Junk Dead Ender Fitzpatrick: Expansion of Investigation BY New York

Just saying, how competent is the NY DEC or PSC? The NY political system is riddled with corruption and insiders deals...worst in the nation with state legislators serving sentences in jail.  Bet you the state is concerned with throwing off beach business with declaring radioactive oil in Lake Ontario. I can't find the state press release anywhere on the their site.
Ok, so it looks like the PSC and DEC agree with Entergy the lube oil is non radioactive. I just want to know what documents and information they are keying on to make this assertion.

Who tested the oil for radioactivity?

State investigating shut down, oil spill at FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Scriba

by Eric Reinhardt

Date: 6/28/2016 at 16:37:10

SCRIBA, N.Y. — New York officials are investigating the shutdown and subsequent oil leak into Lake Ontario at the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Scriba, near Oswego.

The New York State Departments of Public Service (DPS) and Environmental Conservation (DEC) are probing the matter, DPS said in a news release issued Monday night.

The departments describe the plant shutdown as “unexpected.” They’re also pointing to a stuck valve, which they contend led to a leak of non-radiological oil into Lake Ontario.

The two agencies are conducting this joint investigation to understand the precautionary measures the plant operator took and what impact the leak had on water quality.

Investigators have stopped the source of the leak. The incident didn’t release any radioactivity into the environment, the departments say.

New Orleans, Louisiana–based Entergy (NYSE: ETR), which operates the Fitzpatrick plant, is currently remediating the spill under DEC and the U.S. Coast Guard oversight, according to the release.

The plant produces more than 800 megawatts of electric power, representing about 4 percent of the total energy demand in New York, according to the Entergy website.

Contact Reinhardt at ereinhardt@cnybj.com

Junk Entergy Senior Nuke Executive Realignment: Moving Deckchairs on the Titanic

Some come from notorious plants?

 Entergy Nuclear names new leaders for strategic site and fleet support and oversight

Wednesday, Jun 29, 2016

Entergy Chief Nuclear Officer Chris Bakken has announced that Larry Coyle, Indian Point Energy Center site vice president, has been named chief operating officer to work alongside COOs Donna Jacobs and John Ventosa. These leaders are responsible for the strategic direction, support and oversight of the company's national fleet of 11 reactors in nine locations.

In other facility moves, Tony Vitale, currently site vice president for Palisades Power Plant in Michigan, was named site vice president for Indian Point Energy Center in New York, and Charlie Arnone, interim vice president of operations support, was named site vice president for Palisades. Coyle, Vitale and Arnone begin their new roles in August.

"We recognize that we face significant challenges at our sites, across the fleet and industry," Bakken said. "These organizational changes are a part of our nuclear sustainability plan aimed at improving fleet performance."

Coyle joined Entergy in 2011 as general manager of plant operations at Indian Point. In 2013, he was named site vice president at FitzPatrick, and has led the team at Indian Point for the last 18 months. He has more than 33 years of commercial nuclear power experience.

He began his nuclear career with Exelon at Dresden Nuclear Power Station and held various positions increasing in responsibility including main control room supervisor, shift manager, mechanical maintenance manager and work management director. During his tenure at Dresden, he served as an operations peer evaluator for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

Following his work at Dresden, Coyle served as operations director at LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. He then accepted the maintenance director position for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, and was subsequently promoted to plant manager.

Vitale began his career as maintenance engineer at Indian Point. Throughout his 33 year nuclear career, Vitale has held a number of positions with increasing responsibility, including various maintenance, engineering and operations supervisory and management roles before becoming general manager plant operations in 2007. In 2011, he accepted the leadership role at Palisades.

Arnone began his nuclear career 31 years ago after eight years in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power program. He has extensive operations experience as a licensed reactor operator and senior reactor operator.

"I am pleased that Larry, Tony and Charlie have agreed to step into these key fleet and site assignments," Bakken said. "They will have the responsibility for the safe, secure and reliable operations of their respective facilities and will be involved with local communities, take an active role in the industry and partner with our employees as we strive to be one of the best nuclear operators in the world."

Entergy Corporation (NYSE:  ETR) is an integrated energy company engaged primarily in electric power production and retail distribution operations. Entergy owns and operates power plants with approximately 30,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity, including nearly 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power. Entergy delivers electricity to 2.8 million utility customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Entergy has annual revenues of approximately $11.5 billion and more than 13,000 employees.

Junk Plant Salem/Hope: Another Mysterious Plant Trip

This is the second largest nuclear facility in the USA. It is a three unit site with two Salem Units and then Hope Creek. 66% of their units are down mostly over a poor maintenance philosophy. Their philosophy is symbolized by Salem's troubles with bolting issues surrounding the reactor cooling pumps loose bolts in the coolant and their baffling core bolting issues. Maybe they need to extend their outages a week or so to do deeper preventative maintenance. It would be cheaper than a this.

So 66% of this site's plants were dead in this perilous summer period. Its got to jack the grid's prices to the hapless ratepayers.

Facility: SALEM Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 06/28/2016 Notification Time: 06:58 [ET] Event Date: 06/28/2016 Event Time: 04:23 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION SIGNAL "This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal. "Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods [fully] inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Emergency Safety Features] systems functioned as expected. "No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event." The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event. Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

Junk plant Watts Bar: Massive NRC Approval of Tech Spec and Rules Violations

Is the CDRM threated vent plug a NRC defined pressure boundary. It is questionable. This guy is a PWR. They operate at much higher pressures than a BWR. This guy’s leak must have boron deposit near the plug. This is not a water leak…it’s a high pressure 2000 psi steam leak. The vapor probably gets deposited in the containment coolers…then drain to the sump. We got the big time steam cutting probabilities surrounding this guy. If that plug popped out what would it do to the CRDM. You notice the quick worthless show trail corrective action…they only weld sealed this plug. Why didn’t they seal weld all the plugs. What would the increased flow of coolant water thought the CDRM and then out the crack do to the CRDM? Could it damage the CRDM? 

I am interested in why a LER wasn't written up for the plug leak. When did Watts Bar first discover the leaking indications? They measure airborn radiation as a sensitive indicator of a pressure barrier leak. How did the end up ignoring this symptom?     

Reg guild 1.45

RCPB leakage is leakage from a nonisolable fault in the material of an RCS component, pipe wall

(including welds), or vessel wall. Leakage from seals, gaskets, and mechanical connections (e.g., bolts, valve seals) is not considered RCPB leakage although these components are part of the RCPB, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions” (Ref. 2). Thus, RCPB leakage is indicative of degradation of pressure retaining components that could ultimately result in a loss of component structural integrity.

***See, these guys spend all their intelligence on illegally getting around the rules instead using their god given intelligence of blindly following the rules.

I just don't think the NRC educated enough on the specific plant technical specification and how to use power to make these guys follow the rules. So why didn't the NRC order them to shutdown over the out of position rod? Are they getting complacent with leaks and out of position rods?

They had a reactor coolant leak over a control rod drive mechanism drain plug and they didn't know it. I bet they knew it was a leak, but didn't emediately know it was a pressure boundary illegal water leak. They had a reactor pressure barrier leak...they are required to emediately shutdown to repair it.

Basically they had a unaddressed dreaded pressure barrier leak (Davis Bessee)that shorted out the rod position indication.

They violated two tech specs shutdown requirements over this to protect profits and capacity factor.

1) They intentionally overrode the Tech Spec requirements over a inop rod position indication system and the NRC did not intervene.

2) They had a dangerous and illegal reactor pressure boundary leakage. 

They got probably 6 inches of concrete around the reactor and the containment is poorly instrumented containment. They are half blinded on their best days and they know it. It is not like they got a god's eye view of every possible leak. Of course these guys defense with this is, we couldn't discriminate between pressure boundary leak and insignificant leak.  But believe me, they always agonized over how blinded they are with things happening behind the six inches of concrete.       


What did I say about the money grubbing NRC, plant engineers and management always screwing the licensed operators. The control room guys are just powerless to maintain professional nuclear standards. Aren't these the guys where the NRC charged TVA with systemic safety intimidation of the employees. How can you not come to the conclusion that the NRC facilitated this broad intimidation of employees and poor safety culture, if the agency is not enforcing their regulations over and over again. They are letting TVA run around with uncontestable power never contemplated by congress and the peoples who voted for them.      

There are tons of electrical equipment and electrical instrumentation in containment. There are strict QA requirements, but not enforced, to make all this equipment water and moisture proof and temperature resistance. In the big bad meltdown accident LOCA, the environment is upward to 600 degrees. with long term steam, moisture and water saturated conditions. How the hell are we getting electrical shorts in the extraordinary safety related rod position indication system in these benign normal operation conditions in 2015? This was a warning to everyone that is ignored.

My considered accidents:

1) A quick puff of steam filling the area around the CDRM positon indication area but not big enough to create a scram. It shorts out numerous rod position indications leading to numerous rod drop accidents... The control room operators aren't quick enough to scram the reactor and control the core rod density. The core partially melts down leading to the greatest nuclear scandal the US ever seen. The plants are destroyed including the untouched new nuclear plant, but little release of radioactivity. You just cratored the nuclear industry and it will have grave consequences to our nation way beyond the nuclear industry.

2) You come to a mid size or largest design LOCA...but on the big picture is easily controllable. The plant might be easily repairable after it. They allowed again illegal pressure boundary leakage (wink, wink)...the piping tiny crack mysteriously blew open months after knowing about the illegal tiny leak. But all is safe, we are designed and trained for this. But a host of equipment and instrumentation electrical shorts in containment begin to show up. The crew gets terribly confused, become effectively blinded by the magnitude if shorting equipment in containment. A easily controllable events turns into a partial meltdown or a full blown meltdown.

The real risk of the big one is a lost of integrity with the NRC and TVA...everyone is spinning engineering analysis for self interest in a secrecy driven system. Everyone is allowed to have their own special secrets and outsiders can't protect themselves. They have to create a widespread severe employee intimidation system to accomplish this engineering paper whipping spinning.

Nobody knows what the true conditions of the plant is and everyone is lying through their teeth to keep their jobs. This is when you have mind boggling stupid plant accidents that any idiot should have prevented. This happens more than you think. These kinds of new events in a much smaller event are emerging more and more at these plants because of the financial pressures.   

05000390

Licensee Event Report 390/2016-007-00, Technical Specification Action Not Met for Rod Position indication

On April 21,2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 concluded that a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.8, Rod Position lndication, had occurred during the dropped rod event on November 05, 2015. The Surveillance Requirement for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position lndication, (ARPI), agrees within 12 steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position lndication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within 12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A. Because the actions of TS 3.1.8 were not taken within the required times, WBN Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by TS.

On November 05, 2015, WBN Unit had a dropped rod event and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits - Condition B, and TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (OPTR) - Condition A. The control room staff took the actions according to TS and reduced power to less than 75%. However, upon review after the event, it was determined that TS 3.1.8, Rod Position indication for the Control Rod Drive System [El|S:AA], should also have been entered. The Surveillance Requirement (SR) for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position indication (ARPI) agrees within 12

steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel. Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position indication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5. ln the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within

12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.

The dropped rod occurred as a result of an electrical ground caused by moisture intrusion from a reactor coolant system leak. The leak was found during a subsequent maintenance outage on a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) threaded vent plug which had decreased torque. A sealwelded vent plug was installed to prevent further leakage.

Intention falsification of federal documents...or a falsification of licensee documents that impairs the oversight of the NRC. Why didn't the NRC have the expertise to catch it?  

While there was a dropped rod event, this issue was the result of an incorrect licensing position (CR 979285) addressing how to comply with TS 3.1 .8, specifically, whether TS LCO 3.1.8 for Rod Position indication (RPl) should be entered after a dropped rod as a result of not being able to successfully perform the associated 18-month TS SR 3.1.8.1.

B. The cause(s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause.

The cause of this event was an incorrect licensing position of how to comply with TS 3.1.

Wink, wink, wink:  another intentional misinterpretation of tech specs in a operational bind uncontested by the NRC. I am sure the NRC rules allow this. These guys spend tremendous amounts of time studying and training on teck specs. These guys brag they are highly detailed oriented. That is what they get promoted for. Believe me, they knew what they should have done, and they expected the agency's pitiful response.   

Previous similar events at the same plant

LER 2016-002, Technical Specification Action Not Met for lnoperable Containment lsolation Valve, describes a similar event of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications. ln this LER, WBN Unit 1 entered TS 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, for a containment isolation valve being inoperable. The requirement to isolate the penetration associated with this containment isolation valve was not completed within TS time requirements. The cause of this event was operations staff misunderstanding the applicability of the Note associated with TS 3.6.3, which allows administrative controls under certain conditions. ln response to this event, a shift order defining the correct response when entering TS 3.6.3 Condition A was provided to the operating staff, and is to be a topic of future operations training. The response to this issue was specific to TS 3.6.3 and would not have prevented this event.

Junk Region IV: New Administator

Oh, I didn't miss this.

NRC Names Kriss Kennedy as Region IV Administrator

Kriss Kennedy, a 28-year veteran of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has been named the new Administrator of the NRC’s Region IV office in Arlington, Texas. He succeeds Marc Dapas, who has been named Director of the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards in Rockville, Md.
“Over the course of his career, Kriss Kennedy has repeatedly demonstrated an exemplary commitment to technical and managerial excellence,” said Victor McCree, the NRC’s Executive Director for Operations. “The experience he has gained in a wide variety of NRC assignments will serve the agency well.”
Kennedy was assigned as the Deputy Regional Administrator in Region IV in June 2014.

Junk Plant Fitzpatrick: Grossly Delayed Reporting on Oil Spill

Update;

I doubt they had a way to know how much tube lube oil was missing from the plant. I bet you the spill was much large than admitted.  

***These guys are so incompetent: why did the coast guard have to inform Fitz they had a large oil leak discharging from site and why did it take so long for them to discover where the leak came from and then report to the NRC?

1) Event occurred on Friday June 24 at  12:15pm.

2) They reported it to the NRC 4 hours later at 4:06. They are required to report it within 15 minutes. This is a serous violation of NRC regulations. When a event occurs at a plant, the agency wants an immediate report so the agency has time to spin up the agency if it is a bad accident. This is a clear indication that the on shift licensed operators were discombobulated for at least the first few hours of the accident. This whole  thing with the delayed reporting of the scram, the coast guard reporting the spill to the agency and it took days for them to discover where the leak occurred and then make a NRC report...it speaks to massive control room and executive organizational discombobulation for hours and days at a time.

3) Something big is wrong Entergy and NRC: the plant tripped on Friday and the first reporting of it occurred on Monday two days later. This indicates the NRC and Entergy doesn't care or are indifferent about protecting their reputation. The outsiders aren't people, they are just mushrooms.

4) On Sunday June 26 @ 11pm Entergy reports to the NRC the Coast Guard discover a oil plume emanating from the site. Seemingly Entergy reports they were made aware of the offsite plume by the Coast Guard on Sunday at 9:15pm and then reported it to the NRC at 11:08 pm. It is a much shorter delay in reporting from when it was made known to reported to the NRC, than the scam...but I am certain this is contrary to important regulations and acting ethical.

5) Then on Monday June 27 at 2:52 am,  Entergy sheepishly reports to the NRC they discovered the source of oil leak? It takes them almost three days to discover where the oil came from. Really, should they even be running this plant in than condition.

The times and days are all in the reports below.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52042
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/24/2016 Notification Time: 16:06 [ET] Event Date: 06/24/2016 Event Time: 12:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION "At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available. "Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 [EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT]. "The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours. "The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52045
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/26/2016 Notification Time: 23:08 [ET] Event Date: 06/26/2016 Event Time: 21:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN OIL SPILL "The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA. * * * UPDATE ON 06/27/2016 AT 02:52 FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DAN LIVERMORE * * * "The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway." Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

Junk Plant Dresden's fire

Updated 2/28

Imagine having a event where 95% of the safety systems have been striped away from you? The whole nation is watching the event. You are controlling water level on HPCI. RCIC is dead. You are in a emergency manner repairing the plant so it can be safely cooled down. Then the HPCI lube oil motor catches fire. By itself its a minor event. But on the edge of a meltdown, it is a tremendously restful event.

Hope they have a motor on site. Bet you they are scrambling around begging other utilities to give them a motor. Certainly this motor is no long manufactured. Will they have to reverse engineer it from a two bit contractor?   

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52046
Facility: DRESDEN Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [ ] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PRATER HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER	Notification Date: 06/27/2016 Notification Time: 12:21 [ET] Event Date: 06/27/2016 Event Time: 10:50 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2016
Emergency Class: ALERT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO) CYNTHIA PEDERSON (RA) MICHELE EVANS (NRR) JEFFERY GRANT (IRD) ELIOT BRENNER (PAO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

DRESDEN UNIT 3 DECLARES ALERT "At 1050 CDT, [on 6/27/16], an Alert was declared at Dresden Unit 3. The Alert is due to Unit 3 experiencing a fire in the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system, auxiliary oil pump motor. The fire is out. "This notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i)." Dresden Unit 3 is stable and continues to operate at 100% power and HPCI has been declared inoperable. There is no impact on Dresden Unit 2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and FEMA National Watch Center, FDA EOC, NuclearSSA via email only. * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL HAYES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1433 EDT ON 6/27/16 * * * "Termination of MA-5 [Alert]. Fire in HPCI room verified extinguished. HPCI system is inoperable. [Technical Specification] TS 3.5.1 condition G in effect, per 10 CFR 50.72(c)(i) - notification of termination of Alert." Dresden Unit 3 terminated the Alert at 1319 CDT, on 6/27/16. Dresden Unit 3 continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kunowski), NRR (Miller), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and FEMA National Watch Center, FDA EOC, NuclearSSA via email only. * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL CSERNAK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1755 EDT ON 6/27/16 * * * "At 1042 [CDT] on 6/27/16, the U3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable after the Auxiliary Oil Pump failed. "This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D); any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This is an eight hour reporting requirement. "The Dresden NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified." Notified R3DO (Kunowski).

 

***This plant was built in the Middle Ages:

Dresden operators extinguish small fire on pump

Station declares, then terminates ‘Alert’ classification

Published: Monday, June 27, 2016 4:09 p.m. CDT                             

By: SUBMITTED REPORT

MORRIS — Dresden Generation Station operators extinguished a small fire on a pump Monday morning.

The fire lasted three minutes, was contained to the pump and did not affect the safe operation of the plant, according to a news release from the station. Both reactors remain at full power.
Operators promptly identified and extinguished the fire and no off-site assistance was necessary.
An “Alert” was declared and later terminated, as required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. An Alert is the second lowest of four emergency classifications established by the NRC. It was declared at 10:50 a.m. and terminated at 1:19 p.m., according to the news release.

Junk Plant FitzPatrick: Cover-up of Radiactive Leak

Update 6/28

Based on the tube oil coming into direct contact with reactor steam (short radioactive decay), the procedures should dictate the lube oil be treated as radiative in the spill emergency procedures.

Can you just imagine the oil pooling on the roof and the roof caves in?

What would this look like if it was raining cats and dogs out? Winter in heavy snow covering?

This is what I mean by the engineers and plant management always screwing the control room employees by setting them up with degrading equipment. But at least its a job.

Update 3:30 pm

So a NRC official called me back on this. It was a very timely response. I called the allegation department, they wouldn't throw this into a allegation because they think I picked up this up from the media. My expertise about these components bares no weight. The spokesperson said, she thinks the system and lube is clean without any radiation. I told her I am a guy of facts, thinking its clean is not the facts. Bottom line, she is going to ask the NRC residents to get the information. I want the date and last testing sample of lube oil radiation. They just might never have tested this system for radiation. Basically I am asking her, has there been any increase of radiation levels since before the lube oil was placed in the plant? This lube oil has come in direct contact reactor steam and it has to contain radioactivity. I suspect they will find small levels of radiation in the oil, but there is small chance we might get a surprised it was a reportable level. 

It is really important they immediately declared they had a uncontrollable release radiation into the lake. It would be a completely different news story if Fitz first declared this was a radioactive lube oil leak no matter how minute it was. 

By the talk of the NRC spokesmen, the inspectors are too busy monitoring the outcome of the immediate plant trip. They don't have time to take a deep dive into the lube oil radiation contamination documentation. Imagine the fallout if the inspectors go deep into the documentation and discovered the releases was radiative. I am not saying this level of radiation would harm anyone. I just want to see the facts. I want to make sure everyone is following the establish rules and regulations.

This is Entergy's first declaration there is no radiation in the oil (above normal background). I suspect it went down like this. The VP asked his underlings "is there any radiation contamination in the lube oil". They came back off the cuff, I am certain there is no radiation in the oil. But nobody ever collected a sampled for radiation detection yesterday or never referenced the documented history of radiation sampling in the lube oil.     

While this oil contains no PCBs, is non-radioactive, non-hazardous and has low potential health effects, any unintended release to Lake Ontario is not in accordance with Entergy’s standards. 

“We are taking appropriate e actions to mitigate the environmental consequence from this event and working closely with appropriate local, state and federal agencies,” said Brian Sullivan, FitzPatrick’s site vice president and Entergy’s top official at the site. “We have identified the source of the oil, stopped the leak and put protective absorbent material and barriers in place to help mitigate additional oil from reaching the lake. Environmental protection is a hallmark of our operations, and we are taking all appropriate actions.”

***So I have made a complaint to the NRC and NY environmental agency. Notified the media. The NRC promised to get back to me with one of their experts.  

I know the reactor steam comes in direct contact with the lube oil. Most insiders consider the turbine lube oil as non radiative. They are complacent with radioactivity in the lube oil.

*Another good question, do they consider used turbine lube oil as radioactive? What do they do with the used lube oil. Some burn the oil in a burner.... 

With the difficult plant trip and this complacency...I don't think a thought was made about what are the real radioactive levels are in the oil. Does the radioactivity concentrate as the oil ages? Maybe the employees think if they admit the radioactive discharge, they would stop a "Hail Mary" pass at saving the plant.  

*A good question to ask, was their any radioactive tape barriers placed around the spill area on the roof? *Will they treat the oil on the roof or any clean-up materials as radioactivity?

This is one of those deals where this might have gone past everyone on site!!!

Junk Dead-Ender FitzPatrick: Ticking Time Bombs

Update:

This is a picture I took of Vermont Yankee when it was operating. I got the high reactor building in front of us...the shorter long green building behind the reactor building is the turbine building. On the roof of the turbine building on the right, is a small plume of reactor steam and other water vapor. The pipe this steam plume came out of is where the turbine oil leak came from.

Lube Oil Vapor Extractor

This is a BWR. The reactor water...the steam...comes directly in contact with the turbine lube oil. It is basically a large tank of lube with a positive displacement bearing pump. The oil pump takes a suction from the tank, pumps it to the bearing, then returns it to the tank. Basically low pressure steam is used to create a barrier from the turbine steam between the condenser, oil, generator and the outside air. This left over steam is sucked out by by a fan, goes through a cooler, then discharge to outside through a pipe on top of the turbine building. The steam contains hydrogen from the generator, the reactor produces a lot of hydrogen and reactor coolant other radioactivity...this is vented atop the turbine building. Most the equipment is in the basement of the turbine building. The elevation the oil has to flow  to get on the roof is 50 to 100 feet. A lot of pressure has to push this oil to the roof

So water vapor, hydrogen and small amounts to radioactivity gets vented out the pipe atop the turbine building. It is not monitored for radiation.  I had issues if we had a meltdown, this would be a uncontrolled release of radiative. The plume of vapor seen above the turbine during normal operation comes from the components I described.

"Entergy Corporation, which operates the plant, found the source of the oil on the roof of a turbine building, said Neil Sheehan, a public affairs officer for the NRC. The oil was coming from the vent for the hydrogen seal system.

"It appears about 20 to 30 gallons that leaked were then drained through the plant’s discharge drain system to the lake," said NRC public affairs officer Neil Sheehan. "The company has placed oil-absorbent pads on the turbine building roof and has also stopped all circulating water pumps to eliminate any further discharges"

 

Are there more issues like this in front of us with dead-ender and budget starved plants in the future?

It is extraordinary dangerous to depend on a protective trip (recirc pump) with oil cooling instead of tripping the plant and recirc pump on the approaching limits. This plant was spinning wildly out of control.

What does the above mean: "Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43"? Is it another bad breaker.

***Sounds like they discovered a oil sheen on the lake and traced it back to a huge lube oil spill in the turbine building. These guys use many thousands of gallons of oil in the turbine building. It must have been a huge oil spill in the turbine building. One wonders if they destroyed the bearings in the turbine? It is a huge fire risk here???  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52045
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/26/2016 Notification Time: 23:08 [ET] Event Date: 06/26/2016 Event Time: 21:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN OIL SPILL "The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA. * * * UPDATE ON 06/27/2016 AT 02:52 FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DAN LIVERMORE * * * "The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway." Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52042
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/24/2016 Notification Time: 16:06 [ET] Event Date: 06/24/2016 Event Time: 12:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION "At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available. "Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 [EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT]. "The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours. "The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.

Junk Plant River Bend: Sending a message to the NRC.

Out there in the ether of current time, I knew the NRC had a continuing interest in River Bend's junk and obsolete simulator and the serious issues with junk master-pact safety breakers. I chose a opportune time and issue to call the senior resident inspectors. I wanted to let my buddy NRC inspectors to know I was staying abreast of currents issues and had a particular issue with the NRC inspector not finding a large issue with not professionalism with licenced operators. They being poorly trained and continuing to bungle dealing with plant trips and  conservatively following the regs and their procedures. I idea the licenced troops are too intimidated to get the NRC to help them fix their organization.  

Personally I think the trouble here is Entergy's management is too ideologically doctrinaire...management is a tyrant and you must follow our orders without thinking. The high corporate financial pinheads without any nuclear training are running or destroying the plant. The troops or employees have a passive/aggressive organization disorder. Basically as a protest, the troops are bureaucratically sabotaging the management the plant. Say if management orders or request a operator to do something, he knows the request will lead to trouble for the plant, he will carry out the request without providing his valuable input and he might actually throw sand in the gears. The inspector told me Entergy had recently replaced senior management. It seems like the passive/ aggressive strategy has worked for the troops. I think there still is a huge gap of mistrust between the senior management and the troops. The idea that management can pick and chose the facts to support an agenda to boost senior management bonuses without qualms about using intimidation. 

The industry recently has talked about severe financial pressures threatening the operation of fifteen to twenty plants. The nuclear industry has never before faced this kind of pressure. Is that how this plays out, this severe pressure increasingly disconnects integrity and truthfulness from between senior management and the troops.

My objective on the discussion between the senior resident and me was to"take a read" on the "resident" and send a message higher NRC management. I had the opportunity to pick a sensitive time frame to speak to the NRC resident and enhance my message. Many NRC residents have spoken of the independent republican teabagger territory of the south. The local people and captured news media don't keep keep nipping at the heals of NRC and at a particular deep south nuclear plant like they do in the liberal northeast. There just isn't much broader interest in nuclear safety in the independent deep south, the breakaway territories of Republicanland. I had a list of talking points on paper. 

Basically, the licenced operators collectively aren't trained properly  and aren't qualified to be running the plant. The NRC is afraid to put this information in NRC documents. I wanted the senior resident to comment on the disclosed Entergy root cause analysis below. He was too cagey to speak at all about it.     

May 12, 2016

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/201600

 "Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event."

Page 19

This was that horrendous not disclosed inspection circulating in the NRC's ether when I first called the River Bend Senior NRC's resident inspector. The NRC bills themselves as a sampling regulator. The plant system is just too big to inspect everything. The NRC also is a symbolic reporter of record. They only pick a few symbolic issues to violate out of many. In other words, they only pick a few symbolic violations to represent to the public out of many violations. Say they go looking at a problem and find 10 violations. They just pick a few symbolic violations out of the ten to disclosed to the public. The outsiders never see all the violation. The NRC is happy if the licencees documents and fixes the undisclosed violation  in  the dark "smoked filled rooms" of the not publicly disclosed secret document system. 

So on the big picture with simulator issues nationwide, they are saying to the other licencees to secretly fix your simulator fidelity before we come in to find violations. 

If the NRC was a legitimated US regulator, they would order to all licencees, we suspect simulator fidelity issues nationwide and order them to identify all simulator fidelity issues like at River Bend in their simulators, report to us on any mismatch and then fix it. This is a giant regulatory failure at River Bend and it is in all of the plants. We need to see the magnitude of all nuclear plant simulator violation nationwide on one NRC document, to ascertain why the NRC can't do their jobs.             

I feel the NRC thinks the plant is overloaded with past violations...the licencees is overwhelmed answering and fixing NRC identified violations. So the solution to this problem is for the agency to not issue anymore violations(No findings were identified during this inspection.). These guys need a prolonged mandated shutdown to reorganize the plant. 

Basically the same rendition of the agency is a toothless organization.    

May 25, 2016
EA-15-043 

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2016010

The NRC determined that misalignment of the simulator configuration to the design basis of River Send Station led to negative operator training, which complicated the operators’ response to a reactor scram on December 25, 2014. The NRC concluded that your staff identified appropriate corrective actions to address the root cause, contributing cause, and extent of cause of the simulator configuration misalignment. During the on-site portion of the inspection, NRC inspectors determined that your staff’s extent of condition evaluation was too limited in scope. The simulator testing activities used were not effective in identifying differences between the simulator and River Bend Station operating characteristics of components and systems that resulted in negative operator training. In response, your staff conducted an additional extent of condition evaluation, which was provided to the inspectors on March 29, 2016, after completion of the on-site portion of the inspection. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the information and, due to concerns regarding the adequacy of the sample selection, determined that the extent of condition evaluation was inadequate. Based on these determinations, the NRC concluded that the inspection objective involving the extent of condition was not met.

The NRC has determined that completed or planned corrective actions were insufficient to address this performance issue. Specifically, the extent of condition review was insufficient. Therefore, the White finding will remain open and continue to receive consideration as an Action Matrix input until inspectors verify that all inspection objectives have been met. You should notify the NRC of your readiness for a re-inspection when corrective actions have been completed.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

I am trying to give you my setup to the call to the River Bend residents. What is spinning in the ether of time. I make the call on the morning of May 11. The phone rings for a prolong period of time. He must have call waiting capabilities. I think he is busy. Then he answers me in a hushed voice. I tell him who I am. He knows me by my name. He says in a low voice, "I am in a important meeting. "Can I call you back Mike". I am chagrined with him answering the phone. I call these residents all the time. I often go to voice mail, leave a recording. I often get a call back by these busy government officials. I often just call them back and eventually they answer the phone. I would say about 90% of the time they will answer a cold call on the fly and will talk for awhile.

On May 12 I get a e-mail message from the region IV Head public affairs officers. Mr. Dricks once worked in NE. Me and him go back a long ways. When you a get a e-mail or call from a Mr Dricks, it signifies the NRC has put you in Siberia. I generially hate all NRC public affairs officers. I feel their intent is to stiff arm you. They are information disruptors. They make the conversation as painful as possible so you won't call them back. They generially have no current information in their heads. I always ask myself, are these guys that stupid or are they professional actors tasked to look stupid? I just get from these guys, they never whole heartily act for my interest. I always get from these guys they act like corporate public relations hucksters. There primary ends is to always protect the agency and industry, not be truthful US governmental communicators. It doesn't have to be like this. Half of his problem is he lives in Texas now.   

Dricks, Victor <Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov>  

I understand you called the River Bend resident inspector’s office. They asked me to follow up as they are extremely busy. Is there something I can help you with? Victor Dricks  

Senior Public Affairs Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington, Texas 76011 (817) 200-1128 (Office) (817) 983-1992 (Cell)Tosteamshovel2002@yahoo.com
May 12 at 4:09 PM
Victor Dricks
Senior Public Affairs Officer
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV
1600 E. Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, Texas 76011
(817) 200-1128  (Office)
(817) 983-1992  (Cell)

Here is my response to Mr Drinks. My beef with the Mr Dricks's kind of people is their lack of curiosity and achingly quest for new information or changing conditions, constantly searching to update their model of the world in their heads. Poor Mr. Dricks was just the middleman in this fiasco. It is as if he has to play stupid in order to protect their bosses. If it would have been me getting a strange response from a guy like mike Mulligan, I give this guy a call back to see if I met his needs. Strengthen and maintain communication channels with an special outside stakeholder. Get his take on the events. Ascertain if he really wants to talk to the regional NRC manager or the boss of the inspectors and why. Investigation secrecy is just a tool to make a better report. But it is just a tool that can be used properly or tremendously misused. Increasingly these plants are being put under a umbrella of investigation secrecy. Every time you talk to these guys they say its under investigation and we can't talk about the problem. Recent events with the prolonged completion of investigations such as the stator drop accident at ANO and recently the special inspections River Bend speaks to these delayed inspection result. We are talking about the delayed investigations results for almost year or more, with ANO and a prolong delay with River Bend Special inspections. These results should come out in 60 days or so. These plants are put under a cloud of investigative secrecy for years at a time and nobody ever puts the NRC on the carpet with why the investigation took so long to come out. The more trouble a plant gets into, the more secrecy is afforded to the malicious bad actor.

You just have to wonder if the NRC is trying to protect the boss of the NRC inspectors or the regional head with not coming back to me querying if I still want to talk to them. I am convinced I now need to talk to the regional administrator. I lot of times this foot dragging and mock inquisitiveness is just cover for the protection of organizational plausible deniability.

    

  



Mr Dricks,

Could you set up a discussion with the boss of the RB inspectors and the regional administrator. One at a time.  Basically over the NRC's
inability to gain control over River Bend. Four special inspections in a year. i would settle for just the regional administrator. I hope he's up on current River Bend Issues?

Most interesting, is the continued chaos in the control room incidences and it their set up…everything about the collapse of the ops department to control their facility. A banana clip tripping the plant three times?

How come the NRC couldn’t come up with a severe violation over this. I am astonished the inspectors haven’t identified this as across all crews:

“Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event.”

Why hasn’t the NRC failed their training department?

Is the control room and their licensed operators (and management) sacrosanct because they are so politically and media sensitive? Basically the new special inspection is a repeat of all the rest of them.

This is an indicator the NRC doesn’t have the power to stop bad plant management. So what as the NRC see it, is your big picture with River Bend? We see River Bend as a developing San Onofre  were the NRC allowed the whole organization to operated in a severely degraded condition for a decade until they tripped over the new steam generator job. Where we finally seen the true size of the organization dysfunction.The same model as Fort Calhoun.

I see the segments of the RB organization in a passive/ aggressive syndrome. Yessing management to death to their face, but maliciously in administrative manner  sabotaging their bosses and top executives behind the scenes. 

It won't be long before they leak sensitive documents to me?

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH  

               

Junk Plant Hatch and NRC: Ping Ponging between the 2 and 3 Stage SRVs

You know what see here, the object failure of the NRC and Hatch engineering problem analysis and anticipating component degradation since 2010. Their engineering sucks. Don't forget the southern company is hugely influential  It really scares me the experimentation going on here. The inability of the NRC to control SRV durability and reliability. I am sure this is not limited to the SRV valves.

This LER comes from the outage comes before this May's 2016 most recent outage. So the 2 stage is leak prone and has issues of not passing the lift point accuracy test.

Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted In Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

Licensee Event Report 2014-003-00

On May 7, 2014, at approximately 0837, Unit 1 was at 99.9 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when the "as-found" testing results of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) were received which indicated that five of eleven SRVs had experienced setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failing to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoints of 1150 psig +1- 3 percent as required by TS surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1.

That is about a 50% test failure rate. Check out these guys with lift setpoint drift test failures of about 50% since 2010 and multiple shutdowns over the leaking 3 stage. The basic 2 stage and 3 stage valve designs are defective. For some reason, they can't dump these target rock valves and jump into a better and newer design.

In 2014 the cause of the setpoint drift is corrosion induced bonding.   

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Hatch and within the BWR industry. The 2-stage SRVs with platinum coated pilot seats were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift, additionally the modified pilot reduces instances of vibration induced spurious openings and leak-by.

A 3-stage SRV with a similar modified pilot was installed on Unit 2 during the 2013 outage. Current plans are to replace the remaining ten valves at Unit 2 with the same modified pilot valves during the next outage in 2015.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LEA 1-2012·004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

LEA 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were

replaced with 2-stage SAVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

LEA 1-201 0·001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Stellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to corrosion induced bonding. These were the same actions that were taken following similar failures reported in LEA 2-2009- 001, since improved results had been seen to some degree in the industry for at least one operating cycle when these actions were implemented.