These problems have been developing at Pilgrim for years. The NRC should have seen how deep this was through the ROP and put a stop to it for the nation many years ago. It just goes to show you how ineffective the agency is.
How is this and Arkansas Nuclear One similar? The NRC allows this horrific behavior to continue for years and decades till a event
We are dealing with a political absolution system with the NRC. Violations and malicious intent are always forgiven until the NRC system is embarrassed.
I firmly believe the email was purposely leaked. This is clearly a smart whistleblower tactic. This is a revolution brewing. 1) It's attention getting. 2)The lower level inspectors and managers are sick and tired with their bosses censoring and minimizing their findings. You gota wonder if this is the response to the Trump era. This is how the lower level inspectors get their concerns on the public record without the political intervention of their bosses. The bottom level inspectors are our heroes.
Is this a peek into our Trump era. Really the era of the whistleblower. Will all government employees begin leaking their asses off to counteract and mute Trump. You only become a sacrificial whistleblower when your group is made voiceless.
makes them inforce the rules. They come in like heroes identifying all the violations they should have enforced years ago. So everything they do becomes about protecting themselves and the political system, protecting themselves from the public's ire...not about ultimately doing what is in best interest.
“God, the Father of mercies, through the death and
resurrection of his Son has reconciled the world to himself and sent the Holy
Spirit among us for the forgiveness of sins; through the ministry of the Church
may God give you pardon and peace, and I absolve you from your sins in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, + and of the Holy Spirit.”
God may forgive you, but he never mutes his system of worldly
pain and suffering. Pain and suffering is the straight path to enlightenment.
If you have some number of ANOs or Pilgrim, say a hundred as a example...some outcomes will be better or worst than pilgrim. We don't understand complexity enough yet. One or two accidents will sit way worst than the average. This is how you call a horrendous accident or meltdown to your neighborhood.
Folks (NRC inspection leader),
The following is a brief (or maybe not so brief) update of
inspection activities associated with the ongoing Pilgrim 95003 Phase C
Activities:
• The Safety Culture Group conducted additional focus groups
today, bringing the total number of people interviewed so far to over 130. This
group plans to conduct 1 on 1 chance interviews in plant next week to validate
observations from the group discussions
• The Operations NRC inspector observed pre-job briefings
and maintenance and operations evolutions in plant
• Many Engineering discussions over the status of the EDGs
• Many team field activity observations Issues/PDs:
Probably the most important equipment in the plant.
• (Update) The station performed an apparent cause
evaluation for an ‘A’ EDG issue that occurred in September of this year, which
involved oil leakage from the ‘A’ EDG blower gear box relief valve fitting. We
are still inspecting this issue, but items that we are currently following
include:
O Pilgrim only performed a visual inspection of the gear box
following the event, even though there are indications that the gear box was
potentially run with little or no oil. There are two bearings and a pump in
this gear box. We provided this issue as an operability concern to the control
room this afternoon. The initial operability determination was “operable” based
on the fact that they ran the ’A’ EDG successfully this morning. The NRC
Engineering, Maintenance, and Programs group lead does not now have an
immediate operability concern, but numerous questions are still being addressed
by Pilgrim
Another missed 50.59. Its epidemic in the industry and shows contempt for the power of the agency.
O The 50.59 that was performed to install this type of gear
box appears to be inadequate, in that it did not account for a new failure mode
(i.e., introduction of a relief valve to the gear box)
O Inadequate causal evaluation of the issue (Pilgrim
classified the cause as “indeterminate” and missed similar operating experience
from North Anna)
O Questions on the pre-startup checks for the EDG were
resolved by Carey and Erin, as they walked down pre-start up checks with Non
Licensed Operators
O Missed reportability call is likely
O The team further questioned the extent of condition of
this issue related to the same gear box on the ‘B’ EDG. We believe that there
is a current operability question on the ‘B’ EDG related to the same relief
valve failure mechanism and leakage. The Pilgrim Systems Engineering Manager
stated to the team that the site did not want to remove the EDG from service to
investigate this concern as it would result in unavailability time that could
place the EDG in Maintenance Rule A.1. Later in the day the Engineering
Director and Site VP tried to backtrack on this statement, but the team
believes that it was a genuine thought by this senior station manager and is an insight on Safety Culture. Pilgrim
is conducting an inspection of this ‘B’ EDG Gear Box this evening.
O The licensee analyzed oil from both the ‘A’ and ‘B’ EDG
Blower gear boxes and determined that no component degradation occurred.
O The licensee removed the ‘B’ EDG Gear Box RV, and
determined that adequate thread engagement existed, and a common mode failure
was unlikely. The reset and reinstalled the RV
O The licensee also ‘staked’ the threads on the ‘B’ EDG Gear
Box RV to prevent recurrence of the failure…..However, it appears that the
licensee did not perform a 50.59 screening for this modification to SR
equipment which is an additional example of 50.59 process performance
deficiencies.
• (Update) We are observing evidence of some weaknesses in
the use of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as a CAPR in the corrective action
program area. Specifically, the roles and responsibilities of the SMEs do not
appear to be clearly defined (i.e., we are hearing different things from
station personnel, the lead CAP SME, and the support CAP SMEs about what their
role is). At this point, we do not know if this extends to the other areas or
not. The PIR Group is developing examples to support the teams belief that the
CAPRs for the Root Cause for the Corrective Action Program may not be fully
effective. The plant has completed 123 of 134 corrective actions in this area,
yet we have identified CAP problems through this week. Preliminarily, CAPRs 1
and 2 involving the use of SMEs and Use of Performance Indicators appear to be
ineffective.
• (No Change) The Engineering, Maintenance, and Programs
group is looking at several examples where well established programs have not
been followed. There was a circuit breaker replacement (swap) involving 52
circuit breakers covering a wide variety of plant equipment that was not
screened under 50.59 as the licensee believed that they were exact, "like
for like" replacements. The NRC has determined that lugs used inside of
the breakers were a different size, and should have been evaluated accordingly.
Other items that may also support this issue (though the mods are very dated):
O The EDG gearbox issue described above
O During a walkdown, an inspector noted that the EDG exhaust
didn’t appear to be missile-protected. The exhaust was moved as part of a
modification
O Plant Computer modification that impacted the heat balance
calculation
• (No Change) The Engineering, Maintenance, and Programs
group is looking into several examples of corrective actions that may not have
been properly addressed. One involves a 2011 Internal Flooding issue that was
raised, and has not yet been fully addressed.
• (No Change) The Engineering, Maintenance, and Programs
group is inspecting an issue associated with lack of clearance between grating/
pipe supports and the primary containment liner. The design requires 1/16 “
clearance and in some cases there is no clearance. The licensee wrote and
closed 4 CRS without properly evaluating the issue or reviewing extent of
condition. We did brief a 10CFR50 AppB Criterion XVI performance deficiency
that we are developing
Can you believe this with my safety relief valves. I think Entergy and target rock don't want to point fingers at each other. One wonders if this will effect a lot of capacity outside Pilgrim.
• (Update) We receive a revised Root Cause Evaluation for
the 95001 SRV sample on Monday. The teams preliminary review of the document
appears to provide an inadequate Root Cause Evaluation and corrective actions
that will not prevent recurrence. Essentially, this revised root cause blames
Operations Management and an inadequate post trip review. The inspector
believes that these may be contributing causes, but the root cause is more aligned
to a failure to properly implement the corrective action process. Frank Arner
reviewed Doug Dodson’s work and has aligned with Doug’s view that the Root
Cause is not adequate. However, there is a possibility, when you evaluate all
of the corrective actions taken to date on the issue, that they have taken
adequate corrective actions. Doug believes that the Root Cause is an inadequate
Operability Determination for the 2013 SRV Failure, and poor corrective actions
for what they did put in the CAP. Since ODs and CAP are issues that have had
recent actions, we think that they may have taken adequate corrective action.
That being said, it is likely that the licensee did not adequately complete the
95001 in that they got the Root Cause wrong.
• (New) Pilgrim has a longstanding (30+Years) issue where
the ‘B’ RHR Heat Exchanger bottom flange has been leaking. The have conducted
three non-code furminite repairs over the years. The last injection was 2007,
and the leakage has reinitiated at 30 drops per minute. Entergy cannot find the
Why not just shut them down till this very important heat exchanger is fixed. Again, this sounds like the NRC doesn't inforce all violations. This is very corrosive to the safety culture of the licensee and NRC staff. This whole email is littered with unenforced regulation violations.
paperwork for the first injection, and does not know the type or the amount of
material injected. This appears to be a non-code repair of a code system that
either needed to be resolved at the next outage, or code relief provided by the
NRC. Neither has been done. Additionally, there is current leakage (120
drops/min at 50 psig) outside of the drywell that has not been appropriately
evaluated. More to follow on this issue.
• (New) The ECP Manager has not completed the Entergy
The only NRC needs to look up the record on past violations at other Entergy plants with falsifying employees resumes and job qualification requirements. They never learn.
qualification program. This seems strange for a Column 4 plant where Safety
Culture is a fundamental problem area.
• Common Causal Insights:
• (No Change) The Safety Culture Group is hearing that
people are happy and working to improve the site (Exception- Security). The
observation of actual performance however is somewhat disjointed. It appears
that many staff across the site may not have the standards to know what “good”
actually is. There is a lot of positive energy, but no one seems to know what
to do with it, to improve performance, leading to procedural non compliances,
poor maintenance, poor engineering practices, and equipment reliability
problems. Example- Jeff Josey questioned operability of ‘A’ EDG Wednesday
around 10 AM with a well-developed set of questions, and a direct statement
questioning operability. By 4pm, we were aware that the Shift Manager was not
made aware of this challenge, and no CR was written. The NRC then approached
the Shift Manager with the Operability challenge. We are still waiting for the
answers to our operability questions (but as mentioned previously, we don’t
think there is now an immediate concern). Additionally, while observing an IC
surveillance, the worker stated that this test would take him much longer since
the NRC was watching. In fact, the channel that we watched took 2.5 hours to
complete, and the other 3 Channels took 2 hours total to complete when we were
not observing.
• (Update) We became aware today that corrective actions
associated with the Recovery Plan are being “kicked back” to the organization
by the external contracted review folks after completion by Pilgrim because the
closure actions do
The is malicious falsification of documents. I recently warned (ANO) the NRC some employees are playing the NRC. They lie to the NRC because they know they can't get caught. One inspector could not believe a employee would lie to them.
not match the required actions. In several cases that we
have reviewed, station management then changes the recovery action on the CA to
match what was actually done, such that the external contracted review group
agrees with issue closure. We are capturing examples of this to prove our
point. The licensee was in disbelief when we mentioned this issue. One example
that we found today is that the Recovery Plan calls for all Supervisors and
above to have a “Targeted Performance Improvement Plan” which is tailored to
the individual, have milestones, and due dates for specific actions. Apparently
the plans are not tailored to the individual and are nearly all the same, and
we found that some folks just recently found out that they were on a TPIP, and
were surprised. It does not appear that they met the spirit of the recovery
action.
• (No Change) Overall, we are beginning to see a picture
where the people seem to be willing and happy/excited about change, but actions
seem to be marginalized during
Upper management is saying, why waste money on a plant we are going to shutdown in few years. I am convince Don thinks upper management will sensor his rough inspection draft.
implementation. Some of this marginalization
seems to be due to not understanding what the end state should look like, and
frankly some of it seems to be due to a lack of resources across many groups.
We will be probing this further, as it is a key to making a recommendation
whether or not the plan will be effective/ sustainable.
• (New) A licensee oversight contractor informed me that
So they can revise the recovery plan once the recovery plan scheduled inspection is ongoing. What kind of show is going on here.
the
licensee is actively working a further revision to the Recovery Plan to address
the issues that we have found in the last week. They plan to present this to
the NRC later this week. I will likely need to discuss this with NRR to figure
out the rules on reviewing this.
Level of Cooperation:
• In general, the licensee is being responsive, but very
disjointed in their ability to populate meetings and answer questions, staffing
problems seem to impact how fast the licensee can respond. For example- We attempted
to conduct a safety culture focus group with Security and no one showed up,
because the security supervisor “forgot” he needed to support it. The plant
seems overwhelmed by just trying to run the station. An RP person wrote a CR
last evening that the NRC inspection was significantly impacting getting her
work done, and that we should spread out requests over the whole 3
weeks….seemed very frustrated. We have been very clear that we are flexible,
and that we are sensitive to impact on plant activities.
• The licensee engineering group appears unprepared to
address all of the questions being posed by the team. I am couching this by
questioning their overall Engineering Acumen.
My thoughts:
The team is really struggling to figure out what all of this
means. The licensee staff seems to say the right things, and they are genuinely
energized about improving. We believe that there are some incremental
improvements that look bigger than they actually are to the licensee staff. The
corrective actions in the recovery plan seem to have been hastily developed and
implemented, and some have been circumvented as they were deemed too hard to
complete. We are observing current indications of a safety culture problem that
a bunch of talking probably won’t fix. We did see a paired supervisory
observation that uncovered procedure usage problems that were not directly
identified by the workers supervisor. If the 95001 SRV review is truly
Unbelievable
UNSAT
after almost 2 years, my confidence will not be very high, and I reiterate we
received a revision dated 4 days ago. The dance associated with EDG operability
this week is also disturbing on many levels- Poor Engineering Expertise, no
communication with the shift manager, Poor original corrective action, and a
Senior Manager stating a reluctance to assure operability due to a negative
impact on maintenance rule status. Carey, Frank, and met early on Sunday, and
discussed several “themes” that we plan to further develop, namely: Safety
Culture, Ineffective CAP, Conduct of Operations/OPS Standards, Engineering
Acumen, and Work Management. The challenge will be to determine if Corrective
Actions already taken in all of these areas has been effective or not. On the
plus side, we have not identified performance deficiencies at the same rate as
ANO, and the team believes that procedures are in good shape.
Very Respectfully
Don Jackson- Team Lead
