Junk New Coal plant Kemper: It's the Utility Establishment Stupid

I guess the Obama philosophy here is give candy to your friends and enemies alike. It is amazing in the utilities how they are justify secrecy over showing it all. They just have a tremendous concentration of power and throwing money all over the place.

 

These guys are the independent territories of the USA...where everyone hates government. No doubt weak government the electric utilities created is behind this.   

No doubt new nuclear plant Vogtle is like this and everyone has a strict non disclosure contract. Isn't that a  powerful Southern company.

I call this altruism abuse. Justify robing, fraud and deception based on helping people in a emergency by saving the world. Believe me, the green sector including windmills and solar are just as bad as the nukes and coal. At lease natural gas undermines them all with it being so cheap. They all play us so badly...

The news media being so weak plays into it... 

A Model for ‘Clean Coal’ Runs Off the Tracks

A Mississippi project, a centerpiece of President Obama’s climate plan, has been plagued by problems that managers tried to conceal, and by cost overruns and questions of who will pay.

By IAN URBINAJULY 5, 2016

DE KALB, Miss. — The fortress of steel and concrete towering above the pine forest here is a first-of-its-kind power plant that was supposed to prove that “clean coal” was not an oxymoron — that it was possible to produce electricity from coal in a way that emits far less pollution, and to turn a profit while doing so.

The plant was not only a central piece of the Obama administration’s climate plan, it was also supposed to be a model for future power plants to help slow the dangerous effects of global warming. The project was hailed as a way to bring thousands of jobs to Mississippi, the nation’s poorest state, and to extend a lifeline to the dying coal industry.

The sense of hope is fading fast, however. The Kemper coal plant is more than two years behind schedule and more than $4 billion over its initial budget, $2.4 billion, and it is still not operational.

The plant and its owner, Southern Company, are the focus of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and ratepayers, alleging fraud, are suing the company. Members of Congress have described the project as more boondoggle than boon. The mismanagement is particularly egregious, they say, given the urgent need to rein in the largest source of dangerous emissions around the world: coal plants.

The plant’s backers, including federal energy officials, have defended their work in recent years by saying that delays and cost overruns are inevitable with innovative projects of this scale. In this case, they say, the difficulties stem largely from unforeseen factors — or “unknown unknowns,” as Tom Fanning, the chief executive of Southern Company, has often called them — like bad weather, labor shortages and design uncertainties.

Many problems plaguing the project were broadly known and had been occurring for years. But a review by The New York Times of thousands of pages of public records, previously undisclosed internal documents and emails, and 200 hours of secretly though legally recorded conversations among more than a dozen colleagues at the plant offers a detailed look at what went wrong and why.

Those documents and recordings, provided to The Times by a whistle-blower, an engineer named Brett Wingo, and interviews with more than 30 current or former regulators, contractors, consultants or engineers who worked on the project, show that the plant’s owners drastically understated the project’s cost and timetable, and repeatedly tried to conceal problems as they emerged.

The system of checks and balances that are supposed to keep such projects on track was outweighed by a shared and powerful incentive: The company and regulators were eager to qualify for hundreds of millions of dollars in federal subsidies for the plant, which was also aggressively promoted by Haley Barbour, who was Southern’s chief lobbyist before becoming the governor of Mississippi. Once in office, Mr. Barbour signed a law in 2008 that allowed much of the cost of building any new power plants to be passed on to ratepayers before they are built.

Seeing so many of the problems from the inside, at least one employee felt the need to speak up…

Political Intervention: NRC Commissioners Becoming Chaotic

Beg for a big accident during this. ...

The way this goes is the Democrats will get a benign or neutral commissioner, while the republican will hire one their extremist hard right commissioners. The hard right commissioners always wins. This is the crazy establishment going to war with each other. Why would the democrats bleed over a industry they despise.

How can anyone with a straight face say this is a independent agency?

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Down to Three Active Commissioners

 06/30/2016 | Aaron Larson

Following the end of William C. Ostendorff’s term on June 30, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is now down to only three active commissioners on staff. Ostendorff became a commissioner on April 1, 2010, following a distinguished career as a U.S. naval officer, engineer, lawyer, and policy advisor.
His departure adds another vacancy to the one that already exists on the commission (Figure 1). That spot opened when former Chairman Allison Macfarlane left on January 1, 2015, to take a position at George Washington University. President Obama nominated Jessie Hill Roberson on July 15, 2015, to fill the void, but the Senate has not taken action to confirm the pick.

In April, Politico reported that because Roberson is a Democrat, she would presumably not be confirmed until a Republican nominee is put forward to take Ostendorff’s spot. The story quoted Environment and Public Works Chairman James Inhofe (R-Okla.) as saying, “I’m gonna make that real clear that … personally I think it’s a good Democrat that’s been nominated, but we want to make sure that they nominate a Republican too.”

Rebecca Kern, blogger for Bloomberg BNA (Bureau of National Affairs), interviewed Ostendorff earlier this month. She noted that one of Ostendorff’s regrets is that little headway was made during his term on a long-term repository for high-level radioactive waste.

Kern quoted Ostendorff as saying, “I’m not a zealot for Yucca Mountain. I’m not politically charged to move toward a Yucca Mountain, but I do know the nation needs a repository and I’ve been very disappointed in the lack of progress.”

According to a story posted by the Morning Consult, he is leaving the NRC to teach at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Dead-Ender Junk Plant FitzPatrick: Radioactive Discharge to Inviroment

Update

I bet you on the outfall, where the roof drains into a site sewer system, then flows out to Lake Ontario, the Lake mud in the vicinity of the outfall  is radioactive. I would take a set of mud samples, bet you it would be radioactive.  

Fitz is a "incredibly well run facility". The NRC seems to got silent for some reason.

Entergy spokesperson Jerry Nappi said FitzPatrick employees proactively shut the reactor down Friday after discovering a power supply loss to one of its pumps. The incident was related to a malfunction of one of the plant's oil tanks that caused an estimated 20 to 30 gallons of non-radioactive lubrication oil to spill into Lake Ontario.
It's the latest in a string of mishaps at FitzPatrick and Entergy's other New York plant, Indian Point outside of New York City, but Nappi said both facilities are operating reliably. 

"FitzPatrick is an incredibly well run facility," Nappi said. "It operates very reliably. It's designed to shutdown automatically and operators are trained to shut it down if any of 100 things is not operating the exact way it should and that's what happened in this case."

****This below is my picture of VY in 2011. There is a plume of steam from their turbine lube oil vapor extractor vent line. The turbine building is the short, long green building behind the tall concrete reactor building. The vent pipe plume is on the right side of the turbine building on the roof.

This is a BWR. We had no steam generator in this design acting as a radioactivity to the secondary system. Steam is produced by the core, it flows up the steam line into the turbine. The turbine shaft seals keep this steam in the turbine, not in the people space. The turbine lube oil is a integral part of this system. The steam is pretty radioactive. The radioactivity levels varies significantly over the life of the plant. A fuel failure would significantly jack up the radioactivity in the steam.

Basically plant early 1970s licensing and technical specification gives permission with this being a non monitored release of radioactivity. A new plant wouldn't be allowed to have this. It is a flaw in the nuclear professionalism and the NRC continuing to allow this.

The philosophy in the 1970s, if a nuclear accident occurred at the plant, the main steam isolation valves would trip automatically on high steam radioactivity. I don't think they have this trip today. So the MSIVs would bottle up the reactivity in the core and stop the release out of this vent line. I could make the case one of the MSIVs and turbine stop might be leaking. There you would get a unfiltered release to the environment.

But this vent line spews out radioactivity day in and day out. I think it would have a significant effect on the total release of radiation reported to the public.

Bottom line, me yanking out this picture and the memo by Vanags is shocking to the NRC about Fitzpatrick. I am trying to draw attention with this to NY and NRC.  

Fitzpatrick has the same plume coming out of their plant. The Fitz turbine system is fundimentally the same model as VY and Pilgrim.  Like I said, turbine lube oil comes in direct contact with main steam.  The oil absorbs radioactivity. This oil went into Lake Ontario.












A nuclear professional outfit would consider the turbine lube oil a special system. It is potentially radioactivity at least. The would sample new oil on the site for background radiation as a reference. Then sample it say on a monthly or quarterly bases. 

I am going to make the NRC officials swallow their tongues on this one. I gets you to ask the right questions. Water in direct contact with fuel pins turns into steam and flows down the main steam lines into the turbine stop valves and turbine control valves. The high and low pressure turbines converts this steam into power though this steam. Lots of steam passes though the steam turbine. The radioactive steam makes the turbine stop and control extremely contaminated with radiation. During outages when overhauling the valves and turbine, this is a high radioactive contamination area. The got a a tape barrier all around the turbine area and with a step off pad. The people who work on these components have to wear heavy duty anti c clothing and sometimes respirators. The state should query Entergy about what kinds of radiation and radiation contamination levels are involved in a turbine overhaul. Don't even get me talking about radiation contamination levels in the condensate and feed steam system. The steam that contaminates the turbine and components is the same steam seen in the steam plume in my picture. Fitzs has the same LO vapor extractor plume as Vermont Yankee.  The steam coming out of the Fitz's lube oil vapor extractor vent pipe atop of their turbine building is the same steam that craps up the turbine valves and blades. So Fitz has the same steam plume as Vermont Yankee. The shaft seals wear out over time. The size of the steam plume is dependent on turbine shaft seal wear and vibration levels. Ask the NRC what barrier does Fitz have to prevent radiation discharge to the outside (coming from main down steam), as seen in heavy radiation contamination seen in the turbine overhaul. Does this same radiation escape out the vent line plume? This is the vent line where they leaked out the oil. I suspect they is a much more oil put on the roof than what was reported.

Basically Areva is bankrupt and has a lot a quality issues with reactor vessels and components. They are not a trustworthily contractor or vendor. Bet you VY told Areva these are the kind of radiation levels we want told in your independent investigation. They are French whores...

NY and the NRC have to take their own samples of the lube oil and measure radioactivity.

France Warns of Nuclear Industry Shake-Up After Areva Loss

PARIS — France's energy minister said on Monday that an overhaul of the country’s state-controlled nuclear energy industry was imminent, after one of the country’s main builders of nuclear power plants warned of a loss that could hamper its ability to continue operating independently.

The minister, Ségolène Royal, told reporters that France’s main nuclear power companies “should organize themselves to refocus on their core business, to forge alliances between major French enterprises and to win bids at the international level.”

You see how I finally got VY to admit their turbine lube extractor turbine building plume was radioactive in 2011. Basically VY was shutdown because the state no longer trusted anything the NRC and VY said. This memo helped Vermont see the light.   

VERMONT

State of Vermont

Department of Public Service [phone] 802-828-2811 112 State Street [fax] 802-828-2342 Drawer 2O [tty] 8οΟ-734-839ο

Montpelier, VT o562o-26o1 http://www.publicservice.vermont.gov

October 25, 2011

To: VSNAP members Cc: Bernard Buteau, Vermont Yankee State Liaison Engineer

From: Uldis Vanags, DPS Nuclear Engineer

Subject: VY Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent

At the last VSNAP meeting (October 19, 2011), during the public comment period, Mr. Mike Mulligan provided information on a petition (Attachment 1) he submitted to the NRC on August 26, 2011 where he expressed a concern that the Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent was an unmonitored radiological release path and not accounted for in the Vermont Yankee (VY) effluent release report or the environmental radiation report. Mr. Mulligan filed this concern to the NRC per 10 CFR 2.206 and the NRC has not completed its determination to date.

Mr. Mulligan inquired to me (on October 17, 2011) whether the visible vapor from the Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent had any radioactivity associated with it. I posed this question to Vermont Yankee and learned that Vermont Yankee reviewed Mr. Mulligan's petition to the NRC and the question of whether the Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent was an unmonitored radiological release path. Vermont Yankee found that there wasn’t adequate information to answer this question, so VY generated a Condition Report (CR-VTY-2011-03628) on September 12, 2011 which creates a process for investigation and corrective actions. The investigation into this matter so far has determined that based on a 2006 Engineering Review of plant systems, it is likely that the Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent contains tritium, a radionuclide. However, evaluation of the vapor from the vent is need prior to determining whether this is a release pathway that would require reporting. Thus the actions to be taken are:

1) Develop and proceduralize a method for testing the Turbine Oil Vapor Extractor Vent for radionuclide content. Due by November 28, 2011.

2) Perform a sampling of the Vent for radionuclides, including tritium. Due by December 10, 2011.

3) Using the results of the vent radionuclide analysis, conduct a dose analysis to determine

the radiological significance. Due on February 27, 2012.

4) If the dose analysis requires reportability update the Vermont Yankee Off-Site Dose

Calculation Manual (ODCM). If an ODCM revision is not necessary document the justification. Due on March 13, 2012.

Junk Dead-Ender Plant Fitzpatrick: The NRC Cover-up and Unethical Employees In The Public Affairs office.

Update 6/30

Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@yahoo.com> Dear Sir, I had a problem yesterday with a NRC employee yesterday. I called and made a complaint to the Region I Administrator’s office. Mr Dorman was out of the office. I made the complaint to the office secretary. She said a employee would further talk to me about these events. “There is no radioactivity in turbine lube oil on the roof. It is a closed system” Here is my version of these events and a analysis of why this occurred. It is my blog. It will be my talking points to the investigator. Could

To

allegation@nrc.gov allegation@nrc.gov

Today at 11:50 AM

Dear Sir,

 

I had a problem yesterday with a NRC employee yesterday. I called and made a complaint to the Region I Administrator’s office. Mr Dorman was out of the office. I made the complaint to the office secretary. She said a employee would further talk to me about these events.

“There is no radioactivity in turbine lube oil on the roof. It is a closed system”

Here is my version of these events and a analysis of why this occurred. It is my blog. It will be my talking points to the investigator.

Could you pass this e-mail onto the Region 1 Administrators office secretary and also to Chairman Burns’s office?

The Popperville Town Hall: Junk Dead-Ender Plant Fitzpatrick: The NRC Cover-up and Unethical Employees In The Public Affairs office.

The Popperville Town Hall: Junk Dead-Ender Plant Fitzpatrick: The NRC Cover...

"Junk Dead-Ender Plant Fitzpatrick: The NRC Cover-up and Unethical Employees In The Public Affairs office"

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

Steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

1-603-336-8320 

Update 6/29:

The region I(all regions)NRC public affairs officials have become effectively nuclear industry open door mat concierges. They have turned into corporate public relations specialist befitting the nuclear industry. Everything NRC public affairs specialist has turned into the typical corporate model public relations specialist who will automatically sell their souls for a few pennies to the highest bidder. 

You get the word """Public""" in Public Affairs specialist. You are not named nuclear industry Corporate Affairs specialist.

These guys don’t serve our common interest and greater national purpose. They are wholly serving the nuclear industry. The whole ends of this appalling corruption is to continue to make the nuclear industry collectively more fragile. You think you are trying to help-protect your weak buddy-brothers, but you are making them weaker by allowing to "not follow the accepted codes, rules and our common ethics.  

Basically the whole NRC’s public affairs department is not effectively manage towards the greater ends of our country by the EDO and commissioners. I doubt they are really are public servants and they don't serve our collective commons ends and purpose.  

And if the agency’s senior management were smart...the whole exchange by me concerning Fitzpatrick beginning with the trip last Friday has been a plan by me to preserve the NRC’s public credibly.

Ultimately, the NRC has a choice: is the NRC going to consume the NRC’s perilous public credibility on the dead-ender plants or will the agency conserve their precious public credibility to save the plants who might continue to operate for 10, 20 or 30 years and upcoming new plants. All plants and nuclear corporations aren’t the same national worth.
      
***NRC Complaint talking points...this will be my description of the events in my complaint to the NRC! I'd be glad to talk about this to any news media. 1-603-336-8320 Remember, everything is always recorded when talking on a NRC telephone call. I highly approve of this policy.

Think if the news industry first impression was Entergy declared they released radioactive turbine oil to Lake Ontario last Friday. Would their response and the magnitude of the interest be the same? This is what's the concern to the NRC.

Junk Plant Fitzpatrick: Cover-up of Radioactive Leak

(June 27) “By the talk of the NRC spokesmen, the inspectors are too busy monitoring the outcome of the immediate plant trip. They don't have time to take a deep dive into the lube oil radiation contamination documentation. Imagine the fallout if the inspectors go deep into the documentation and discovered the releases was radioactive. I am not saying this level of radiation would harm anyone. I just want to see the facts. I want to make sure everyone is following the establish rules and regulations.”

Region 1 Public Affairs Staff

Senior Public Affairs Officer: Diane Screnci
Field Public Affairs Officer: Neil Sheehan

Implements NRC policies and programs for Public Affairs in the Region.   

6/27/2016@ 4:18pm

Hypothetical conversation between Fitz's senior VP and his slave underlings surrounding the turbine lube oil leak.

“This is Entergy's first declaration there is no radiation in the oil (above normal background). I suspect it went down like this.”

“The VP asked his underlings "is there any radiation contamination in the lube oil". They came back off the cuff, I am certain there is no radiation in the oil. But nobody ever collected a sampled for radiation detection yesterday or never referenced the documented history of radiation sampling in the lube oil.”

I called the NRC's Allegation department early yesterday (6/28 to get my complaint down on the NRC’s paperwork, that the Fitzpatrick leaking turbine lube oil was radioactive. I don’t trust verbal communications with the NRC officials. I highly favor written commutations for this reason and it is publically available. I know the Allegations department would accept my complaint and reply in writing. They declined to accept my allegation. The Allegations person said instead of an official allegation complaint, she would get an expert NRC person to have a talking with me. I found that perfectly acceptable. I was surprised the Allegation department didn’t automatically accept my complaint. I have a lot of experience good and bad with the NRC’s allegation department. I was basing my allegation on my experience and some documents and pictures I had obtained.

Surprisingly I got a quick call back from I think was Senior Public Affairs Officer Diane Screnci later on in the afternoon of June 28. I laid out my rationale why I think it was an uncontrolled radioactive discharge. I think we had about a 20-minute pleasant conversation. I specifically stated many times I need a current sample result on radiation contamination levels in the turbine lube oil to be happy. She told me she would get the information from the Fitz staff. She stated, the Fitz’s staff is extremely busy…don’t think you will get a quick answer back. Mrs. Screnci responses seems very reasonable and I was impressed with the NRC response even though I wasn’t allowed to document my concerns

This afternoon on June 29, I see on my tv screen I getting a region 1 call. I suspect it is about Fitz. It is Mrs. Screnci. She has a very pleasant voice on the phone. She confidently and curtly declares,

“I got this from the Fitz'd staff, there is no radioactivity in Fitz’s turbine lube oil spill.  It is a closed system. The turbine lube oil is completely isolated from the radioactivity”.

Yesterday I thought Entergy was covering-up their illegal discharge of radioactivity into Lake Ontario. Today I think it’s a conspiratorial cover-up by Entergy and NRC, that Fitz’s illegally discharged radioactivity to Lake Ontario contrary to regulations.

When I hear Mrs. Screnci response “it’s a close system” I immediately think I can’t be hearing such nonsense from a seasoned highly trained PA officer and much more educational and experienced NRC staff at a Nuclear power plant. The plant’s NRC staff is highly professional nuclear people and it's in the highly sensitive nature of the business…these guys would never put the agency’s and individual reputation on the line with such nonsense.  

I immediately told her the staff doesn’t know how the turbine lube oil and sealing steam works at Fitze talking like this. I begin thinking she must think I am a typical anti-nuclear dummy. Then it comes to me, she trying to derail my concern and information, she thinks I am a anti nuke dummy by throwing disruptive communication bs at me. How widespread is this in the PA office. But I think, I am absolutely sure she knows who I am. Then it came, she playing the role of a information disruptor, not a federal regulator who supposed to eb a provider of accurate and reliable information to all stakeholders. Her role is supposed to a provided of accurate information to the outsiders, not a disruptor of bad information leaving the plant.

I ask her, “can I show you something”. I am two steps ahead of her, I got my ducks in row. I get this light grunt from her on the phone, a slight delay, then begrudging prolonged OK. She was beginning to unethically dump me from the phone, but thought about who I was and held her tongue. I think she hates me. 

Vermont Yankee has the same turbine lube oil and vapor extractor as Fitz. The radioactivity in the turbine lube oil is a well warn path for me at VY. I show her a picture of the identical VY vapor extractor pipe vent on top the turbine build as Fitz…it’s got a large reactor main steam and vapor plume coming out of the vent line. It is the same line…vent pipe…that turbine lube oil that leaked oil out at Fitz vent line. I showed her the memo I got Vermont's state nuclear engineer Uldis Vanag in Oct 2011. He thinks there is at least tritium getting discharge from the lube oil system and probrably other radionuclides. Basically VY never knew radiation was in the plume…I forced VY to hire Areva to do an independent investigation on radiation in the turbine lube oil. The implication is the yearly environmental radiation discharge report was incomplete. I thoroughly explained the meaning of the VY’s lube oil plume picture and the state’s official memo to me.

Then I get a sheepish Mike from Mrs. Screnci, "I know what happened". I misconstrued your question yesterday(a lie). I thought you were just asking about the lube oil on the roof. This absolutely makes no engineering or system/component sense. It is complete gibberish. I will ask the proper question now to the staff.

Mrs Screnci declaration of no radioactive turbine oil on turbine roof to me (6/29) 

“I got this from the NRC's Fitzpatrick staff; there is no radioactivity in Fitz’s turbine lube oil spill on the roof.  It is a closed system. The turbine lube oil is completely isolated from the radioactivity”.

You notice how closely this tracts with my hypothetical question the Fitz’s VP posed to his staff on June 27. The NRC is doing the same thing with Mrs. Screnci to me. She is intentionally stiff arming me off my investigation of these events. Didn't I do a great job predicting this kind of response:

                                          

My hypothetical conversation(6/27)between Fitz's site VP to is underling slaves:  

“The VP asked his underlings "is there any radiation contamination in the lube oil". They come back off the cuff, I am certain there is no radiation in the oil. (But nobody ever collected a sampled for radiation detection yesterday or never referenced the documented history of radiation sampling in the lube oil.)”  

I thought about what occurred here for a few minutes…then made a call to the region I administrator to file a complaint. He was out of the office for a few days…I suspect a vacation. Basically we are now checking to see if the regional administrator is also participating in unethical behavior and a cover-up. The regional administrator (senior official in region I) is a Mr. Dorman. I had to describe my concern to Mr Dorman Office secretary. She told me a NRC employee will call you to make the official complaint. My aim is to get these concern in the NRC documents. This article is my talking points to that person.
    

Mrs Screnci is the senior office in the region I public affair office. So who could you trust to make this complaint in that office. I wanted to make this complaint to her office. Basically this is corruption in the highest order…a US regulator’s public affairs senior officer is carrying the water of Entergy and the nuclear industry. She participated in an illegal cover-up. She is not a US governmental regulator’s public affairs officer…see is a anti US public Affairs officer. Her action withholds information the public has a right to know and protects bad actor nuclear plant operators.

Can’t you see Mrs. Screnci and NRC’s response, Mike, we were trying to protect a secret NRC investigation…that’s is why we deceived you.    

Junk Dead Ender Fitzpatrick: Expansion of Investigation BY New York

Just saying, how competent is the NY DEC or PSC? The NY political system is riddled with corruption and insiders deals...worst in the nation with state legislators serving sentences in jail.  Bet you the state is concerned with throwing off beach business with declaring radioactive oil in Lake Ontario. I can't find the state press release anywhere on the their site.
Ok, so it looks like the PSC and DEC agree with Entergy the lube oil is non radioactive. I just want to know what documents and information they are keying on to make this assertion.

Who tested the oil for radioactivity?

State investigating shut down, oil spill at FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Scriba

by Eric Reinhardt

Date: 6/28/2016 at 16:37:10

SCRIBA, N.Y. — New York officials are investigating the shutdown and subsequent oil leak into Lake Ontario at the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Scriba, near Oswego.

The New York State Departments of Public Service (DPS) and Environmental Conservation (DEC) are probing the matter, DPS said in a news release issued Monday night.

The departments describe the plant shutdown as “unexpected.” They’re also pointing to a stuck valve, which they contend led to a leak of non-radiological oil into Lake Ontario.

The two agencies are conducting this joint investigation to understand the precautionary measures the plant operator took and what impact the leak had on water quality.

Investigators have stopped the source of the leak. The incident didn’t release any radioactivity into the environment, the departments say.

New Orleans, Louisiana–based Entergy (NYSE: ETR), which operates the Fitzpatrick plant, is currently remediating the spill under DEC and the U.S. Coast Guard oversight, according to the release.

The plant produces more than 800 megawatts of electric power, representing about 4 percent of the total energy demand in New York, according to the Entergy website.

Contact Reinhardt at ereinhardt@cnybj.com

Junk Entergy Senior Nuke Executive Realignment: Moving Deckchairs on the Titanic

Some come from notorious plants?

 Entergy Nuclear names new leaders for strategic site and fleet support and oversight

Wednesday, Jun 29, 2016

Entergy Chief Nuclear Officer Chris Bakken has announced that Larry Coyle, Indian Point Energy Center site vice president, has been named chief operating officer to work alongside COOs Donna Jacobs and John Ventosa. These leaders are responsible for the strategic direction, support and oversight of the company's national fleet of 11 reactors in nine locations.

In other facility moves, Tony Vitale, currently site vice president for Palisades Power Plant in Michigan, was named site vice president for Indian Point Energy Center in New York, and Charlie Arnone, interim vice president of operations support, was named site vice president for Palisades. Coyle, Vitale and Arnone begin their new roles in August.

"We recognize that we face significant challenges at our sites, across the fleet and industry," Bakken said. "These organizational changes are a part of our nuclear sustainability plan aimed at improving fleet performance."

Coyle joined Entergy in 2011 as general manager of plant operations at Indian Point. In 2013, he was named site vice president at FitzPatrick, and has led the team at Indian Point for the last 18 months. He has more than 33 years of commercial nuclear power experience.

He began his nuclear career with Exelon at Dresden Nuclear Power Station and held various positions increasing in responsibility including main control room supervisor, shift manager, mechanical maintenance manager and work management director. During his tenure at Dresden, he served as an operations peer evaluator for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

Following his work at Dresden, Coyle served as operations director at LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. He then accepted the maintenance director position for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, and was subsequently promoted to plant manager.

Vitale began his career as maintenance engineer at Indian Point. Throughout his 33 year nuclear career, Vitale has held a number of positions with increasing responsibility, including various maintenance, engineering and operations supervisory and management roles before becoming general manager plant operations in 2007. In 2011, he accepted the leadership role at Palisades.

Arnone began his nuclear career 31 years ago after eight years in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power program. He has extensive operations experience as a licensed reactor operator and senior reactor operator.

"I am pleased that Larry, Tony and Charlie have agreed to step into these key fleet and site assignments," Bakken said. "They will have the responsibility for the safe, secure and reliable operations of their respective facilities and will be involved with local communities, take an active role in the industry and partner with our employees as we strive to be one of the best nuclear operators in the world."

Entergy Corporation (NYSE:  ETR) is an integrated energy company engaged primarily in electric power production and retail distribution operations. Entergy owns and operates power plants with approximately 30,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity, including nearly 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power. Entergy delivers electricity to 2.8 million utility customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Entergy has annual revenues of approximately $11.5 billion and more than 13,000 employees.

Junk Plant Salem/Hope: Another Mysterious Plant Trip

This is the second largest nuclear facility in the USA. It is a three unit site with two Salem Units and then Hope Creek. 66% of their units are down mostly over a poor maintenance philosophy. Their philosophy is symbolized by Salem's troubles with bolting issues surrounding the reactor cooling pumps loose bolts in the coolant and their baffling core bolting issues. Maybe they need to extend their outages a week or so to do deeper preventative maintenance. It would be cheaper than a this.

So 66% of this site's plants were dead in this perilous summer period. Its got to jack the grid's prices to the hapless ratepayers.

Facility: SALEM Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 06/28/2016 Notification Time: 06:58 [ET] Event Date: 06/28/2016 Event Time: 04:23 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION SIGNAL "This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal. "Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods [fully] inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Emergency Safety Features] systems functioned as expected. "No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event." The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event. Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

Junk plant Watts Bar: Massive NRC Approval of Tech Spec and Rules Violations

Is the CDRM threated vent plug a NRC defined pressure boundary. It is questionable. This guy is a PWR. They operate at much higher pressures than a BWR. This guy’s leak must have boron deposit near the plug. This is not a water leak…it’s a high pressure 2000 psi steam leak. The vapor probably gets deposited in the containment coolers…then drain to the sump. We got the big time steam cutting probabilities surrounding this guy. If that plug popped out what would it do to the CRDM. You notice the quick worthless show trail corrective action…they only weld sealed this plug. Why didn’t they seal weld all the plugs. What would the increased flow of coolant water thought the CDRM and then out the crack do to the CRDM? Could it damage the CRDM? 

I am interested in why a LER wasn't written up for the plug leak. When did Watts Bar first discover the leaking indications? They measure airborn radiation as a sensitive indicator of a pressure barrier leak. How did the end up ignoring this symptom?     

Reg guild 1.45

RCPB leakage is leakage from a nonisolable fault in the material of an RCS component, pipe wall

(including welds), or vessel wall. Leakage from seals, gaskets, and mechanical connections (e.g., bolts, valve seals) is not considered RCPB leakage although these components are part of the RCPB, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions” (Ref. 2). Thus, RCPB leakage is indicative of degradation of pressure retaining components that could ultimately result in a loss of component structural integrity.

***See, these guys spend all their intelligence on illegally getting around the rules instead using their god given intelligence of blindly following the rules.

I just don't think the NRC educated enough on the specific plant technical specification and how to use power to make these guys follow the rules. So why didn't the NRC order them to shutdown over the out of position rod? Are they getting complacent with leaks and out of position rods?

They had a reactor coolant leak over a control rod drive mechanism drain plug and they didn't know it. I bet they knew it was a leak, but didn't emediately know it was a pressure boundary illegal water leak. They had a reactor pressure barrier leak...they are required to emediately shutdown to repair it.

Basically they had a unaddressed dreaded pressure barrier leak (Davis Bessee)that shorted out the rod position indication.

They violated two tech specs shutdown requirements over this to protect profits and capacity factor.

1) They intentionally overrode the Tech Spec requirements over a inop rod position indication system and the NRC did not intervene.

2) They had a dangerous and illegal reactor pressure boundary leakage. 

They got probably 6 inches of concrete around the reactor and the containment is poorly instrumented containment. They are half blinded on their best days and they know it. It is not like they got a god's eye view of every possible leak. Of course these guys defense with this is, we couldn't discriminate between pressure boundary leak and insignificant leak.  But believe me, they always agonized over how blinded they are with things happening behind the six inches of concrete.       


What did I say about the money grubbing NRC, plant engineers and management always screwing the licensed operators. The control room guys are just powerless to maintain professional nuclear standards. Aren't these the guys where the NRC charged TVA with systemic safety intimidation of the employees. How can you not come to the conclusion that the NRC facilitated this broad intimidation of employees and poor safety culture, if the agency is not enforcing their regulations over and over again. They are letting TVA run around with uncontestable power never contemplated by congress and the peoples who voted for them.      

There are tons of electrical equipment and electrical instrumentation in containment. There are strict QA requirements, but not enforced, to make all this equipment water and moisture proof and temperature resistance. In the big bad meltdown accident LOCA, the environment is upward to 600 degrees. with long term steam, moisture and water saturated conditions. How the hell are we getting electrical shorts in the extraordinary safety related rod position indication system in these benign normal operation conditions in 2015? This was a warning to everyone that is ignored.

My considered accidents:

1) A quick puff of steam filling the area around the CDRM positon indication area but not big enough to create a scram. It shorts out numerous rod position indications leading to numerous rod drop accidents... The control room operators aren't quick enough to scram the reactor and control the core rod density. The core partially melts down leading to the greatest nuclear scandal the US ever seen. The plants are destroyed including the untouched new nuclear plant, but little release of radioactivity. You just cratored the nuclear industry and it will have grave consequences to our nation way beyond the nuclear industry.

2) You come to a mid size or largest design LOCA...but on the big picture is easily controllable. The plant might be easily repairable after it. They allowed again illegal pressure boundary leakage (wink, wink)...the piping tiny crack mysteriously blew open months after knowing about the illegal tiny leak. But all is safe, we are designed and trained for this. But a host of equipment and instrumentation electrical shorts in containment begin to show up. The crew gets terribly confused, become effectively blinded by the magnitude if shorting equipment in containment. A easily controllable events turns into a partial meltdown or a full blown meltdown.

The real risk of the big one is a lost of integrity with the NRC and TVA...everyone is spinning engineering analysis for self interest in a secrecy driven system. Everyone is allowed to have their own special secrets and outsiders can't protect themselves. They have to create a widespread severe employee intimidation system to accomplish this engineering paper whipping spinning.

Nobody knows what the true conditions of the plant is and everyone is lying through their teeth to keep their jobs. This is when you have mind boggling stupid plant accidents that any idiot should have prevented. This happens more than you think. These kinds of new events in a much smaller event are emerging more and more at these plants because of the financial pressures.   

05000390

Licensee Event Report 390/2016-007-00, Technical Specification Action Not Met for Rod Position indication

On April 21,2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 concluded that a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.8, Rod Position lndication, had occurred during the dropped rod event on November 05, 2015. The Surveillance Requirement for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position lndication, (ARPI), agrees within 12 steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position lndication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within 12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A. Because the actions of TS 3.1.8 were not taken within the required times, WBN Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by TS.

On November 05, 2015, WBN Unit had a dropped rod event and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits - Condition B, and TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (OPTR) - Condition A. The control room staff took the actions according to TS and reduced power to less than 75%. However, upon review after the event, it was determined that TS 3.1.8, Rod Position indication for the Control Rod Drive System [El|S:AA], should also have been entered. The Surveillance Requirement (SR) for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position indication (ARPI) agrees within 12

steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position indication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within

12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.

The dropped rod occurred as a result of an electrical ground caused by moisture intrusion from a reactor coolant system leak. The leak was found during a subsequent maintenance outage on a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) threaded vent plug which had decreased torque. A sealwelded vent plug was installed to prevent further leakage.

Intention falsification of federal documents...or a falsification of licensee documents that impairs the oversight of the NRC. Why didn't the NRC have the expertise to catch it?  

While there was a dropped rod event, this issue was the result of an incorrect licensing position (CR 979285) addressing how to comply with TS 3.1 .8, specifically, whether TS LCO 3.1.8 for Rod Position indication (RPl) should be entered after a dropped rod as a result of not being able to successfully perform the associated 18-month TS SR 3.1.8.1.

B. The cause(s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause.

The cause of this event was an incorrect licensing position of how to comply with TS 3.1.

Wink, wink, wink:  another intentional misinterpretation of tech specs in a operational bind uncontested by the NRC. I am sure the NRC rules allow this. These guys spend tremendous amounts of time studying and training on teck specs. These guys brag they are highly detailed oriented. That is what they get promoted for. Believe me, they knew what they should have done, and they expected the agency's pitiful response.   

Previous similar events at the same plant

LER 2016-002, Technical Specification Action Not Met for lnoperable Containment lsolation Valve, describes a similar event of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications. ln this LER, WBN Unit 1 entered TS 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, for a containment isolation valve being inoperable. The requirement to isolate the penetration associated with this containment isolation valve was not completed within TS time requirements. The cause of this event was operations staff misunderstanding the applicability of the Note associated with TS 3.6.3, which allows administrative controls under certain conditions. ln response to this event, a shift order defining the correct response when entering TS 3.6.3 Condition A was provided to the operating staff, and is to be a topic of future operations training. The response to this issue was specific to TS 3.6.3 and would not have prevented this event.