TVA Heading To Perdition

The fixation on budget reductions is going to kill them. All these CEOs need to do is shift to natural gas to become heroes.

TVA gives top bosses record pay hike; utility's employees to share $102 million

Winning performance payments are down nearly 10 percent from previous year

November 16th, 2016 by Dave Flessner

TVA employees will have extra reason to be thankful at the Thanksgiving holiday this year with year-end bonuses being paid just in time for Black Friday sales next week.

The utility's 10,700 employees will share in $102 million of winning performance pay based upon the utility's record in the past year of achieving record high income while cutting the average price of power delivered to the 9 million people across its seven-state region.

In its year-end financial report, TVA said it met more than 80 percent of its performance goals during fiscal 2016.

The winning performance payments average more than $9,532 per worker, but most hourly employees will get only a fraction of that amount and the specific payments also vary according to what individuals are paid and in what division they work within at TVA.

The winning performance payments are down nearly 10 percent from the previous year when TVA paid a total of $113 million to 10,900 workers, or an average of nearly $10,367 per worker.

TVA officials said employees are scheduled to receive the yearly bonus checks next week, just ahead of Thanksgiving.

"We continue to set higher standards each year and, while we had a very good year in achieving most of our performance metrics, we did not fully meet all of the objectives and the winning performance payments reflect that," said Sue Collins, TVA's chief human resources officer.

Although TVA boosted its net income in the past year to a record high $1.2 billion and cut the average cost of power by 2.3 percent, TVA failed to meet its performance goals for nuclear power production with more frequent plant outages than planned.

TVA reduced the average delivered cost of its power from 7.2 cents per kilwatthour in 2011 to 6.7 cents per kilowatthour in 2016. The savings have come primarily due to cheaper fuel, but TVA also has trimmed $800 million of annual operating expenses in the past four years by cutting staff, reducing borrowing and phasing out some plants and programs.

TVA completed construction and started the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor this year as the first new nuclear unit added to America's grid in the 21st century. But the project ended up taking more than three months longer than what was budgeted and during its completion the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission raised concerns about what it said was a "chilled environment" for plant workers to raise safety concerns.

The year-end payments for performance are part of the at-risk pay for TVA employees designed to encourage workers to help the federal utility achieve its goals for safety, reliability, cost and economic development.

Individual TVA employees who are not covered by labor union contracts also get annual pay raises based on their performance. Merit pay increases granted to salaried and other office workers last month averaged 2.8 percent to 3 percent, TVA spokeswoman Gail Rymer said.

Pay at the top

TVA's top bosses took home even bigger paychecks in fiscal 2016 based upon meeting most of TVA's targets.

TVA President Bill Johnson was paid a record $4.9 million in salary and performance bonuses in the fiscal year ended Sept. 30, up 7.4 percent from what he was paid in salary and bonuses the previous year. Including the value of his pension and other payments, Johnson's overall compensation in fiscal 2016 totaled $6.45 million, making him again this year the highest paid federal employee in America.

His pay and bonuses last year were more than 12 times the $400,000 salary paid to the president of the United States and 24 times the $203,700 salary for members of the president's cabinet.

But Johnson, a former Progress Energy CEO recruited to TVA four years ago, was paid in the bottom quartile of top utility CEOs in the private sector, according to pay consultants who study executive compensation. The $4.9 million paid to the TVA CEO in the past year was 40 percent below the median pay of nearly $8.2 million for 21 comparable CEOs in the utility industry surveyed by the Towers Watson consulting group.

Johnson's $950,000-a-year salary, before any performance pay, did not change in the past year, and his increase in pay came entirely from performance pay increases.

Last week, however, TVA directors agreed to boost the amount Johnson could earn next year to help bring his compensation better in line with that of other comparable utilities. The board agreed to raise the performance bonus potential for Johnson from 285 percent of his base salary of $995,000 to 305 percent of that salary in 2017.

TVA Chairman Joe Ritch said TVA must remain competitive in its compensation with other utilities and should reward managers and employees when they meet performance standards.

"We've seen enormous progress and we recognize that when you have a highly talented person or group of persons in management like we have at TVA we need to be somewhat competitive in our compensation," Ritch said. "We are still below the average pay for many of these positions, but we still want our leadership to know that we are supporting them. While compensation is not the only thing you get by working at TVA, it is a very important reflection of our belief that they should be here and stay here at least for a reasonable period of time."

Other top TVA executives also enjoyed bigger boosts in total compensation last year due to TVA's improved performance. TVA Chief Operating Officer Charles "Chip" Pardee, who is retiring from TVA next month, was paid a compensation package worth more than $3.3 million, up 12 percent from the $2.98 million in total compensation Pardee received a year ago.

Two other TVA executives are expected to earn more next year in new positions at TVA filling the vacancy created by Pardee's retirement. Last month, TVA Nuclear Chief Joe Grimes was promoted to executive vice president of generation, while Mike Skaggs, who previously headed the completion of Watts Bar Unit 2, was promoted to executive vice president of operations.

Richard Howorth, head of the board's People and Performance Committee, said the increases in executive pay reflect the top managers' success in achieving most of TVA's performance targets. If such goals had not been met, their pay would have been reduced.

"This is at-risk compensation," Howorth said last week at a TVA board meeting in Blairsville, Ga.

Income improves

Despite lower net power sales from extreme weather, reduced operating costs helped the Tennessee Valley Authority achieve its highest ever net income of $1.2 billion for fiscal year ended Sept. 30, 2016, up $122 million from 2015.

TVA reported that sales of electricity decreased by 1.5 percent for the fiscal year, as compared to the prior year. The Tennessee Valley region experienced the second mildest winter of the last 55 years, only partially offset by the warmest summer of that same period.

Revenues from the sale of electricity decreased by $386 million in fiscal year 2016, as compared to the prior year, primarily due to lower fuel cost recovery revenues, as well as lower sales volume driven by weather.

"It was a strong year for TVA employees — they met goals and objectives and delivered results for the Tennessee Valley financially, operationally and in our relationships with customers and other stakeholders," Johnson said. "In 2016, our fuel and purchased power costs were nearly a billion dollars less than in 2012. This was due primarily to the flexibility of our more diverse generating portfolio, lower gas prices and improved operating performance."

Junk Plant Browns Ferry: Snowballing Back To Pre Pre 2011 Red Finding Attitude?

The "Safety Relief Valve" green finding is grossly not appropriate. It tells me the industry still does not have control of the SRV reliability...

05000259/2016003, 05000260/2016003, 05000296/2016003; 07/01/2016–09/30/2016; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3; (Equipment Alignment, Fire Protection, Licensed Operator Requalification and Performance, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessment, Problem Identification and Resolution, Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion).  

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors.  Six non-cited violations (NCVs) and one licensee-identified Severity Level IV NCV were identified.  The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP) dated April 29, 2015.  Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, “Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas” dated December 4, 2014.  All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC’s Enforcement Policy dated August 1, 2016.  The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Cornerstone:  Initiating Events

• Green.  An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Renewed License Number DPR-52, condition 2.C.(14) was identified for the licensee’s failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c).  Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a compensatory roving fire watch, within 1 hour of rendering the spray systems that protect the Main 500kV transformer 2B and Unit Service Station Transformer (USST) 2B nonfunctional.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee established the required fire watch and entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1203990.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors (Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013.   The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding did not affect the reactor’s ability to reach and maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.  The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area of Change Management (H.3) because leaders failed to clearly establish the control room's ownership of Fire Protection Requirements Manual (FPRM) usage as part of the NFPA 805 transition. (Section 1R05)

• Green.  A self-revealing Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Fire Protection Program Implementation, was identified for the licensee’s failure to maintain the integrity of the high pressure fire protection piping.

The licensee’s immediate corrective action was to isolate the leak and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1102016. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of protection against external factors such as fire.  Specifically, the high pressure fire protection system piping was unable to maintain the required pressure during a system demand.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013.   The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding did not affect the reactor’s ability to reach and maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Operating Experience because there was a similar occurrence of a fire protection piping break at Browns Ferry caused by heavy construction vehicle traffic in 2014 (P.5).  (Section 1R15)

Cornerstone:  Mitigating Systems

• Green.  An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for the licensee's failure to ensure sufficient clearance was available following a replacement of the Core Spray minimum flow valve actuator motors.  Modifications personnel failed to identify that the resulting clearances were less than permitted by TVA procedure MAI-4.10 “Piping Clearance Instruction” and that they required an engineering evaluation.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee cut away portions of floor grating to establish an acceptable amount of clearance for the valves.  The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 1161330 and 1169591.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).  Specifically, the inadequate clearance resulted in an analysis showing that ASME code allowable design stresses would be exceeded under accident conditions.  Exceeding design stresses created a reasonable doubt on the operability and reliability of loop 2 of the Core Spray system for Units 2 and 3.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.  The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of the Core Spray loop.  Operability was maintained because an engineering evaluation demonstrated, through the use of alternative analytical methods, that the piping stress criteria in Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was satisfied and that the stresses in the valve would not cause distortions of a magnitude that would prevent operation of the valve.  The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not reflective of present licensee performance since it occurred more than three years ago.  (Section 1R04)

• Green.  An NRC identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action" was identified for the licensee's failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the prompt determination of operability (PDO) for CR 1061051.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1193943.  

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).  Specifically, had the deficiencies in the PDO been identified, engineers would have recognized that the resulting stresses exceeded allowable design stresses in the valve vendor's weak link analysis and approached the yield strength of the stem material.  As a result, the practice was permitted to continue until the valve stem catastrophically failed. This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.  The inspectors determined the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a loss of system function and/or function for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.  Senior Reactor Analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model for Browns Ferry Unit 1.   The HPCI system was modeled as unavailable for a conservative exposure period of 7 days.  The delta CDF estimate was less than 1E-6/yr range, which represents a finding of very low safety significance (Green).  The dominant core damage sequence was an inadvertent open relief valve, failure of HPCI, and failure to depressurize.   The availability of additional injection sources helped minimize the risk significance. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Design Margins area of the Human Performance aspect (H.6), because engineers did not demonstrate the behavior of carefully guarding margins to ensure that safety related equipment was operated and maintained within design margins.  (Section 4OA2.5)

• Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Condition E in that an inoperable Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valve function existed longer than the allowed technical specification time.  The licensee implemented corrective actions by declaring the affected component inoperable per technical specifications, identified preventative maintenance procedures as the cause, repaired the breaker stabs to restore the circuit, and re-performed the surveillance to establish operability.  This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1161991.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, one of the TS required ADS valves opening capability was not fully qualified.  Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012,  the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function as the other five Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) ADS functions were still available.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Identification since the licensee had not taken sufficient post maintenance actions to verify function of the alternate breaker for the ADS valve 3-PCV-001-0022. (P.1) (Section 4OA3.1)

• Green.  A self-revealing NCV of TS 3.4.3, Safety Relief Valves was identified for two required MSRVs being inoperable longer than the allowed outage time and follow on action completion time.  The licensee’s immediate corrective action was to replace all Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves prior to the completion of the refueling outage.  This issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1157981. 

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, two required MSRVs were not able to lift within their required pressure band.  This performance deficiency was screened using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.   This performance deficiency screens to Green because although the system was inoperable for greater than its allowed outage time and follow on action completion time, the system maintained its safety function.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Resolution since the licensee has not taken sufficient corrective actions to address the continued  out of tolerance lift results caused by corrosion bonding of the MSRV pilot valve seats. (P.3) (Section 4OA3.3)   A violation of Severity Level IV that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC.  .  Corrective Actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered in the licensee’s corrective action program.   The violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Junk Watts Bar: Substantial Safety Culture Weakness

I suggested the plant be shutdown for a year: clean out management and retrain their employees...

NRC inspection finds 'substantial weaknesses' in TVA safety culture at new nuclear plant

The Tennessee Valley Authority has improved the environment for workers to raise safety concerns at its newest nuclear plant, but a new regulatory review of TVA's work environment at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant concludes the utility still is not maintaining an adequate safety culture.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission met with 136 workers in 17 focus groups at Watts Bar this summer after concluding in March that TVA had "a chilled work environment" at the Spring City, Tenn., plant that could discourage employees or contractors from raising safety concerns.

"Focus groups within and outside of the operations department indicated the existence of broader, previously unrecognized challenges to the maintenance of a positive safety culture, which continued to challenge the safety conscious work environment," Alan Blamey, branch chief of reactor projects in the Atlanta office of the NRC, said in a letter to TVA last week. "The (NRC inspection) team identified substantial weaknesses in various attributes which were found to be pervasive across various work units."

Blamey said nearly half of those interviewed by the NRC at Watts Bar "believed retaliation was a potential outcome for raising concerns."

"In addition, most employees did not believe that concerns were promptly reviewed or appropriately resolved, either by their management or via the corrective action program," Blamey told the TVA.

The NRC has asked Watts Bar officials to respond to ongoing concerns that managers don't want to hear or don't adequately respond to employee concerns at Watts Bar. The NRC has asked TVA to explain how it will ensure workers voice safety concerns without retaliation during a meeting set for 6 p.m. Thursday at the Comfort Inn in Athens, Tenn.

"The NRC has determined that, given the current state of the site's safety culture, you are not meeting the Commission's expectation that licensees establish and maintain a positive safety culture and safety conscious work environment," Blamey said in a letter to TVA's head of regulatory licensing last week.

In March, the NRC issued a letter to TVA expressing concern that some operations employees may not have felt comfortable raising safety concerns at the plant, especially among operators who were running Watts Bar Unit 1 while TVA crews were finalizing work on a second reactor at Watts Bar.

TVA, which began operating Unit 1 at Watts Bar in 1996, began power generation at Watts Bar Unit 2 on a limited basis in May and declared Unit 2 a commercial reactor last month.

In the 1980s when Watts Bar was first being built, whistle blowers raised questions about the installation of electric cables and other plant equipment, ultimately forcing a lengthy and costly review and rework of some plant systems that helped delay the completion for the plant or another decade. At the time, TVA also created a new employee concerns program to independently receive and review safety concerns raised by workers.

In March of this year as TVA was finalizing plans to activate Unit 2, the NRC expressed concern that some licensed operators may have been unduly influenced by TVA managers outside the control room. Those influences could cause what is described as a "chilling effect" on the plant's work environment.

"Our goal in this ongoing effort is to ensure that all nuclear power plant employees always feel free to express concerns about safety issues within their organization and to the NRC directly without fear of retaliation," said Cathy Haney, the region administrator for the NRC office in Atlanta.

At Thursday's meeting, TVA is expected to provide an update on its corrective actions related to the work environment at the plant. NRC officials will discuss the agency's plans to continue to provide oversight regarding how TVA allows and responds to employee concerns.

NRC spokesman Roger Hannah said regulators have seen progress by TVA, "but obviously for something involving the work culture we need to see improvements sustained over time."

TVA spokesman Scott Brooks said utility employees have indicated their willingness to raise their concerns "and we're working to make sure that they understand that they are supported and are able to raise their issues" about any safety concerns about the plant or its operations.

"We are still working on building and improving trust among our employees," Brooks said. "We've made improvements in our work environment, but we obviously have some more work to do because it takes time."

Troubled Entergy's Nuclear Fleet: Waterford Junk And Grand Gulf's Special Inspection

So Waterford is up to 13% power from late last night from some mysterious shutdown. This sounds like the equivalent to the Grand Gulf new special inspection. These guys over the last two years got a terrible capacity factor.

Waterford was shutdown mysteriously around Oct 25...

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52321
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 10/27/2016 Notification Time: 08:26 [ET] Event Date: 10/27/2016 Event Time: 00:21 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	N	N	0	Hot Standby	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

LOSS OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN SYSTEMS FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM "At 0021 [CDT] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16. "The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022. "WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.

The Heroin Based Dominican Gangs in New England

These guys are soulless killers. I was told if they needed a hit job (murder)in the USA, they would just drag a young kid out of the Dominion Republic ghettoes. Put him on a plane and give him drugs...he kill anyone the gang wanted. After the murder, they just abandon the kid in the USA. These guys don't play around. They are vicious killers.

Anyone in Southeast NH and Ma knows about these guys. I wrote in the recent past how into heroin the Dominicans are. These gangs are all huge throughout New England. The problem is, they got 100,000 ghettoes thugs to replace this gang. Maybe another heroin competitive gang took out these guys to drum up new business...      

Feds dismantle multi-million dollar heroin ring, 27indicted

By PAT GROSSMITH
New Hampshire Union Leader
CONCORD -- An 18-month investigation uncovered a multi-million dollar heroin ring that has operated for three years supplying kilograms of the deadly drug across northern Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, authorities said Wednesday.

Twenty-seven people have been indicted for participating in the drug trafficking operation, which allegedly also dealt in fentanyl and was headed mainly by individuals from the Dominican Republic who would imported drugs from Mexico.

Eighty percent of the heroin distributed in New England comes from the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to Michael J. Ferguson, Drug Enforcement Administration Agent in Charge, New England Field Division. He said the heroin being sold can be up to 94 percent pure, making it deadly, but it becomes deadlier yet when cut with the powerful painkiller fentanyl.

"Two milligrams of fentanyl is like two grains of salt and is enough to kill you," said Ferguson.

U.S. Attorney Emily Gray Rice said it has yet to be determined how many of the hundreds of drug overdose deaths in New Hampshire could be attributable to these traffickers.

Ferguson said the drug operation was in business to make money.

"They don't care that people are dying," he said. "They don't use it themselves. If it wreaks harm, then so be it."...

Confirmation Entergy And Grand Gulf Is Junk

In my discussions with the NRC over Grand Gulf, they admitted collectively Entergy's Nuclear Fleet as a whole is under special and intense added scrutiny over a host of operational shortcomings...

Power Engineering

Grand Gulf staying offline until January

Meanwhile, Entergy officials said during the call that the regulated Grand Gulf nuclear plant in Mississippi probably won’t return to service before early 2017.

The unit was shut down Sept. 9 because it wasn’t measuring up to Entergy’s internal standards for “operational excellence,” company executives said during the call.

The Grand Gulf maintenance outage was chiefly trigged by a pump repair, and the plant will take extra time before reconnecting to the grid to evaluate operations, an Entergy spokesperson noted following the call.

Over the past calendar year, Grand Gulf has experienced outage several times for required maintenance. “Before ending the current maintenance outage, plant employees and leadership will take a deliberate and thorough review of processes, procedures and protocols to ensure we are operating to high standards,” the spokesperson said.

“The decision will ensure the needed maintenance and repairs can be fully made, and that worker knowledge and training are at high levels before returning to full operations. To provide the time we need to undertake this process, we anticipate that the unit will not return to service before mid-January 2017,” the Entergy spokesperson went on to say.

During the call, Denault said Entergy is increasing its investment in certain nuclear facilities in order to improve performance and improve the plants’ performance in the eyes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Terrifying New Iron Beam Crack On The Route 119 Brattleboro Bridge.

10/26 update

I called the NHDOT office this morning. Told the lady to tell Doug to look at my blog. I got pictures of the crack there.  

***I had a errand in Brattleboro. So I parked my car in dirt parking area in NH. I love to walk across, inspect and assess the bridge just for fun. I protested to build the new bridge for three years. I had my signs up all over the place on the New Hampshire side. I was a real pest over this. While protesting, I kicked a wooden plank on the walkway and noticed it moving. I discovered the plank screws had all corroded. Nothing was attaching the wooden planks to the bridge and I considered it dangerous. I notified the NHDOT and Hinsdale police. They seemed to ignore my concerns. I barricaded both

???

Seeing how I was convicted with damaging the same bridge a few years ago, I bet you some people are thinking what is that scheming Mike Mulligan up too? Did he create the crack in the bridge to get even with the police, courts and system? Did he damage the bridge again?  Everyone already thinks I am crazy.    

ends of the walkway for safety. Then pulled up about twenty planks up and threw them overboard into the river. I called the police within a hour...told them what I did. The police charged me with one felony, two big class A misdemeanors and littering with my signs. I plead guilty to a class C misdemeanor. I got fined about $1500 and I was prohibited from being anywhere near the bridge for

I took pictures up and down the bridge in the area two or three years ago. I took pictures of all the big flaws in the bridge. There was no cavernous iron beam crack back there then. I am absolutely positive of it. I concede it either could be an old crack or a new crack. The crack might not have been detectable by eyesight from a distance. But what is undisputable is the gigantic gape of the edges of the gape now. It today seems like the edges of the gape aren’t now paralleled to each other. The edges of the crack are pulling apart and the outer beam is twisting as it goes.       

a year. Two hundred and sixty three days later, the NHDOT did about a $30,000 walkway wooden plank replacement job. It was all a attention getting tactic by me to build a replacement bridge. About a year after of  my conviction, the legislators funded a $ 40 million dollar new bridge. This now rickety and dangerous bridge was built in the early 1920s. They are beginning to dig dirt in 2017 for the new bridge. Many think I energized the local population in order for them to demand this bridge replacement. I wish they would name the new bridge the "Mike Mulligan" memorial bridge :)

I inspected this bridge thoroughly, completely pictured up this disgusting bridge and placed them on my blog. You can do a goggle search on Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale NH...see the media articles on

• I first called the "Brattleboro Reformer" and explained what I'd seen. They emediately said we'll send a photographer. Met them at the bridge in about 10 minute.

• I next called the local NHDOT. They referred me to the main NHDOT headquarter's maintenance department. I assume where the NHDOT bridge inspection department is located. The lady made a electronic report with the bridge number...We went over the location three times making absolutely we got the right bridge and location. Told her the "Brattleboro Reformer" took pictures and if you call them they might send you their pictures.  

my arrest and the NHDOT replacing the wooden planks. I use to paraded around bridge in a angel get-up and people called me the "bridge angel guy". The iron beam crack is very new. The NHDOT did a thorough bridge inspections this early summer. Did they miss the crack in the inspection or did it occur after the inspection? I consider the terribly underfunded NHDOT as corrupt as hell and in the bridge inspection falsification game based on insufficient funding...

My cell phone camera doesn't do justice to this dangerous crack. This is a critical bridge. It means one iron beam snaps, then the whole bridge can collapse. It is a very poorly engineered bridge in today's eyes. New bridges are designed to allow one or more beams to snap and the rest of the bridge iron beams safely picks up the load. It is so sick as a society. We got 80,000 pounds or more tractor trailers pounding over this 1921 bridge and the bridge in held together by rivets. Remember the Titanic...

Here below is a rather close-up of the new crack. It looks like a fatigue crack from the flexing of the bridge. A fatigue crack in itself is not a big deal. What frightens the hell out of me is the tremendous forces that are separating apart both sides of cracked and disconnected iron beam. I worry about there being much more dangerous unseen damage below the roadbed causing this broken iron beam. I would prohibit any traffic on this bridge until a thorough inspection is completed and evaluated.

It is about in the middle of the bridge. I am trying to give you a clue where the cracked beam is in the below. If you follow down to below the wooden walkway planks you will fine it.

About ten more feet towards the Brattleboro side is where the crack is from the white spray painted spot. 

(new)In 2014 I marked this area with the white spray paint because of the severe corrosion under the road bed. Throughout my protest people would ask me to show them my examples of the worst corrosion. In the beginning, I would have to hunt back and forth to find the spots. Eventually I marked my examples with this white spray paint. Look directly below this white spot for my example. So today's cracked bridge bracing is about 10 feet more toward the Brattleboro side.      

Somebody even numbered the area.

Election Night

Will there be historic high or low voter turnout this cycle?

What if it is historic high voter turnout and many people can’t vote because of the long lines throughout the night. How will that play into Trump’s  it is a rigged system?

Junk Arkansas Unit 2:Power Plant Maintenence Incompetence

incompetence

I talked to the NRC inspector on this. This is called gross maintenance incompetence. They did a 24 hour test on the DG around Sept 14. The test failed. Then they had 14 day before they had to shutdown according to TS.  Fourteen days then came and gone, that is what forced them to shutdown. Basically another 20 days passed to today. They are still shutdown...

Its crazy...

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52267
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR Region: 4 State: AR Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 09/28/2016 Notification Time: 09:46 [ET] Event Date: 09/28/2016 Event Time: 07:45 [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS	Person (Organization): JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	65	Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO INOPERABLE DIESEL GENERATOR "On September 16, 2016, at 0036 [CDT], during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated. "It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 [CDT], ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5." The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.

Entergy’s New Nuclear Philosophy: Two Broken Plants, Just Fix One At A Time

Unit 1: temporally shutdown due to crack in one-inch pipe.

Unit 2: normal refueling. All work now stopped on unit 2.

So just think how costly this is. We are talking about a million to two million dollars a day shutdown cost let alone the other cost on one plant. They must have to extend the outage on unit 2. This is a terrible sign of corporate financial weakness...

They stopped all refueling activities on unit 2 to focus all their resources on getting unit 1 back on the line. Entergy doesn’t have the resources to do two simultaneous shutdown maintenance periods at the 2 unit ANO? Yep, cooper is in outage? These two plant have the worst record in the industry?   

Junk Plant Arkansas 1?

So Grand Gulf, Arkansas 1&2 are currently in shutdown. The only one in a legitimate scheduled outage is Arkansas 2?

Come on, they been shutdown for almost three weeks for a leak in a tiny "one" inch line??? What else did they find?

9/30/2016

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52271
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR Region: 4 State: AR Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE NRC Notified By: MARK GOHMAN HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 09/30/2016 Notification Time: 04:01 [ET] Event Date: 09/29/2016 Event Time: 21:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): WILLIAM COOK (R1DO) CHRIS MILLER (NRR)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

UNISOLABLE LEAK ON DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PIPING DUE TO WELD FAILURE ON A 1" COMMON PIPE "At 2100 CDT on 09/29/16, while in Mode 6, both trains of Decay Heat (Residual Heat Removal) were declared inoperable due to a cracked weld on a 1" common pipe. The leak developed in a USAS B31.7, Class1 pipe at a weld upstream of pressure indication isolation valve DH-1037. The leak is not isolable from the common 8-inch Decay Heat piping and encompasses approximately 1/3 [one third] of the pipe circumference. "At the time of discovery, the unit was in Lowered Inventory with both Loops of Decay Heat in service. Subsequently, one train of Decay Heat has been secured to reduce the likelihood of crack propagation. One Train of Decay Heat remains in service providing the function of removing Decay Heat and the other train is readily available. The leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.9.5, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low water Level. "This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that results in a loss of Safety Function associated with the Decay Heat System (Residual Heat Removal System). "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." The leak is approximately 0.25 gallons per minute and pipe pressure is 140 psi. Compensatory measures are in place and include an individual posted to watch the pipe in case plugging is necessary. Repairs to the pipe will be completed once pipe is able to be drained.

Junk Grand Gulf Licensed Operators and Capacity Factor

(when they ever going to restart)

Amy Wold,

River Bend, Waterford and Grand Gulf nuclear plants are a mess. The Entergy Southern plants are really in trouble. What is wrong with Grand Gulf recently besides the plant being grossly not profitable with all the down powers and shutdowns???  I believe the NRC recently ask them to stay

(Sept 29) “Junk Plant Grand Gulf: Delay Startup to Fix Safety Culture”

shutdown because the control room employees were unsafe…this is unprecedented. Grand Gulf recently made a public notification they are going to shutdown because they no longer trust their “control room” employees to be safe??? Give the resident Grand Gulf NRC inspector a call and ask them why they are shut down?    

Are our efforts to make Entergy spend big bucks on Vermont Yankee, Indian Point, Fitzpatrick and Pilgrim financially starving Grand Gulf, Waterford and River Bend? Is it A war between Entergy’s regulated and non-regulated plants?  

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

16032094206

Junk Cook Plant Engineering Assumption

God help us all if all their engineering assumption are as inaccurate as this. The industry is riddle with not conservative engineering assumptions.

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 316/2016-001-01

Manual Reactor Trip Due to Moisture Separator Heater Expansion Joint Failure

ROOT CAUSE

The Root Cause was determined to be an organizational failure to recognize the risk significance of, and to adequately correct or mitigate, previously identified vibration issues with the Unit 2 B Right MSR crossover expansion joint tie rod and bellows in a timely fashion.

CONTRIBUTING CAUSES

Tack welds were inappropriately applied to nuts on the tie rod areas under tensile load. This was inconsistent with the intent of the Engineering Change which installed the threaded tie rods and was the result of poor communication between engineering workgroups. These tack welds on ASTM A 193 B7 material created stress risers which accelerated tie rod high cycle fatigue failure.

The B crossover lines are subject to higher levels of vibration than the A and C crossover lines. The vibration amplitudes produced stresses in the B tie rods that led to the tie rod high cycle fatigue failure.

The B crossover line vibration issue was removed from the plant high priority list following U2C22 before the vibration condition was resolved. Unit 2 returned to service and operated for several months with elevated vibration levels on the MSR B crossover lines before vibration amplitudes were addressed. Since the issue was no longer on the plant high priority list, the issue was no longer a station priority and workgroups lost focus on the issue.

Indian Point Junk Maintenence

Pathetic

Licensee Event Report# 2015-001-01, "Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Containment Caused by a Service Water Pipe Leak with a Flaw Size that Results in Exceeding the Allowed Leakage Rate for Containment" Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 DPR-26

The direct cause was corrosion. The apparent cause was the length of time to implement a modification to replace the FCU motor cooler copper-nickel piping identified in 2009 per the SW mitigation strategy. An engineered clamp was installed over the pipe defect. The pipe and affected elbow were replaced in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI Code during the spring refueling outage in 2016. A modification to replace piping will be processed for funding. The event had no significant effect on public health and safety.

Hurricanes and Zika Mosquitoes

10/9


Well, we had our Florida Hurricane. Hurricane Mathew raked the east coast of Florida mostly missing Mimi.

Originally posted om 8/20/16 

8/25

Can tropical systems influence the spread of the Zika virus?            

By Katy Galimberti, AccuWeather.com Staff Writer

August 25, 2016; 10:11 AM ET                       

Experts say that hurricanes and tropical storms could influence the spread of the Zika virus.
With a brewing system in the Atlantic that could impact the Bahamas and Florida, tropical activity could lead to a wider spread of the Aedes aegypti mosquitoes.
Jason Rasgon, associate professor of entomology and disease epidemiology at Penn State University, told AccuWeather that there are multiple methods in which hurricanes and tropical storms can spread mosquitoes, including those carrying Zika...

As example in our recent hurricanes, strange moths had been seen.

“Hurricane winds and flooding can carry in new insects and seeds, ushering in new season-long battles and making growing season the next year a challenge.”

Major Restructuring Going On At The NEI

By Timothy Cama - 10/04/16 12:12 PM EDT

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has tapped Maria Korsnick, a veteran of the nuclear industry, to be its new CEO.
Korsnick, currently the chief operating officer at NEI, will start her new role Jan. 1, when Marv Fertel, the current CEO, retires.

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She has previously held executive positions at Constellation Energy Nuclear Group and Exelon Corp.“Maria is highly regarded for her strong leadership skills and exceptional technical expertise,” Dan Brandt, chairman of NEI’s board and CEO of Pinnacle West Capital Corp., said in a Tuesday statement announcing Korsnick's promotion.
“As proven by her success as NEI’s chief operating officer, she will provide the vision and guidance that will drive the organization’s effectiveness,” he said.
“I couldn’t be more proud to have the opportunity to lead NEI and advance nuclear energy,” Korsnick said in the statement. “The nuclear industry is facing challenges, and I’m looking forward to help strengthen the policies, regulations and public support that will ensure it has a robust future.”
Fertel’s retirement, announced in August, came along with a major shakeup in leadership at NEI. The top lobbying and communications officials at the group are leaving, and NEI is looking for one person to replace them in a newly combined role.
The changes come at a crucial moment for the nuclear sector. Numerous plants are expected to close in the coming years amid competition from cheap natural gas and renewables, and increasing safety and security requirements.
A small handful of new plants or reactors are under construction domestically as well.
NEI is working on various major policy priorities, like getting a tax credit renewed for newly built plants, trying to get the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site built and reforming the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Exelon's Nuclear Plants Removing Handguns From All Security Guards To Boost Profit

Update

http://www.whec.com/nys-exposed/security-changes-ginna-nuclear-power-plant/4280162/?cat=11217

 

*We reached out to Exelon, the company that owns Ginna to find out how the changes will impact security. In a statement, the company says in part: 

"Our nuclear facilities are secure. Our security officers remain heavily armed and ready to defend the facility. Handguns were one option for a weapon, but were never required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)... Over the past ten years, we have spent millions of dollars continually fortifying nuclear power plants. With these improvements, handguns are no longer required." 

According to internal emails and a newsletter that News10NBC obtained, Exelon and management at Ginna also say this change will save money. We went to Ontario Town Supervisor John Smith who says he supports the change, especially if is saves money. 

"I would applaud the power plant realizing the position they are in and they have a lifeline -- fortunately from our ratepayers -- to sustain Ginna, and other upstate New York power plants," says Smith. "Anywhere they would trim costs to reduce dependency would be a smart more. I am very comfortable with that." 

*Statement from Exelon: 

Our nuclear facilities are secure. Our security officers remain heavily armed and ready to defend the facility. Handguns were one option for a weapon, but were never required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 

The nuclear industry in conjunction with the NRC closely monitors evolving security threats, and reviews and adjusts protection strategies accordingly. Over the past ten years, we have spent millions of dollars continually fortifying nuclear power plants. With these improvements, hand guns are no longer required. 

Well-trained security forces, robust physical barriers, intrusion detection systems, surveillance systems, and plant access controls are just some of the measures designed to protect the public, employees and the plant. Overlapping layers of physical, human and electronic security make the plant secure. 

The nuclear energy industry’s security programs are highly regulated by the federal government, ensuring nuclear power plants are among the best protected private sector facilities in the nation.  

This change was thoroughly evaluated by industry experts who found that eliminating handguns would have no impact on the current security strategy, given the other barriers, weapons and detection systems already in place.

My analysis of this event...it is the test case for nuclear industry/NEI's 30% budget reduction program nationwide. They think gov Cuomo is in a terribly weak position with his corruption issues, thus they chose NY for the test case. I think the industry wants to remove handguns nationwide from nuclear guards as a money saving policy.   

I can't believe the "power that be" didn't evaluate the optics of removing handguns from the security force. The idea they didn't disclose this to outsiders before they tried to implement it

This has been approved by the NRC. This is my case for the fallacy of security secrecy always protects our nation. The CIA director this weekend in the news shows saying the stability of the world is in the worst shape in 50 years. 

I bet you one of the risk perspectives says having poorly paid and disgruntled security officers running around with live handguns is a humongous risk for the plant. The nightmare is a security officer with a handgun strapped on his waist coming into the control room killing all the control room employees with his gun. Or he participating in a outside terrorist attack while he is inside the plant with his live gun...

This guy might be in a lot of trouble. He has outed the approved security stance in a nuclear plant without prior approval. He could have used the NRC's allegation process if he had too. I doubt Allegation would rule in his favor.

These are idiots here. Idiots follow the rules to their own demise. This is a radicle change in nuclear plant security posture, why didn't they have a public meeting over this as a means to cover their butts.  

NYS Exposed: Security changes at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

October 03, 2016 06:27 AM

A nuclear power plant in our area is trying to cut costs by making security changes. These changes could be putting people living nearby in danger.

News10NBC received a phone call from a concerned employee at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The employee says the security force at Ginna is going to be getting rid of all hand guns onsite.

The man that reached out to us has worked at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant for a number of years as a security officer. He says as of http://www.whec.com/nys-exposed/security-changes-ginna-nuclear-power-plant/4280162/ 

NYS Exposed: Security changes at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

October 03, 2016 06:27 AM

A nuclear power plant in our area is trying to cut costs by making security changes. These changes could be putting people living nearby in danger.

News10NBC received a phone call from a concerned employee at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The employee says the security force at Ginna is going to be getting rid of all hand guns onsite.

The man that reached out to us has worked at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant for a number of years as a security officer. He says as of October 12, security officers will no longer be carrying hand guns. Riffles will still be on site for some officers to carry, and others to use in case of an emergency, but this man says this change is putting people in danger.

Amanda Ciavarri: If someone were able to get into the reactor, what kind of havoc could they cause?

Securuty officer: From what we are trained in, it is sickness, death. You are talking about 15,000 people surrounding that area getting very sick or dying. And it is my job to protect them.

Amanda Ciavarri: Can you do your job with this change?

Security officer: I don't know. I don't feel very confident, I can tell you that. 

According to a company newsletter that News10NBC obtained, it is a move that Exelon, the company that owns Ginna, says will save money. But does it compromise security?

Security Officer: I think the public should have a say if they are going to make major security changes, and they aren't giving the public that option, and they are paying for it.

The plant is funded in part by RG&E customers, who pay a fee every month that goes to run Ginna. On News10NBC at 5 and 6, we will look into how this change will impact safety. Also, if it is saving money, does that mean you will be paying less for utilities? The answers we find may shock you.

October 12, security officers will no longer be carrying hand guns. Riffles will still be on site for some officers to carry, and others to use in case of an emergency, but this man says this change is putting people in danger.

Amanda Ciavarri: If someone were able to get into the reactor, what kind of havoc could they cause?

Security officer: From what we are trained in, it is sickness, death. You are talking about 15,000 people surrounding that area getting very sick or dying. And it is my job to protect them.

Amanda Ciavarri: Can you do your job with this change?

Security officer: I don't know. I don't feel very confident, I can tell you that.

According to a company newsletter that News10NBC obtained, it is a move that Exelon, the company that owns Ginna, says will save money. But does it compromise security?

Security Officer: I think the public should have a say if they are going to make major security changes, and they aren't giving the public that option, and they are paying for it.

The plant is funded in part by RG&E customers, who pay a fee every month that goes to run Ginna. On News10NBC at 5 and 6, we will look into how this change will impact safety. Also, if it is saving money, does that mean you will be paying less for utilities? The answers we find may shock you.

HBO’s Newsroom 2016: All I Did Is Cry Through It Today

I love this series. Hated it at times. I just love a liberal or altruistic happy ever ending story. It certainly doesn’t come from the democrats. It just don’t happen anymore. This afternoon, I was looking around for a TV program to watch. I came to the HBO list of series, I knew I had to watch something in Newsroom. I ended up watching the last program. I surprisingly teared and cried throughout the whole program. Post the show’s ending in Dec 2014, how do you think the USA has progressed since then.

I am seriously thinking of becoming voter terrorist…I am going to vote for trump. The FBI should pay me a visit me “again”. They should put me in Guantanamo and throw away the keys. The reason why I am voting for trump is I want him to "blow up" the USA. As Ralph Nader chewed us out for in another election, I am going to vote for the "least worth choice" again. I am going to vote for what I think is in the best interest of our nation. I think quickly "blowing up the USA" would create less damage in the long term, than continuing in our current trajectory.

I feel so sad for me…

Our news media is broken...

Go watch this HBO program again in the light of our crazy and crazier political season...

Any good American should be crying for "you"...