Oh No, Now ANO Is Down to 81% for two days.

Plus Grand Gulf and River Bend. You keep being at 100% Waterford...

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelte: Vogtle

What is wrong with this picture. The longer they dittle in construction and the more expensive the plant gets, the more profits they make. Way more profits.  

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelter questions financial plan for Plant Vogtle

By Maria Saporta  –  Contributing Writer, Atlanta Business Chronicle

an hour ago

A Georgia state senator is strongly criticizing the financial plan to pay for the two new nuclear power plants at Plant Vogtle.

Speaking at Friday morning’s Sustainable Atlanta Roundtable (SART), State Sen. Chuck Hufstetler (R-Rome), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, openly criticized Senate Bill 31 that passed in 2009 that approved the financial plan for Plant Vogtle. It was called the Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, which permitted the utility to begin recovering the costs of financing the construction of the new nuclear plants from consumers before they came on line.

Pointing out that he wasn’t yet in office when that bill passed (he was elected in 2012), Hufstetler said, “It was probably a mistake to go forward the way it did.”

After the SART meeting, which is organized by Southface, a nonprofit group that promotes renewable enery, Georgia Power was asked to respond to Hufstetler’s comments. The utility’s response is presented in full later in this article.

But Hufstetler’s also strongly criticized the way the utility would be making profit from the project’s cost overruns.

Originally – in August 2008, it was estimated that Plant Vogtle reactors 3 and 4 would cost $14.3 billion and would begin commercial operations in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Now it is estimated that that the two reactors will cost $25.2 billion with the first reactor due to go into service in late 2021 and the second one scheduled to be operational in 2022.

Sen. Hufstetler said that because of the cost overruns, Southern Co.’s profit is now estimated to go from $7.4 billion to $12.6 billion – a difference of $5.2 billion.

“I don’t think Southern Co. should make additional profit just because of cost overruns,” Hufstetler said.

When asked if he would be seeking new legislation to limit the utility’s profit on the project, Hufstetler responded that he’s looking at options.

“We can still examine the profit (issue),” he said. “There are a lot of things that have happened that we can’t change. (But) we can look at the additional profit going forward. We can revisit the profit.”

Also, Hufstetler said the state can “make sure we put incentives in the right place” when considering future energy investments.

Specifically, Hufstetler pointed to the comparable costs of different energy sources.

Currently, he said the cost per kilowatt hour for nuclear energy will be 13 cents, compared to 4.4 cents for solar energy.

“We are putting a unit on line that’s going to be three times that cost (of solar),” he said.

He went on to say that nuclear represents 10 percent of our power resources in Georgia, but it will account for 20 percent of the cost of power.

“If our rates are going up and other states are going down, we will lose our competitive advantage,” Hufstetler said. “It’s a tough issue. We do need to look at the consumers in Georgia and protect them…

New FBI Mark Felt/Deepthroad Movie

There is a lot of shocking similarities between the Nixon and Trump Times. But I think Trump can play the game a lot better than Nixon.

Washington Post reporter trying to get the big picture from Mark on Watergate. There is so much chaos in the Whitehouse and contradictory public statement. I don't understand it.

Mark, "chaos is control"...   

Dead Ender Junk Pilgrim: More Safety Relief Valves Problems

Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A

Is this a grade I or II valve and its component?

Generally a grade II is a commercial grade. A grade I is a full nuclear safety grade valve. They have been putting grade II as a result of  secret deregulation...

Yep, this is a update from  the first one on April 2017. We really don't know all of the recent secret failures or degradation with these components. Just like this guy, nobody outside the plant knew this guy was leaking. You really can't ascertain how unreliable these are. Are the walking dead plants allowed secret deregulations.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: (04-2017) 0313112020
~ ... ,.,"~ Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. l i\ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry . • ! ~ .f" (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. ..... .~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects .
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means htti;1://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3!J used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER .PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 1 OF4
4. TITLE Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
SEQUENTIAL
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A NUMBER NO. 05000 N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 24 2017 2017 - 007 01 12 20 2017 N/A 05000 N/A
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
N
D 20.2201(b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) D 20.2201(d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) D 20.2203(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(4) D so.73(a)(2)(iii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 73.71(a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) D so.36(c)(2) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) D 73.71(a)(s) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D so.46(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 73.77(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i) D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) ~ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
LICENSEE CONTACT
11
LEPHONE NUMBER {Include Area Code) !Mr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr.- Regulatory Assurance Manager 1508-830-8323 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX B SB RV T020 y
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ~ NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On April 24, 2017, during Refueling Outage 21 while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Safety/Relief Valves, a high resistance was measured across the solenoid pilot valve coil of SV203-3A. !This solenoid pilot valve was replaced during Refueling Outage 21. After the solenoid pilot valve was removed it was transported to an offsite vendor for additional testing.
rrhis LER supplement is being submitted to provide the NRC with additional information. PNPS continued to follow the testing performed by our offsite vendor and now has additional information to provide the NRC.
PNPS stated at the time that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat arid mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety ~unction regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50. 73 (a)(2)(v)(B) or (D).
rrhis event posed no threat to public health and safety.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
u.s_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for cqmpleting this form http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NARRATIVE BACKGROUND
05000-293
YEAR
2017
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
The 2-stage pilot operated safety relief valve consists of two principle assemblies: a pilot valve section (top works) and the main valve section. The pilot valve section (first stage) is the pressure sensing and control element and the main valve (second stage) provides the pressure relief function. The first stage consists of a pilot-stabilizer disc assembly. The pilot is the pressure sensing member to which the stabilizer disc movement is coupled. Though not mechanically connected, a light spring keeps the stabilizer in contact with the pilot. A pilot preload spring permits set point adjustment of the valve and provides pilot seating force. The solenoid-operated pilot valve controls the pneumatic pressure applied to a diaphragm actuator which controls the relief valve directly. An accumulator is included with the control equipment for each relief valve to store pneumatic energy for relief valve operation. The second or main stage consists essentially of a large piston which includes the main valve disc, the main valve chamber, and a preload spring.
PNPS has four safety relief valves. Each of the four relief valves is equipped with an accumulator and check valve arrangement. These accumulators are provided to assure that the valves can be held open following failure of the nitrogen supply to the accumulators, and are sized to contain sufficient nitrogen for a minimum of 20 valve operations for each safety relief valve. Bottled gas can be used to manually recharge the accumulators associated with two safety relief valves. This capability was installed to address a potential loss of normal nitrogen supply to the accumulators which was identified during seismic reviews.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 24, 2017, while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) safety relief valves a high resistance was measured across the solenoid valve coil circuit of SV203-3A.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The degradation mechanism has been determined to be the solenoid pilot valve coil with high electrical resistance. Per input from our offsite vendor, corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections inside the coil created the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Removed and replaced solenoid pilot valve assembly for SV203-3A.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 2 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
. . "t"'i;, ...... "/
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nureqs/staff/sr1022/r3l)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE OFFSITE VENDOR
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
-007
REV NO.
- 01
After performing multiple tests including destructive examinations of the SV203-3A solenoid valve coil the offsite vendor provided the following conclusions: Degradation of SV203-3A was limited to corrosion at the copper crimp connectors used to attach coil lead wires to the coil winding wire; the construction of the crimp connectors in SV203-3A included an insulating PVC sleeve material; although installation of the coil winding wires in the SV203-3A crimp connectors are inconsistent with industry practices, the coil winding wires were securely joined to the stranded lead wires at the stranded lead wire end of the crimp; the PVC sleeve material on the SV203-3A crimp connectors likely released chlorine, resulting in corrosion of the crimp connectors and wires; corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections created .the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter prior to application of higher voltage; application of voltage as low as 30 VDC was sufficient to overcome the corrosion product layer allowing the SV203-3A valve to actuate with no nitrogen pressure applied to the inlet port; application of higher voltages up to and including 125 VDC during electrical testing disturbed the corrosion layer sufficiently to allow a 9 VDC powered multimeter to measure SV203-3A coil resistance values representative of actual service conditions with respect to voltage. The valve operated as intended throughout the electrical testing despite the corrosion product accumulation on the crimp connectors; and subsequent to electrical testing, coil resistance values remained within acceptable limits.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
There are no consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety from this event. The original concern was that there was a potential inoperability of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) which provides a means to rapidly depressurize the primary system to a pressure where low-pressure systems can provide makeup for core cooling in the event of a small or medium break Loss of Coolant Accident. An Engineering evaluation determined that the safety relief valve was fully operable at all times and rem~ined available and capable of performing its intended safety function.
The engineering evaluation that was performed concluded that this event did not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure. (Reference NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Safety System Functional Failures, Clarifying Notes, Engineering Analyses.) As such, this event will not be reported in the NRC Performance Indicator for Safety System Functional Failures since an engineering evaluation was performed which determined that the system was capable of performing its safety function.
No actions to reduce the frequency or consequence are necessary.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 3 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
~'11.IU.!lr.,,,, l i -:.t ; ~ ...... ..,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc:gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
REPORT ABILITY
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
PNPS believed at the time of the event that it was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety function regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 1 O 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(B) cir (D).
PREVIOUS EVENTS
LER 2015-002-00, Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Determined to be Inoperable. Following Evaluation
LER 2013-002-00 and -01, SRV-38 Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift
LER 2011-007-00, Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage
REFERENCES
CR-PNP-2017-5067
CR-PNP-2017-5386
CR-PNP-2017-6183

The Southern Co And Vogtle Nuclear Plants.

Since the Ga PSC OK'd the continuation of Vogtle, the Southern Co stock price has been in steep decline. Is it the new tax laws or what?

Hinsdale NH: The Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge

I created the political energy that got this bridge. I creatively protested at this bridge for years leading to a chain of events ending in this. Picturing up this bridge, the disgusting underside of the bridge.

Do you know the similarity between the Titanic and the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges? All the iron beams and plating are held together by 1920's rivets. There is not a weld in the structural parts of the bridge. The Titanic was constructed in 1909 and the two Bridges were constructed around 1921. I wonder how many other bridges are held together rivets?    

Hinsdale officials seek to spur economic development with zoning changes

By Liora Engel-Smith Sentinel Staff 


HINSDALE — With a new bridge in the works that will make the town more accessible from Interstate 91, town officials are proposing zoning changes they hope would spur economic development.

The changes would affect Brattleboro Road (Route 119), which runs from just west of the town’s center, and then north along the Connecticut River before crossing the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges into Brattleboro.

The N.H. Department of Transportation plans to replace those bridges with a single-span structure to the south beginning in 2019.

Meanwhile, Hinsdale officials hope to bring the proposed zoning changes to the voters at the March town meeting.

The public will have an opportunity to comment on the zoning changes at a Jan. 16 hearing at 6:30 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall.

The town’s planning board will present a proposal that would zone smaller commercial lots near homes along Brattleboro Road as appropriate for outfits such as restaurants, gas stations or childcare facilities. Larger parcels that aren’t near homes would be zoned to allow light-industrial businesses, such as auto body shops and warehouses.

The affected properties — about 100 of them, according to the public notice posted in The Sentinel — are already zoned for commercial uses, but ordinances don’t specify what types of commercial activities are permissible. The new proposal would clarify the uses, increasing zoning transparency, Michael J. “Mike” Darcy, vice chairman of the board of selectmen and ex-officio member of the planning board, said.

Darcy said the new bridge could bring more traffic into Hinsdale, potentially creating fertile ground for new businesses along Route 119. Unlike the existing bridges, the new bridge will be wider, enabling more truck traffic.

“(It) will create the potential for more traffic, and part of that traffic can be the 18-wheelers that can carry the goods that can feed (the growth of) a retail store,” he said.

The zoning proposal, which has been in the works since spring 2017, would make the town “as development and business-friendly as it can be,” he said

“Our hope is that the clarification will make it easier for a property owner to promote their land to a developer, that it will actually create more appeal for developers,” he said.

The new bridge between Brattleboro and Hinsdale will replace two older bridges, which were built in 1920 and underwent rehabilitation in 1988.

In September 2017, the N.H. Department of Transportation presented a preliminary construction plan. Its staff will hold a public hearing about the bridge project on Jan. 18 at 7 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall. Construction will likely conclude in 2021 or 2022, Kathryn M. Lynch, Hinsdale’s community development coordinator, said.

“With the bridge coming, (the planning board) wanted to prepare for business to come to town,” she said.

Also along Brattleboro Road are several parcels of land owned by the state of New Hampshire. These parcels would be zoned for rural and agricultural uses, Darcy said.

“It’s one of those back burner things,” he said. “It existed, and it’s been a (question of) how do we use this (land) the best that we can. I think it was a strong exercise for the planning board to really delve into something and understand what our zoning is and how it works.”

Is River Bend Going Power Nuts Like Grand Gulf

Least ANO looks good?

Jan 8 0%
Jan 7 66%
Jan 6 100%

Opening Almost All Off Shore Drilling

 Bout time!!!

Junk Plant Pilgrim Crashes In A Blizzard, Again

Update Jan 12

The experts and NRC knows I set up the NRC to be more interested Pilgrim's SRV problems and the massive Pilgrim downgrade. I wonder why I never get credit for my activities?

More on the Safety Relief Valves.  


***Waiting for the event report.

Here it is. What I am looking for.

1) Did they isolate from the main condenser, did the MSIVs go shut?

2) Any troubles from the safety relief valves?

3) Was it a clean shutdown or scram, did they have lots of equipment or employee problems.

Really, history proves this plant isn't designed for the winter weather?

The event report.

Having the switchyard breaker trip is grossly incompetent. But they kept the MSIVs open. It makes the scram really easy and doesn't challenge equipment as much. Is a easy scram good or bad? On the bad side, you don't get a wider view with the condition of the equipment? But on the big picture, they done good with the scram.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53147
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD	Notification Date: 01/04/2018 Notification Time: 17:57 [ET] Event Date: 01/04/2018 Event Time: 14:10 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/04/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO) MICHAEL F. KING (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	81	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM "On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted. "As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System. "Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset. "Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. "This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation." "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser. Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release.

   

Northern Nuke Industry Doing Astonishingly Well In Frigid Weather So Far

:)