Junk Plant Fermi: Loss of Air Compressors and SRVs.

This is a known big problem from my day. Training isn't adequate for how complicated it is with losing the air compressors. A lot of non safety components bites the operators in the ass during a loss of air compressors. It has a tremendous possibility of destructively consuming employee resources. We always wondered why the air compressors weren't safety grade and powered from the safety buses? We always figured the diesel generator weren't big enough.

Good plants don't get into the situation of losing all  their air compressors. Losing all air compressors is a indication the plant organization and NRC are terribly dysfunctional. They collectively are preforming inadequate maintenance and updating their obsolete equipment.  \

This is another example where the industry sees a problem and won't clear it from being a problem with creating a diversion to the operators.

OPERATING EXPERIENCE REGARDING COMPLICATIONS FROM A LOSS OF
INSTRUMENT AIR

Personally, the NRC response is just inconsequentially paper whipping the problem. Decades ago they should have ordered this problem to be fixed.

It looks like the NRC is picking up a increase of frequency with the lost of all air compressors and complicated scrams. You can can be sure if there is a increase of LOOPs, there will be a increase of loss of all air compressors.

A Poor Maintenance Fiasco at Fermi

This is an example with how bullet proof durable the SRVs need to be. You might see a barely visible flaw in the SRVs like lift accuracy problem and leakage under the low duty of normal plant operations...but it could cause big problems in a big accident with a stuck open valve or won't operate valve. It is a particularly big risk in a plant with few SRVS of four or so valves.

Safety Relief Valve Challenges (January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015)

On September 13, 2015, a reactor scram occurred from full power due to a loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW). The loss of TBCCW tripped all Station Air Compressors, which caused Instrument Air header pressure to degrade and resulted in the manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). During the response to this event, all Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) were cycled. The SRVs did not open due to exceeding lift pressure, but were manually operated to control pressure. There were 303 total SRV cycles. The number of cycles for each SRV are given below. For each SRV, the cycles occurred between approximately 2300 hours on September 13, 2015 and approximately 1400 hours on September 15, 2015, and are based upon data from the Sequence of Events Recorder (SOER).

 SRV B2104F013A cycled 1 time

 SRV B2104F013B cycled 44 times

 SRV B2104F013C cycled 32 times

 SRV B2104F013D cycled 46 times

 SRV B2104F013E cycled 10 times

 SRV B2104F013F cycled 32 times

 SRV B2104F013G cycled 5 times

 SRV B2104F013H cycled 17 times

 SRV B2104F013J cycled 14 times

 SRV B2104F013K cycled 29 times

 SRV B2104F013L cycled 4 times

 SRV B2104F013M cycled 29 times

 SRV B2104F013N cycled 11 times

 SRV B2104F013P cycled 17 times

 SRV B2104F013R cycled 12 times

No other SRV challenges occurred during 2015.