Thursday, November 17, 2016

Massive Cyberattack Ongoing at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission


Update Nov 18

Adams is still dead.
This is another example of the NRC’s penchant for secrecy. How much else do they hide from us? If it is embarrassing for the agency…just burry the evidence in a deep hole so outsiders never understand. This has impaired the agency for most of the day.  Outsiders like me can’t access the NRC’s and licensee’s documents on the Adams. What about government transparency? How do you hold government employees accountable concerning spending my money? We should have gotten a complete explanation about this morning. It is extremely rude and unprofessional. What kind of government is this???  How many minutes were people attempting to connect to ADAMS and just watching that little processing clock spin around till it tripped you off the dead system.     
Completely disconnect the agency from the internet this morning (at least in Region I). Connections to internet very spotty the rest of the day.

ADAMS has been down all day. This thing must be huge?
 

Sent hordes of employees home early because no work could be done???

Is the Hinsdale NH/Brattleboro Vt Route 119 Bridge In Trouble?



Shaheen: ‘Good news’ that Sewalls Falls Bridge is open, but funding picture is the ‘bad news’

Jeanne Shaheen said the federal government’s reluctance to invest in infrastructure is at least partly to blame for the length of time it took to build the new Sewalls Falls Bridge in Concord.

Shaheen, a Democratic U.S. senator and former governor, noted at an opening ceremony of the bridge Tuesday that it was in 1994, when she was only a state senator, that she began working to replace its 1915 predecessor.

The complications that caused such a lengthy process were numerous, said state Department of Transportation spokesman Bill Boynton. There were historical and environmental implications, as well as conservation easements and funding to be attained.

But Shaheen focused on the federal funding for the project that was promised but delayed in reaching New Hampshire.

“The federal government really didn’t do what we said we were going to do at the timetable that we said we would,” Shaheen said. “It shouldn’t take that long to get this kind of a project done.”

Mayor Jim Bouley added with a smile that he had a full head of hair when the planning process began.

Bill Cass, the assistant commissioner of the state’s Department of Transportation, said his colleagues planned in 2003 that the bridge could be constructed by 2007, “but there was a little note in the margin that said it could be delayed two or three years as they worked through some of the issues.”

In the end, it was Aug. 9, 2015, before construction began, nearly a year after the historic connector between routes 3 and 132 was closed.

The federal Highway Trust Fund was healthy and growing for several decades until recently, according to the Congressional Budget Office, when spending began to outpace taxes collected on gas and other transportation-related products and activities. Between 2008 and mid-2015, the federal government had to transfer more than $65 billion from the general fund to cover highway expenses.

The start of construction on the Sewalls Falls Bridge was delayed in 2015 amid the shortfall. The city ended up cutting a deal with the state DOT, which administers the federal grant money, that would allow Concord to start building and be reimbursed with federal dollars when they became available, according to a Monitor report at the time. A federal grant paid for 80 percent of the $11 million project.

Shaheen visited the bridge back then and lamented that there had been 32 short-term extensions of the Highway Trust Fund in the previous six years, without the adoption of a long-term solution.

That’s the “good news, bad news” story of the bridge funding, Shaheen said Tuesday.

“I’m thrilled to be here to celebrate the good news of this story today and I pledge to you that I will continue to work on the bad news of getting those investments at the federal level,” she said, “so we can continue to see these kinds of projects move forward for the state of New Hampshire.”

The bridge opened to traffic last week. For a time before the earlier bridge closed, drivers had to take turns crossing one at a time for fear that it couldn’t accept the weights it once held.

Largest Oil Deposit Ever Found In U.S: Premian Basin/Wolfcamp Shale


What does this mean for the nukes?

USGS: Largest oil deposit ever found in U.S. discovered in Texas

The U.S. Geological Survey recently discovered the largest continuous oil and gas deposit ever found in the United States, officials said Tuesday.
The agency announced that the Wolfcamp shale, located in the Midland Basin portion of Texas’ Permian Basin, contains 20 billion barrels of oil and 1.6 billion barrels of natural gas liquid.
The Permian Basin is one of the most productive oil and gas areas in the country, and more than 3,000 horizontal wells have been drilled in the Wolfcamp shale section, the agency said in a statement.
“The fact that this is the largest assessment of continuous oil we have ever done just goes to show that, even in areas that have produced billions of barrels of oil, there is still the potential to find billions more,” said Walter Guidroz, program coordinator for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Energy Resources Program.
The oil is worth almost $900 billion at current prices, Bloomberg News reported.
The discovery is nearly three times larger than oil found in 2013 in the Bakken and Three Forks formations in the Williston Basin Province of Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota, according to the USGS.

Wednesday, November 16, 2016

President Trump and the NRC

The House and Senate is being run by the republicans. The NRC commissioners normally have five members. There is only three in there now, based on republican obstructionism of Obama. I’d remind President Trump, if a nuke plant melted down and caught in a scandal like TMI, it would eat up a tremendous amount of your administration.  Other interest would be placed in the back room.


Trump spoke very little about anything nuclear industry prior to the election.

So, President Trump will have a tremendous influence on the NRC and nuclear industry. The nuke industry and electric utilities are a very politically powerful force. These guys eat presidents and governors of all stripes by the dozens.

My great hope is he would reform our electric system.

I’d like him to commit the USA into replacing 50% of our nuclear plants in a decade with new plants…

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Leaking And Severely Deteriorated Turbine/Reactor Building Seismic Safety Seals

Update

I called back the NRC. Man, have they become responsive. So I called the second time. Talked a little, they said we are looking into it. The region 1 inspector support guy called me right back within minutes. He confirmed the NRC is looking at it with pilgrim...looking to see if it had generic implication.

I would have liked to get a call back in these first two calls saying the seismic seals are inspected on a regular bases...the last time was three years ago on such and such a date. Everything is fine. 



***Getting ready for the big inspection. Here is an important safety seal at Vermont Yankee never inspected during the life of the plant. It was discovered completely deteriorated and causing in leakage in a closed plant. It has implications at other similar plants. Do you think Entergy and the NRC covered their asses looking for this problem at other plants?

I just called the NRC inspectors at Pilgrim. I left a message inquiring about this problem at Pilgrim. I wanted to talk about water in leakage into pilgrim.


Water leak reported at Vermont YankeeBy SUSAN SMALLHEER
Rutland Herald
Wednesday, September 28, 2016

BRATTLEBORO, Vt. — Entergy Nuclear says it has found a potential source of water infiltration into Vermont Yankee’s turbine building, a problem that has cost the company more than a million dollars.

Entergy Nuclear spokesman Joseph Lynch told members of the Vermont Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel that metal barriers on either side of the so­ called seismic gap between the turbine building and the reactor building were being replaced in an effort to keep groundwater from seeping into the building.

Lynch said the gap between the two buildings was created as a safety feature when Vermont Yankee was built in the event of an earthquake. But plant officials now think that a deteriorated metal barrier and its insulation is letting water into the turbine building.

He said the seismic gap was only a couple of inches wide. He said replacing that metal barrier, which is insulated with some kind of foam material, began this week, a project that is expected to take five weeks. He said the company believed that would drastically reduce water infiltration.

Currently, between 700 and 900 gallons of water a day are seeping into the turbine building. Once it reaches the building, it becomes contaminated with radioactivity.


At one point this winter, Entergy was storing the contaminated water in small portable swimming pools, but it has discontinued that practice.

In January, Entergy said 2,500 to 3,000 gallons a day were leaking into the turbine building.

On average, the company is paying $4 a gallon to dispose of the contaminated water, which is being shipped to U.S. Ecology Idaho Inc. in Grand View, Idaho. In June, the company said it had spent $1.2 million on the water problem.

Lynch told Brattleboro resident Bob Leach that the radioactivity levels in the water were so low, that the tankers full of tainted water did not even need to be placarded according to federal regulations as radioactive.

Entergy is shipping one tanker holding 5,000 gallons of contaminated water a week to the disposal site in Idaho, and it has a storage tank that holds 20,000 gallons of water to collect the tainted water.

Lynch said actions by the company to seal cracks in the building’s foundation had cut back on the amount of water coming into the building since it was first discovered in winter 2015, shortly after Vermont Yankee shut down.

The company said it believed the water had been seeping into the building all along, but once the building went ‘‘cold and dark’’ after the reactor’s shutdown, the building was no longer warm, leading to natural evaporation.

Mike McKenney of Entergy Nuclear gave the panel an update on the water intrusion problems, and said if the project started earlier in the week it likely would sharply reduce the amount of water coming into the building.

McKenney told Rep. David Deen, D­Westminster, a panel member, that he did not believe that this summer’s prolonged drought had an effect on the drop in groundwater seeping into the building.

He said the company was investigating drilling interceptor wells under the building to keep the clean water from seeping into the building, thus picking up radioactivity in the process.

Earlier this year, Entergy said it was thinking of seeking a state permit to discharge the radioactive water into its storm drain system, which in turn discharges directly into the Connecticut River. Entergy has since dropped those plans.

Entergy has said it plans to seek reimbursement from the Vermont Yankee decommissioning trust fund to cover its costs addressing the water problem.

TVA Heading To Perdition

The fixation on budget reductions is going to kill them. All these CEOs need to do is shift to natural gas to become heroes.
TVA gives top bosses record pay hike; utility's employees to share $102 million
Winning performance payments are down nearly 10 percent from previous year
November 16th, 2016 by Dave Flessner
TVA employees will have extra reason to be thankful at the Thanksgiving holiday this year with year-end bonuses being paid just in time for Black Friday sales next week.
The utility's 10,700 employees will share in $102 million of winning performance pay based upon the utility's record in the past year of achieving record high income while cutting the average price of power delivered to the 9 million people across its seven-state region.
In its year-end financial report, TVA said it met more than 80 percent of its performance goals during fiscal 2016.
The winning performance payments average more than $9,532 per worker, but most hourly employees will get only a fraction of that amount and the specific payments also vary according to what individuals are paid and in what division they work within at TVA.
The winning performance payments are down nearly 10 percent from the previous year when TVA paid a total of $113 million to 10,900 workers, or an average of nearly $10,367 per worker.
TVA officials said employees are scheduled to receive the yearly bonus checks next week, just ahead of Thanksgiving.
"We continue to set higher standards each year and, while we had a very good year in achieving most of our performance metrics, we did not fully meet all of the objectives and the winning performance payments reflect that," said Sue Collins, TVA's chief human resources officer.
Although TVA boosted its net income in the past year to a record high $1.2 billion and cut the average cost of power by 2.3 percent, TVA failed to meet its performance goals for nuclear power production with more frequent plant outages than planned.
TVA reduced the average delivered cost of its power from 7.2 cents per kilwatthour in 2011 to 6.7 cents per kilowatthour in 2016. The savings have come primarily due to cheaper fuel, but TVA also has trimmed $800 million of annual operating expenses in the past four years by cutting staff, reducing borrowing and phasing out some plants and programs.
TVA completed construction and started the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor this year as the first new nuclear unit added to America's grid in the 21st century. But the project ended up taking more than three months longer than what was budgeted and during its completion the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission raised concerns about what it said was a "chilled environment" for plant workers to raise safety concerns.
The year-end payments for performance are part of the at-risk pay for TVA employees designed to encourage workers to help the federal utility achieve its goals for safety, reliability, cost and economic development.
Individual TVA employees who are not covered by labor union contracts also get annual pay raises based on their performance. Merit pay increases granted to salaried and other office workers last month averaged 2.8 percent to 3 percent, TVA spokeswoman Gail Rymer said.
Pay at the top
TVA's top bosses took home even bigger paychecks in fiscal 2016 based upon meeting most of TVA's targets.
TVA President Bill Johnson was paid a record $4.9 million in salary and performance bonuses in the fiscal year ended Sept. 30, up 7.4 percent from what he was paid in salary and bonuses the previous year. Including the value of his pension and other payments, Johnson's overall compensation in fiscal 2016 totaled $6.45 million, making him again this year the highest paid federal employee in America.
His pay and bonuses last year were more than 12 times the $400,000 salary paid to the president of the United States and 24 times the $203,700 salary for members of the president's cabinet.
But Johnson, a former Progress Energy CEO recruited to TVA four years ago, was paid in the bottom quartile of top utility CEOs in the private sector, according to pay consultants who study executive compensation. The $4.9 million paid to the TVA CEO in the past year was 40 percent below the median pay of nearly $8.2 million for 21 comparable CEOs in the utility industry surveyed by the Towers Watson consulting group.
Johnson's $950,000-a-year salary, before any performance pay, did not change in the past year, and his increase in pay came entirely from performance pay increases.
Last week, however, TVA directors agreed to boost the amount Johnson could earn next year to help bring his compensation better in line with that of other comparable utilities. The board agreed to raise the performance bonus potential for Johnson from 285 percent of his base salary of $995,000 to 305 percent of that salary in 2017.
TVA Chairman Joe Ritch said TVA must remain competitive in its compensation with other utilities and should reward managers and employees when they meet performance standards.
"We've seen enormous progress and we recognize that when you have a highly talented person or group of persons in management like we have at TVA we need to be somewhat competitive in our compensation," Ritch said. "We are still below the average pay for many of these positions, but we still want our leadership to know that we are supporting them. While compensation is not the only thing you get by working at TVA, it is a very important reflection of our belief that they should be here and stay here at least for a reasonable period of time."
Other top TVA executives also enjoyed bigger boosts in total compensation last year due to TVA's improved performance. TVA Chief Operating Officer Charles "Chip" Pardee, who is retiring from TVA next month, was paid a compensation package worth more than $3.3 million, up 12 percent from the $2.98 million in total compensation Pardee received a year ago.
Two other TVA executives are expected to earn more next year in new positions at TVA filling the vacancy created by Pardee's retirement. Last month, TVA Nuclear Chief Joe Grimes was promoted to executive vice president of generation, while Mike Skaggs, who previously headed the completion of Watts Bar Unit 2, was promoted to executive vice president of operations.
Richard Howorth, head of the board's People and Performance Committee, said the increases in executive pay reflect the top managers' success in achieving most of TVA's performance targets. If such goals had not been met, their pay would have been reduced.
"This is at-risk compensation," Howorth said last week at a TVA board meeting in Blairsville, Ga.
Income improves
Despite lower net power sales from extreme weather, reduced operating costs helped the Tennessee Valley Authority achieve its highest ever net income of $1.2 billion for fiscal year ended Sept. 30, 2016, up $122 million from 2015.
TVA reported that sales of electricity decreased by 1.5 percent for the fiscal year, as compared to the prior year. The Tennessee Valley region experienced the second mildest winter of the last 55 years, only partially offset by the warmest summer of that same period.
Revenues from the sale of electricity decreased by $386 million in fiscal year 2016, as compared to the prior year, primarily due to lower fuel cost recovery revenues, as well as lower sales volume driven by weather.
"It was a strong year for TVA employees — they met goals and objectives and delivered results for the Tennessee Valley financially, operationally and in our relationships with customers and other stakeholders," Johnson said. "In 2016, our fuel and purchased power costs were nearly a billion dollars less than in 2012. This was due primarily to the flexibility of our more diverse generating portfolio, lower gas prices and improved operating performance."

Monday, November 14, 2016

Junk Plant Browns Ferry: Snowballing Back To Pre Pre 2011 Red Finding Attitude?

The "Safety Relief Valve" green finding is grossly not appropriate. It tells me the industry still does not have control of the SRV reliability...
05000259/2016003, 05000260/2016003, 05000296/2016003; 07/01/2016–09/30/2016; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3; (Equipment Alignment, Fire Protection, Licensed Operator Requalification and Performance, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessment, Problem Identification and Resolution, Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion).  

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors.  Six non-cited violations (NCVs) and one licensee-identified Severity Level IV NCV were identified.  The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP) dated April 29, 2015.  Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, “Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas” dated December 4, 2014.  All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC’s Enforcement Policy dated August 1, 2016.  The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Cornerstone:  Initiating Events

• Green.  An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Renewed License Number DPR-52, condition 2.C.(14) was identified for the licensee’s failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c).  Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a compensatory roving fire watch, within 1 hour of rendering the spray systems that protect the Main 500kV transformer 2B and Unit Service Station Transformer (USST) 2B nonfunctional.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee established the required fire watch and entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1203990.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors (Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013.   The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding did not affect the reactor’s ability to reach and maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.  The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area of Change Management (H.3) because leaders failed to clearly establish the control room's ownership of Fire Protection Requirements Manual (FPRM) usage as part of the NFPA 805 transition. (Section 1R05)

• Green.  A self-revealing Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Fire Protection Program Implementation, was identified for the licensee’s failure to maintain the integrity of the high pressure fire protection piping.

The licensee’s immediate corrective action was to isolate the leak and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1102016. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of protection against external factors such as fire.  Specifically, the high pressure fire protection system piping was unable to maintain the required pressure during a system demand.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013.   The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding did not affect the reactor’s ability to reach and maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Operating Experience because there was a similar occurrence of a fire protection piping break at Browns Ferry caused by heavy construction vehicle traffic in 2014 (P.5).  (Section 1R15)

Cornerstone:  Mitigating Systems

• Green.  An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for the licensee's failure to ensure sufficient clearance was available following a replacement of the Core Spray minimum flow valve actuator motors.  Modifications personnel failed to identify that the resulting clearances were less than permitted by TVA procedure MAI-4.10 “Piping Clearance Instruction” and that they required an engineering evaluation.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee cut away portions of floor grating to establish an acceptable amount of clearance for the valves.  The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 1161330 and 1169591.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).  Specifically, the inadequate clearance resulted in an analysis showing that ASME code allowable design stresses would be exceeded under accident conditions.  Exceeding design stresses created a reasonable doubt on the operability and reliability of loop 2 of the Core Spray system for Units 2 and 3.  This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.  The inspectors determined the finding was Green because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of the Core Spray loop.  Operability was maintained because an engineering evaluation demonstrated, through the use of alternative analytical methods, that the piping stress criteria in Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was satisfied and that the stresses in the valve would not cause distortions of a magnitude that would prevent operation of the valve.  The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not reflective of present licensee performance since it occurred more than three years ago.  (Section 1R04)

• Green.  An NRC identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action" was identified for the licensee's failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the prompt determination of operability (PDO) for CR 1061051.  As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1193943.  

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).  Specifically, had the deficiencies in the PDO been identified, engineers would have recognized that the resulting stresses exceeded allowable design stresses in the valve vendor's weak link analysis and approached the yield strength of the stem material.  As a result, the practice was permitted to continue until the valve stem catastrophically failed. This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.  The inspectors determined the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a loss of system function and/or function for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.  Senior Reactor Analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model for Browns Ferry Unit 1.   The HPCI system was modeled as unavailable for a conservative exposure period of 7 days.  The delta CDF estimate was less than 1E-6/yr range, which represents a finding of very low safety significance (Green).  The dominant core damage sequence was an inadvertent open relief valve, failure of HPCI, and failure to depressurize.   The availability of additional injection sources helped minimize the risk significance. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Design Margins area of the Human Performance aspect (H.6), because engineers did not demonstrate the behavior of carefully guarding margins to ensure that safety related equipment was operated and maintained within design margins.  (Section 4OA2.5)

• Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Condition E in that an inoperable Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valve function existed longer than the allowed technical specification time.  The licensee implemented corrective actions by declaring the affected component inoperable per technical specifications, identified preventative maintenance procedures as the cause, repaired the breaker stabs to restore the circuit, and re-performed the surveillance to establish operability.  This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1161991.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, one of the TS required ADS valves opening capability was not fully qualified.  Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012,  the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function as the other five Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) ADS functions were still available.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Identification since the licensee had not taken sufficient post maintenance actions to verify function of the alternate breaker for the ADS valve 3-PCV-001-0022. (P.1) (Section 4OA3.1)

• Green.  A self-revealing NCV of TS 3.4.3, Safety Relief Valves was identified for two required MSRVs being inoperable longer than the allowed outage time and follow on action completion time.  The licensee’s immediate corrective action was to replace all Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves prior to the completion of the refueling outage.  This issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1157981. 

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, two required MSRVs were not able to lift within their required pressure band.  This performance deficiency was screened using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012.   This performance deficiency screens to Green because although the system was inoperable for greater than its allowed outage time and follow on action completion time, the system maintained its safety function.  The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Resolution since the licensee has not taken sufficient corrective actions to address the continued  out of tolerance lift results caused by corrosion bonding of the MSRV pilot valve seats. (P.3) (Section 4OA3.3)   A violation of Severity Level IV that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC.  .  Corrective Actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered in the licensee’s corrective action program.   The violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Tuesday, November 01, 2016

Junk Watts Bar: Substantial Safety Culture Weakness

I suggested the plant be shutdown for a year: clean out management and retrain their employees...
The Tennessee Valley Authority has improved the environment for workers to raise safety concerns at its newest nuclear plant, but a new regulatory review of TVA's work environment at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant concludes the utility still is not maintaining an adequate safety culture.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission met with 136 workers in 17 focus groups at Watts Bar this summer after concluding in March that TVA had "a chilled work environment" at the Spring City, Tenn., plant that could discourage employees or contractors from raising safety concerns.
"Focus groups within and outside of the operations department indicated the existence of broader, previously unrecognized challenges to the maintenance of a positive safety culture, which continued to challenge the safety conscious work environment," Alan Blamey, branch chief of reactor projects in the Atlanta office of the NRC, said in a letter to TVA last week. "The (NRC inspection) team identified substantial weaknesses in various attributes which were found to be pervasive across various work units."
Blamey said nearly half of those interviewed by the NRC at Watts Bar "believed retaliation was a potential outcome for raising concerns."
"In addition, most employees did not believe that concerns were promptly reviewed or appropriately resolved, either by their management or via the corrective action program," Blamey told the TVA.
The NRC has asked Watts Bar officials to respond to ongoing concerns that managers don't want to hear or don't adequately respond to employee concerns at Watts Bar. The NRC has asked TVA to explain how it will ensure workers voice safety concerns without retaliation during a meeting set for 6 p.m. Thursday at the Comfort Inn in Athens, Tenn.
"The NRC has determined that, given the current state of the site's safety culture, you are not meeting the Commission's expectation that licensees establish and maintain a positive safety culture and safety conscious work environment," Blamey said in a letter to TVA's head of regulatory licensing last week.
In March, the NRC issued a letter to TVA expressing concern that some operations employees may not have felt comfortable raising safety concerns at the plant, especially among operators who were running Watts Bar Unit 1 while TVA crews were finalizing work on a second reactor at Watts Bar.
TVA, which began operating Unit 1 at Watts Bar in 1996, began power generation at Watts Bar Unit 2 on a limited basis in May and declared Unit 2 a commercial reactor last month.
In the 1980s when Watts Bar was first being built, whistle blowers raised questions about the installation of electric cables and other plant equipment, ultimately forcing a lengthy and costly review and rework of some plant systems that helped delay the completion for the plant or another decade. At the time, TVA also created a new employee concerns program to independently receive and review safety concerns raised by workers.
In March of this year as TVA was finalizing plans to activate Unit 2, the NRC expressed concern that some licensed operators may have been unduly influenced by TVA managers outside the control room. Those influences could cause what is described as a "chilling effect" on the plant's work environment.
"Our goal in this ongoing effort is to ensure that all nuclear power plant employees always feel free to express concerns about safety issues within their organization and to the NRC directly without fear of retaliation," said Cathy Haney, the region administrator for the NRC office in Atlanta.
At Thursday's meeting, TVA is expected to provide an update on its corrective actions related to the work environment at the plant. NRC officials will discuss the agency's plans to continue to provide oversight regarding how TVA allows and responds to employee concerns.
NRC spokesman Roger Hannah said regulators have seen progress by TVA, "but obviously for something involving the work culture we need to see improvements sustained over time."
TVA spokesman Scott Brooks said utility employees have indicated their willingness to raise their concerns "and we're working to make sure that they understand that they are supported and are able to raise their issues" about any safety concerns about the plant or its operations.
"We are still working on building and improving trust among our employees," Brooks said. "We've made improvements in our work environment, but we obviously have some more work to do because it takes time."

Monday, October 31, 2016

Troubled Entergy's Nuclear Fleet: Waterford Junk And Grand Gulf's Special Inspection

So Waterford is up to 13% power from late last night from some mysterious shutdown. This sounds like the equivalent to the Grand Gulf new special inspection. These guys over the last two years got a terrible capacity factor.

Waterford was shutdown mysteriously around Oct 25...


Power ReactorEvent Number: 52321
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)

UnitSCRAM CodeRX CRITInitial PWRInitial RX ModeCurrent PWRCurrent RX Mode
3NN0Hot Standby0Hot Standby
Event Text
LOSS OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN SYSTEMS FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

"At 0021 [CDT] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16.

"The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022.

"WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.

Wednesday, October 26, 2016

The Heroin Based Dominican Gangs in New England

These guys are soulless killers. I was told if they needed a hit job (murder)in the USA, they would just drag a young kid out of the Dominion Republic ghettoes. Put him on a plane and give him drugs...he kill anyone the gang wanted. After the murder, they just abandon the kid in the USA. These guys don't play around. They are vicious killers.

Anyone in Southeast NH and Ma knows about these guys. I wrote in the recent past how into heroin the Dominicans are. These gangs are all huge throughout New England. The problem is, they got 100,000 ghettoes thugs to replace this gang. Maybe another heroin competitive gang took out these guys to drum up new business...      

By PAT GROSSMITH
New Hampshire Union Leader

CONCORD -- An 18-month investigation uncovered a multi-million dollar heroin ring that has operated for three years supplying kilograms of the deadly drug across northern Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, authorities said Wednesday.

Twenty-seven people have been indicted for participating in the drug trafficking operation, which allegedly also dealt in fentanyl and was headed mainly by individuals from the Dominican Republic who would imported drugs from Mexico.

Eighty percent of the heroin distributed in New England comes from the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to Michael J. Ferguson, Drug Enforcement Administration Agent in Charge, New England Field Division. He said the heroin being sold can be up to 94 percent pure, making it deadly, but it becomes deadlier yet when cut with the powerful painkiller fentanyl.

"Two milligrams of fentanyl is like two grains of salt and is enough to kill you," said Ferguson.

U.S. Attorney Emily Gray Rice said it has yet to be determined how many of the hundreds of drug overdose deaths in New Hampshire could be attributable to these traffickers.

Ferguson said the drug operation was in business to make money.

"They don't care that people are dying," he said. "They don't use it themselves. If it wreaks harm, then so be it."...


Confirmation Entergy And Grand Gulf Is Junk 

In my discussions with the NRC over Grand Gulf, they admitted collectively Entergy's Nuclear Fleet as a whole is under special and intense added scrutiny over a host of operational shortcomings...
Power Engineering

Grand Gulf staying offline until January

Meanwhile, Entergy officials said during the call that the regulated Grand Gulf nuclear plant in Mississippi probably won’t return to service before early 2017.

The unit was shut down Sept. 9 because it wasn’t measuring up to Entergy’s internal standards for “operational excellence,” company executives said during the call.

The Grand Gulf maintenance outage was chiefly trigged by a pump repair, and the plant will take extra time before reconnecting to the grid to evaluate operations, an Entergy spokesperson noted following the call.

Over the past calendar year, Grand Gulf has experienced outage several times for required maintenance. “Before ending the current maintenance outage, plant employees and leadership will take a deliberate and thorough review of processes, procedures and protocols to ensure we are operating to high standards,” the spokesperson said.

“The decision will ensure the needed maintenance and repairs can be fully made, and that worker knowledge and training are at high levels before returning to full operations. To provide the time we need to undertake this process, we anticipate that the unit will not return to service before mid-January 2017,” the Entergy spokesperson went on to say.

During the call, Denault said Entergy is increasing its investment in certain nuclear facilities in order to improve performance and improve the plants’ performance in the eyes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Terrifying New Iron Beam Crack On The Route 119 Brattleboro Bridge.  

10/26 update
I called the NHDOT office this morning. Told the lady to tell Doug to look at my blog. I got pictures of the crack there.  
***I had a errand in Brattleboro. So I parked my car in dirt parking area in NH. I love to walk across, inspect and assess the bridge just for fun. I protested to build the new bridge for three years. I had my signs up all over the place on the New Hampshire side. I was a real pest over this. While protesting, I kicked a wooden plank on the walkway and noticed it moving. I discovered the plank screws had all corroded. Nothing was attaching the wooden planks to the bridge and I considered it dangerous. I notified the NHDOT and Hinsdale police. They seemed to ignore my concerns. I barricaded both
???
Seeing how I was convicted with damaging the same bridge a few years ago, I bet you some people are thinking what is that scheming Mike Mulligan up too? Did he create the crack in the bridge to get even with the police, courts and system? Did he damage the bridge again?  Everyone already thinks I am crazy.    

ends of the walkway for safety. Then pulled up about twenty planks up and threw them overboard into the river. I called the police within a hour...told them what I did. The police charged me with one felony, two big class A misdemeanors and littering with my signs. I plead guilty to a class C misdemeanor. I got fined about $1500 and I was prohibited from being anywhere near the bridge for
I took pictures up and down the bridge in the area two or three years ago. I took pictures of all the big flaws in the bridge. There was no cavernous iron beam crack back there then. I am absolutely positive of it. I concede it either could be an old crack or a new crack. The crack might not have been detectable by eyesight from a distance. But what is undisputable is the gigantic gape of the edges of the gape now. It today seems like the edges of the gape aren’t now paralleled to each other. The edges of the crack are pulling apart and the outer beam is twisting as it goes.       
a year. Two hundred and sixty three days later, the NHDOT did about a $30,000 walkway wooden plank replacement job. It was all a attention getting tactic by me to build a replacement bridge. About a year after of  my conviction, the legislators funded a $ 40 million dollar new bridge. This now rickety and dangerous bridge was built in the early 1920s. They are beginning to dig dirt in 2017 for the new bridge. Many think I energized the local population in order for them to demand this bridge replacement. I wish they would name the new bridge the "Mike Mulligan" memorial bridge :)

I inspected this bridge thoroughly, completely pictured up this disgusting bridge and placed them on my blog. You can do a goggle search on Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale NH...see the media articles on

  • I first called the "Brattleboro Reformer" and explained what I'd seen. They emediately said we'll send a photographer. Met them at the bridge in about 10 minute.

  • I next called the local NHDOT. They referred me to the main NHDOT headquarter's maintenance department. I assume where the NHDOT bridge inspection department is located. The lady made a electronic report with the bridge number...We went over the location three times making absolutely we got the right bridge and location. Told her the "Brattleboro Reformer" took pictures and if you call them they might send you their pictures.  

my arrest and the NHDOT replacing the wooden planks. I use to paraded around bridge in a angel get-up and people called me the "bridge angel guy". The iron beam crack is very new. The NHDOT did a thorough bridge inspections this early summer. Did they miss the crack in the inspection or did it occur after the inspection? I consider the terribly underfunded NHDOT as corrupt as hell and in the bridge inspection falsification game based on insufficient funding...

My cell phone camera doesn't do justice to this dangerous crack. This is a critical bridge. It means one iron beam snaps, then the whole bridge can collapse. It is a very poorly engineered bridge in today's eyes. New bridges are designed to allow one or more beams to snap and the rest of the bridge iron beams safely picks up the load. It is so sick as a society. We got 80,000 pounds or more tractor trailers pounding over this 1921 bridge and the bridge in held together by rivets. Remember the Titanic...


Here below is a rather close-up of the new crack. It looks like a fatigue crack from the flexing of the bridge. A fatigue crack in itself is not a big deal. What frightens the hell out of me is the tremendous forces that are separating apart both sides of cracked and disconnected iron beam. I worry about there being much more dangerous unseen damage below the roadbed causing this broken iron beam. I would prohibit any traffic on this bridge until a thorough inspection is completed and evaluated.


It is about in the middle of the bridge. I am trying to give you a clue where the cracked beam is in the below. If you follow down to below the wooden walkway planks you will fine it.


About ten more feet towards the Brattleboro side is where the crack is from the white spray painted spot. 

(new)In 2014 I marked this area with the white spray paint because of the severe corrosion under the road bed. Throughout my protest people would ask me to show them my examples of the worst corrosion. In the beginning, I would have to hunt back and forth to find the spots. Eventually I marked my examples with this white spray paint. Look directly below this white spot for my example. So today's cracked bridge bracing is about 10 feet more toward the Brattleboro side.      


Somebody even numbered the area.


Friday, October 21, 2016

Election Night



Will there be historic high or low voter turnout this cycle?

What if it is historic high voter turnout and many people can’t vote because of the long lines throughout the night. How will that play into Trump’s  it is a rigged system?

Wednesday, October 19, 2016

Junk Arkansas Unit 2:Power Plant Maintenence Incompetence

incompetence

I talked to the NRC inspector on this. This is called gross maintenance incompetence. They did a 24 hour test on the DG around Sept 14. The test failed. Then they had 14 day before they had to shutdown according to TS.  Fourteen days then came and gone, that is what forced them to shutdown. Basically another 20 days passed to today. They are still shutdown...

Its crazy...

Power Reactor
Event Number: 52267
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 07:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)

Unit
SCRAM Code
RX CRIT
Initial PWR
Initial RX Mode
Current PWR
Current RX Mode
2
N
Y
100
Power Operation
65
Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO INOPERABLE DIESEL GENERATOR

"On September 16, 2016, at 0036 [CDT], during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated.

"It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 [CDT], ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.

Entergy’s New Nuclear Philosophy: Two Broken Plants, Just Fix One At A Time




Unit 1: temporally shutdown due to crack in one-inch pipe.

Unit 2: normal refueling. All work now stopped on unit 2.

So just think how costly this is. We are talking about a million to two million dollars a day shutdown cost let alone the other cost on one plant. They must have to extend the outage on unit 2. This is a terrible sign of corporate financial weakness...

They stopped all refueling activities on unit 2 to focus all their resources on getting unit 1 back on the line. Entergy doesn’t have the resources to do two simultaneous shutdown maintenance periods at the 2 unit ANO? Yep, cooper is in outage? These two plant have the worst record in the industry?   

Junk Plant Arkansas 1?

So Grand Gulf, Arkansas 1&2 are currently in shutdown. The only one in a legitimate scheduled outage is Arkansas 2?

Come on, they been shutdown for almost three weeks for a leak in a tiny "one" inch line??? What else did they find?

9/30/2016
Power ReactorEvent Number: 52271
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK GOHMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/30/2016
Notification Time: 04:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2016
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)

UnitSCRAM CodeRX CRITInitial PWRInitial RX ModeCurrent PWRCurrent RX Mode
1NN0Refueling0Refueling
Event Text
UNISOLABLE LEAK ON DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PIPING DUE TO WELD FAILURE ON A 1" COMMON PIPE

"At 2100 CDT on 09/29/16, while in Mode 6, both trains of Decay Heat (Residual Heat Removal) were declared inoperable due to a cracked weld on a 1" common pipe. The leak developed in a USAS B31.7, Class1 pipe at a weld upstream of pressure indication isolation valve DH-1037. The leak is not isolable from the common 8-inch Decay Heat piping and encompasses approximately 1/3 [one third] of the pipe circumference.

"At the time of discovery, the unit was in Lowered Inventory with both Loops of Decay Heat in service. Subsequently, one train of Decay Heat has been secured to reduce the likelihood of crack propagation. One Train of Decay Heat remains in service providing the function of removing Decay Heat and the other train is readily available. The leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.9.5, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low water Level.

"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that results in a loss of Safety Function associated with the Decay Heat System (Residual Heat Removal System).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The leak is approximately 0.25 gallons per minute and pipe pressure is 140 psi. Compensatory measures are in place and include an individual posted to watch the pipe in case plugging is necessary. Repairs to the pipe will be completed once pipe is able to be drained.

Junk Grand Gulf Licensed Operators and Capacity Factor 

(when they ever going to restart)

Amy Wold,

River Bend, Waterford and Grand Gulf nuclear plants are a mess. The Entergy Southern plants are really in trouble. What is wrong with Grand Gulf recently besides the plant being grossly not profitable with all the down powers and shutdowns???  I believe the NRC recently ask them to stay
shutdown because the control room employees were unsafe…this is unprecedented. Grand Gulf recently made a public notification they are going to shutdown because they no longer trust their “control room” employees to be safe??? Give the resident Grand Gulf NRC inspector a call and ask them why they are shut down?    
Are our efforts to make Entergy spend big bucks on Vermont Yankee, Indian Point, Fitzpatrick and Pilgrim financially starving Grand Gulf, Waterford and River Bend? Is it A war between Entergy’s regulated and non-regulated plants?  
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
16032094206

Tuesday, October 18, 2016

Junk Cook Plant Engineering Assumption

God help us all if all their engineering assumption are as inaccurate as this. The industry is riddle with not conservative engineering assumptions.
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 316/2016-001-01
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Moisture Separator Heater Expansion Joint Failure

ROOT CAUSE
The Root Cause was determined to be an organizational failure to recognize the risk significance of, and to adequately correct or mitigate, previously identified vibration issues with the Unit 2 B Right MSR crossover expansion joint tie rod and bellows in a timely fashion.

CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
Tack welds were inappropriately applied to nuts on the tie rod areas under tensile load. This was inconsistent with the intent of the Engineering Change which installed the threaded tie rods and was the result of poor communication between engineering workgroups. These tack welds on ASTM A 193 B7 material created stress risers which accelerated tie rod high cycle fatigue failure.

The B crossover lines are subject to higher levels of vibration than the A and C crossover lines. The vibration amplitudes produced stresses in the B tie rods that led to the tie rod high cycle fatigue failure.

The B crossover line vibration issue was removed from the plant high priority list following U2C22 before the vibration condition was resolved. Unit 2 returned to service and operated for several months with elevated vibration levels on the MSR B crossover lines before vibration amplitudes were addressed. Since the issue was no longer on the plant high priority list, the issue was no longer a station priority and workgroups lost focus on the issue.