me from one department to another because some NRC employees are too lazy to do their jobs. I am going to have to explain myself 100 times to different departments and NRC employees, who don't even know what the function of a SRV is.  ...The NRC is doing one of those teenager la la la la deals while covering their ears to the obvious.

Basically, I asserted LER's are insanely incomplete and inaccurate...

...I would say i was exposed to a militaristic use of language to disrupt communications....the use of rules and regulations in way to disrupt communication and knowledge of the problem to the
public. It is using words, language, rules and regulations, indeed government as weapons against the innocence...the intent is deny public participation with government. They militaristically trying to rule me and everyone out of public participation.

I think what we got here is systemic breakdown with the utilities and NRC to control vender repair, new parts and basic off site engineering services. I think these vendor component and engineering suppliers are not required to tell the truth. I would say since I been hitting them on these issues the NRC has tried to come to grips with their vender service provider problem.

Bottom line, they are having trouble getting replacement parts on these obsolete plants. Companies have gone out of business and ceased production streams, and the new deal is they are hiring companies who specialize in doing "reverse engineering" on replacement parts that are dangling without any new parts stream.

...As example, all the new Mitsubishi kids are making the San Onophe SGs and the old experienced engineers have retired or died.  

New March 28
I backed out of the NRC allegation process. They got hyper legalistic and evidence thingy on me...they knowing that the agency and the utility had all the cards. I said the Peach Bottom 2.206 administrator sent my issue into allegation...I didn't call in allegation on my own. I thought it was going to be a conversation between me and agency...not this one way deal where if i said i sneezed then I had to prove I sneeze. I asked, should I have brought my lawyers and engineers into the deal.

I didn't think the Allegations process was fair and opened...it was hyper legalistic and hyper regulatory rules thingy where you couldn't sneeze if it wasn't in the rules. The Alligation team went cold into this not even researching my involvement with VY and Peach Bottom, and the LERs and inspection reports.   

I said I withdrawal my concern and I don't want to be updated about this. They told me you can't withdrawal a concern once one was given to the NRC....but you can be anonymous.

  ...At the bottom of it over VY and the Peach Bottom SRV issue, I spent days researching everything i could about the SRVs. I spent a hour and half each with both inspectors at VY and Peach Bottom for a total of four plant inspectors and three hours talking to me. I knew the territory and what I was talking about...I was frustrated that these four officials went cold into this meeting. Then they played the, mike this thing is evidence driven and we got to know the LER number and we got to know who the VY inspector's names are. It was humiliating and disrespectful for me. There was one official talking to me as I was discussing my issue, then none of the other three officials could even do quick search on the VY docket for the LER document number to get us past the sticking point. What BS!

I got a e-mail trail from Don, lets schedule a meeting beginning last thurs. I say I ready right now, tomorrow and any time at your convenience next week. Just set the time and date and i will be there. I wanted to make it easy for him. Then I get a e-mail tues saying I can't find anyone to have a meeting with you without any explanation. Next day he tells me the following day the meeting is on, what time.

They don't even have the courtesy on their own to read my 2.206s and transcripts surrounding the VY and Peach Bottom seals. These Allegation idiots have in their documents I make a recent allegation by phone about VY seals again and they are the ones who made the VY inspectors call me without going though the Allegation process.

That is another more specfic information not disclosed in the VY LERs or inspection reports...the 400 degree vitol seals.

We should go through the VY seal LER and update, then contrast what got in the NRC inspector report and then what came out in the NRC inspectors meeting with me. We should then discuss what should have been disclosed in LERs and further inspection reports. As far as i am concerned, the inspectors at both plants should be on the phone bridge. We should go over it point by point and not have any other commitment to rush anyone, until everything is completely hashed out. We should do the same thing with the Peach Bottom LER.

Again, we don't have public participation with the NRC and utilities around our homes, unless all the aspects of the problem is out in the public arena.

March27 

Mr. Mulligan:

I have been unable to contact the appropriate NRC technical staff, for a telephone call with you. I will contact you when I know more.

Sorry for the late information.

v/r,

Ron Schmitt

USNRC

New

From: "Schmitt, Ronald"
To: "Michael Mulligan (steamshovel2002@yahoo.com)"
Cc: "James, Lois"
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 8:33 AM
Subject: Time to discuss your concerns (RE: Quality Assurance program at Target Rock)
  
Dear Mr. Mulligan:

This email is in regards to your email that you sent to Mr. John Hughey, of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 17, 2012. In your email, you expressed concerns regarding the Quality Assurance program at Target Rock, as a result of failed safety relief valves at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and Peach Bottom nuclear power plants.

We would like to set up a call with you so that our staff can ask additional questions to better understand your concern.

Please respond to this email with some days and times that are convenient for you so that I can schedule the call.

Thank you for informing us of your concern. If you have any questions, please contact me or Ms. Lois James at .

 

Ronald V. Schmitt

Office Allegation Coordinator

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Pilgrim's failed Target Rock SRV
Licensee Event Report 2011-007-00: Safety Relief Valve leakage

So you get it, with the SRV threaded seals at VY and Peach Bottom they failed within the first cycle from degradation due to poor quality seals. Now at Pilgrim another SRV fails with months due to leakage and they blame poor pilot valve workmanship at Target Rock.

Sounds like systemic QA problems with Target Rock. I request a investigation of Target Rock and all similar safety valves.

I talked to your nice Peach Bottom inspectors over increasing the SRV's set inaccuracy from plus or minus 1% to plus or minus 3%. Does the NRC have any evidence that decreasing the margin of set point accuracy reduces the entry into applicable tech spec LCO. I see all the utilities have different guesses on what cause pilot valve bonding. Some say its oxygen or hydrogen that sets up bonding on the surfaces, others say its just bonding and they don't care. Others again say its outside insulation and temperatures that sets it up.

As far as the statement that increasing the relief valve testing set point inaccuracy will reduce entry into a LCO, I don't think that is true. The limited data I see indicates when you increase testing set point inaccuracy, you increase entry into a LCO in the long run.

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000293/2011- 005

October 1, 2011 through December 31 , 2011

 The inspectors selected the issues of safety relief valve (SRV) and automatic depressurization system (ADS) valve leakage and setpoint test failures as an inspection sample for in-depth review to assess the corrective actions taken by Entergy to address these long-standing issues. Entergy's corrective actions included replacing the four ADS valves and the two safety relief valves with a Target Rock three-stage relief valve design, increasing the capacity of the two safety relief valves, and amending the license to allow for a set-point pressure band of +/- 3%. Additionally, the new valves were equipped with multiple leak detection temperature indicators.

The inspectors reviewed procedures, condition reports, engineering evaluations, modification packages, post maintenance testing, and license amendment correspondence, and interviewed plant personnel to assess Entergy's problem identification, evaluation, and corrective action effectiveness with respect to SRV and ADS valve leakage and set-point drift. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the technical specifications and UFSAR to assess the change to the relief valves with respect to design and licensing bases requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. Findinqs and Observations

Findinqs and Observations

No findings were identified.

The ADS valves and SRVs were originally a two-stage Target Rock-type design, consisting of a pilot-stage assembly and a main-stage assembly. Industry Operating Experience had shown that two-stage Target Rock relief valves exhibited some amount of pilot-stage leakage during plant operation. Additionally, the technical specification allowed valve setpoint pressure band was +/- 1%, which left little margin to maintain the valves operable in the event of valve leakage. As a result, SRV and ADS valve pilot stage leakage were challenges throughout the plant's operating history and caused several forced shutdowns.

The inspectors noted, based on nuclear industry operating experience, that the replacement of all the ADS and SRVs with the three-stage Target Rock design was a significant positive step in reducing the likelihood of relief valve seat leakage.

Additionally, the inspectors noted Entergy's evaluation of an expanded relief valve setpoint pressure band and subsequent license amendment have resulted in significantly more operating margin for the plant in the event that a valve does exhibit signs of leakage. Finally, the inspectors determined the addition of several temperature monitoring points on the valve would allow Entergy to more effectively evaluate the operability of the valve should any leakage occur.

Mike Mulligan's US Government Renaissance

First published as comments in the NYT's in: The Nurture of Nuclear Power

I always thought the problem with nuclear power was ideology not technology. The dominant control ideology of the industry has been increasingly the hard right wing conservatives and this ideology is dominant at every plant. There are very few democrats at any of these plants and certainly even less as you go up the management ranks.

The model has defaulted into a autocratic and a decentralized form...every plant is a one off. We serve profits and self interest, and not the greater good of our nation.

The true benefits of nuclear industry has never been shown. I propose a government take-over of the 25 Fukushima plants in the USA. As a national security issue, we should replace those plants with brand new identical models. Lets begin another grand experiment. They would be large plants and centrally controlled in the initial construction and early operation phase. Imagine the efficiency if these plants were built to one set of codes from both the regulator and the designer/builder stand point. It should be a government controlled and modeled like the TVA project.

What if we woke up one day and we discovered government could be more efficient and 'just' than any corporation...or at least could complete with them.

President Obama could say these plants are a dire threat to the USA and the only way out is to replace them. We just about got negative interest rates with QE2 and why couldn't we come up with a revolutionary borrowing mechanism. It would be a giant jobs and public works project. It would split the Republicans this fall and who knows the size of the political coalition we could create for the nation?

There is more value than the traditional economic benefits than cheap and reliable electricity over a project like this. We should value a project like this for how much advanced education and advance managerial experience it drives into our nation. How much advanced intellectual experienced it drives into all the employees who are associated with this voyage. This is, and always was, the real wealth of our nation!

An Unforgettable Night - ATC Operator Event at Palisades

There are a lot of these CRDM seal shutdowns at Palisades. No other plant in the nation has these kinds on troubles. These complex seal repair shutdowns have been involved with unpredictable interactions and incidences.

A initial plant design defect that is not corrected is driving enormous complicity into the control room and their employees are being overwhelmed by it.

I told the NRC this was a very important event for the industry and there should have been reports to the industry about what went on this night a Palisades. What nobody can get away from, the agency doesn't have the capability to capture events in such detail as this employee did.

This event occurred on Oct 23, 2010 and Palisades has had another seal shutdown on Jan of this year. We got to see this letter for the first time this March 8 2012.

I believe the event was entered into the Palisades ROP as a question of why did one of their employees leave the control room. Nobody has yet answered why were they winging this vacuum fill procedure, why did they lose reactor water level for a period of time worrying about vortexing and why did they allow so many distraction going on while they were manipulating core water level during a high risk alignment of the plant.


An Unforgettable Night - ATC Operator Event at Palisades

Introduction
On the early morning of October 23, 2010, I left the ‘at the controls’ area of Palisades nuclear plant without a proper relief or turnover. Up until that time, I had always considered myself to be a very conscientious and safe operator. I never imagined that I would leave the control room without a proper turnover – but I did. I hope by writing this article, others can learn from my mistakes and avoid making the same or any similar mistake. With that objective, this article describes the events that led to my actions, the effect this event has had on me, the lessons I have learned, and my experiences with the NRC investigative and enforcement processes.

Description of Events
Palisades was nearing the end of a refueling outage, which was on course to be our most successful ever due to the short duration and large number of major projects completed. We were about to enter our third reduced inventory period to perform a vacuum fill operation.

This vacuum fill procedure was relatively new for Palisades, having successfully

performed it for the first time during the previous refueling outage. It is a procedure to lower the water level in the reactor to the middle of the hot leg, and then draw a vacuum on the Primary Coolant System (PCS) to evacuate air and other non-condensable gasses. We devised this procedure in an effort to improve plant reliability—specifically to extend the life of our control rod drive mechanism pressure boundary seals.

Excerpts:

During the brief, I mentioned that during my turnover briefing, I heard that the reactor head did not have a vent path.

We lined up the drain path and commenced, but the PCS level indications did not respond as expected and we stopped the drain.

During this period, we had Auxiliary (non-licensed) Operators (AO's) troubleshoot the problem by verifying level glass and vent path lineups.

Concurrent with the PCS drain, most of the control room staff was at the Infrequently Performed Test and Evolutions (IPTE) brief for the vacuum fill work.

While this occurred, we had more issues with the EHC system; a reactor operator called the control room and stated he was not sure we had a good EHC flow path.

I felt this was a problem that required reviewing the prints and was too distracting with the PCS drain taking place while in reduced inventory, so I handed off the call to a different operator.

I told a Senior Reactor Operator that we were having issues with the EHC system, but he was busy overseeing the PCS drain.

A few moments later, however, the EHC low level alarm came in.

Several minutes later, the low level alarm was still not clear and I was concerned about a possible leak, so I secured the pump. I quickly heard back that there was a spill...

Consequently, they requested that the pump be placed in service for their vendor work, stating the cooling and flow path issues were solved.

This was all happening while the PCS level indication troubleshooting was in progress.

Eventually, Maintenance workers removed some temporary flange covers on the reactor head for a better vent path.

The drain that we initially briefed to be about 17 minutes ended up taking over three hours.

After we got to mid-loop, I lowered shutdown cooling flow to about 3100 gpm, which was the high end of the vacuum fill requirements.

...commented that he did not like the pace I was making my adjustments.

The previous time we performed the vacuum fill procedure, it worked flawlessly, but this time was different.

There was indication of a leak somewhere that was intermittently venting and allowing pressures to equalize throughout the system.

While Operator 1 and other members of the control room staff were troubleshooting the problems with vacuum fill, we received the low critical service water alarms and entered a procedure for "Loss of Service Water."

...the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) had to come down off the CRS’ “island” and speak with me directly to ensure effective communications during this very active period in the control room.

We soon learned that the work control center sent out a lube and stroke PM for the main lube oil service water isolations, and that was probably the cause of the low header pressure.

During the hold, I noticed the shutdown cooling flow rate had slowly started to trend down to 2900 gpm on its own and I voiced my concerns to the Control Room Supervisor. I showed him the one minute shutdown cooling flow rate trend on the Palisades Plant Computer (PPC), and said there may be some vortexing or other flow phenomenon that I did not understand.

He stated we could also enter the LCO, if necessary.

Suddenly, however, PCS level indication sharply fell to an elevation below the bottom of the hot leg.

As PCS pressure rose, the primary coolant level slowly recovered to an expected value and I received the order to raise the PCS level to exit reduced inventory.

By this time, it was early morning and we exited reduced inventory during SRO turnover.