April 17: This is a Kewaunee Nuclear Plant fracting extinction level event with Unit 1. At the end of the day, electricity price are too low to make the needed repairs on this plant.
So the right way to do this is to bring in the heavy load cranes and yank it out through the roof like they did during new constructions. This is the cost of doing shortcuts. It would have turned it into a prolong outage.."We have a permanently installed turbine building crane rated for around 150 tons. The generator stator weighs ~4x that much. The stator is something that hasn't been moved in ~39 years since original installation. It isn't really practical to install a permanent crane capable of moving that size load that might need to be moved once every 40 or so years. The turbine building crane spans ~100' or more. The size of the girders necessary to span that length and carry ~500+ tons would be huge, not to mention the size of the trolley, winch, cables and other hardware. Note that this crane was installed around 1970."
I doubt the NRC will allow the plants to restart....
You know, this had to happen in "the government as terrorists" deep south who hates oversight and regulations. I always thought a nuclear industry extinction level level event with the extremist right wingers, would emerge from the south exactly for that reason.
ANO Contrator Initiated Layoffs After Accident
Howard West
10:00 AM, Tuesday, April 16 2013 | 1572 views
LONDON — In the wake of Easter Sunday’s industrial accident at Arkansas Nuclear One where one worker was killed and eight others injured, at least one ANO contractor has laid off employees who have worked at the plant during shutdowns.
Entergy contractor Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) laid off more than 100 employees during the first week of April, a source who is employed by the contractor told The Courier.
CB&I has corporate offices in The Woodlands, Texas, and builds power plant industrial complexes, and maintains infrastructure for those facilities.
As of Monday afternoon, CB&I officials had not responded to requests from The Courier for comments about layoffs with their company at ANO.
An ANO spokesperson said last week when workers aren’t needed at the plant during down times, the contracting company is released from their contract with Entergy.
“Typically, contract workers are hired to perform specific jobs during refueling outages,” ANO spokesman Michael Bowling said last week. “These workers would be released from their contract when their jobs are complete or when there services are no longer needed. Some contractors hired for the 1R24 [refueling outage] have been released.”
According to an employee who was laid off on April 3, iron workers, pipe fitters, painters, laborers and carpenters joined the ranks of those who are temporarily out of a job.
“They told my supervisor not to call anybody in on Sunday,” the source said. “The supervisor told everyone to stay home. I went in on Wednesday and received layoff paperwork. All they needed was scaffold builders and extra labor. They said they are supposed to recall us, but CB&I and Entergy officials were vague about it. They said we weren’t needed.
“They gave no estimated time of when they will recall those who got laid off. We were scheduled to be there till June. Some traveled as many as 200 miles to work the outage. What now for them?”
The source reported that Entergy officials said there will be a quick-as-possible turnaround on restarting the Unit Two reactor.
“Supervisors said they were trying to bring Unit Two back on line by the end of the month,” the source said. “They said they would call people back.” The laid off employee is trying to find work now. A second source, another laid off employee, said she doesn’t blame ANO for the layoffs, and anticipates unemployment benefits to arrive this week, but with a nearly 70 percent reduction of her regular pay.
“I have no hard feelings towards the contracting company I worked for, or ANO, because I was laid off,” she said. “I understand the need for investigations and a plan to move forward.
“Filing for unemployment through Michigan has presented some challenges. I’ve had no income for the past two weeks. Hopefully, I will receive a check this week.”
The second source, who has a residence in Atkins, traveled back to Arkansas after working as a laborer in Florida during the past year. She was somewhat surprised by the way she and her coworkers were informed of the layoff.
“They called Sunday to tell me not to come in till tomorrow’s shift [April 2],” she said.
“The next night, they called and said come in to be processed out. They didn’t tell us anything other than we were being laid off. I hope to get the opportunity to work at ANO again.”
She said she understands the dynamic impact the accident had on plant workers and administrators. She feels fortunate she was able to enjoy her time with family this past week.
“The accident was so tragic and unexpected, and impacted the whole community,” she said. “Who am I to complain.”
One Little Rock union representative believes the best thing they could do for newly unemployed workers is find them work.
“I anticipate once the plant is back on line, they will be back to work,” Lindsay Brown, Local Union 424 representative, said. “The layoff is based on no need for these folks until Entergy navigates its way through its accident investigation. Entergy has laid off individuals who aren’t pertinent to restarting the plant.”
“It is intrinsic to the construction industry to have temporary layoffs due to unforeseen circumstances such as weather and supply issues. This particular incident, a 550-ton stator falling from rigging, is no exception,” Brown said.
“Construction is the only job I know where one works themselves out of a job,” he said. “Some painters would be done by now. It depends on the work packages. Our folks know what they’re in for. Maybe there should be a better safety net.
April 19: Did Entergy lose trust in CB&I?
So the stator drop happened on March 31 and this is from Commissioner Magwood's speech on March 13, 2013NRC proposes civil penalty for CB&I Shaw, cites poor safety culture
April 19, 2013The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a notice of violation and proposed a civil penalty of $36,400 against Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) for discrimination by one of its newly purchased Shaw subsidiaries against an employee who raised a safety concern. The NRC also requested CB&I take action to improve safety culture at a second former Shaw subsidiary.
CB&I completed a takeover of the Shaw Group of companies in February. These separate actions, issued April 18, stem from complaints filed with the NRC before the takeover was effective.
The notice of violation, issued by NRC’s Office of Enforcement, describes two violations of NRC employee protection requirements at Shaw Nuclear Services. A quality assurance supervisor was fired in May 2011 for notifying Shaw and Louisiana Energy Services, an NRC licensee, of some potentially faulty rebar that may have been shipped to its National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico by a third-party vendor. The second violation related to language in Shaw’s Corporate Code of Conduct that could prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage employees from participating in protected activities, including providing information to the NRC.
Because Shaw did not identify the violations or take corrective action once the NRC identified them, the NRC doubled the normal civil penalties, for a total fine of $36,400. The company is to respond within 30 days describing corrective actions it intends to implement, and it may request alternative dispute resolution to explore settlement options.
In a separate letter to Philip K. Asherman, president and chief executive officer of CB&I, the NRC cited a “chilled work environment” at CB&I’s facility in Lake Charles, La., formerly known as Shaw Modular Solutions. Workers hesitant to raise safety concerns through company channels have reported them directly to the NRC.
While there are more than 600 vendors supplying safety-related goods and services to the nuclear industry, approximately 35 percent of all vendor-related safety allegations received by the NRC from January 2010 through January 2013 involved the Lake Charles facility. The NRC’s review of these complaints did not identify any specific quality issues with parts supplied by Shaw or CB&I; however, the significant number of employee concerns reported to the NRC suggests a poor environment for raising safety concerns within the company.
The NRC’s expectations in this area are described in policy statements addressing safety culture and maintenance of a safety-conscious work environment.
“The NRC takes seriously the ability of employees to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and employee protection from discrimination,” Glenn M. Tracy, director of the Office of New Reactors, said in the letter. He acknowledged that CB&I was already implementing management changes at the former Shaw companies and said, “It is vital to assess the work environment and address unresolved conflicts.”
Tracy requested CB&I respond within 30 days and explain corrective actions it intends to take to improve the safety-conscious work environment at the Lake Charles facility. The company is also to inform employees about the letter and corrective actions.
NRC licensees are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facilities and the quality of the safety-related goods and services they procure for their sites. The NRC inspects licensee and vendor performance to assure that licensees are verifying the quality of goods and services they receive.
"Utilities—who are you? The current fleet of nuclear plants in this country represents a tremendous success story. Over the last 30 years, capacity factors have increased from around 75% to consistently over 90% while at the same time showing tremendous advances in safety by every measure.
However, while you have grown strong in operations—due in no small part to the success of INPO—I believe your engineering capabilities are another story. Many of the power companies present today once maintained large engineering and project management teams that oversaw and often managed the construction of nuclear power plants. Early in my career, I worked with electric utility research managers; how many companies still have senior people on their staffs with this title? Most companies reduced significantly their engineering capabilities as deregulation came into vogue.
To be entirely honest, I am skeptical that most of you could successfully oversee the construction of a new nuclear power plant today—even among those companies that currently have new plant applications before the agency. This isn’t simply an issue about new plants. These reduced capabilities also affect your ability to maintain the current fleet. As your plants age, your ability to analyze and manage change will face important and unpredictable challenges.Remember, the NRC could have issued a stop work order at any point and called in the heavy lift NRC experts....
Are you certain you are ready for this? Are you the companies you think you are, or are some of you falsely confident in your reputations for engineering and management excellence when much of your past expertise is sitting by a pool in Florida? Or are some of you expecting that you will be able to call your favorite vendor to deal with complex emerging issues? Even under the best circumstances, vendors will require close, expert oversight. These are your plants and you are responsible to your ratepayers and the public for all the work done at your sites. Blaming the vendor if things go wrong will buy you little sympathy.
They are debating how a secondary system and supposedly non safety risk system cascaded into severely threatening nuclear safety systems at two plants. They are talking about the how turbine has been moved off the concrete pedestal.
"Looks like the blue equipment of Bigge was ok.The stator made it from the turbine deck to the hatchway and was turned correctly to be lowered to the transport below.
It appears that the front left leg of the gantry crane was positioned on a floor beam.That beam is bent.Simple guess is that the floor that supported the front two legs of the gantry beams was not strong enough.The under beam buckled and the gantry came apart.
The turbine deck was strong enough to support the back two legs of the gantry, probably had jack plates built into the foundation, legs of gantry probably right above foundation columns under turbine deck.Front legs were on building floor.This looks like the fatal flaw.Floor beam held for a while then deflected.
Be interesting who decided that the front legs could be supported by the floor with not under columns to the ground floor.Not going to be pretty."
Entergy and Arkansas Nuclear One has a long history of Falsification, running their plants horrendously not safe and corrupted staffs. Of course, I got turned around talking about both plants have different emergency response organizations.
April 16...
The accident:
Update: RUSSELLVILLE, AR- Pope County Coroner Leonard Krout has identified the worker killed in the accident at Arkansas Nuclear One as 24-year-old Wade Walters.April 17: Atomic Power Review: There are inside reports of structural damage to the (very large) support structure for Unit 1's turbine generator. (A nuclear plant's turbine generator can be over 225 feet long and weigh over 5000 tons completely assembled; the support structure is even larger and heavier.) None of those has been either confirmed or denied by Entergy -- or for that matter even acknowledged.
New information Sunday night revealed one person died from a maintenance accident at the Arkansas Nuclear One plant in Pope County, while at least eight others were injured.
Images of the 600-ton stator that fell Sunday morning, killing one man and injuring eight others, are beginning to surface online...
So the structural girders around the turbine deck floor opening gave way...
Timeline
- Jan 9, 2012 The licensee researched exercise drill document in late Dec 2011
- retained the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham
- Jan 12, 2012, the ANO Emergency Preparedness Manager notified the NRC resident inspector and regional emergency preparedness inspectors that senior employee a had apparently falsified documents.
- April 2012: NRC IO initiated investigation
- Dec 14, 2012: Completed investigation
***A corruption and lying that is so pervasive within the NRC, the NRC Office Of Investigation and Entergy...it is so blatant.
- NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008
***It frightened me when I found this.
LICENSEE FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2012-024
Submitted by NUCBIZ on April 14, 2013 - 15:05
In April 2012, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation to determine if a senior emergency planner at Entergy Operations Incorporated, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), willfully falsified documents related to miscellaneous drills and surveillances. The investigation was completed on December 14, 2012.
The NRC OI investigation reported that on January 9, 2012, the licensee researched the exercise drill documentation as a result of recordkeeping discrepancies identified in late December 2011. The licensee spoke with the senior emergency planner, who admitted that he had falsified the paperwork. The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation. The Balch & Bingham investigation also identified that the senior emergency planner falsified surveillance documents.
During the NRC OI investigation, the senior emergency planner at ANO admitted to generating false documentation over a period of four years. The false documentation does not meet the requirement under 10 CFR 50.9(a), Completeness and Accuracy of Information. This regulation states, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The false documentation included 2 miscellaneous drills involving the Post Accident Sampling (PAS) system, as recorded on December 14, 2010 and December 7, 2011, and 2 drills involving environmental monitoring, as recorded on December 14, 2010, and December 6, 2011. The drills were required by the licensee's procedure number 1903.004, "Admin and Maintenance of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures," which fulfills the requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). In addition, it was determined that the senior emergency planner at ANO falsely documented 3 surveillances required by EP-010, "Emergency Response Facility Walkthrough Surveillance, Technical Support Center (TSC)" on May 12, June 4, and September 30, 2008. The TSC surveillance required checking the operation of the NRC management counterpart link (MCL) telephone line in the TSC. The false documentation indicated that the NRC MCL line was operable. The investigation determined that the NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008. This surveillances was also required by the emergency plan, to meet the regulatory requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8).
The senior emergency planner admitted that he was knowledgeable of the regulations and requirements to conduct drills and surveillances. He admitted that he generated false documentation as a result of his lack of time management, and that the falsification of documents was the most effortless action to take.
The licensee took immediate corrective actions, which included requiring additional documentation to support a drill package, with management's review and signature. In addition, the licensee took remedial action against the employee commensurate with the circumstances that demonstrated the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect with the licensee's organization.Right these two statements are contradictory...
Based on the results of this investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
In addition, since you identified the violation and based on our understanding of your corrective action...I am getting word that the NRC was sniffing around the emergency planner's work...thus Entergy jumping out of the bushes admitting it wasn't accurate...
These lawyers are the cleaners...their job is to sterilized the employees into not admitting senior managers participated in the falsification. Seeing how this was going to the courts, why didn't they allow the OI to investigate the events first.
The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) ANO-C-2012-00098 to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation.
A very similar and long last falsification event
4 fired, 34 disciplined at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
A series of investigations at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in Scriba has resulted in four workers being fired and 34 being disciplined, a spokeswoman for the plant owner said Thursday.
Meanwhile, federal prosecutors announced that one of the fired workers has pleaded guilty to falsifying tests of safety equipment at the plant.
Also Thursday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified the owner of the plant, Entergy Nuclear Northeast, that it could face civil actions in the wake of the investigations.
Results of the three investigations were handed over to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Syracuse, which brought criminal charges against Michael McCarrick, 56, of Oswego, a former radiation protection technician at the plant. McCarrick admitted to falsifying records relating to more than two dozen plant worker.
In his guilty plea, he admitted he failed to adequately perform tests to make sure the workers’ emergency respirators were properly fitted and sealed, and then falsely documented that they were.
The plant is required to refit workers’ emergency respirators every year. The respirators, which protect against chemical releases or other fumes during emergencies, must fit snugly, and the fit can change as workers gain or lose weight or otherwise change.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Craig Benedict said that on 32 documented occasions between 2006 and 2009, McCarrick falsely claimed he had completed such tests. Benedict said the incidents were investigated by special agents from the NRC.
No known injuries occurred as a result of the falsified tests
McCarrick pleaded guilty to one felony count of violating the Atomic Energy Act. He could receive up to two years in prison and a $250,000 fine when he is sentenced Jan. 10.
The NRC also found that two unidentified “staff level individuals” acted with “careless disregard” by not following through on their suspicions that the respirator fit tests were inadequate.
The NRC informed Entergy that the second investigation found that McCarrick deliberately failed to document required surveillance of air samples or to make sure workers leaving the radiologically controlled area went through contamination monitors.
The third investigation found that McCarrick and another radiation protection technician failed to conduct other leak testing and surveillance duties.
McCarrick was the only worker charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office . However, the NRC notified Entergy that it could face civil action pending the result of either an enforcement conference with the NRC or a mediation session, whichever the company chooses.
Entergy spokeswoman Tammy Holden said the plant conducted an internal investigation in June 2009 after learning the NRC had received a phone call alleging a potential violation at the plant.
Most of the 34 workers who were disciplined were workers who should have known that their “fit tests” for the respirators were either not done or were incomplete, Holden said. She said those workers were removed from the site during the investigation and later received either suspensions of pay or verbal or written warnings. They were also retrained.
Holden stressed that the masks are rarely required, and that none of the workers who had inadequate fit tests did any work during that period that would have required the masks to be used.
“At no point was there any risk to the public health or safety at any time during this process,” she said.
Escalated Enforcement Action:
Enforcement Policy. Whether the violation involved willfulness. Willful violations are of particular concern because the NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. The Commission cannot tolerate willful violations. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness. Violations with willful aspects will typically be considered for escalated enforcement (i.e., SL I, II, or III). The term “willfulness” as used in this Policy refers to conduct involving either a careless disregard for requirements or a deliberate violation o requirements or falsification of information. In determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, the NRC will consider such factors as the position, training, experience level, and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g., licensee official or nonsupervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in the significance assessment will depend on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations commensurate with the circumstances, such that the action reflects the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee’s organization.They were lackadaisical with safety and caring about the integrity and honor of their company. Palisades DC event that nearly killed a guy and spun the plant around barely in control.
Finally, based on the facts gathered during the special inspection, the inspectors determined that a possible cause for the September 25, 2011, event was that the Palisades organization did not establish safety policies amongst the management team and employees, which reinforced that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. Specifically, several of the organizational decisions demonstrated in this event were not consistent with the established nuclear safety policies and procedures at the site. In addition, production and schedule goals were not developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner that reinforced nuclear safety on September 25, 2011, as demonstrated by the organization’s performance during the execution of this emergent work.
Another recent worthless confirmatory order. Can't trust them at their word the NRC seems to be saying...
March 14, 2013
EN-13-003
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc. (EA-13-031)
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1
Docket Number 50-313
Subject: CONFIRMATORY ORDER TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
This is to inform the Commission that a Confirmatory Order (CO) will be issued on or about March 20, 2013, to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, licensee), confirming Entergy’s commitment to submit its license amendment request (LAR) by January 31, 2014. This LAR will transition the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,” in accordance with Section 50.48(c) to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On June 28, 2011, Entergy committed to the date of August 31, 2012, for submission of its license amendment application. However, due to ANO-1’s implementation of its transition strategy and continued development of a high-quality application, the LAR will require more time than anticipated. In a letter dated August 23, 2012, the licensee proposed a new submittal date of January 31, 2014. This proposed date is beyond the previous committed submittal date and, thus, exceeds the enforcement discretion (i.e., until August 31, 2012) that the NRC granted to ANO-1 for certain fire protection noncompliances.
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