Region III Allegations and NRC Infrastructure In Disarray

I have been doing a little work with NRC Allegation surrounding the Lasalle nuclear plant. I discovered with their safety relief valve LERs (and LAR), some are missing in the docket. It the NRC and Exelon and NRC so incompetent nobody is enforcing LER reporting. Out of three SRV LERs in ten years at Unit 1, two are missing from the docket. Is it a coverup? This ask is there more LER missing at Lasalle, region III and throughout the nations. What is the extent and cause of condition?

So I dial up the LaSalle inspectors...the line is dead. I have been working with Sara in region III Allegation, can get a hold of here. I call the region III main office and try to get them to connect me to the allegation department. Every time they connect me I get a dead line.  I believe three times. Now I am getting irked. So I call the Washington operation line. I thinking they can connect me to Sara. I believe they tried to connect me to Sara and then somebody else. I had two operations people on the line now. They treated me very professionally. So basically region III was having broad land line problems and especially region III Allegation. So I pipe up to the operations people, now I got a new Allegation concern. You got a broad Allegation's phone reliability problem. That is when the staff fesses up and says we do have allegation phone issue for two days and we are working on it. I mean, you can clearly see it, there is many people here...the NRC instincts is to keep their blemishes or sins close to the vest instead of clearly admit we are having phone issues. Why couldn't they put a notification on the "report a concern page" we are having allegation phone issues. The instinct to hide and make the NRC look good.

So about a hour later after all this I get a mysterious phone call from deep voice and slow talking person telling me I called his line and didn't leave a message. He asked "did you call me"? So I asked, "who are you". He wouldn't tell me his name. I am convinced he is a NRC official. I push him hard on giving me his name. Finally I tell him he is a NRC official. He admits it. So I asked "what department do you work at"? It was like pulling teeth. You get it, he is a NRC employee, he is required to treat me with some level of respect. So I push him a little harder worrying he will hang up on me, We do a little more dancing around nothing, then he tells me his name and he is a project manager. I ask him, ":is one of your plants Lasalle". He says no. I give him the short story about talking to the inspectors at LaSalle and Allegations surrounding SRV issues, we are stumped on why I would call him? Later I am thinking when I called Region III, when the operator desperately  called around to three dead lines to dump, one of those line was his.          

More On the Grand Gulf Scram on Dec 12, 2018

I wonder if the Dec 12, 2018 special inspection results are out? I doubt it.

So two hours after the event started, they are forced to scram. This is totally non conservative. God knows how bad reactor water level was jumping around. So all this hiring below comes from the Scram on Dec 12, 2018 and the deficiencies in plant operations throughout 2018. In this 2016 special inspection below, Entergy voluntarily shutdown to train their operations staff for five months. They brought in many industry experts to figure out what is wrong and retrain the licensed operator. Out of the 2018 scram hiring some 300 hundred employees Entergy is overhauling operations again. Why is this repetitive retraining and overhauling plant operations going on in the worst plant in the nation? Why can't the NRC ROP quickly turn around a bad actor plant in a fairly short time?      

2016 Special Inspection 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has begun a special inspection at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mississippi to review circumstances surrounding several recent operational events. The Entergy plant has been shut down since September 8.

On September 23, following maintenance on the residual heat removal system, workers discovered that a misalignment of valves had rendered the plant’s alternate decay heat removal system unavailable. Technical specifications require that the alternate system be available when one of the plant’s two residual heat removal systems is out of service. The system is used to remove decay heat from the reactor following shutdown. The following day, when preparing to restart the reactor, control room operators caused an unexpected increase in reactor vessel water level due to a misalignment of valves.

Three NRC inspectors will spend about a week on site evaluating the cause of the problem and the adequacy of corrective actions to address performance issues. An inspection report documenting the team’s findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection.

“The purpose of this special inspection is to better understand the circumstances surrounding several recent operational events to determine if operator response was appropriate,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Kriss Kennedy. “We will also review the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that their causes, including associated equipment problems and any contributing operator actions, have been effectively addressed.”  

Entergy hiring 320 for Mississippi nuclear operations 

Associated Press Published 8:29 a.m. CT Jan. 25, 2019 | Updated 9:10 a.m. CT Jan. 25, 2019 

New Orleans-based Entergy says it will add 250 jobs in Jackson, augmenting its nuclear workforce. Spokeswoman Mara Hartmann says some employees will transfer from northeastern nuclear plants Entergy is closing or selling.

The electrical utility says it's also hiring another 70 people at Grand Gulf, increasing workers to 890. Entergy is overhauling the plant's management after operational problems. Grand Gulf supplies electricity to customers in Mississippi, Arkansas and Louisiana...

Downtime at 'aging' Grand Gulf attracts increased scrutiny

Edward Klump and Kristi E. Swartz, E&E News reporters Energywire: Tuesday, December 4, 2018

Tucked near Mississippi's border with Louisiana, deep in Entergy Corp.'s territory, rests the largest single-unit U.S. nuclear power station.

It's called Grand Gulf, and it boasts a 1,443-megawatt capacity.

But it hasn't been acting like a dependable backbone of the power grid.

An E&E News review of federal daily reactor status reports from 2013 through last month found Grand Gulf listed at full power roughly 52.5 percent of the time. It was at zero percent power almost 21 percent of the days studied. On other days, it was at various reduced levels.

Does that sound like a baseload plant?

"No," said Ted Thomas, chairman of the Arkansas Public Service Commission.

New Orleans-based Entergy has a 90 percent stake in the plant through an entity called System Energy Resources Inc. Cooperative Energy in Mississippi has the other 10 percent...

They bungle this event below as a whole and control of reactor water level. It is not the first time they lost control of water level. You notice how components that feed the vessel (RCIC) are having mechanical issues delaying the control of water level.  

Licensee Event Report 2018-010-00, Reactor Manual Scram due to Main Turbine Bypass Valve Drifting Open 

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Unit 1 was operating at approximately 100 percent power in Mode 1. There were no Structures, Systems, or Components that were inoperable that contributed to this event.
B. DESCRIPTION
At appoximately 1200 hours CDT on Wednesday, December 12, 2018 while operating in MODE 1 at appoximately 100 percent power the GGNS·Main Steam Bypass Stop and Control Valve 'A' [JI] began drifting open. The valve began to modulate between O -10% open over the course of 90 minutes. After 90

Can't you hear the CEO telling the licensed operators, "I don't want you shutting down for any reason". We are getting into a lot of outside trouble with our disgraceful capacity factor and gads of shutdowns. One more scam or down power and I am going to fire you all. I am exaggerating here a little, but I suspect this kind of upper level pressure with the two hour delay in fixing the B/P valves. The delay was the operators and other techs trying to troubleshoot to problem and hopefully going to fix the issues before the plant scram. And the indications was worsening by the seconds.  

minutes, the valve began to open at an increased rate, reaching approximately 50% open. The reactor was manually scrammed at 1351 hours. The Main Steam Line Isolation Valves [SB] were manually closed as a mitigating action to control reactor pressure vessel rate of depressurization and cooldown. Reactor pressure was controlled through the use of the Safety/Relief Valves [SB] and ultimately the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System [BN].
During the scram recovery, at 1358 hours the operator proceeded into the steps for a controlled start of RCIC. The expected RCIC injection response was delayed due to discharge pressure indication and governor valve light indications were not as expected. Therefore, the operator prepared to initiate the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System [BG] based on current reactor water level and its trend.
During preparation to initiate HPCS, the operator noted that RCIC had started to inject but reactor level was in the low end of the d~sired control band at-24.811 Wide Range (WR) with a downward trend and'current RCIC injection was not arresting the decreasing trend in a timely manner. After evaluating the reactor water level and rate of change, the operator completed manually starting H PCS injection at 1408 hours. At 1409 hours, the HPCS injection was secured with reactor water level at 7.4" WR and trending higher and RCIC still injecting. RCIC and Safety/Relief Valves were utilized for reactor water level control until RCIC was placed in standby at 1645 hours. 

As far as the delay to shutdown, there is nothing to fix on failed linear variable differential transformer below. I wonder how old it was? They can't operate for long with that kind of problem. The delay in scraming provided no benefit to prevent a scam or shutdown. They should have emediately scrammed and I suspect they were required to emediately shutdown per procedure. Not wait two hours to do the required thing...    

The direct cause of the event was a failed Linear Variable Differential Transformer (L VDT) in the actuator for the Main Steam Bypass Stop and Control Valve 'A' that directy resulted in the inability of the valve primary controller to properly position the valve. Failure of the L VDT resulted in a constant error signal being present at the controller, which allowed the valve to integrate open over time.

Typical Inspection Report for a Plant Heading Towards The Junk Yard

Relaxation with NRC rules and inspections as a plant is near permanent shutdown?

Fuel failures, Bum CRDM and incompetence with detecting cracks in the reactor head...

February 13, 2019

 SUBJECT:  PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT — NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION  REPORT 05000255/2018004

Is This Hope Creek Going To Plus or Minus 5% With SRV Testing

Just Remember, Hope had gone from plus or minus 1%, to 3% and heading to 5% over setpoint drift. It is a massive relaxation in testing requirement on these defective and unstable valves. The Hope is they will be permanently shutdown in a few years over financial problems.

ML19031B845 isn't in the docket yet? But this guy gives you a idea of the magnitude of relaxation.  

 From: Kim, James Sent: Friday, February 15, 2019 12:32 PM To: Duke, Paul R. Cc: Thomas, Brian J. Subject: Acceptance Review Result: Hope Creek-Relief Request to USE ASME Code Case OMN-17  (L-2019-LLR-0010)
Mr. Duke,
 By letter dated January 31, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19031B845), Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear, LCC (PSEG, the licensee) submitted a relief request for Hope Creek Generating Station in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and standards,” paragraph (z)(i) requesting approval for alternate rules for testing ASME Class 1 Pressure Relief/Safety Valves for the fourth 10-year inservice inspection interval.
 The NRC staff has reviewed your application and concluded that it does provide technical information in sufficient detail to enable the NRC staff to complete its detailed technical review and make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposed relief request in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety and the environment. Given the lesser scope and depth of the acceptance review as compared to the detailed technical review, there may be instances in which issues that impact the NRC staff’s ability to complete the detailed technical review are identified despite completion of an adequate acceptance review. If additional information is needed, you will be advised by separate correspondence. 
 The NRC staff has estimated that this licensing request will take approximately 120 hours to complete. The NRC staff expect to complete this review in approximately 8 months, which is October 2019 in support of the fall 2019 refueling outage. If there are emergent complexities or challenges in our review that would cause changes to the initial forecasted completion date or significant changes in the forecasted hours, the reasons for the changes, along with the new estimates, will be communicated during the routine interactions with the assigned project manager. 
 These estimates are based on the NRC staff’s initial review of the application and they could change, due to several factors including requests for additional information, unanticipated addition of scope to the review, and review by NRC advisory committees or hearing-related activities. Additional delay may occur if the submittal is provided to the NRC in advance or in parallel with industry program initiatives or pilot applications. 
 If you have any question, please contact me, James Kim, at James.Kim@nrc.gov or 301-415-4125.
 James Kim, Project Manager Branch 1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Why Has River Bend Been at 75% Power For Forever

Junk Plant Hope Creek Safety Relief Valve Cover-Up

Reposted from 1/29

Update Feb 14

Meeting a 10am this morning. 

Update Jan 30

I forgot to brag about my capabilities. I am solely responsible for pushing the NRC into making the set point drift a issue with the BWROG. I caught the drastic increase of setpoint drift LERs. Basically I said the SRVs over time with setpoint drift and leakage, unreliable parts...was a threat to the industry. It is interesting the NRC only choose the set point drift. The industry generally withholds all information about valve leakage and abnormal temperatures. So it is really hard to figure out how much leakage is going on in the industry by outsiders.

Check out my concerns at Hope Creek and Pilgrim in Adams? These valves are defective and they are sitting on a precipice of hell.       

Update

Oh, this guy is in my cell phone calendar. 

January 29, 2019 Title: Public Phone Call with the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) Regarding the Target Rock Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Setpoint Drift Issue February 14, 2019, 10:00 AM to 11:00 AMDate(s) and Time(s):
Location: Teleconference
Category: This is a Category 2 meeting. The public is invited to participate in this meeting by discussing regulatory issues with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at designated points identified on the agenda. Purpose: For the BWROG to provide a status update of activities being taken to address the Target Rock SRV Setpoint Drift Issue. Contact: Joe Golla 301-415-1002 joe.golla@nrc.gov
NRC NRC Staff Participants: External Boiling Water Reactors Owners Group
Teleconference:
Bridge Number Pass Code (888) 606-7810 16608

***The magnitude of the non performance issues here are astonishing. Most of the below information is new. Most has not been publicly documented. This reminds me of Pilgrim before their 2015 blizzard trip. The vast amount of non performance was secret. Then three failed. These valves are very delicate for their harsh safety environment. These safety valves may cycle up to 400 times in a accident.  

January 28, 2019

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2018004 

) SRV Main Seat Leakage In NRC IR 2018002, the Semi-Annual Trend review section documented multiple high SRV tailpipe temperatures and conclusions that two of these SRVs, ‘H’ and ‘K’, were exhibiting signs of main seat leakage.  Then, in NRC IR 2018003, an annual sample conducted for ‘H’ SRV and ‘D’ MSL issues documented that on September 5, 2018.  On that date, PSEG also initiated NOTF 20803213 recommending that engineering review the conclusions and corrective actions from a 2014 causal evaluation (ACE 70168360) due to the inspector’s questions.  Upon further review, the inspectors noted that PSEG had not taken action on NOTF 20803213 because even though there was automatic relief valve seat leakage it had not progressed and begun generating cyclic noises associated with condensate induced water hammer.  In 2014, these noises associated with condensate induced water hammer occurred in the torus approximately ~20 times/min.  October 1, 2018, the inspectors noted that PSEG initiated NOTF 20806044 for degrading conditions associated with the ‘H’ SRV main leakage, and then documented the reoccurrence of the condensate induced water hammer in the torus in NOTF 20814836 on December 20, 2018.  As of December 31, 2018, PSEG initiated actions to develop an adverse condition monitoring (ACM) plan and operation technical decision making (OTDM) document for the issue.  In addition, PSEG initiated NOTF 20816775 when the inspectors determined that the ‘H’ SRV main seat leak rate data from August to December 2018 was incorrect and did not include peer checks.

Safety Valves

Got three of these guys. Basically these valves are similar to the SRV. It has no remote function. These guys got a last ditch function with maintaining pressure in the vessel. It would be a horrible accident if these guys failed.  

December 10, 2018 

Licensee Event Report No. 2018-003-00 Cooper Nuclear Station

Safety Valve Failure Results in Loss of Safety Function

The pressure relief system includes three American Society of Mechanical Engineers code safety valves · (SV) [EIIS:SB] which are located on the main steam lines [EIIS:SB] within the drywell [EIIS:NH], between the reactor vessel [EIIS:RPV] and the first main steam isolation valve [EIIS:ISV]. The SVs provide protection against over pressurization of the nuclear system and discharge directly into the interior space of the drywell.
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.3 requires the safety function of three SVs to be operable. The nominal set pressure and tolerances for these valves are established in CNS TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1. 

PUBLIC MEETING WITH BOILING WATER REACTOR OWNERS’ GROUP on SRVS

Target Rock Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift Issue for Boiling Water Reactors September 12, 201

Agenda
• Background • Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Design Function • Safety Significance • Technical Specification (TS) Compliance • Industry Actions Considered in Past • Next Steps • Boiling Water Reactor Owners’ Group (BWROG) Feedback

Background
• Purpose:  To discuss Target Rock 2-stage SRV setpoint drift issue for boiling water reactors (BWRs). • Licensees continue to experience a large number of surveillance test failures with 2-stage Target Rock SRVs. • Typically TSs allow only one SRV failure. • TS operability allowance for setpoint drift for most plants is  ±3 percent. • As found setpoint drift for a number of BWRs ranges between +3 to +10 percent. – Most significant instance being a setpoint drift of +18.5 percent.

Background (cont.)
• Originally, the issue was addressed by Generic Safety Issue (GSI) B-55, “Improved Reliability of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves.” • GSI B-55 concluded the following: – Safety significance is low. • There is margin to reactor coolant system stress limits. – Industry was already pursuing actions to correct the setpoint drift. • Staff was satisfied with industry actions to resolve issue. – Regulations already require licensees to correct the setpoint drift (no new regulatory requirements are needed). • TSs, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.55a, and 10 CFR 50.65. • Therefore, GSI B-55 was closed in December 1999.

 SRV Design Function
• The SRVs are part of the nuclear pressure relief system and, in part, prevent overpressurization of the nuclear process barrier.  • A select number of SRVs are used by the automatic depressurization system (ADS) to rapidly decrease reactor pressure during specific small-break loss-of-coolant accidents during loss of high-pressure injection scenarios.  • The setpoint drift issue does not affect the ADS function.

Safety Significance The NRC staff reviewed the licensee event reports (LERs) considering the following design aspects for determining the safety significance for SRVs that do not open at their expected setpoints:
• ASME Code pressure/service limits on the primary system. • Hydrodynamic loads on SRV discharge piping. • Performance of high-pressure injection systems.

Safety Significance (cont.)
Based on the review of LERs, the NRC staff determined the safety significance associated with Target Rock 2-stage setpoint drift to be low.

TS Compliance
• In the Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric BWR plants, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.3 states: “The safety function of [11] S/RVs shall be OPERABLE.” • SR 3.4.3.1 states: “Verify the safety function lift setpoints of the [required] S/RVs” are within a specified range. • Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 states that “[f]ailure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO.”

TS Compliance (cont.)
• Following the guidance of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)-0326, “Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety,” if there is not a reasonable expectation of operability, the SRVs should not be considered operable. • NRC staff considers the repeated failure of Target Rock SRVs a challenge to a reasonable expectation of operability.  This could lead to determination of inoperability and noncompliance with TSs.

Past Industry Actions Industry has identified corrosion-induced oxide bonding to be the cause of the current setpoint drift issue for 2-stage Target Rock SRVs. The licensees have tried the following options since the closure of GSI B-55, but with limited success: • Application of platinum coatings to SRV pilot valve discs. • Change the pilot valve disc material to Stellite 21 in an effort to prevent corrosion bonding. • Enhanced SRV insulation to reduce corrosion and improve reliability. • Return to modified Target Rock 3-stage SRV (subject to downward setpoint drift concerns).
10

Owners group slides 

Craig Shepherd (DTE) – Committee Chairman
BWROG/NRC Meeting September 12, 2018
Copyright 2018, BWR Owners’ Group, All Rights Reserved
BWROG Target Rock SRV Performance Improvement Committee
2
History/Scope
Formed in 2016
Committee Scope:  address the common causes of repetitive Target Rock 2-stage SRV as-found set-point test failures in the fleet. • Technical Exchange Meetings:  share site set point drift performance, best practices, roadmap planning • 2-stage valve focus • Scope focused on setpoint drift
Membership:  DTE/Fermi, Duke/Brunswick, Exelon/FitzPatrick, NPPD/Cooper, PSEG/Hope Creek, TVA/Browns Ferry
Copyright 2018, BWR Owners’ Group, All Rights Reserved
3
2017/18 Activities
• Industry-shared IBAD procedure (application of Platinum to disc surface) • Autoclave Screening Test - used to help develop sputtering application process of Platinum on test coupons and comparison to IBAD.  Obtained positive results. • Plasma Enhanced Magnetron Sputter Coating of (Quantity 3) pilot discs with Platinum.  Performed steam validation testing with positive results. In process of obtaining BWROG product for utilizing Sputtering for application of Platinum on SRV pilot discs. • Static Autoclave Material Screening - baseline conditions of corrosion bonding with control group and screening other materials. (Started Aug. 24, 2018)
Copyright 2018, BWR Owners’ Group, All Rights Reserved
4
2019 Planned Activities
Test different thickness of (sputtered) Platinum coated on pilot discs in valve lift tests. • Sputtering opens process space for different thicknesses of Platinum Coating. • Potential for fleet usage – Know that current thickness of Platinum coating provided step-improvement in set point drift performance.  – Does increase in thickness provide more protection from corrosion bonding?
Copyright 2018, BWR Owners’ Group, All Rights Reserved
Initial scoping effort to understand current Tech Spec Limits and alternative licensing approaches. • Not a funded project at this time. • Initial discussions among multiple BWROG committees.
LER Reduction
Copyright 2018, BWR

Example of NRC Risk Perspective Corruption

They are basically substituting bureaucrat's expert judgement for science, engineering and facts. Generally the NRC inspectors are not experts over the plants compared to the plant employees. So how does a guy like me know the exerts credential, training and skills are appropriate for the task? Is all the uncertainty wasted out? 

So at the bottom of the pile of horse manure on this risk perspectives, all you got are humans making judgments about safety. This is no way the system keeps these experts straight...they are the NRC untouchables. The unconstrained gods of nuclear safety... Dirty human judgements are behind everything about risk perspectives, and I have massively decreasing confidence surrounding our professional class...

This all is sneaky deregulation and weakening of the controls surrounding the industry. The politicians all want plausible deniability with the acceptance of campaign contributions. If a terrible accident happens, the politicians don't want to get blamed or our political system in general. To for fill this style of corruption, they create two systems. One is defined by congressional  regulations and other is defined as a secret system were the NRC bureaucrats appease the politicians and utility big wigs pulling the strings  unseen by any political oversight. The professional judgement thing here is... really, is the nuclear plants being regulated and overseen by the professional class wild west gunslingers for hire.        

February 07, 2019

MEMORANDUM TO: Sean E. Peters, Chief  Human Factors and Reliability Branch  Division of Risk Analysis  Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
 FROM: Jing Xing, Senior Human Performance Engineer  /RA/  Human Factor and Reliability Branch  Division of Risk Analysis  Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
 SUBJECT:  UTILIZATION OF EXPERT JUDGMENT TO SUPPORT HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF FLEXIBLE COPING STRATEGIES (FLEX)


This memorandum transmits work performed for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) related to the use of expert judgment to support human reliability analysis of flexible coping strategies (FLEX).  To date, the research products developed by the Human Factors and Reliability Branch (HFRB) along with the staff of NRR include: 1) The presentation on the topic to the 2018 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, 2) A draft paper on the topic submitted to the 2019 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Conference, and 3) A brief summary of the results of the expert elicitation on FLEX human reliability analysis.  Dr. Jing Xing from HFRB and Ms. Michelle Kichline from NRR reviewed these documents and concluded that the documents contained materials useful for the NRC’s risk-informed licensing reviews related to implementation of FLEX equipment and, therefore, recommend that they be made publicly available. If you have any questions about these materials, please contact me. 

Enclosures: As Stated


CONTACT: Jing Xing, RES/DRA  

Junk Plant Seabrook

With concrete degrading in critical parts of Seabrook, environmental advocates urge to delay renewal of license

David L. Ryan/Globe Staff/File/2011
The Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in Seabrook, N.H.
By David Abel Globe Staff February 12, 2019


NEWBURYPORT — Concerned about growing cracks in the concrete containment dome and in other critical parts of the sprawling complex at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, a group of activists here has been urging federal regulators to postpone a planned extension of the aging plant’s operating license.

With the help of lawmakers from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, they recently won a reprieve.

Officials at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreed last month to delay their renewal decision and meet with local residents on Wednesday in Hampton, N.H., to discuss whether the plant should be allowed to continue producing electricity 20 more years after its current license ends in 2030.

Now, the activists are planning to file an emergency petition with the government, seeking immediate action “to ensure that the NRC will uphold its duty to protect the public,” said Natalie Hildt Treat, executive director of the C-10 Research & Education Foundation, which for years has been monitoring radiation from the plant.

The petition, which the group plans to file this week, demands that regulators delay their decision on the license extension. “We think the NRC made a mistake when it concluded that [extending the license] would pose no significant hazard to public safety,” she said...

Quadrillions Of Dollars In Damages And Millions Of Souls Lost: A Country Totally Lost?

By 2030 or 2040 we will see how phony green energy and carbon taxes are. It is just selfish people feeding their faces and caring not a wit about the future. We will look back and wonder why this 2019 population were so  spiritually impoverish. 

I sent this to the NRC.  

Mike Mulligan <steamshovel2002@gmail.com>

Mon, Jan 7, 8:35 PM



to Marjorie


"Hello, Mr. Mulligan,

Thank you very much for your message. I did provide the concern you pointed you about the availability of the 2019 reactor status data to our Information Technology staff in NRC HQ. I’m glad you have a work-around that you can use until we get that addressed. I also provided your message to our regional office attorney for his evaluation to enter your message into ADAMS.

VR,

Marjey"

Thanks.

This email business today was all my fault. I never should have sent my message with Yahoo. Please send all future emails with Gmail. 

The "event notification report also doesn't have a 2019 link. 

I bet it was the "I love the USA" that sent my email to the lawyer : ) Let me know if I have to change something to get it in. I have gotten messages into Adams often. This seems non routine.

I could make the case the current political issue in relevant in this case and I know the NRC is highly sensitive to political and the news cycle. No matter how you frame it as you are a independent agency. I bet you I am the only one in the USA who would say our political tribulations and instability could make a major accident much worst. The results of the damage fuel might not be the costliest component. Because of political instability, the public and politicians might create overregulation in a hysterical reaction. The scenario I thinking about, we might recklessly shutdown all the reactors in the USA in just a few years. That would kill 20% of our grid capacity. It took us twenty years to replace all that electricity. We had riots, price spikes and electrical shortage and a continually collapsed stock market. Our president had to declare marshal law in order to save out tittering nation Of course, this will spill out to other nations. 

Then in a hundred years, a report might come out. If the USA went full nuclear in 2025, how much less would the results of global warming be? Why didn't you go full nuclear by 2025? You seen it coming. Well, we had a reactor accident in 2021. Our nation was in a very unstable condition. The generations in 2025 was traumatized by the nuclear accident and the news media overreactions. We had to wait till all the 2025 generations died before we could ever speak nuclear power again. The public just wouldn't let us build them again. Nuclear power was the third rail for the politicians.

Second Salem Plant Severely Threatened During Polar Vortex Emergency

How close to the precipice was NJ with a tremendous amount of grid capacity severely threatened during a Polar Vortex event. Salem 1&2 and Hope Creek are a three plant facility. The three plants are the second largest nuclear facility in the nation. Would there be blackout?

This three plant facility is heading towords perminant shutdown in a few years. Are they spending enough money on the facility???  

What about grid resilience???  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53852
Facility: SALEM Region: 1     State: NJ Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JASON MORGAN HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 01/31/2019 Notification Time: 04:23 [ET] Event Date: 01/31/2019 Event Time: 03:01 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/31/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

2

M/R

Y

100

Power Operation

0

Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP - CIRCULATING WATER ICING CONDITIONS "At 0301 [EST] on 1/31/19, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to icing conditions requiring the removal of 4 Circulating Water Pumps from service. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. 21 CFCU [Containment Fan Cooler Unit] was inoperable prior to the event for a planned maintenance window and did not contribute to the cause of the event and did not adversely impact the plant response to the trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred following the manual reactor trip. The reason for the Auxiliary Feed Water System auto-start was due to low level in a steam generator. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. "Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feed Water System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The icing condition was described as frazil ice. Unit-1 reduced power to 88% because one circulating water pump was shutdown.