Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed,
non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee’s
failure to implement Maintenance Procedure 7.3.16, “Low Voltage Relay Removal
and Installation,” Revision 22, for relay replacement work. Specifically, on
October 28, 2016, the licensee failed to evaluate the potential impact of
primary containment isolation system relay PCIS-REL-K27 work on shutdown
cooling relay PCIS-REL-K30, which was mounted next to K27 and shared a common
mounting rail. As a result, the licensee did not identify the potential of
losing residual heat removal shutdown cooling, and while installing the K27
relay and snapping it into the mounting rail, workers caused a momentary
actuation of relay K30 and a loss of residual heat removal shutdown cooling.
Corrective actions to restore compliance included restoration of shutdown
cooling, completion of the K27 relay maintenance with shutdown cooling out of
service, and an outage risk management procedure change that prohibited work on
or near shutdown cooling relays while the system was required to be in service.
The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-CNS-2016-07645.
The licensee’s failure to implement Maintenance
Procedure 7.3.16, in violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, was a
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and
therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance
attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the associated
cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant
stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited
violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee’s failure to
maintain Emergency Procedure 5.1ASD, “Alternate Shutdown,” Revision 17, for
establishing reactor equipment cooling system flow to the high pressure coolant
injection system fan coil unit. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain
Emergency Procedure 5.1ASD with adequate instructions to place the reactor
equipment cooling system north or south critical loop in service and verify
reactor equipment system flow to the high pressure cooling injection system fan
coil unit during some control room evacuation scenarios. The immediate
corrective actions were to assess operability of the high pressure coolant
injection system during control room evacuations that are not related to fire
scenarios, and to revise Emergency Procedure 5.1ASD with instructions to open
the critical loop supply valves (REC-MOV-711 or REC-MOV-714) in the control
room or locally, and verify reactor equipment system flow to the high pressure
coolant injection fan coil unit. The licensee entered this deficiency into the
corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2017-01403.
Green. The inspectors
identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
“Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with the licensee’s
failure to identify a condition adverse to quality associated with Station
Procedure 2.2.24.1, “250 Vdc Electrical System (Div 1),” Revision 14, in
accordance with Station Procedure 0-CNS-LI-102, “Corrective Action Process,”
Revision 6. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that Station
Procedure 2.2.24.1 contained inadequate instructions to ensure the oncoming
charger 1C output voltage was matched with the bus 1A voltage when transferring
bus 1A from charger 1A to charger 1C, so that technical specification bus
voltage requirements would remain met. This resulted in an unexpected and
initially unrecognized decline in voltage on the bus to below the required
minimum of 260.4 Vdc.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with the licensee’s failure to identify a
condition adverse to quality for Division 1 residual heat removal service water
booster pump A, in accordance with Station Procedure 0-CNS-LI-102, “Corrective
Action Process,” Revision 6. Specifically, on January 5, 2017, the inspectors
identified an oil level lower than normally expected, oil on the pump skid, and
an oil droplet formed on the Division 1 residual heat removal service water
booster pump A inboard bearing sight glass. The inspectors informed the control
room of this condition, and the licensee determined the oil leakage from the
pump’s sight glass would have prevented the pump from operating for the
required 30 days during a design basis accident. The immediate corrective
action was to repair the Division 1 residual heat removal service water booster
pump A inboard bearing sight glass, restoring operability of the pump. The
licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-CNS-2017-00054.
The licensee’s failure to identify a condition
adverse to quality for Division 1 residual heat removal service water booster
pump A, in violation of Station Procedure 0-CNS-LI-102, was a performance
deficiency.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited
violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the licensee’s failure to use an approved
method to disposition an American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code
nonconforming condition in the residual heat removal service water system.
Specifically, the licensee identified multiple locations with localized pipe
thinning below the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code B31.1 design
minimum pipe-wall thickness during an ultrasonic examination but failed to use
an approved method to calculate a new acceptable pipe-wall thickness. As a
corrective action to restore compliance, the licensee replaced this section of
piping on November 1, 2016, during Refueling Outage 29. The licensee entered
this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports
CR-CNS-2016-05558 and CR-CNS-2016-05963.
Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed,
non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4 for the licensee’s failure
to install the correct reactor core isolation cooling pressure control valve,
RCIC-AOV-PCV23, mechanical stop and verify proper operation of the system prior
to entering a mode of applicability for Technical Specification 3.5.3. This
condition resulted in RCIC-AOV-PCV23 going fully open during surveillance
testing following Refueling Outage 29, causing a pressure transient. This
transient caused a failure of the reactor core isolation cooling turbine lube
oil cooler gasket, lifting of a pressure relief valve, and a water leak. The
licensee immediately shut down the reactor core isolation cooling system and
declared it inoperable. The immediate corrective actions were to restore
RCIC-AOV-PCV23 from the closed mechanical stop to the required open mechanical
stop and to replace the turbine lube oil cooler gasket to restore operability
of the system. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action
program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2016-08122 and initiated a root cause
evaluation to investigate this condition.