Monday, May 21, 2018

Cash Starved Southern Sells Asset, Vogtle Next


Cash-Starved Southern Sells Florida Assets to NextEra
NextEra Energy on May 21 said it would acquire several assets from Southern Co., including Southern’s ownership interest in two natural gas-fired power plants in Florida, in a deal valued at about $6.5 billion.
Southern in a statement Monday said the sale would help the company reduce debt, which has dogged Southern as its subsidiary Georgia Power continues construction of Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia. The expansion at Vogtle is years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget.
Southern CEO Tom Fanning earlier this month told company investors that the utility needed to raise cash to reduce debt, pay for the new Vogtle reactors, and boost the company’s returns. Southern’s share price on average is down more than 10% in 2018. The company laid out the details of the sale and presented a plan for its use of the equity proceeds over the next five years in a conference call Monday morning. Southern in a statement Monday said, “Proceeds from these transactions are intended to be used to reduce debt and improve Southern Company’s balance sheet.”...

Hinsdale NH: Where the Hell Is My Thanks

Just google "Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale NH-Brattleboro route 119 bridge". The Hinsdale bridge committee worked on this for decades and got nothing done. I came on the scene in and about 2012 with my "build new bridge" poster antics taped to the Hinsdale side of the
Hinsdale owes me my court fine of fine of $1500 dollars. 

bridge and within just a few years it galvanized my community into complaining to the politicians, that we are in dire need of getting it replaced. I even engineered my own arrest over loose boards on the bridge as a tool to boost public interest in the terrible conditions of the bridge. I don't give a shit about my reputation. That is the difference between me and you. I soon got the bridge walkway boards replaced in a $28,000 job and my fine for pulling up the boards was about $1500. I spent $1500 dollars and turned my wife's hair grey, in order to get a $50 million dollar bridge for my community.  

If all the players were really truthful, they would all admit my antics got them thinking of the terrible conditions of the bridge and imagining/anticipating if the bridge collapsed or the NHDOT declared it unsafe...our community would be devastated by it. I certainly thought the poor condition of bridge was severely limiting the economical growth for decades before I taped my first "build new bridge" poster to the bridge in 2013.           

"Bringing big business to the border in Hinsdale" 

By Sierra Hubbard Sentinel Staff
May 12, 20

HINSDALE — A national farming and outdoor retailer chose a border town of 4,000 residents for its second pin on the Granite State map, joining other major chain stores to settle in Hinsdale in recent years.

Runnings sells a wide variety of goods, from larger items like lawnmowers to home decor, pet products, power tools and outdoor apparel.

The store opened for business at 18 Georges Field Road in Hinsdale on April 19, but it’s celebrating a grand opening May 16 to 20. The event will stretch over several days and include product demonstrations, a petting zoo and more than $25,000 in prizes, according to Dennis A. Jensen, the company’s director of marketing and advertising.

This marks the second Runnings store in the state; one opened in Claremont three years ago. Jensen said the Hinsdale location is part of the Minnesota-based company’s expansion into the Northeast, which began in 2014 with store openings in New York, along with later additions in Claremont and Putnam, Conn. The retailer has more than 40 stores in six states.

As of the end of April, Jensen said the Hinsdale stored had hired 58 employees, half of whom are part time. He noted that many were hired locally and said more positions will be added as needed.

But the benefits of Runnings opening in town extend beyond the workforce, according to Hinsdale Selectman Mike Darcy.

“It is filling in a previously vacant storefront, which is nice because the building’s not just sitting there rotting ... ,” Darcy said. “It’s going to get the care and maintenance that it deserves.”

The building housed a Walmart until it moved out in 2011 to open a larger supercenter 3 miles away.

Jensen said the location was ideal, but not solely because of the physical space. He said the company looks specifically for customers with lifestyles that fit the profile of a Runnings shopper, which encompasses a love for pets, the outdoors, hobbies and working with one’s hands.

“We will not open a store if we don’t feel like there’s a demand for what we’re trying to sell,” Jensen said. “When we looked in the area, there really was that need we felt that we could meet with the store.”

But Runnings isn’t the only big-box company to take root in Hinsdale. In 2013, Tractor Supply Co. built a store on Brattleboro Road, also called Route 119. Based in Brentwood, Tenn., Tractor Supply operates 21 stores in New Hampshire, according to its website.

Walmart, which came to Georges Field Road in 1993, opened its supercenter in April 2011, also on Brattleboro Road.

Darcy said the town of about 4,000 people is prime real estate for national chains and larger companies.

“We’re right at the meeting of Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts,” he said.

It’s an attractive location because the Granite State has no sales tax, he said, unlike its neighbors.

State Sen. Jay V. Kahn, D-Keene, represents District 10, which includes Hinsdale. Because of the tax incentive and proximity, he said residents have a close relationship with cross-border towns.

“What you find in Hinsdale is that the state border is very fluid,” Kahn said. “People in Hinsdale work in Brattleboro, Vermont, and vice versa.”

Businesses in Hinsdale, he said, have the advantage of access to pools of residents from several area towns, including those in nearby states. Kahn said this advantage applies to both workforce and customer base.

And officials with the town are planning more improvements to an area that’s already appealing to outside companies.

“If you look just a few years out, the Hinsdale bridge will be replaced, which will facilitate even more traffic,” Kahn said.

Two bridges connect the town to Brattleboro over the Connecticut River, both Pennsylvania truss-style spans built in 1920 and rehabilitated in 1988. Officials with the N.H. Department of Transportation classify the narrow bridges as functionally obsolete, which means the outdated structures don’t meet current design standards and have height and weight restrictions.

Hinsdale has worked for decades to replace the bridges, and state highway officials held public hearings in January outlining plans to build a new span across the border. Construction is expected to begin spring 2020 and continue into 2023, according to state officials.

“If there’s going to be any large retail or any large commercial expansion in Hinsdale, the new bridge will play a big role in that,” Darcy said, adding that it will offer travelers better access to Interstate 91.

Phil Suter, president and CEO of the Greater Keene Chamber of Commerce, said efforts to replace the bridges are part of attempts by town officials to make Hinsdale more attractive to businesses.

Suter said the communities along the border have struggled since the sale of Vermont Yankee, a prominent nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vt., that employed as many as 650 people in its prime.

Built in 1972, the plant’s owner announced in 2013 that the facility planned to shut down its reactor by the end of 2014. The sale and transfer of the plant’s spent nuclear fuel to dry-cask storage is expected to be completed by the end of this year.

When the facility’s owner made the announcement, Vernon and the surrounding communities suddenly faced what many towns across the country have encountered as nuclear power plants cease their operations: Residents and families with high incomes packed up and left.

“That cost the area a number of jobs,” Suter said, noting that many were higher skilled positions. “... Anything that comes back into that area is good. It’s good for the tax base; it’s good for the real estate market.”

And in a region that emphasizes the importance of supporting local businesses, Suter quelled concerns about big-box retailers moving in and said there’s room for businesses of all sizes. Ultimately, he said the residents will choose the establishments that are fair, have good customer service and take part in the community.

“People will vote with their dollars,” Suter said. “They’ll vote with their feet.”

With the potential to generate jobs, revenue and maybe even new residents in Hinsdale, Suter said it’s a “really big deal” that the company chose the town for its second location in New Hampshire.

“This opening of this store, Runnings, is a really big deal,” Suter said. “They don’t casually open a store like that if they don’t think there’s a market for what they do.”

Troubled Columbia: Unstable SRV Design, Again

Update

Actually, there is little SRV LERs here. I find this suspicious. Why do we have tons of SRV LERs at plants I identified on my blog(Hatch, Pilgrim Hope...), while almost none at Columbia???

What is wrong with this picture? Columbia doesn't have a single SRV LER. Are they not reporting failures?

05000397

A transformer breakdown and a SRV problem is not a good thing at the same time? I haven't seen many LERs with SRV issues at Columbia?

Training troubles
On December 28, 2017, the licensee informed the inspector of the following operating test results:

• 5 of 6 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test

• 50 of 57 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test

• 56 of 57 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test 
Actually, this plant is owned by the US government.
Power Reactor Event Number: 53410
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: SEAN KEEHN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 05/18/2018
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2018
Event Time: 06:51 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM CAUSED BY MAIN TRANSFORMER TRIP

"At 0651 [PDT] on May 18th, 2018, Columbia Generating station experienced a Main Transformer trip, that caused a Reactor Scram. Reactor Power, Pressure and Level were maintained as expected for this condition. MS-RV-1A (Safety Relief Valve) and MS-RV-1B (Safety Relief Valve) opened on reactor high pressure during the initial transient. MS-RV-1B appeared to remain open after pressure lowered below the reset point. The operating crew removed power supply fuses for MS-RV-1B and it currently indicates intermediate position. SRV (Safety Relief Valve) tail pipe temperatures indicate all valves are closed. Suppression pool level and temperature have remained steady within normal operating levels.

"All control rods inserted and reactor power is being maintained subcritical.

"RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level is being maintained with condensate and feed system with startup flow control valves in automatic. Reactor Pressure is being maintained with the Turbine Bypass valves controlling in automatic. The main condenser is the heat sink.

"No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) systems actuated or injected; the EOC-RPT (End of Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip) and RPS (Reactor Protection System) systems actuated causing a trip of the RRC pumps and a reactor scram.

"Core recirculation is being maintained with RRC-P-1A (Reactor Recirculation Pump) running.

"No release has occurred.

"At this time there will be no notifications to state, local or other public agencies.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.

"The cause of the event is currently under investigation. Plant conditions are stable."

The plant is in its normal electrical alignment and offsite power is available to the site.

Thursday, May 17, 2018

Junk Plant ANO 1 Still Indicating A Very Troubled Plant

They got only one of two backup cooling systems working after the scram. They were just coming out of a outage.
ower Reactor Event Number: 53404
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4     State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN PARKS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/16/2018
Notification Time: 22:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2018
Event Time: 17:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 10 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP

"At 1750 CDT, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reactor tripped due to the trip of the 'B' Main Feedwater Pump. Unit 1 was at 10 percent power with escalation of power in progress with one Main Feedwater Pump in service. Investigation is in progress as to the cause of the Main Feedwater Pump trip. The Main Feedwater Pump trip resulted in RPS [reactor protection system] actuation on loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps and resulted in Emergency Feedwater (EFW) actuation. All Control Rods inserted into the core properly and the reactor was verified shutdown.

"EFW experienced a half-trip on the 'A' train of Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) at time of system actuation, but was successfully actuated manually immediately upon discovery. Train 'B' EFIC actuated in Automatic as designed. The half-trip of the 'A' train of EFIC is currently believed to be associated with EFIC Channel 'C'; however, investigation is underway to verify this.

"Currently, ANO-1 has been stabilized and is being maintained in Mode 3 with Auxiliary Feedwater in service. Heat removal is via Turbine Bypass valves to the Condenser.

"No radiological releases have occurred due to this event."

There was no effect on Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Arkansas.

Wednesday, May 16, 2018

Hope/Salem Is A Mess: Their's And The Nation's Flex Stratigy


May 9, 2018 theres

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2018001
Implementing Procedures for Beyond Design Basis FLEX Mitigating Strategies Not Followed Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems  
 Green  FIN 05000354/2018001-01 Closed H.5 – Human Performance – Work
Each violation should be treated separately. Then fine or worst the hell out of them for each violation. Honestly, in this bundle all violations into one generic single violation system, you have no idea how many violation are in the industry. It is just not disciplining away from a chaotic and erratic site. It sends no messages to the other plants to keep these plants orderly.

The big inexpensive and flaw in the system the flex system should have been included into a licensing bases system.

These components are  
Management 71152 A Green finding (FIN) was identified by the inspectors for multiple examples of PSEG not following the station specific procedures that implement the Salem and HCGS Final Integrated Plans for Beyond Design Basis FLEX Mitigating Strategies, EM-SA-100-1000 and EM-HC-100-1000, respectively.  Specifically, since compliance with the FLEX order was met on November 10, 2016, PSEG did not follow the common PSEG fleet PM Process and diesel fuel oil testing program procedures, MA-AA-716-210, CY-AB-140-410, and SC.OP-LB.DF-0001 for the annual fuel oil sampling of FLEX equipment.  In addition to this, between December 6, 2017, and March 8, 2018, PSEG did not follow site specific procedures for FLEX equipment unavailability and mitigation capability protection in accordance with these procedures, OP-HC-108-115-1001 and OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program. Description:  PSEG is committed to comply with NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, and NRC Order on Mitigation Strategies, EA-12-049.  

FLEX Equipment Preventive Maintenance

Section 11.5.2 of NEI 12-06 states, in part, that portable equipment that directly performs a FLEX mitigation strategy for the core, containment, or spent fuel pool (SFP) should be subject to maintenance and testing guidance provided in Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) AP 913, Equipment Reliability Process, to verify proper function.  The maintenance program should ensure that the FLEX equipment reliability is being achieved.  Standard industry templates (e.g., EPRI) and associated bases will be developed to define specific maintenance and testing.

In complying with NRC Order EA-12-049, PSEG implemented EM-HC-100-1000 and EM-SA-100-1000.  In Sections 2.18.7 of these procedures it states that FLEX mitigation equipment is subject to initial acceptance testing and subsequent periodic maintenance and testing to verify proper function.  FLEX diesel generators and pumps are in PSEG’s fleet common PM process, MA-AA-716-210, which defines periodic testing and maintenance and follows the PM template requirements in EPRI’s Preventive Maintenance Basis for FLEX Equipment – Project Overview Report (EPRI Report 3002000623), dated September 2013.  

The inspectors reviewed a number of recent equipment and PM issues at PSEG associated with the HCGS, Salem, and fleet common FLEX diesel generators and pumps.  During the review, the inspectors found that this equipment is scheduled per PSEG’s PM program and, in accordance with EPRI guidance, should be tested every 6 months and the fuel oil should be sampled every 12 months.  Based on the inspector’s requests and questions related to the FLEX fuel oil cloud point and sample results, PSEG found that the initial fuel oil samples for all of the FLEX diesel generators and pumps were either never taken (at Salem) or not analyzed (at HCGS).  Because of this, the inspectors determined that since compliance with the FLEX order was met on November 10, 2016, PSEG has not followed the common PSEG fleet PM Process and diesel fuel oil testing program procedures, MA-AA-716-210, CY-AB-140-410, and SC.OP-LB.DF-0001, for the annual fuel oil sampling of FLEX equipment.

FLEX Equipment Unavailability and Protection

Section 11.5.3 of NEI 12-06 states, in part, that the unavailability of equipment and applicable connections that directly performs a FLEX mitigation strategy for the core, containment, and SFP should be managed such that risk to mitigating strategy capability is minimized.  The unavailability of installed plant equipment is controlled by existing plant processes such as the technical specifications. 

PSEG’s FLEX equipment allowable outage times and required actions for equipment unavailability are maintained in site specific operations procedures OP-HC-108-115-1001 and OP-SA-108-115-1001 in order to meet the requirements in NEI 12-06.

For the three site FLEX diesel pumps (H1FLX-10-P-500 (HCGS)); SCFLX-1FLXE18 (Salem); C1FLX-1FLXE42 (back-up common to Salem and HCGS), a loss of two of three represents a loss of a FLEX mitigation capability.  OP-HC-108-115-1001 and OP-SA-108-115-1001 state, in part, that when installed equipment which supports FLEX strategies becomes unavailable, then the FLEX strategy affected by this unavailability does not need to be maintained during the unavailability.  The required beyond design basis (BDB)/FLEX equipment may be unavailable for 90 days provided that the site BDB/FLEX capability (N) is met. If the site BDB/FLEX capability is met but not protected for all of the sites’ applicable hazards (flood, earthquake, high winds from hurricane or tornado, or local intense precipitation), then the allowed unavailability is reduced to 45 days.

On February 19, 2018, PSEG documented NOTF 20787557 for the FLEX diesel back-up pump common to Salem and HCGS (C1FLX-1FLXE42) failure to start that was not returned to an available condition until March 8.  A NOTF (20783115) dated December 6, 2017, 75 days earlier, documented a failure to start with the same common FLEX diesel pump.  The inspectors noted that no actions were taken to resolve the December issue other than attempting to start the pump multiple times over 12 days until the pump started on December 18, 2017.  At this point, PSEG declared the pump available without performing any corrective maintenance or documenting any basis for the pump being available.  The inspectors questioned PSEG about the time period mentioned above and how PSEG’s BDB/FLEX capability was protected during that time for all of the applicable site hazards as all three pumps are located in outside FLEX storage areas at ground level.  Because of this, the inspectors determined that PSEG did not follow site specific procedures for FLEX equipment unavailability and mitigation capability protection for this common diesel pump between December 6, 2017, and March 8, 2018 (92 days).

Based on all of the information above, the inspectors determined that there were multiple examples of PSEG not following the station specific procedures for FLEX Mitigating Strategies.  Specifically, PSEG did not follow the common PSEG fleet PM Process and diesel fuel oil testing program procedures for the annual fuel oil sampling of FLEX equipment, or site specific procedures for FLEX equipment unavailability so that equipment issues were appropriately tracked and adequately protected to allow it to be unavailable for greater than 90 days when availability should have been limited to less than 45 days.
11

Corrective Actions:  PSEG’s corrective actions for the above issues included obtaining fuel oil samples from all the Salem, HCGS, and common FLEX equipment onsite and analyzing the samples to ensure the fuel oil quality remained adequate.  PSEG also replaced the starting solenoid on the common FLEX diesel pump that failed to start and returned the pump to an available status on March 8, 2018, 92 days after it first became unavailable.

Corrective Action References:  20787557, 20783115, 60138024, 20787861, 20787862, 20787863, 20787879, 20787880, 20787881, 20787882, 20787883, 20787884, 20791977, 20791974, and 80122006. Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency:  PSEG’s station specific procedures EM-SA-100-1000 and EM-HC-100-1000 implement the Salem and HCGS FLEX Mitigating Strategies, which includes FLEX equipment PM and unavailability.  The inspectors determined that since January 2017, there were multiple examples of PSEG not implementing these procedures utilizing existing procedures for the PM process, diesel fuel oil testing or operability assessment and equipment control, and that this represented a performance deficiency.

Screening:  The performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  The inspectors also reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” and found it was sufficiently similar to Example 3.k, in that significant programmatic deficiencies were identified that could have led to worse outcomes.

Significance:  Issues identified concerning FLEX are evaluated through a cross-regional panel using IMC 0609, Appendix M, “Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria,” as informed by Appendix O, “Post Fukushima Mitigation Strategies Significance Determination Process (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051)” (ML16055A351).  The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspector answered “no” to the five questions in the draft Appendix O.  Specifically, this condition was not associated with SFP level instrumentation required by NRC Order EA-12-051 and did not result in a complete loss of function to maintain or restore core cooling, containment pressure control/heat removal and/or SFP cooling capabilities.

Cross-Cutting Aspect:  This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Management, because PSEG did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority and did not identify and manage the coordination of different Salem, HCGS and PSEG common work groups or job activities.  Specifically, PSEG did not execute work activities associated with the FLEX fuel oil sampling or corrective maintenance activities on FLEX equipment that would ensure that equipment’s reliability and availability. (H.5) Enforcement:  This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of regulatory requirements was identified.  Because the finding does not involve a violation of regulatory requirements and has very low safety significance, it is identified as a finding.

Observation 71152  Annual Follow-up of Selected issues Review of Recent FLEX Equipment and Preventive Maintenance Issues

The inspectors noted the following observations during the review:

1. PSEG is inconsistent when conducting CAP screening for NOTFs involving FLEX equipment failures in accordance with procedure LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process.  NOTFs 20775917 and 20766130 for FLEX diesel generator (H1FLX-10-G-2026) and pump (H1FLX-10-P-500) failures to start were screened as significance level (SL) 4, a non-corrective action program condition (N-CAP), when similar failures to start of a FLEX diesel pump (C1FLX-1FLXE42) in NOTFs 20783115 and 20787557 were screened as SL3, a condition affecting regulatory compliance (CARC).  NOTF 20788124 for the spare FLEX diesel generator (SCFLX-1FLXE10) low engine coolant temperature and determined it to be non-functional, but the NOTF was screened as SL4 instead of SL3.

2. PSEG did not have a process or procedure in place to ensure that the fuel oil used for outdoor FLEX equipment has the required fuel additives to ensure proper operation during cold weather operations.  PSEG documented the inspector’s concern in NOTF 20786860.

3. PSEG did not quarantine and send out for failure analysis a failed FLEX component, the engine control module from a FLEX diesel generator (H1FLX-10-G-2026), identified in NOTF 20775917.  PSEG has initiated NOTFs 20774397 and 20783803 to document delays and a lack of oversight in the failure analysis tracking process.  PSEG has created corrective actions under orders 70196257 and 70197907 to revise ER-AA-230-1004, Failure Analysis Tracking and Reporting by April 2018.