Junk Dead-Ender FitzPatrick: Ticking Time Bombs

Update:

This is a picture I took of Vermont Yankee when it was operating. I got the high reactor building in front of us...the shorter long green building behind the reactor building is the turbine building. On the roof of the turbine building on the right, is a small plume of reactor steam and other water vapor. The pipe this steam plume came out of is where the turbine oil leak came from.

Lube Oil Vapor Extractor

This is a BWR. The reactor water...the steam...comes directly in contact with the turbine lube oil. It is basically a large tank of lube with a positive displacement bearing pump. The oil pump takes a suction from the tank, pumps it to the bearing, then returns it to the tank. Basically low pressure steam is used to create a barrier from the turbine steam between the condenser, oil, generator and the outside air. This left over steam is sucked out by by a fan, goes through a cooler, then discharge to outside through a pipe on top of the turbine building. The steam contains hydrogen from the generator, the reactor produces a lot of hydrogen and reactor coolant other radioactivity...this is vented atop the turbine building. Most the equipment is in the basement of the turbine building. The elevation the oil has to flow  to get on the roof is 50 to 100 feet. A lot of pressure has to push this oil to the roof

So water vapor, hydrogen and small amounts to radioactivity gets vented out the pipe atop the turbine building. It is not monitored for radiation.  I had issues if we had a meltdown, this would be a uncontrolled release of radiative. The plume of vapor seen above the turbine during normal operation comes from the components I described.

"Entergy Corporation, which operates the plant, found the source of the oil on the roof of a turbine building, said Neil Sheehan, a public affairs officer for the NRC. The oil was coming from the vent for the hydrogen seal system.

"It appears about 20 to 30 gallons that leaked were then drained through the plant’s discharge drain system to the lake," said NRC public affairs officer Neil Sheehan. "The company has placed oil-absorbent pads on the turbine building roof and has also stopped all circulating water pumps to eliminate any further discharges"

 

Are there more issues like this in front of us with dead-ender and budget starved plants in the future?

It is extraordinary dangerous to depend on a protective trip (recirc pump) with oil cooling instead of tripping the plant and recirc pump on the approaching limits. This plant was spinning wildly out of control.

What does the above mean: "Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43"? Is it another bad breaker.

***Sounds like they discovered a oil sheen on the lake and traced it back to a huge lube oil spill in the turbine building. These guys use many thousands of gallons of oil in the turbine building. It must have been a huge oil spill in the turbine building. One wonders if they destroyed the bearings in the turbine? It is a huge fire risk here???  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52045
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/26/2016 Notification Time: 23:08 [ET] Event Date: 06/26/2016 Event Time: 21:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN OIL SPILL "The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA. * * * UPDATE ON 06/27/2016 AT 02:52 FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DAN LIVERMORE * * * "The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway." Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52042
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 06/24/2016 Notification Time: 16:06 [ET] Event Date: 06/24/2016 Event Time: 12:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION "At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available. "Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 [EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT]. "The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours. "The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.

Junk Plant River Bend: Sending a message to the NRC.

Out there in the ether of current time, I knew the NRC had a continuing interest in River Bend's junk and obsolete simulator and the serious issues with junk master-pact safety breakers. I chose a opportune time and issue to call the senior resident inspectors. I wanted to let my buddy NRC inspectors to know I was staying abreast of currents issues and had a particular issue with the NRC inspector not finding a large issue with not professionalism with licenced operators. They being poorly trained and continuing to bungle dealing with plant trips and  conservatively following the regs and their procedures. I idea the licenced troops are too intimidated to get the NRC to help them fix their organization.  

Personally I think the trouble here is Entergy's management is too ideologically doctrinaire...management is a tyrant and you must follow our orders without thinking. The high corporate financial pinheads without any nuclear training are running or destroying the plant. The troops or employees have a passive/aggressive organization disorder. Basically as a protest, the troops are bureaucratically sabotaging the management the plant. Say if management orders or request a operator to do something, he knows the request will lead to trouble for the plant, he will carry out the request without providing his valuable input and he might actually throw sand in the gears. The inspector told me Entergy had recently replaced senior management. It seems like the passive/ aggressive strategy has worked for the troops. I think there still is a huge gap of mistrust between the senior management and the troops. The idea that management can pick and chose the facts to support an agenda to boost senior management bonuses without qualms about using intimidation. 

The industry recently has talked about severe financial pressures threatening the operation of fifteen to twenty plants. The nuclear industry has never before faced this kind of pressure. Is that how this plays out, this severe pressure increasingly disconnects integrity and truthfulness from between senior management and the troops.

My objective on the discussion between the senior resident and me was to"take a read" on the "resident" and send a message higher NRC management. I had the opportunity to pick a sensitive time frame to speak to the NRC resident and enhance my message. Many NRC residents have spoken of the independent republican teabagger territory of the south. The local people and captured news media don't keep keep nipping at the heals of NRC and at a particular deep south nuclear plant like they do in the liberal northeast. There just isn't much broader interest in nuclear safety in the independent deep south, the breakaway territories of Republicanland. I had a list of talking points on paper. 

Basically, the licenced operators collectively aren't trained properly  and aren't qualified to be running the plant. The NRC is afraid to put this information in NRC documents. I wanted the senior resident to comment on the disclosed Entergy root cause analysis below. He was too cagey to speak at all about it.     

May 12, 2016

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/201600

 "Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event."

Page 19

This was that horrendous not disclosed inspection circulating in the NRC's ether when I first called the River Bend Senior NRC's resident inspector. The NRC bills themselves as a sampling regulator. The plant system is just too big to inspect everything. The NRC also is a symbolic reporter of record. They only pick a few symbolic issues to violate out of many. In other words, they only pick a few symbolic violations to represent to the public out of many violations. Say they go looking at a problem and find 10 violations. They just pick a few symbolic violations out of the ten to disclosed to the public. The outsiders never see all the violation. The NRC is happy if the licencees documents and fixes the undisclosed violation  in  the dark "smoked filled rooms" of the not publicly disclosed secret document system. 

So on the big picture with simulator issues nationwide, they are saying to the other licencees to secretly fix your simulator fidelity before we come in to find violations. 

If the NRC was a legitimated US regulator, they would order to all licencees, we suspect simulator fidelity issues nationwide and order them to identify all simulator fidelity issues like at River Bend in their simulators, report to us on any mismatch and then fix it. This is a giant regulatory failure at River Bend and it is in all of the plants. We need to see the magnitude of all nuclear plant simulator violation nationwide on one NRC document, to ascertain why the NRC can't do their jobs.             

I feel the NRC thinks the plant is overloaded with past violations...the licencees is overwhelmed answering and fixing NRC identified violations. So the solution to this problem is for the agency to not issue anymore violations(No findings were identified during this inspection.). These guys need a prolonged mandated shutdown to reorganize the plant. 

Basically the same rendition of the agency is a toothless organization.    

May 25, 2016
EA-15-043 

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2016010

The NRC determined that misalignment of the simulator configuration to the design basis of River Send Station led to negative operator training, which complicated the operators’ response to a reactor scram on December 25, 2014. The NRC concluded that your staff identified appropriate corrective actions to address the root cause, contributing cause, and extent of cause of the simulator configuration misalignment. During the on-site portion of the inspection, NRC inspectors determined that your staff’s extent of condition evaluation was too limited in scope. The simulator testing activities used were not effective in identifying differences between the simulator and River Bend Station operating characteristics of components and systems that resulted in negative operator training. In response, your staff conducted an additional extent of condition evaluation, which was provided to the inspectors on March 29, 2016, after completion of the on-site portion of the inspection. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the information and, due to concerns regarding the adequacy of the sample selection, determined that the extent of condition evaluation was inadequate. Based on these determinations, the NRC concluded that the inspection objective involving the extent of condition was not met.

The NRC has determined that completed or planned corrective actions were insufficient to address this performance issue. Specifically, the extent of condition review was insufficient. Therefore, the White finding will remain open and continue to receive consideration as an Action Matrix input until inspectors verify that all inspection objectives have been met. You should notify the NRC of your readiness for a re-inspection when corrective actions have been completed.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

I am trying to give you my setup to the call to the River Bend residents. What is spinning in the ether of time. I make the call on the morning of May 11. The phone rings for a prolong period of time. He must have call waiting capabilities. I think he is busy. Then he answers me in a hushed voice. I tell him who I am. He knows me by my name. He says in a low voice, "I am in a important meeting. "Can I call you back Mike". I am chagrined with him answering the phone. I call these residents all the time. I often go to voice mail, leave a recording. I often get a call back by these busy government officials. I often just call them back and eventually they answer the phone. I would say about 90% of the time they will answer a cold call on the fly and will talk for awhile.

On May 12 I get a e-mail message from the region IV Head public affairs officers. Mr. Dricks once worked in NE. Me and him go back a long ways. When you a get a e-mail or call from a Mr Dricks, it signifies the NRC has put you in Siberia. I generially hate all NRC public affairs officers. I feel their intent is to stiff arm you. They are information disruptors. They make the conversation as painful as possible so you won't call them back. They generially have no current information in their heads. I always ask myself, are these guys that stupid or are they professional actors tasked to look stupid? I just get from these guys, they never whole heartily act for my interest. I always get from these guys they act like corporate public relations hucksters. There primary ends is to always protect the agency and industry, not be truthful US governmental communicators. It doesn't have to be like this. Half of his problem is he lives in Texas now.   

Dricks, Victor <Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov>  

I understand you called the River Bend resident inspector’s office. They asked me to follow up as they are extremely busy. Is there something I can help you with? Victor Dricks  

Senior Public Affairs Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington, Texas 76011 (817) 200-1128 (Office) (817) 983-1992 (Cell)Tosteamshovel2002@yahoo.com
May 12 at 4:09 PM
Victor Dricks
Senior Public Affairs Officer
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Region IV
1600 E. Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, Texas 76011
(817) 200-1128  (Office)
(817) 983-1992  (Cell)

Here is my response to Mr Drinks. My beef with the Mr Dricks's kind of people is their lack of curiosity and achingly quest for new information or changing conditions, constantly searching to update their model of the world in their heads. Poor Mr. Dricks was just the middleman in this fiasco. It is as if he has to play stupid in order to protect their bosses. If it would have been me getting a strange response from a guy like mike Mulligan, I give this guy a call back to see if I met his needs. Strengthen and maintain communication channels with an special outside stakeholder. Get his take on the events. Ascertain if he really wants to talk to the regional NRC manager or the boss of the inspectors and why. Investigation secrecy is just a tool to make a better report. But it is just a tool that can be used properly or tremendously misused. Increasingly these plants are being put under a umbrella of investigation secrecy. Every time you talk to these guys they say its under investigation and we can't talk about the problem. Recent events with the prolonged completion of investigations such as the stator drop accident at ANO and recently the special inspections River Bend speaks to these delayed inspection result. We are talking about the delayed investigations results for almost year or more, with ANO and a prolong delay with River Bend Special inspections. These results should come out in 60 days or so. These plants are put under a cloud of investigative secrecy for years at a time and nobody ever puts the NRC on the carpet with why the investigation took so long to come out. The more trouble a plant gets into, the more secrecy is afforded to the malicious bad actor.

You just have to wonder if the NRC is trying to protect the boss of the NRC inspectors or the regional head with not coming back to me querying if I still want to talk to them. I am convinced I now need to talk to the regional administrator. I lot of times this foot dragging and mock inquisitiveness is just cover for the protection of organizational plausible deniability.

    

  



Mr Dricks,

Could you set up a discussion with the boss of the RB inspectors and the regional administrator. One at a time.  Basically over the NRC's
inability to gain control over River Bend. Four special inspections in a year. i would settle for just the regional administrator. I hope he's up on current River Bend Issues?

Most interesting, is the continued chaos in the control room incidences and it their set up…everything about the collapse of the ops department to control their facility. A banana clip tripping the plant three times?

How come the NRC couldn’t come up with a severe violation over this. I am astonished the inspectors haven’t identified this as across all crews:

“Additionally, the team observed that during the root cause evaluation the licensee determined that the operating crew that was on-shift at the time of the event had multiple issues with communication, weakness in teamwork, and haste prior to the loss of SDC event.”

Why hasn’t the NRC failed their training department?

Is the control room and their licensed operators (and management) sacrosanct because they are so politically and media sensitive? Basically the new special inspection is a repeat of all the rest of them.

This is an indicator the NRC doesn’t have the power to stop bad plant management. So what as the NRC see it, is your big picture with River Bend? We see River Bend as a developing San Onofre  were the NRC allowed the whole organization to operated in a severely degraded condition for a decade until they tripped over the new steam generator job. Where we finally seen the true size of the organization dysfunction.The same model as Fort Calhoun.

I see the segments of the RB organization in a passive/ aggressive syndrome. Yessing management to death to their face, but maliciously in administrative manner  sabotaging their bosses and top executives behind the scenes. 

It won't be long before they leak sensitive documents to me?

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH  

               

Junk Plant Hatch and NRC: Ping Ponging between the 2 and 3 Stage SRVs

You know what see here, the object failure of the NRC and Hatch engineering problem analysis and anticipating component degradation since 2010. Their engineering sucks. Don't forget the southern company is hugely influential  It really scares me the experimentation going on here. The inability of the NRC to control SRV durability and reliability. I am sure this is not limited to the SRV valves.

This LER comes from the outage comes before this May's 2016 most recent outage. So the 2 stage is leak prone and has issues of not passing the lift point accuracy test.

Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted In Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

Licensee Event Report 2014-003-00

On May 7, 2014, at approximately 0837, Unit 1 was at 99.9 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when the "as-found" testing results of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) were received which indicated that five of eleven SRVs had experienced setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failing to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoints of 1150 psig +1- 3 percent as required by TS surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1.

That is about a 50% test failure rate. Check out these guys with lift setpoint drift test failures of about 50% since 2010 and multiple shutdowns over the leaking 3 stage. The basic 2 stage and 3 stage valve designs are defective. For some reason, they can't dump these target rock valves and jump into a better and newer design.

In 2014 the cause of the setpoint drift is corrosion induced bonding.   

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Hatch and within the BWR industry. The 2-stage SRVs with platinum coated pilot seats were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift, additionally the modified pilot reduces instances of vibration induced spurious openings and leak-by.

A 3-stage SRV with a similar modified pilot was installed on Unit 2 during the 2013 outage. Current plans are to replace the remaining ten valves at Unit 2 with the same modified pilot valves during the next outage in 2015.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LEA 1-2012·004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

LEA 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were

replaced with 2-stage SAVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

LEA 1-201 0·001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Stellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to corrosion induced bonding. These were the same actions that were taken following similar failures reported in LEA 2-2009- 001, since improved results had been seen to some degree in the industry for at least one operating cycle when these actions were implemented.

Drought: How Much Drier Will It Get In Our Area?

This is not good for the beginning of summer.

USGS Current Water Data for the Nation

We’ve had a lot of spectacularly beautiful days recently. Today is one of those days?

Drought Monitor

Mid-Atlantic and Northeast

Dry conditions prevailed over much of the region, though well-placed showers (1-2 inches) in southwestern Pennsylvanian and environs led to the removal of Moderate Drought (D1) and a reduction of Abnormal Dryness (D0) across the central Appalachians. In contrast, D0 and D1 were increased from New York into New England due to declining streamflows (locally below the 10th percentile) and a lack of rain over the past 90 days (less than half of normal). In fact, many of the Northeast’s D1 areas are now running rainfall deficits in excess of 6 inches over the past 6 months.

Part 21 Notification of Junk Breaker and Electric Control Devices

Basically, this comes out of the River Bend and other plant concerns with large breaker reliability. Look at the  notification with the *.

I think this is unprecedented?

* 2016-31-00	Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division	Interim Report Regarding a Nonconformance on Struthers-Dunn Relay Part No. B255XCXPFHSC125V Supplied to PSEG	06/08/2016	ML16162A679
* 2016-29-00	ABB Inc.	Notification of Deviation Related to K-Line Circuit Breaker Secondary Trip Latch	06/03/2016	ML16162A681
* 2016-28-00	Xcel Energy Prairie Island	Initial Notification of a Failure to Comply Related to ABB Circuit Breaker Type K-600S EO	06/03/2016	ML16162A682
			06/02/2016	ML16154A268
*2016-26-01	Ametek Solidstate Controls	Notification of Potential Defect with Ametek Inverter Manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607 (Updated)	06/02/2016	ML16162A683
* 2016-26-00	Ametek Solidstate Controls	Notification of Potential Defect with Ametek Inverter Manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607	06/02/2016	ML16162A680
* 2015-26-02	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Potentially Unqualified Component in Certain Allen Bradley Model 700RTC Timing Relays	05/26/2016	ML16154A207
* 2016-24-00	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Potential Reportable Condition Related to Eaton Freedom Series Contactor	05/19/2016	ML16154A205
2016-23-00	Nutherm International, Inc.	Potential Defect Found in a Moore Industries SCT Series Signal Converter	05/17/2016	ML16154A206
* 2016-22-00	United Controls International	Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Printed Circuit Boards and Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) Fuses	05/16/2016	EN 51936
* 2016-20-01	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Masterpact NT and NW Style Circuit Breakers Failed to Electrically Close Following an Anti-Pump Condition (Updated)	05/13/2016	ML16139A832
* 2016-20-00	AZZ/Nuclear Logistics Inc.	Masterpact NT and NW Style Circuit Breakers Failed to Electrically Close Following an Anti-Pump Condition	05/12/2016	ML16139A833
* 2016-19-00	Electroswitch	Part 21 Notification on Various Electroswitch Products Sold as Safety Class 1E	05/10/2016	ML16139A834
* 2016-11-01	Rotork Controls, Inc.	Part 21 Notification Concerning V12 [Part No N69-921] and K5 [N69-838 & N69·926] Safety Related Micro Switches	05/04/2016	ML16127A595
* 2016-16-01	National Technical Systems	Updated Potential Part 21 on Siemens 401-158 Safety Clip used on Type 3AF Circuit Breakers	04/29/2016	ML16126A111
2015-88-01			04/26/2016	ML16118A372
* 2016-14-00	Prairie Island Units 1 and 2	Interim Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Related to a Load Sequencer Undervoltage Relay	04/14/2016	ML16106A207
* 2015-26-01	AZZ / Nuclear Logistics	Potentially Unqualified Component in Certain Allen Bradley Model 700RTC Timing Relays (Update)	04/08/2016	ML16109A177
2016-07-01	Louisiana Energy Services	Final Report for Potential 10 CFR 21 Notification	04/06/2016	ML16104A403
			03/22/2016	ML16102A078
* 2016-13-00	United Controls International	Part 21 Notification for Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) OT15 Fuses	03/22/2016	ML16098A446
2015-20-01	United Controls International	Follow Up to Resistive Short Identified on Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Sense & Transfer Module	03/22/2016	ML16098A445
*2016-11-00	Rotork Controls, Inc.	Interim Report Related to a Basic Micro Switch Which Did Not Change State	03/18/2016	ML16088A087
*2016-16-00	National Technical Systems	Potential Part 21 on Siemens 401-158 Safety Clip used on Type 3AF Circuit Breakers